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The classical view in economics on the role of modern corporations in society has traditionally 
rested on the assumption that corporations are profit maximizers, and have no reason to fit 
society’s moral standards. Mainstream economists have thus long embraced the “shareholder 
value maximization” approach, which posits that firms should be controlled by profit-
maximizing shareholders while other stakeholders are protected by contracts and regulation. 
However, in reality, corporations very often engage in activities beyond profit maximization, 
and are voluntarily involved in issues related to other stakeholders’ interests, such as providing 
generous employee benefits, producing environmental-friendly goods, screening out suppliers 
that use child labor, and initiating projects that are aimed at helping the poor in less developed 
countries. Corporate social responsibility (CSR), as what the aforementioned stakeholder-
oriented behaviors are called, has increasingly become a mainstream business activity: firms 
are investing even more resources in public goods provision, and many companies reduce 
negative externalities below levels required by law. Are these CSR activities good or bad from 
the shareholder’s perspective? Why do firms want to be socially responsible rather than pure 
profit maximizers? Why do some firms engage more in CSR than others? 
These questions were very difficult to answer empirically, largely due to the fact that it was 
very hard to measure “CSR”, especially on a global scale. In recent years, some data providers 
have begun to assemble cross-country firm-level information on corporate involvement in 
stakeholder issues by giving CSR ratings to companies on major equity indices around the 
world. In this dissertation, I try to utilize these newly assembled data to address the above 
questions regarding corporate tradeoff between shareholders and other stakeholders, as well 
as their implications for firm value and social welfare. The CSR data used in these chapters 
usually measure corporations’ engagement and compliance to environmental, social, and 
traditional corporate governance (ESG) issues. “Engagement” refers to a firm’s voluntary 
initiation in CSR projects, while “compliance” refers to the legally mandated conducts that a 
firm has to follow. For example, engagement in ESG may include a company’s voluntary R&D 




program that is aimed at increasing employee welfare and productivity (the “S” dimension), 
or a voluntary increase in gender and racial diversity of the board of directors (the “G” 
dimension). compliance to ESG issues may include strictly following environmental 
regulations on CO2 emissions (the “E” dimension), not using child labor and guaranteeing 
minimum working conditions of factories in developing countries (the “S” dimension), and 
sticking to the legally required ratio of independent directors on the board (the “G” 
dimension). These engagement and compliance activities in various ESG dimensions properly 
capture different aspects of stakeholder issues. Given these conceptual and empirical details, 
this dissertation investigates what factors at both the macro-level and the micro-level drive 
corporations’ tradeoff between shareholder-orientation and orientation to other stakeholders, 
or put differently, what are the “foundations” of CSR at various levels. 
In the first chapter, titled “On the Foundations of Corporate Social Responsibility”, I focus 
on the legal and institutional foundations of CSR by investigating the roles of legal origins 
(vis-a-vis political institutions, regulations, and social preferences) in providing the fertile 
ground for corporate tradeoff between shareholders and other stakeholders, thus driving 
cross-country variations in CSR practices. The paper contrasts three broad views on CSR: (1) 
it is a response to government failures; (2) it reflects individual and societal preferences; (3) it 
is a result of a country’s legal origin that shapes the corporations’ tradeoff between shareholder 
and stakeholder values. By empirically testing these views, the paper shows that the variations 
in CSR and sustainability are most fundamentally driven by legal origins. Among the different 
legal origins, the English common law fosters CSR the least, whereas the Scandinavian legal 
origin fosters it the most. Firms from German legal origin countries outperform their French 
counterparts in terms of ecological and environmental policy, but the French legal origin firms 
outperform German legal origin companies in social issues and labor relations. In contrast, 
political institutions, regulations, and social preferences are not strong and consistent 
predictors of CSR. These results are robust across different CSR ratings and estimation 
methods, and are further supported by several quasi-natural experiments. Finally, the paper 




rights, or in other words, finance and ‘good society’ are not necessarily in conflict because CSR 
can also contribute to the maximization of shareholder value (as proxied by e.g. Tobin’s Q). 
 
In the second chapter, titled “Socially Responsible Firms”, I investigate the agency 
foundations of CSR by contrasting two general views over CSR activities: (1) the CSR “value-
enhancing view”, which argues that socially responsible firms, such as firms that promote 
efforts to help protect the environment, promote social equality, improve community 
relationships, can and often do adhere to value-maximizing corporate governance practices; 
(2) the agency view, beginning with Milton Friedman’s (1970) claim that ‘the only social 
responsibility of corporations is to make money’, which considers CSR as a manifestation of 
managerial agency problems inside the firm, which enable managers to engage in CSR that 
benefits themselves at the expense of shareholders. The paper takes a comprehensive look at 
the CSR agency and value-enhancing views around the globe. By means of a rich and partly 
proprietary CSR dataset with global coverage across a large number of countries and covering 
thousands of the largest global companies, these two views are tested by examining whether 
traditional corporate finance proxies for firm agency problems, such as capital spending cash 
flows, managerial compensation arrangements, ownership structures, and country-level 
investor protection laws, account for firms’ CRS activities. Based on this comprehensive 
analysis the paper finds no evidence that CSR conduct is a function of firm agency problems. 
Rather, consistent with the value-enhancing view, well-governed firms are more likely to be 
socially responsible. In addition, CSR is associated with managerial pay-for-performance and 
maximization of firm value, and counterbalances the negative effects of managerial 
entrenchment on firm value, which support the value-enhancing view that CSR in general is 
not inconsistent with shareholder wealth maximization. 
The third chapter, titled “Concentrated Wealth and Stakeholder Value”, investigates the 
ownership foundations of CSR. In the majority of firms around the world, corporate 
ownership is very concentrated, especially around wealthy families and states. In this paper, I 
study the effects of family- and state-control on stakeholder value as proxied by a firm’s 




public and proprietary CSR data on firms in 60 countries, I find that: (1) Ownership 
concentration has a significant but non-linear impact on stakeholder value but not shareholder 
value. (2) The type of controlling shareholder has a strong impact on stakeholder value: family-
controlled firms have significantly worse CSR performance, whereas state-controlled firms 
have significantly better CSR performance. (3) The CSR performance is lowest in family firms 
where family members — especially of the second and following generations — serve as 
CEOs, and CSR performance is highest in state firms with politically-connected CEOs. (4) 
The negative effect of family-control on stakeholder value further translates into lower firm 
value, whereas the positive effect of state-control does not lead to higher firm value. All results 
survive after controlling for various country- and firm-level factors as well as country, industry, 
and year fixed effects, implementing an instrumental variable strategy, and performing quasi-
natural experiments to get proper identification. These findings entail a critical evaluation on 
the role of family-control on corporate social responsibility and a more benevolent view of 
government ownership in dealing with market externalities. 
In Chapter 4, I investigate the cultural and cognitive foundations of CSR. The paper draws on 
the linguistics literature and the cognitive category literature which suggest that obligatory 
future-time-reference (FTR) in a language reduces the psychological importance of the future 
(grammatically separating the future and the present leads speakers to disassociate the future 
from the present, as this would make the future feel more distant). Applying this to a corporate 
context, the paper theorizes that companies with strong-FTR languages as their 
official/working language would be less future orientated and hence perform worse in future-
oriented activities such as corporate social responsibility (CSR)—firms’ environmental, social, 
and governance engagement—compared to those in weak-FTR language environments. 
Examining thousands of global companies across 59 countries, the paper finds support for 
the above conjecture. This is further supported by testing several factors that are expected to 
mitigate the negative relation between FTR and CSR performance: CSR performance is 
weaker for firms that have greater exposure to diverse global languages as a result of (a) being 
headquartered in countries with higher degree of globalization, (b) being more international 




experience and overseas education. These results are robust after controlling for country fixed 
effects and in a quasi-natural experiment setting, and similar language effect is found for other 
future-oriented organizational behaviors such as R&D expenditure. Overall, these results 
suggest that language use by corporations is a key cultural variable that is a strong predictor of CSR and 
corporate future-orientation, and thus the paper introduces a new way to think about the underlying 
variation in global CSR practices. 
 
The fifth and sixth chapters look at the social influence of state-owned firms and the social 
context of corporate governance. Instead of using the cross-country firm-level CSR ratings, 
they zoom in firms in a particular country – China – and focus on the role of the state 
(government) in influencing firm behavior. 
Chapter 5, titled “The Political Determinants of Executive Compensation: Evidence from an 
Emerging Economy”, investigates how state presence in corporations through shareholding 
and political connections affect managerial compensation. This is based on the premise that 
when the economy is regulated, corporate governance mechanisms such as executive 
compensation are subject to political forces other than competitive market-based forces. We 
study the political determinants of executive compensation by exploring an exogenous shock 
that removed market friction of share-tradability and use a large proprietary sample of Chinese 
firms. We find that under political constraints of nontradable shares, State ownership is 
negatively associated with managerial pay level and positively associated with pay-performance 
sensitivity according to asset-based benchmark. Board structures such as independent 
directors and compensation committee do not function to harness managerial pay, and other 
market-based factors do not have significant influence. However, all the effects reverse 
following the removal of market friction of share tradability. 
Chapter 6, titled “An Anatomy of State-Control in the Globalization of State-Owned 
Enterprises”, extends the analysis of state influence to the context of international investment, 
and identifies two types of state control mechanisms that influence globalization decisions and 




executives’ political connections, both of which are contingent upon the home country’s 
evolving institutional environments. Using a two-step corporate globalization decision model 
and 17,272 firm-year observations of non-financial, Chinese-listed companies, the paper finds 
a strong impact of both types of state control on SOEs’ globalization, and that the impacts 
differ between the periods before and after domestic governance reform and across different 
globalization-decision steps. The diminishing impact of executives’ political connections and 
the increasing impact of state ownership control on firms’ degree of globalization demonstrate 
the evolving relationship between the state and the managers, as well as the dynamics of state 
control in globalizing SOEs. 
Taken together, these chapters provide a comprehensive analysis of the foundations of CSR 
and corporate shareholder-stakeholder relationship from various perspectives: legal, agency, 
ownership, cultural, and the social impact of the state as a key shareholder as well as 
stakeholder. Theoretically, the dissertation contributes to the understanding of why and how 
social responsibility is divided between the state and the market, and how profit maximization 
and social objectives coexist in various types of corporations. Practically, I hope this 
dissertation can have implications for policymakers aiming at stimulating socially desirable 
corporate behaviors – while not jeopardizing shareholder welfare at the same time – and the 





Chapter 1. On the Foundations of  Corporate 
Social Responsibility 
 
Hao Liang, Luc Renneboog 1 
 
ABSTRACT 
We investigate the fundamental determinants and value implications of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) around the world. We contrast three broad views on CSR: (1) it is a response to 
government failures; (2) it reflects individual and societal preferences; (3) it is an equilibrium result of 
a country’s legal origin that shapes the corporations’ tradeoff between shareholder and stakeholder 
values. Using public and proprietary country-level sustainability and firm-level CSR data, we find that: 
(a) Legal origins are more fundamental sources of CSR than political, social, and firm-level financial 
forces; (b) The English common law, widely-recognized as being most shareholder-oriented and 
economically efficient, fosters CSR and sustainability the least, while companies under the 
Scandinavian civil law origin assume most social responsibilities; (c) Globally, CSR contributes to 
shareholder value maximization. 
Keywords: Corporate social responsibility, sustainability, legal origins, stakeholder orientation, 
shareholder value. 
JEL Code: G30, K22, M14, O10, O57 
                                                          
1 Both authors are from Tilburg University. We are very grateful to Andrei Shleifer and Holger Spamann for 
comments and suggestions on the early versions. We also wish to thank Licht Amir, Ian Appel, Lucian Bebchuk, 
Gennaro Bernile, Daniel Beunza, Archie Carroll, Martijn Cremers, Henrik Cronqvist, Hans Degryse, Magali Delmas, 
Elroy Dimson, Joost Driessen, Robert Eccles, Tore Ellingsen, Fabrizio Ferraro, Allen Ferrell, Caroline Flammer, 
Julian Franks, Edward Freeman, Richard Friberg, Jesse Fried, William Goetzmann, Rebecca Henderson, Nancy 
Huyghebaert, Yannis Ioannou, Oguzhan Karakas, Philipp Krueger, Thomas Lambert, Alberto Manconi, Chris 
Marquis, Mark Roe, Amir Rubin, George Sefareim, Joaquim Schwalbach, Roy Shapira, Sunny Li Sun, Jörgen Weibull, 
Nan Zhou, and the seminar participants at Harvard Law School, Harvard Business School, Tilburg University, 
London Business School, University of  Cambridge (Judge), Stockholm School of  Economics, University of  Zurich, 
Institut Bachelier and Ecole Polytechnique, Humboldt-Berlin University, University of  Notre Dame (Mendoza), 
University Paris Dauphine, Norwegian School of  Economics, Cardiff  Business School, as well as the conference 
participants at the 10th and 11th Corporate Finance Day (Ghent and Liège), EFMA 2014 Conference, 2014 China 
International Conference in Finance, Harvard Business School Conference on Sustainability and the Corporation: 
the Big Ideas, Vigeo’s Corporate Social Responsibility Conference ‘Assessing Corporate and Sovereign Intangible 
Capital’ (Paris), and the 2nd Geneva Summit of  Sustainable Finance for helpful comments and suggestions. All errors 





  “Business cannot succeed in a society that fails. 
Likewise, where and when business is stifled, societies 
fail to thrive.” 
—Björn Stigson, World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
 
“Driving shareholder wealth at the expense of everything 
else will not create a company that’s built to last.” 
—Paul Polman, CEO of Unilever, Harvard Business Review (2012) 
 
Introduction 
It has been widely believed that the sustainability of the society – the pursuit of sustainable economic 
growth through strong environmental protections, social welfare, and rules of laws – crucially hinges 
on the socially responsible operational and investment behavior of modern corporations (Porter, 1991; 
United Nations Global Compact, 2013). Accordingly, the importance of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) and the so-called stakeholder rights has been recognized by researchers, policymakers, and 
practitioners. What fundamental forces steer companies to behave as good citizens in society rather 
than as pure profit maximizers? Is protecting stakeholder rights in conflict with protecting shareholder 
rights? What are their implications to societal sustainability? These are the key questions of this study. 
Adequately addressing these questions was difficult in the past, largely because cross-country 
firm-level CSR data did not exist, until recently. This paper makes use of these new data to empirically 
address the issue of the shareholder-stakeholder tradeoff, as well as its fundamental determinants and 
corporate consequences, on a global scale. From a classical economics perspective, CSR can be broadly 
considered as protecting the interests and addressing the needs of various stakeholders, and can be 
measured by both a firm’s engagement (voluntarily initiated) in and its compliance (legally mandated) to 
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues.2 These issues are mostly related to concerns for 
                                                          
2 For example, engagement in ESG may include corporate initiatives such as voluntarily developing an R&D project 
that is deemed as environmental friendly (the “E” dimension), or voluntarily developing employee training programs 
that are aimed to increase employee welfare and productivity (the “S” dimension), or voluntarily increase gender and 
racial diversity of  the board of  directors (the “G” dimension). compliance in ESG issues may include e.g. compliance 
to environmental regulation on CO2 emission (the “E” dimension), not using child labor and guaranteeing minimum 
working conditions of  factories in developing countries (the “S” dimension), and sticking to the legally required ratio 




the environment (such as climate change, hazardous waste, nuclear energy, ecological balance, etc.), 
society (such as social diversity, human rights, consumer protection, consumer consciousness, etc.), 
and corporate governance (such as management and board structures and representation, executive 
compensation, anti-corruption, etc).3  
Some are skeptical about CSR and consider it a value-diverting activity that does not contribute 
to aggregate social welfare and sustainability (e.g., Friedman, 1970; Jensen, 2001; Cheng, Hong and 
Shue, 2013; Masulis and Reza, 2014). In this paper, we quantify the relationship between firm-level 
CSR and country-level sustainability by showing that CSR scores are significantly correlated with 
country-level sustainability ratings in many dimensions. Some correlations are almost 50%, which is 
substantial given that the CSR scores and country sustainability ratings are from very different data 
sources and use different rating metrics. Therefore, although the focus in this paper is on firm-level 
CSR performance, we also try to connect the determinants of CSR to the broader theme of country-
level sustainability and social welfare. 
The extant literature mostly considers CSR as a firm’s voluntary initiative, and investigates how it 
affects the firm’s financial and operational performance, which is usually termed as ‘doing well by 
doing good’ (e.g., Dowell et al., 2000; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes, 2003; Renneboog, ter Horst and 
Zhang, 2008, 2011; Guenster, Bauer, Derwall, and Koedijk, 2011; Cheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim, 2012; 
Deng, Kang, and Low, 2013). Others study the inverse, ‘doing good by doing well’, namely whether 
it is only well-performing firms that can afford to adhere to ESG criteria (e.g., Hong, Kubik, and 
Scheinkman, 2012). In addition, these studies usually take only one perspective of CSR, such as 
employee satisfaction (Edmans, 2011, 2012; Edmans, Li, and Zhang, 2014), environmental protection 
(e.g., Dowell, Hart, and Yeung, 2000; Konar and Cohen, 2001), corporate philanthropy (e.g., Seifert, 
Morris, and Bartkus, 2004; Masulis and Reza, 2014), or consumer satisfaction (e.g., Luo and 
Bhattacharya, 2006; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013). The theoretical predictions and empirical evidence 
to date on the causal relationship between “doing good” and “doing well” are rather mixed, which 
posts challenge to understand what drives corporations to balance their shareholders and other 
stakeholders, and what are the roots and foundations of CSR. Given that both “doing good” and 
“doing well” are related to governance issues such as corporate shareholder-stakeholder relationship, 
                                                          
3 Similarly, The European Federation of  Financial Analysts Societies (EFFAS) interprets ESG as the need to focus 
on: (1) energy efficiency, (2) greenhouse gas emissions, (3) staff  turnover, (4) training and qualification, (5) maturity 




and corporate governance is mostly determined by country-level factors (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 
2007), this motivates us to look for country-level determinants that may be more fundamental drivers 
of such shareholder-stakeholder tradeoff. In addition, if, apart from voluntary adoption, CSR is partly 
legally mandated, a single country study is not appropriate and one can only investigate the foundations 
of CSR within a cross-country institutional framework. Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) take such cross-
country perspective and empirically examine the association between “national institutions” and the 
scores on a CSR index, although most of what they call “institutions” such as a leftist political ideology4 
are not true institutions with persistent and durable features in the spirit of North (1981), but more 
like the consequences of institutions, which implies that those proxies for institutions may still be 
endogenously determined. Nevertheless, as revealed both by their data and ours, there are huge cross-
country variations in CSR ratings and actual stakeholder practices, the magnitudes of which dominate 
that of cross-sectional and time-series differences at the firm-level. 
In this paper, we try to go one step further and explain the cross-country variations of CSR by 
focusing on its foundations from three broad economic perspectives. The “division” view holds that 
there is a division of roles between the government (the public sector) and the market (the private 
sector) in economic activities (Friedman, 1970; Besley and Ghatak, 2001; Benabou & Tirole, 2010). 
Under this public-private dichotomy, the market’s role is to harness corporations’ pursuit of self-
interest for the pursuit of efficiency and market actors only have responsibilities to their shareholders, 
while the government’s responsibility is to correct market failures whenever externalities stand in the 
way of efficiency, and to redistribute income and wealth. CSR as a private provision of public goods 
emerges as an alternative response to market and distributive failures by the government.  
The “preference” view holds that CSR reflects aggregate individual and society’s preferences for 
corporations to take social responsibility (Benabou and Tirole, 2003, 2006). This view attributes CSR 
to social demands (Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2014). In addition, social preferences are not 
autonomously formed, but are usually shaped and aggregated by political institutions through voting 
and elections (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Pagano and Volpin, 2005; Perotti and von Thadden, 
2006; Roe, 2003, 2006). Political institutions are a reflection of who possesses the political power to 
                                                          
4 These variables include the measurement of regulations promoting competition, the level of corruption, leftist 
political ideologies, the power of labor unions, the availability of human capital, the presence of market-based 
financial systems, the existence of a CSR stock market index, etc. In addition, the authors did not include legal origins, 





shape laws and regulations that benefit their political constituencies —their stakeholders (Perotti and 
von Thadden, 2006). Therefore, the degree to which different stakeholders are involved in political 
participation reflects to what extent CSR reflects their preferences. 
The third view—which is more novel and central to this paper—is that legal frameworks can 
constitute fertile ground for economic outcomes, such as CSR, and are shaped by a country’s legal 
origin (La Porta et al., 2008). This “legal origin” view hinges on two conflicting theories of the firm 
(Williamson, 1981). The first views the firm as a nexus of internal relationships between owners and 
the management (the principal-agent relation), and suggests that the purpose of corporations is to 
maximize profits and shareholder value. The second theory focuses on the external relations between 
the firm and its stakeholders, and views the firm as a nexus of (sometimes also intangible and implicit) 
contracts between interested parties—in addition to shareholders, these comprise customers, suppliers, 
owners, managers, employees, and communities (“stakeholders”) 5 —who realize economic gains 
through their participation in these contractual relationships. Corporations constantly trade off these 
two types of contractual relationships, that is, they are faced with the tradeoff between a shareholder 
and (other) stakeholders’ focus. Under the legal origin view, such contractual relationships are shaped 
by laws rooted in a country’s legal origin, which fertilizes various contract-based economic outcomes 
including the above corporate shareholder-stakeholder tradeoff.  
By empirically testing these three theoretical viewpoints, we find strong evidence supporting the 
legal origin view, but not the division nor the preference views on CSR. Our results also do not support 
the traditional “doing good by doing well” hypothesis. Institutional mechanisms that exclusively steer 
shareholder protection and financial development often fail to maximize stakeholder wealth and 
societal sustainability: among the different legal origins, the English common law fosters CSR the least, 
whereas the Scandinavian legal origin fosters it the most. In addition, firms from German legal origin 
countries outperform their French counterparts in terms of ecological and environmental policy, but 
the French legal origin firms outperform German legal origin companies in social issues and labor 
relations. This result survives the inclusion of an aggressive set of country- and firm-level control 
variables and several quasi-natural experiments. We also find that political institutions, such as 
democratic participation, that are believed to be key determinants of access to finance are not 
                                                          
5  The stakeholder perspective dates back to Edward Freeman’s (1984) influential book Strategic Management: A 
Stakeholder Approach. The book describes and recommends the methods by which management can give due regard 
to the interests of  the stakeholder groups. Similar definitions and arguments can be found in Donaldson and Preston 




preconditions for CSR and sustainability, and sometimes even hinder CSR implementation. Finally, 
we find that protecting shareholder rights is not necessarily at odds with protecting stakeholder rights, 
or in other words, finance and ‘good society’ are not necessarily at odds because CSR can also 
contribute to the maximization of shareholder value (as proxied by e.g. Tobin’s Q). 
Our paper contributes in the following ways. First, while most cross-country studies on the role 
of fundamental institutions focus on country-level differences and use macro-level data that usually 
suffer from small sample inference and sensitivity to outliers, our unit of analysis is not only the 
country but also the firm for which we have extensive proprietary and public data on their 
performance on ESG issues, which also enable us to differentiate between CSR engagement and 
compliance. The fact that we combine a macro- and micro-level analysis enables us to better understand 
the mechanisms of how fundamental institutions determine corporate behavior. Second, examining 
the potential tensions between shareholders and stakeholders at the micro-level, as well as between 
financial development and societal sustainability at the macro-level, may be liable to endogeneity issues. 
Our approaches circumvent these problems as we investigate such tension by focusing on their 
common fundamental antecedents—the legal origins, political institutions, and social preferences—
that are well established in economic theories, and we apply several global-scale quasi-experiments to 
identify causality. All results point to the causation from legal origin to firm CSR, and from CSR to 
firm value, and therefore offer a clearer picture of the determinants and consequences of CSR. Third, 
our study has significant policy and welfare implications: if institutional origins are found to be of first-
order importance, then policymakers could imitate the tools associated with the winning origin. Hence, 
our empirical findings can offer a guide for institutional reform aiming at stimulating economic and 
societal sustainability. Many large corporations and countries worldwide today find it hard to achieve 
good citizenship and sustainable development, in part because of institutional heritage. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I reviews three broad theories of CSR and 
lays out their respective empirical predictions. Section II describes our data and empirical strategies. 
Section III exhibits the empirical results, while Section IV presents several robustness checks. Section 
V comprises several quasi-experimental tests to further establish causality. Section VI explores the 





Theories of  Corporate Social Responsibility 
We begin our analysis by considering three broad economic theories of CSR, motivated by Benabou 
and Tirole (2010), Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012), and de Bettignies and Robinson (2013). In their 
frameworks, CSR as a form of private provision of public goods is determined by both supply-side 
and demand-side factors. The supply-side factors concern a division of responsibilities between the 
state (government) and the market (corporations), while the demand-side factors concern the society’s 
preferences for CSR and how such preferences can be aggregated by political institutions. We then 
propose a legal origin view that combines these factors, and also provides grounds for understanding 
the relationship between shareholder value and stakeholder value.   
The Division View 
The division view of CSR addresses the question as to why corporations empower themselves 
to care about society and provide public goods and hence be a substitute for democratically elected 
governments in this respect. The classical economics framework embraces a state-market dichotomy: 
the responsibilities of governments and of the private sector are largely divided, with corporations 
being profit-driven and shareholder-oriented, and governments correcting externalities and 
distributive failures, usually through regulations (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 
2002; de Bettignies and Robinson, 2013). CSR emerges as a substitute for governments that bend to 
wealthy constituents’ opposition to redistributive policies (Benabou and Tirole, 2010). Following this 
line, de Bettignies & Robinson (2013) argue more specifically that CSR arises as a response to 
inefficient regulation. This argument essentially predicts that CSR is more active in countries where 
governments fail to supply a sufficient level of public goods through the governments’ regulatory 
policies. 
The Preference View  
The preference view, to the contrary, argues that it is stakeholders themselves who demand that 
corporations be more socially responsible. This preference view has two dimensions. The first one is 
that CSR reflects individuals’ or society’s direct preferences for social goods, other than monetary 
incentives such as shareholder returns (Benabou and Tirole, 2003, 2006; Besley and Ghatak, 2005). 
Benabou and Tirole (2006) term such preferences ‘intrinsic motivations’. In some societies, the culture 




through labor movements and political contests (Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier, 2014). Therefore, 
one would expect CSR to be stronger in countries with such standards and norms that put more 
emphasis on caring about society. 
The second dimension is that citizenry preferences are usually reflected through voters putting 
pressure on politicians to deliver certain economic policies (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). 
Preferences can thus be shaped and aggregated by political institutions. Political institutions refer to a 
set of rules such as democracy, electoral rules, legislative procedures, constraints to the political 
executive, etc. (North, 1981; LLSV, 1999; Glaeser et al., 2004; Roe, 2006; Matten and Moon, 2008). 
The principal mode of political decision making is elections, and parties that win them shape laws that 
benefit their political constituencies—their stakeholders (Botero et al., 2004). Hence, political decisions 
are influenced by voters in elections who represent preferences and economic interests of different 
stakeholders (Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 2012). Therefore, political institutions such as the degree 
of democratic participation determine which and to what extent stakeholders can influence decision-
making through political participation and voting for their representatives to implement the policies 
that protect their interests. For example, labor protection is usually stronger in countries with more 
democratic participation, unionization, and proportional electoral systems (e.g., Roe, 2003; Pagano 
and Volpin, 2005; Perotti and von Thadden, 2006; Perotti and Schwienbacher, 2009). This essentially 
implies that more democratic political institutions can more broadly aggregate various stakeholders’ 
preferences by making stakeholders’ voices be heard, and are thus related to a higher level of CSR. In 
the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), such democratic participation is considered as part of 
“inclusive institutions” which epitomize “the good society”. Of course, the premise of this prediction 
is that democratic elections provide the legitimacy to define what is “right” for society (Benabou and 
Tirole, 2010).  
The Legal Origin View 
The fundamental roles of legal origins on economic outcomes are advocated by La Porta et al. 
(2008), and have been adopted by much of the law, finance, and economics literature. The legal origin 
theory argues that the largely exogenous legal origins—common versus civil law, and the legal 
subfamilies within the civil law tradition such as German, French, and Scandinavian legal systems— 
utilize different strategies for social control of business, contract enforcement, property rights 
protection, and dealing with market failure. These differences form the basis of contracting that is 




law tradition is widely believed to be superior to other civil law traditions in this regard.6 Among the 
myriad of contractual relationships, the internal contract between owners and the management, and 
the external one between the firm and its various stakeholders are of foremost importance as they are 
related to two fundamental yet conflicting “theories of the firm” (Williamson, 1981). Therefore, legal 
origins can provide a foundation for the corporate tradeoff between shareholder orientation (internal 
contracting) and stakeholder orientation (external contracting). 
However, there are fierce debates regarding which type of contracting (or orientation) is more 
efficient at providing social goods. The premise of internal contracting rests on the principal-agent 
paradigm, under which corporate law aims to address the agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders, and between controlling and minority shareholders. The common law tradition—under 
the traditional “law and finance” view—is believed to better address agency conflicts, which leads to 
the development of deeper and broader markets that reduce the costs of external finance to firms and 
facilitate efficient capital allocation, and hence leads to a higher level of economic prosperity (Rajan 
and Zingales, 1998). Therefore, maximizing shareholder value is tantamount to maximizing social 
value, which will in turn benefit other stakeholders, and thus shareholder value maximization is central 
to the principle of capitalism (Williamson, 1985). 
In contrast, the premise of external contracting—or stakeholder-orientation—lies in the 
paradigm that the company is managed for the benefits and needs of all stakeholders, not merely its 
shareholders (Freeman, 1984; Henderson and Ramanna, 2013). Under this paradigm, stakeholder 
welfare would not be achieved through the “trickling-down” of enlightened shareholder value and 
capital market development, but has to be directly protected by stakeholder-oriented laws (Freeman, 
1984). Sometimes it even hinges on laws that are “laxer” regarding shareholder protection, because 
CSR as provision of public goods goes beyond the ownership and property rights that are essential in 
the “law and finance” view. In this regard, the civil law traditions are believed to be more stakeholder-
orientated in defining company law (Matten and Moon, 2008). For example, in Germany, corporations 
are legally required to pursue the interests of parties other than only shareholders through the system 
of co-determination in which employees and shareholders have an equal number of seats on the 
supervisory board (Allen, Carletti, and Marquez, 2009). The harmonization laws of the European 
                                                          
6 However, the superiority of  the common law has been questioned in some other studies. For example, Roe (2006) 
argues that the outperformance of  common law countries in financial development is not due to legal origin, but 
due to the postwar legislatures and political ideologies. Spamann (2010) reconstructed the LLSV’s legal data, and 




Community include provisions permitting corporations to take into account the interests of creditors, 
customers, potential investors, and employees. The corporate laws in Japan presume that Japanese 
corporations exist within a tightly connected and interrelated set of stakeholders, including suppliers, 
customers, lending institutions, and friendly corporations (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
In the next section, we test these three broad views using several newly assembled firm-level CSR 
samples covering almost 70 countries.  
 
Data and Empirical Strategy 
CSR Data and Descriptive Statistics 
In recent years, a variety of ESG indices measuring firm-level CSR performance have been 
constructed by means of different rating methodologies (e.g. some based on a box-ticking approach—
compliance, or on interpretative analysis—engagement) and hinge on various datasets, some of which 
are proprietary. We have extensively discussed the reliability of these ratings with practitioners, 
policymakers, and data providers. One could raise the concern that the “G” component of ESG 
measurement is overlapping with the traditional corporate governance issues which are materially 
different from the other stakeholder issues, as improving corporate governance does not necessarily 
require monetary investments while improving the welfare of other stakeholders does (Krueger, 2013). 
Therefore, we have deliberately selected databases that minimize the weight on corporate governance 
regulation, while putting more emphasis on environmental and social issues. 
Our main data on ESG performance are from MSCI’s Intangible Value Assessment (IVA) 
database. The IVA indices measure a corporation’s environmental and social risks and opportunities, 
which refer to issues where companies generate large environmental and social externalities and may 
be forced to internalize (future) unanticipated costs associated with those externalities. The rating then 
takes into account the extent to which a company has developed robust CSR strategies and 
demonstrated a strong track record in managing these specific risks and opportunities. Such rating 
methods capture both the legally mandated aspects (unanticipated costs associated with regulatory 
penalties and lawsuits) and voluntary aspects (risk management strategies and strategies to capture 




comparison to their industry peers from both domestic and international markets, and therefore the 
rating does not depend on the local CSR situations and rules. The IVA Rating is compiled using 
company profiles, ratings, scores, and industry reports, and is available from 1999 to 2011.7 Its 
coverage comprises the top 1,500 companies of the MSCI World Index (expanding to the full MSCI 
World Index over the course of the sample period); the top 25 companies of the MSCI Emerging 
Markets Index; the top 275 companies by market cap of the FTSE 100 and the FTSE 250 (excluding 
investment trusts); and the ASX 200. For this large sample with global coverage, MSCI constructs a 
series of 29 ESG scores8, among which, Labor Relations, Industry Specific Carbon Risk, and Environmental 
Opportunity receive the highest weights in the global rating, and the weight on traditional corporate 
governance regulation is below 2%. The detailed composition of the IVA rating is shown in Table 1. 
Furthermore, we triangulate our results based on the IVA ratings from MSCI with that from the 
RiskMetrics EcoValue21 Rating and the RiskMetrics Social Rating from RiskMetrics and so capture the 
environmental and social aspects of CSR, respectively. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Our main sample covers 91,373 firm-time observations from 59 countries. By means of the 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) and the Kompass sector classification, we classify our sample 
firms into 17 aggregated industries We also employ other CSR indices provided by various ESG rating 
agencies with a global scope in order to validate our results. These indices include MSCI’s Impact 
Monitor data, Vigeo’s corporate ESG ratings, and Thomson Reuters’ Asset4 ratings of which the 
                                                          
7 The information on which the IVA ratings are based is extracted from the following sources: (a) Corporate 
documents: annual reports, environmental and social reports, securities filings, websites, and Carbon Disclosure 
Project responses; (b) Government data: central bank data, U.S. Toxic Release Inventory, Comprehensive 
Environmental Response and Liability Information System (CERCLIS), RCRA Hazardous Waste Data Management 
System, etc. In particular for European companies, the information is expanded by means of  many other information 
sources; (c) Trade and academic journals included in Factiva and Nexis; and (d) professional organizations and 
experts: reports from and interviews with trade groups, industry experts, and non-governmental organizations 
familiar with the companies’ operations. 
8 A key ESG issue is defined as an environmental and/or social externality that has the potential to become 
internalized by the industry or the company through one or more of the following triggers: (a) Pending or proposed 
regulation; (b) A potential supply constraint;(c) A notable shift in demand; (d) A major strategic response by an 
established competitor; (e) Growing public awareness or concern. Once up to five key issues have been selected, 
analysts work with sector team leaders to make any necessary adjustments to the weights in the model. Each key 
issue typically comprises 10-30% of the total IVA rating. The weights take into account the impact of companies, 
their supply chains, and their products and the financial implications of these impacts. For each key issue, a wide 





country coverage and number of observations are shown in the Appendix. In contrast to the MSCI 
IVA data that focus on engagement (developing strategies to manage its risks and opportunities), the 
Vigeo ESG data is more CSR compliance-oriented as it applies a check-the-box approach to rate how 
a firm and the country in which it operates comply with the conventions, guidelines, and declarations 
by international organizations such as UN, ILO, and OECD. We also obtain a cross-sectional dataset 
of country-level sustainability ratings from Vigeo, which rates each country based on the laws and 
regulations that fulfill the country’s (1) environmental responsibility, (2) social responsibility and 
solidarity, and (3) institutional responsibility, which is a country’s legal and regulatory framework in 
relation to sustainability. These three country-level domains echo the firm-level “E”, “S” and “G” 
criteria.9 
Methodology 
As the IVA ratings measuring a company’s ESG performance are integers ranging from 0 to 6 
and are not normally distributed, we use the nonparametric Wilconxon-Mann-Whitney test in a 
univariate analysis which compares the median ESG values across different legal origins, and between 
capitalist and socialist countries. We will subsequently apply reduced-form regressions to analyze the 
impact of legal origin and political institutions on CSR. Given that some of our independent variables 
are time-invariant (e.g., legal origins) and that we would like to draw inferences on the population, 
random-effect models are used in this panel setting. Our estimations are made by OLS, random-effects 
generalized least squares (GLS), and random-effects ordered probit models. The latter are estimated 
by means of maximum likelihood and consider the discrete, ordinal nature of the ratings and the rating 
changes in a panel data setting (as in e.g., Alsakka and Gwilym, 2010). The general specification can 
be expressed as: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡




′𝑍c𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝑡           (1) 
Where Legal is a vector of different types of civil law origins, Political is a vector of political 
institutions and social preferences variables which, in our sample, are mostly time-variant, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the 
vector of firm-level financial and governance variables, while 𝑍c𝑡 is a vector of country-level control 
variables. Except for legal origins, all the other variables are time-variant in nature. The subscript i 
                                                          
9 The sovereign ratings are based on 120 ESG risk and performance indicators in the aforementioned three 
domains. Countries are graded on a scale of  100 on their commitment and performance in these indicators such as 
ratification of  the Kyoto convention, the Vienna convention, the Stockholm convention, CO2 emissions per head, 




refers to the individual firm, t to the time, and c to the country. 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  is the firm-level ESG rating. In the 
case of ordered probit models, 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  is an unobserved latent variable linked to the observed ordinal 










0            𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ ≤ 𝜇1
1 𝑖𝑓 𝜇1 < 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ ≤ 𝜇2
2 𝑖𝑓 𝜇2 < 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ ≤ 𝜇3
3 𝑖𝑓 𝜇3 < 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ ≤ 𝜇4
4 𝑖𝑓 𝜇4 < 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ ≤ 𝜇5
5 𝑖𝑓 𝜇5 < 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ ≤ 𝜇6









            (2) 
The 𝜇′𝑠  represent thresholds to be estimated (along with the 𝛽  and 𝛾  coefficients) using 
maximum likelihood estimation, subject to the constraint that 𝜇1 < 𝜇2 < 𝜇3 < 𝜇4 < 𝜇5 < 𝜇6. 
Moreover, we explore a few quasi-natural experiments on some exogenous changes of a firm’s 
legal regime and CSR demand using OLS estimation while controlling for country-, industry-, and 
year-fixed effects so as to further establish causality. Finally, we apply an IV approach for the effect 
of CSR on Tobin’s Q and estimate two-stage least square (2SLS) and fixed effects models (controlling 
for firm fixed effects). We cluster the standard errors at the country level. In unreported regressions, 
we cluster the standard errors also at the firm level which yields similar (and stronger) results. 
The Variables 
In equation (1), the dependent variables are various CSR measures that capture the different 
dimensions of firms’ engagement and compliance to ESG issues: the Overall IVA Rating, the 
EcoValue Rating (from RiskMetrics) and the Social Rating (from RiskMetrics), all are converted to 
ordered integer scores ranging from 0 to 6. As explanatory variables, we include: 
a. Legal Origins 
The Legal Origin refers to the type of law that applies in the country where the firm is 
headquartered: English common law, French/German/Scandinavian civil law systems, and Socialist 
origins (both current and former socialist countries) (LLSV, 1998). 
b. Social Preferences 
To capture the direct preferences for CSR by citizens around the world, we utilize data from 




answered “A great deal” or “Quite a lot” (relative to “Not very much” and “None at all”) to the 
following question: How much confidence do you have in major companies to take social 
responsibility. We pick up this item as one of our “preference” variables and term it as Citizenry 
Preferences because there is ample evidence that confidence is strongly related to trust in society, 
which is further associated with the preferences of citizens on how society should be organized (e.g., 
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2004, 2008). 
To capture the indirect social preferences that are aggregated by political institutions, we define 
the variable Democratic Participation. As Glaeser et al. (2004) argue that only aspects that directly 
relate to electoral rules are a good proxy for “institutions”, we mainly focus on indices that measure 
democratic participation and rules that define voting and elections: the Vanhanen Democratic 
Participation index and the Polity IV Democracy index are often used in political economy. 
Political Executive Constraints proxies for the constraints to potential expropriation by the 
political elites as suggested by Glaeser et al. (2004): “[Political executive constraints] is the only measure 
that is clearly not a consequence of  dictatorial choices, and […] can at least loosely be thought of  as 
relating to constraints to government” (p. 282). We use the same index, developed by Polity IV. 
Our third political variable is Corruption Control which measures the extent to which politicians 
are constrained from pursuing their self-interest (through corruption), and to some extent also 
captures constraints. Apparently, there are more political variables that stand for aggregate social 
(stakeholder) preferences, but we stick to the above three because they are most closely connected to 
North’s (1980) conception of institutions as “constraints” and thus better reflect aggregate preferences. 
In the robustness section, we will deal with alternative specifications. 
To test the division view, we use a country’s Regulatory Quality to proxy for the government’s 
engagement and effectiveness in taking society responsibility and dealing with market externalities. 
This variable captures the government’s ability to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development. 
c. Corporate Governance and Financial Variables 
We also control for corporate governance structures such as the nature and dispersion of 





Dispersed Ownership is directly influenced by legal origins and political institutions (Aslan and 
Kumar, 2012; Roe, 2003, 2006), but may at the same time affect the (need for) protection of 
stakeholder rights. The literature highlights both the negative consequences of dispersed ownership 
due to managerial agency problems, and its positive value implication due to the alleviation of the 
dominant shareholder problem (as the dominant shareholder can expropriate the rights of minority 
shareholders). Ownership dispersion also captures the extent to which conflicts can arise between 
shareholders and stakeholders regarding CSR expenditures (Barnea and Rubin, 2010). We use the 
Orbis’ Independence Indicator as a proxy for ownership dispersion/concentration. 
Ultimate Owner (UO) Types include (i) the state; (ii) wealthy individuals or families; (iii) 
foundations or research institutes (e.g. universities); (iv) pension funds; (v) venture capital and private 
equity; (vi) banks, insurance companies and other financial institutions (financial consortia); and (vii) 
corporations (Claessens, Djankov, and Lang 2000). The inclusion of these ultimate owner type 
dummies is motivated by the literature that the identity of large shareholders can significantly influence 
corporate policies, including CSR (Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach, 2009). 
The board of directors’ tier structure (or Supervisory Board) refers to the adoption of a one-tier 
board system that combines the management and supervisory directors into one body, or a two-tier 
system that separates them. Under the two-tier structure, the supervisory board usually consists of 
employees and outsiders, which fosters codetermination by shareholders and other stakeholders. In 
about three quarters of the countries, the one-tier board has been legally or voluntarily adopted. 
Elsewhere, notably in Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Scandinavia, the two-tier structure 
prevails. We include a firm-level dummy variable capturing the existence of a supervisory board.  
We also include a set of control variables such as firm-level financial constraints to investigate 
whether firms are “doing good by doing well” (Hong, Kubik, and Scheinkman, 2012). Our variables 
capture different aspects of financial constraints: (1) short-term investment to cash flow sensitivity 
(Financial Constraints) (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988), (2) Interest Coverage, and (3) Financial 
Slack, measured by the current ratio. We also include financial performance: return on assets (ROA). 
d. Country-level Controls 
We control in equation (1) for a country’s level of economic development: the (logarithm of the) 
GDP per capita and a globalization index. GDP per capita captures income and wealth effects, as 




merely worry about daily economic survival. The globalization index is expected to capture the 
spillover effect of CSR standards across countries, as corporations in more globalized countries are 
under higher pressure to comply with international conventions and principles that outline the norms 
for acceptable corporate social conduct. Detailed definitions and sources of all our variables are 
summarized in the Appendix. 
Results 
Descriptive Results 
We first examine the relation between firm-level CSR (the CSR ratings from MSCI IVA) and 
country-level sustainability (the Vigeo sustainable country ratings). The average correlation coefficient 
between these two sets of indices is above 25% and statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. 
The correlations between the aggregated IVA rating and the overall country rating, the environmental 
responsibility country rating, the institutional responsibility country rating, and the social responsibility 
and solidarity country rating amount to 29%, 21%, 28% and 26%, respectively. The correlations 
between the RiskMetrics Ecovalue rating and the aforementioned country ratings are 23%, 24%, 21% 
and 20%, respectively. The correlations between the RiskMetrics Social rating and those country 
ratings are 26%, 20%, 25% and 24%. Similarly high correlations are found between the country-level 
sustainability rating and other firm-level CSR ratings. The correlation between Vigeo’s ‘human 
resource concern’ and ‘country institutional responsibility’ is as high as 47 percent. Given that these 
datasets are from different sources and are constructed by means of different rating metrics, the 
positive correlations are remarkable. It confirms the aforementioned normative argument that CSR is 
closely related to societal sustainability, and indicates that the fact that firms address 
social/environmental/governance issues (even through voluntary engagement rather than pure 
compliance to regulation) is not mutually exclusive to governmental efforts to achieve a sustainable 
society. 
We compare the mean ESG ratings for the countries belonging to different legal origins in Table 
2. In addition to the overall ESG rating (Overall IVA Rating) and two general ratings on environmental 
and social policies (EcoValue21 Rating and Social Rating), we also show the various components of 
the CSR subcategories representing benefits for different types of stakeholders.10 The comparisons of 
                                                          




the means of the CSR indices across legal origins in Table 2 show that the English common law system 
is inferior to the civil law systems in terms of fostering good corporate ESG performance. Firms from 
the Scandinavian and German legal origins outperform those from the English common law system, 
especially in terms of environmental issues, as indicated by the scores in EcoValue21 Rating and the 
subcategories Environment, Environmental Management Capacity, Environmental Opportunity, 
Industry Specific Carbon Risk, Environmental strategy, Environmental Management Systems, 
Environmental Accounting Reporting, Certification (e.g., ISO14000), etc. In social- and labor-related 
issues, firms from the French legal origins outperform those from the English and German legal 
origins, as can be derived from the scores of the Social Rating and the subcategories Human Capital, 
Stakeholder Capital, Employee Motivation and Development, Labor Relations, Health Safety, 
Customer Stakeholder Partnerships, Human Rights Child and Forced Labor, etc. The English 
common law system is only superior to civil law systems in the domain of the firm’s interactions with 
local communities and traditional corporate governance concerns. Companies from the Socialist legal 
origin perform the worst across the board. 
[Insert Tables 2 about here] 
We further compare the differences across legal origins for various aspects of CSR using a non-
parametric test (Wilcoxon-Man-Whitney test). Table 3 shows that the differences in ESG performance 
(overall and by component) are highly statistically significant across legal families, and that civil law 
countries consistently outperform common law countries in all ESG subfields. Within the civil law 
countries, we find that firms of countries with German legal origin outperform their French 
counterparts in terms of ecological and environmental policy (EcoValue 21 rating, Industry Specific 
Carbon Risk, and Environmental Opportunity), but that the French legal origin firms outperform 
German legal origin companies in social issues and labor relations. Capitalist economies attach more 
attention to ESG relative to the current and former socialist countries (Russia, China, and some 
Eastern European countries). 
[Insert Table 3 about Here] 
                                                          
Capability & Adaptability, Traditional Governance Concerns, etc. The benefits for employees – the recognition of  human 
capital - are manifested in Employee Motivation Development, Labor Relations, Health & Safety, etc. The benefits for 
customers can be derived from the categories Customer Stakeholder Partnerships, Intellectual Capital & Product 
Development, Product Safety, etc. The environmental issues – categories Environmental Management capacity through 





In Table 4 we present the results from both random-effect GLS models and pooled OLS 
explaining the variation in the different CSR ratings: the Overall IVA Rating, the RiskMetrics 
EcoValue (environmental) Rating, and the RiskMetrics Social Rating (all are ordinal integer scores 
ranging from 0 to 6). The English common law origin is our benchmark and is therefore omitted from 
the models.11 Models (1)—(3) show the results from regressing the three CSR ratings on legal origin 
dummies, Citizenry Preference, Regulatory Quality, together with other control variables. In Models 
(4)—(6), we further expand Models (1)—(3) by including the political institutions variables 
(Democratic Participation and Executive Constraints) as alternative measures of aggregate social 
preferences, the types of ultimate owner (UO) (whereby the case in which industrial companies are 
the ultimate owners is the benchmark), and industry fixed effects.12 Models (7)—(9) have the same 
specification as Models (4)—(6), except that they are estimated by means of a pooled OLS. 
Several important observations can be made: First, the coefficients on the French, German, and 
Scandinavian civil law origins from models (1) to (9) are mostly positive and statistically significant, 
regardless what estimation methods are used, which implies that firms under civil law systems do 
better in terms of ESG adoption/performance than those under the English common law system. 
The economic effects are substantial: without controlling for the type of ultimate owner, firms in civil 
law countries on average outperform those in common law countries by over one grade (on a scale of 
7) in different ESG ratings (Models 1-3). Controlling for the type of ultimate owner, such 
outperformance is amplified to over 3 grades on the ESG ratings with random-effect GLS estimations 
(Models 4-6), and to about 1.5 grades on the ESG ratings with pooled OLS estimations (Models 7-9). 
According to LLSV (1998) and La Porta et al. (1999), ownership concentration is more prevalent in 
civil countries, thus the effects of civil laws are expected to be stronger in firms with controlling 
shareholders. Therefore, restricting the sample to firms with controlling shareholders leads to both 
economically and statistically stronger effects of the civil law dummies. Similar economic magnitudes 
                                                          
11 Given the consistent ESG underperformance of  firms in (current or former) socialist countries, which are still 
under an autocratic or dictatorial regime, we exclude these countries from our sample, and focus on the differences 
between common law systems and civil law systems (and their subsystems). 
12 In Model (5), we further exclude Financial Constraints measured as the sensitivity of  short-term investment to 
cash flow, considering Chen & Chen’s (2012) criticism on this measure. We also exclude Financial Slack (current 
ratio) – a measure of  liquidity and the ability to meet creditors’ demand – which is sensitive to the type of  ultimate 
owner. Given that not all firms have dominant shareholders as the ultimate owner, the number of  observations 





are found for French and German legal origins; in the environmental rating, firms from German civil 
law origin even outperform those from common law origins by 4 grades on average—more than half 
of the whole scale—when estimated using GLS. This stands in marked contrast with the traditional 
legal origin theory in the law and finance literature that the common-law countries generally have the 
strongest, and French civil-law countries the weakest investor protection, financial development, and 
economic efficiency (LLSV, 1998; La Porta et al., 2008). Our findings echo the legal origin view of 
CSR, but also reveal something different from the traditional legal origin theory: while common law 
focuses more on the legal protection of shareholders which is the premise of stronger financial 
development, it fails to sufficiently bolster stakeholder rights compared to civil laws. 
Second, in Models (1)-(3), none of the coefficients on Citizenry Preferences and Regulatory 
Quality are statistically significant. In Models (4)-(6) when political institutions variables and more 
controls are included, the coefficients on Citizenry Preferences become positive and significant, while 
those on Regulatory Quality are largely insignificant. For the “preference” view to hold, we expect 
and a positive association between citizenry preference, democracy, and CSR. We find that the 
preference view is not fully supported because, while the Citizenry Preferences are statistically 
significant, the coefficients on Democratic Participation have the inverse sign (they are all negative 
and significant), while those on Executive Constraints are insignificant.13 For the “division” view to 
hold, we expect a negative association between governmental regulatory quality and CSR, but we find 
that this is not the case. The results of Models (7)-(9) where the same specifications are estimated 
using pooled OLS (a method that is usually preferred with cross-country time-invariant factors as key 
explanatory variables), also exhibit little consistent support for the division and preference views 
because Citizenry Preferences, Democratic Participation and Executive Constraints are all 
insignificant). Only Regulatory Quality is (marginally) significant and positive.  
One may be concerned that the negative coefficients on participation indices in Models (4)-(6) 
seem counter-intuitive. In unreported regressions, we try several other democracy indices that measure 
similar aspects of political participation and democratic rule: the Democracy Ranking, the Economist 
Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) Democracy Index (both the overall EIU democracy index in 2006, and the 
EIU index of electoral rules and political participation over different years), the Free House Political 
Rights Index, the Unified Democracy Scores, and the Polyarchy Democracy Index 2000. The previous 
                                                          
13 In unreported regressions where we include all ultimate owner dummies and treat “no ultimate owner” as the 




results survive with different democracy indices and the coefficients on the democracy indices often 
remain negative. This does not mean that we interpret the negative coefficient on democratic 
participation as unaccountability of the democratic process with regard to ESG issues, but rather as 
inefficiencies of the democratic participation process in dealing with changes in ESG preferences: due 
to difficulty in consensus building, democratic participation in political decision making may be a 
burden for aggregating social preferences to pursue more CSR initiatives, especially for those often 
beyond laws and regulations. This is also in line with Glaeser et al. (2004) in that democratic institutions 
do not cause growth and create wealth; rather, they are the consequences of economic growth and wealth 
creation. In addition, a country’s globalization (Globalization Index) mostly has a positive impact on 
CSR, but is not consistently correlated with CSR, which echoes the findings by Ioannis and Serafeim 
(2012) that trade openness is positively but not persistently related to CSR. As the sign of the 
coefficient on GDP per capita is rather ambiguous, the income level is not a key determinant of CSR. 
For the firm-level variables, Table 4 also shows that ownership structure and board structure do 
not seem to matter much for CSR, as the coefficients on Dispersed ownership and the Supervisory 
board dummy are mostly insignificant. For forms with higher ownership concentration, the type of 
controlling shareholders—the state, individuals or families, financial institutions, pension funds, and 
private equity—mostly do not significantly affect CSR performance. Exceptions are private equity-
controlled firms (UO – VC/PE) that on average underperform in terms of CSR ratings (Models (4)-
(9)), and foundations-controlled firms that outperform (Models (4)-(6)). The former may be due to 
the fact that private equity ownership usually has short-term investment horizon and does not engage 
in long-term strategic plans such as CSR, and the latter can be easily explained by the social missions 
of charity foundations. Furthermore, most of the financial performance and constraints variables (not 
reported in this table to preserve space, but will be shown in later results) are statistically insignificant, 
indicating that they are not the primary source of CSR. This finding thus fails to support the ‘doing 
good by doing well’ hypothesis, in that more profitable and less financially constrained firms are able 
to assume more social responsibilities (Hong et al., 2012). Overall, we conclude that legal origin is the 
most significant and persistent predictor of CSR adoption and performance in our cross-country 
setting. 
[Insert Table 4 about Here] 
One may be concerned about the weighting of countries by the number of their firm-years in the 




largest companies in terms of market capitalization in each country (countries with fewer than ten 
companies are dropped).14 In unreported regressions, we conduct OLS tests on this equally-weighted 
sample with the same variables, and the above main results survive. 
Random-Effect Ordered Probit Estimations 
Since we use ordinal dependent variables, we re-estimate the above models by means of random-
effects ordered probit models15. The first three columns (Models (1)-(3)) in Table 5 report the results 
when we only include legal origins in the models with Overall IVA Rating, EcoValue Rating and Social 
Rating as the dependent variables, respectively. Similar to the GLS results of Tables 4, the coefficients 
on the three civil law origins are mostly positive and statistically significant at the 99% confidence level 
(with as only exceptions, the French origin in environmental performance and the German origin in 
social performance). As before, the economic significance of the Scandinavian origin remains the 
highest across the civil law origins: Scandinavian origin increases the ESG rating by over 2 grades 
relative to the English origin. Models (4)–(6) of Table 5 show the results of further including political 
institutions (Corruption Control, Executive Constraints, and Regulatory Quality) as well as other 
country- and firm-level covariates. Again, our previous results are upheld: legal origin (civil law) 
dummies are consistently positive and significant, the sign on Corruption Control and Executive 
Constraints is negative and significant, and that on Regulatory Quality is mostly positive but not 
consistent. These findings do not support either the division view or the preference view. Adding 
Citizenry Preference as an additional variable to capture social preferences to Models (7)-(9), does not 
change the results of the previous models. The coefficient on Citizenry Preference itself is positive for 
the overall IVA rating (Model 7) and Social rating (Model 9), but negative for the EcoValue rating 
(Model 8), and these signs are difficult to be reconciled with that of the democratic participation 
                                                          
14 This leaves us with 32 countries and 320 observations if  we run simple OLS, or 8,916 observations if  we run 
random effects or pooled OLS. 
15 Given the complex nature of  our non-linear estimation models, we cannot add in all the possible explanatory 
variables as they sometimes may not result in convergent estimations, and need to make some choices. We use 
Executive Constraints—suggested by Glaeser et al. (2004) and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005)—as our key proxy for 
democratic participation, as using the Vahanen democratic participation index often results in non-convergence in 
estimation. We do not include the ultimate owner type in the estimation as these dummy variables account for only 
a small portion of  the sample and including them will lead to non-convergence in the estimation. We also exclude 
the globalization index from all models, and include Corruption Control in Model (4) to replace Executive Constraints, 
for the same reason. In addition, the firm-level Supervisory Board dummy is replaced by a country-level Board Tier 




variable (Executive Constraints). This indicates that aggregate social preference is not a consistent 
predictor for CSR, and we hence do not find support the “preference” view. 
[Insert Table 5 about Here] 
Estimations with Alternative CSR Data 
One possible concern could be that our empirical results are driven by the peculiarity of our CSR 
data. The similarity in the results from the Overall IVA Rating data and from RiskMetrics data 
(EcoValue21 Rating and Social Rating) could be due to the fact that they use similar rating 
methodologies.16 To address this issue, we conduct our tests on CSR scores from other databases with 
global coverage: (i) the ESG Impact Monitor, 17  (ii) Vigeo’s corporate ESG (panel) data (three 
representative subindices which measure corporate compliance rather than engagement related to 
corporate governance, human resources, and consumer & supplier relations),18 and (iii) Thomson 
Reuters’ Asset4 (panel) data.19 We use the Vanhanen index and the Polity IV executive constraints 
index to capture the impact of democratic participation, and we also in- and exclude the variable 
Corruption Control as a robustness check. Table 6 shows that that our previous results largely survive 
with different ESG measures from the above alternative CSR databases: firms with civil law origins 
outperform those with common law origin in terms of CSR. The exception is in Model (3) but the 
reverse (negative) signs on legal origins are actually not that unexpected because the Vigeo corporate 
governance dependent variable measures the traditional governance concerns from an agency 
perspective. The fact that firms with common law origins do better in terms of shareholder protection 
is indeed consistent with the traditional law and finance view. In terms of compliance to human 
resources rules, firms under civil law do better than those under common law (Model (4) of Table 6), 
but in the domain of consumer and supplier concerns, only firms under Scandinavian legal origin 
                                                          
16 RiskMetrics/ISS was acquired by MSCI in 2010, although their original rating methodologies have been 
maintained. 
17 Also developed by MSCI but with emphasis on the ‘impact’ of  companies’ ESG performance (especially on the 
significance of  a company’s social and environmental impact and its ability to manage that impact). The database 
captures how well a company adheres to international norms and principles such as the UN Global Compact and 
ILO Core Conventions and assesses corporate strategies, disclosure and performance with respect to these norms and 
principles.  
18 ESG performance focuses on six domains: (1) environment, (2) human rights, (3) human resources, (4) business 
behavior (customers & suppliers), (5) community involvement, and (6) corporate governance. 
19 ESG information on 4,300+ global companies based on 250+ key performance indicators and 750+ individual 
data points covering every aspect of  sustainability reporting. The sample includes MSCI World, MSCI Europe, 
STOXX 600, NASDAQ 100, Russell 1000, S&P 500, FTSE 100, ASX 300 and MSCI Emerging Market. On 




outperform (Model (5)). In addition, the sign of the coefficient on the democratic participation indices 
is still persistently either negative or insignificant.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Robustness 
Investor protection and cultures 
We also investigate whether the impact of legal origins on CSR occurs through corporate 
governance rules and cultures. Presumably, legal origins can have a direct impact on CSR through the 
shareholder-stakeholder tradeoff (embedded in the spirit of law), or an indirect one through rules and 
regulations related to investor protection and corporate governance. Therefore, we include in our 
models the widely used anti-director rights index (ADRI).20 In addition, as cultures could have affected 
both legal origins and political institutions, and have an impact on CSR performance, we also control 
for culture by introducing the Hofstede five cultural dimensions at the country level (Hofstede and 
Hofstede, 2005). These dimensions are: (1) Power Distance, (2) Individualism, (3) Masculinity versus 
Femininity, (4) Uncertainty Avoidance, and (5) Pragmatism (for definitions see Appendix). We present 
the tests in Table 7: as investor protection and cultures usually endogenously affect economic 
outcomes (Stulz and Williamson, 2003; Sapienza, Zingales, and Guiso, 2006; Tabellini, 2010), we 
exclude the two economic development variables, Ln(GDP per capita) and the Globalization Index. 
In addition, to address the concern that ESG ratings are given relative to industry benchmarks and 
thus already take into account of the industry effects, we show results both with and without industry 
dummies to check robustness of the results. We conclude that the effects of ADRI and the Hofstede 
cultural variables per se on CSR are not strong or consistent, and that our previous results on legal 
origins, democratic participation, and political executive constraints, as well as ownership and board 
structures are maintained when controlling for corporate governance rules and culture. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
                                                          
20 Both the original LLSV (1998) ADRI and Spamann’s (2010) revised ADRI consist of  six key components: (1) 
proxy by mail allowed; (2) shares not blocked before shareholder meeting; (3) cumulative voting/ proportional 
representation; (4) oppressed minority protection; (5) preemptive rights to new share issues; and (6) percentage of  
share capital to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting. Replacing ADRI with other widely-used investor 
protection indices such as the anti-self-dealing index in Djankov et al. (2008) and the one-share one-vote index 





We relate the Vigeo sustainable country ratings (175 countries worldwide) to the country-level 
variables used in the above analyses: legal origins, political institutions, economic development 
variables, and ADRI. Citizenry preference is not included in the regressions (so we only rely on 
democratic participation as a proxy for aggregate social preferences), because it would reduce our 
cross-section sample size to 22. Still, in unreported regressions we find that including citizenry 
preference does not make the results much different. The findings in Table 8 suggest that: (1) Legal 
origins strongly explain the variation in countries’ sustainability measures—the overall CSR score, 
specific ratings for the environment, social issues and solidarity, and country-level governance 
(“institutional responsibility”); and their effects are more persistent than the impact of shareholder-
orientation (ADRI) and economic development; (2) The effects of political institutions are not 
significant, neither over long nor short time spans. Thus, our country-level results are largely consistent 
with the firm-level results. 
[Insert Table 8 about Here] 
 
Evidence from Quasi-Natural Experiments 
One major concern on our above cross-country firm-level analysis is that unobservable country-level 
alternative factors can drive spurious correlations between legal origins and CSR, and make causal 
identification difficult. This concern can be largely eliminated if we are able to control for country 
fixed effects that can take into account all time-invariant country-level factors, which, however, will 
also omit our key variables: legal origins. In order to further establish causality from legal origin to 
CSR while controlling for country fixed effects, we exploit several quasi-natural experiments that 
either changed a company’s legal regime or shifted firms to new equilibria. We then estimate models 
using a differences-in-difference (DiD) approach. In general, a DiD estimation can be specified as: 
𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝐴𝑐 + 𝐵𝑡 + 𝐶𝑠 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛾𝐼𝑙𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑐𝑡         (3) 
where 𝐴𝑐, 𝐵𝑡, and 𝐶𝑠 are fixed effects for countries, years, and sectors (industries), respectively. 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 
are relevant individual controls and 𝜖𝑖𝑐𝑡 is an error term. 𝐼𝑙𝑡 is the interaction between legal origin 




OLS estimate 𝛾. Standard errors are clustered across firms and time to account for serial and cross-
sectional correlations. 
Cross-Listing on Stock Exchanges 
Ideally, one would find an exogenous shock to the change of a country’s legal origin to study the 
causal effects of legal origin on firm-level CSR. However, such truly exogenous shock did not occur 
during our sample periods. Nevertheless, large multinational corporations do frequently cross-list in 
other countries, such that they may become subject to another legal regime (imposed by the listing 
rules). We therefore use cross-listing on different stock exchanges in different legal regimes (common 
law versus civil law) as our first quasi-experimental setting to explore the effects of cross-legal-regime 
listing on the change of firm-level CSR. To do so, we use the CSR sample with ASSET4 ESG ratings 
for this quasi-experimental test, because ASSET4 data focus on subsidiary-level ESG ratings, and 
cross-listing and scandals mainly have an impact at the subsidiary-level. The ESG ratings from 
ASSET4 are on a scale from 0 to 100. 
Table 9 reports the results on listings across different legal regimes, with each column representing 
one specification. The dependent variables are the overall CSR rating, environmental rating, and social 
rating from the ASSET4 sample, and the independent variables include the ones we previously 
controlled for and several additional variables thanks to the availability of data on Datastream (which 
embeds ASSET4),21 as well as the dummy variable indicating whether the firm had a cross-listing 
history. Importantly, with this setting we are able to simultaneously control for industry, year, and 
country fixed effects, which largely rule out alternative country-level channels. Panel A reports the 
results for cross-listing from the common law to the French civil law regime, with dependent variables 
being CSR ratings in the year of the cross-listing in Models (1)-(3), and CSR ratings one year after the 
cross-listing in Models (4)-(6). The DiD estimator is the coefficient on the interaction term between 
the cross-listing dummy and the dummy capturing the year of the cross-listing (“Cross-listing × year”). 
Consistent with previous results, the coefficients on most interaction terms in Panel A are highly 
significant and positive, and the economic magnitudes are again non-trivial: the average CSR scores 
increased by more than 4 grades upon cross-listing, and still increased by more than 2 grades one year 
                                                          
21 These additional variables include Tobin’s Q (market-to-book ratio of  assets), cash flow rights of  the largest 





after. These results indicate that upon and after being cross-listed from the common law regime to 
the French civil law regime, the firm substantially upgraded its CSR performance. 
One may be concerned that the above statistical significance is driven by alternative explanations 
such as the possibility that CSR changes are due to international corporate expansion or that investors 
(or stakeholders) are sensitive to the information salience of the cross-listing, regardless which legal 
regime the firm cross-listed into. We address this concern by showing in Panel B the results for cross-
listing from the French civil law regime to the common law regime, with as dependent variables the 
CSR ratings in the year of cross-listing in Models (7)-(9). Interestingly, we find statistical significance 
for neither the interaction terms nor the main effects of cross-listing. These one-directional results 
give us confidence that the causality goes indeed from the legal origin to firm CSR. 
[Insert Table 9 about Here] 
Another three quasi-experiments we conducted are related to unexpected shocks of corporate 
scandals or natural disasters, which moved firms out of equilibrium and magnified the costs and 
benefits of different legal regimes. These shocks include the 2008 Chinese milk scandal, the 2004 
Asian earthquake and tsunami, and the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill. All these shocks significantly 
shifted demands for CSR in certain industries, thus offer us ideal settings to investigate which legal 
regime house companies that shifted most. 
Chinese Milk Scandal and Product Responsibility 
The 2008 Chinese milk scandal was a food safety incident in China, involving milk and infant 
formulae, and other food materials and components, adulterated with melamine. By November 2008, 
China reported an estimated 300,000 victims, with six infants dying from kidney stones and other 
kidney damage, and an estimated 54,000 babies were hospitalized. Government inspections later 
revealed that the problem existed in products from 22 companies, including market leaders such as 
Mengniu. The World Health Organization referred to the incident as one of the largest food safety 
events it had had to deal with in recent years. The issue raised severe concerns about food safety, not 
only in China but all over the world, as many food manufacturing and processing companies import 
food materials and components from China, or had foreign operations in China. The European Union, 
European Commission, and the United States Food and Drug Administration all tightened up food 




The Chinese milk scandal raised worldwide awareness of companies in food-related industries on 
their product safety and responsibility. We therefore utilize the “product responsibility” rating offered 
by ASSET4 and compared companies on their reaction -across legal regimes- in terms of upgrading 
their own product safety, measured by their product responsibility scores. We exclude Chinese firms 
from the sample because we want to avoid the (expectedly strong) local impact on our international 
results. Panel A of Table 10 shows the results of all previously controlled variables, and the DiD 
estimator is the coefficient on “Civil law × 2009”. Again, the coefficient is positive and statistical 
significant with a non-trivial economic magnitude, indicating that food-related companies in civil law 
countries upgraded their product responsibility performance by more than 7 grades on average (on a 
scale of 100) in relation to firms in common law countries. 
Indian Ocean Earthquake and Corporate Donations 
The 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, was an undersea megathrust earthquake that 
occurred on Sunday, 26 December 2004, and was one of the deadliest natural disasters in recorded 
history. The earthquake was caused when the Indian Plate was subducted by the Burma Plate and 
triggered a series of devastating tsunamis along the coasts of most landmasses bordering the Indian 
Ocean, killing over 230,000 people in fourteen countries, and inundating many coastal communities. 
The plight of the affected people and countries prompted a worldwide humanitarian response. In all, 
the worldwide community donated more than $14 billion in humanitarian aid, while some funds are 
from national governments, most others are corporate donations. 
Corporations constantly donate money in normal times, but the earthquake and tsunami 
magnified the amount of corporate donations. We therefore compare the overall donations made in 
2005—right after the disaster—by corporations in our world sample. Panel B of Table 10 shows the 
results from this natural experiment with the same control variables as before, and the coefficient on 
“Civil law × 2005” is the DiD estimator. Again, this coefficient is positive and statistically significant, 
indicating that on average firms in civil law countries donated more money that those in common law 
countries right after the Asian earthquake disaster, which further supports our conjectures on the 
causation between legal origin and CSR, and on the preponderance of civil laws in relation to common 
law in fostering a corporate stakeholder focus. 




The Deepwater Horizon oil spill, also known as the BP oil disaster, began on 20 April 2010 in Gulf 
of Mexico on the BP-operated Macondo Prospect. It is considered the largest accidental marine oil 
spill in the history of the petroleum industry. Following the explosion and sinking of the Deepwater 
Horizon oil rig, a sea-floor oil gusher flowed for 87 days, with several failed efforts to contain the flow. 
The spill had a severe environmental impact. The US Government estimated the total discharge at 4.9 
million barrels (210 million US gal; 780,000 m3), which directly polluted 68,000 square miles (180,000 
km2) of ocean and had a ‘devastating’ effect on marine life in the Gulf and led to the gulf ecosystem 
being “in crisis”. Between May and June 2010, the spill waters contained 40 times more Polycyclic 
aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH)’s—which often include carcinogens and chemicals that pose various 
health risks to humans and marine life—than before the spill. 
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill was an environmental shock to all energy-related industries 
regarding the environmental consequences of their production and operations. We therefore compare, 
across legal regimes, corporations’ upgrading of their environmental concerns after the oil spill, 
measured by the change of the overall environmental score as the dependent variable. Panel C of 
Table 10 shows the results in a similar way in in Panels A and B, except that the DiD estimator is the 
coefficient of “Civil law × 2010”. This coefficient is still positive and statistically significant, indicating 
that energy-related firms in civil law countries on average upgraded their environmental performance 
by more than 7 grades in relation to those in common law countries. This result once again supports 
our conjecture that legal origin matters, and that civil law provides more fertile grounds for CSR. 
[Insert Table 10 about Here] 
As a further robustness check of our quasi-experiment results, we conducted several placebo tests. 
For the Chinese milk scandal shock, we interact the civil law dummy with years 2002-2007 (years 
before the scandal) separately and run regressions on the same specification, and find none of these 
interactions are statistically significant. Therefore, the significance of “Civil law × 2009” is more likely 
driven by the scandal.  
For the Asian tsunami and earthquake experiment, we conduct Placebo tests in the period of 
2002 to 2007, with year 2002 and year 2007 being unaffected by major natural disasters, and years 
2003-2006 being strongly affected by several major natural disasters. 22Again, the Placebo test further 
                                                          
22 Natural disasters such as earthquakes happened frequently throughout history around the world. We restrict our 
placebo tests in years 2002-2007 for the ease of  comparison, because after 2007, there are years with several global 




reinforce our “causality” story: the interactions with “unaffected years” (2002 and 2007) are not 
significant, while the interactions with “affected years” (2003-2006) are positive and significant, 
indicating that civil law firms increased more dramatically than common law firms during disaster time. 
The placebo test on Deepwater Horizon oil spill and environmental upgrading in energy-related 
industry gives similar results: the coefficient on the interaction between Civil Law and Year 2010 is 
positive and significant, while the coefficients on interactions with other years throughout 2002 to 
20012 are not, except for the interaction with year 2005, which is likely due to other environmental 
issues affecting energy-related industries in the same period. Therefore, the significance of “Civil law 
× 2010” is more likely driven by the environmental disaster (oil spill) shock. To preserve space, the 
results of these placebo tests are not reported. Overall, they provide further supports to the argument 
that civil law firms react more strongly in CSR practice than common law firms. 
 
Shareholder Value Implication of  CSR 
Finally, we consider the implications of CSR on shareholder value, which has not yet been 
explored within a cross-country setting in the extant “doing well by doing good” literature. To do so, 
we first investigate the direct effect of CSR on shareholder value. Second, we investigate the 
moderating effect of CSR on the negative association between agency problems and shareholder value.  
For the direct effect of CSR on shareholder value, the typical endogeneity issue between doing 
well (shareholder value) and doing good (CSR) emerges: CSR can influence firm value (“doing well by 
doing good”), but firm value can also reversely influence CSR adoption (“doing good by doing well”). 
Therefore, we apply an instrumental variable approach to address this issue by using instruments for 
firm-level CSR and conduct a two-stage least square estimation. The IV that we use is the political 
orientation of the government—left, right, or center—the data that is assembled from the Database 
of Political Institutions (DPI) and varies over time, with “Left” coded as 3, “Center” as 2, and “Right” 
as 1. First, there is evidence that the political color of the government or ruling parties are directly 
                                                          
earthquakes happened in these years: On Dec. 26, 2003, a 6.6 earthquake flattens the historic city of  Bam in 
southeastern Iran, and some 26,000 people are killed. On Dec. 26, 2004, a 9.1 earthquake off  western Indonesia 
triggers a tsunami in the Indian Ocean, killing 230,000 people in a dozen countries. On Oct. 8, 2005, a 7.6 




related to firms’ CSR performance (Hong and Kostovetsky, 2012; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2014). 
In particular, left-wing parties that are in power are more likely to foster pro-social corporate policies 
in relation to more right-wing parties. Second, country-level governments’ political orientation is not 
likely to directly affect firm-level market valuation, as they mostly reflect voters’ political preferences 
in a country, rather than managerial concerns to maximize shareholder value in a firm. Even one may 
argue that political orientation affects firm value through policies, such influence should mainly take 
place through regulating firms’ social behavior (i.e., through CSR), rather than through other channels. 
Even if one still believes that political orientation of the government affects CSR through other firm-
level channels, they should be mostly captured by our firm fixed effects which absorb unobservable 
time-invariant characteristics at the firm-level. An important note is that because both our endogenous 
variables and IV are time-variant, we are able to control for firm fixed effects in both stages, which 
largely rules out other potential channels.  
We show the second stage results of the 2SLS regressions in Table 11. The dependent variable in 
the second stage is the winsorized (at 5%) Tobin’s Q, defined as either the market-to-book ratio 
(columns (1)—(6)) of equity or the market-to-book ratio of assets (columns (7)—(12)). The CSR 
indices—predicted by political orientation of the country’s government in the first stage—are the 
overall IVA Rating, RiskMetrics EcoValue Rating, and RiskMetrics Social Rating from the MSCI IVA 
sample. In the first stage, our IV is positively and significantly correlated with different CSR indicators, 
and the Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistics are all much higher than Stock-Yogo weak instrument test 
critical values, supporting the relevance of our IVs. In the second stage, we document that the 
coefficients of various CSR measures (predicted from the first stage) are mostly positive and significant 
in the second stage, even after controlling for firm-fixed effects, which indicates that CSR is 
significantly related to the maximization of shareholder value. In unreported analysis when we replace 
the aggregate CSR ratings with those subindices such as Labor Relations and Environmental Opportunities, 
very similar results are obtained. These results may imply that financial returns and social responsibility 
are not necessarily in conflict as in Friedman’s (1970) view. In fact, maximizing stakeholder value can 
be consistent with maximizing the value of shareholders who belong to the broader group of 
stakeholders. 
[Insert Table 11 about Here] 
To test the moderating effect of CSR on agency costs, we utilize the rich coverage of corporate 




entrenchment index (E-index) as a proxy for agency problems. Our global E-index is constructed 
following the structure of the original E-index for the US as in Bebchuk et al. (2009). We incorporate 
the following provisions: (1) a poison pill; (2) a golden parachute; (3) a classified board, (4) other anti-
takeover devices, and (5) supermajority requirements for amending charters or bylaws.23 We conduct 
our test on a panel dataset of more than 4,700 of the largest public firms from 60 countries in the 
ASSET4 sample from 2002 to 2013. The dependent variable for all specifications is Tobin’s Q, defined 
as the market-to-book ratio of assets, winsorized at the 5% level. The key explanatory variables are 
the global E-index, the CSR rating (ASSET4’s overall CSR score, environmental score, and social 
score, respectively), and the interaction between the E-index and CSR (Entrenchment Index × CSR), 
together with the control variables specified above for Table 11. As shown in Table 12, the 
Entrenchment Index is significantly and negatively correlated with Q. The interaction terms between 
CSR and Entrenchment are mostly positively and significantly correlated with Q. In addition, the main 
effects of CSR are mostly positive. We interpret these results—especially the positive coefficients on 
the interaction terms between CSR and Entrenchment—as supporting our previous findings in Table 
11 in that CSR not only directly leads to higher firm value, but also moderates the negative effects of 
agency problems. 
[Insert Table 12 about Here] 
One may be concerned that managerial entrenchment is mainly relevant for firms/countries without 
major controlling shareholders, as the original test was developed in a US context and hence mostly 
applies for Anglo-American countries with dissipated ownership structures. In unreported regressions, 
we also measure the “wedge” between voting rights and cash flow rights of the largest shareholder as 
another proxy of potential agency problem for firms with controlling shareholders. In these 
unreported tests, our previous results on legal origins remain, and that the wedge variable is mostly 
not significantly correlated with CSR. 
Conclusion 
La Porta et al. (2008: 326) claim that “…. legal origins—broadly interpreted as highly persistent 
systems of social control of economic life—have significant consequences for the legal and regulatory 
                                                          
23 As a further robustness check of  our “global E-index”, we create Entrenchment Index 2 by replacing “classified 




framework of the society, as well as for economic outcomes.” In this paper, we focus on an important 
economic outcome, namely corporate social responsibility that is argued to contribute to a sustainable 
society (or ‘good society’ in the words of Shiller (2012)). We have set out to examine the foundations 
of CSR and its implication for firm value. We assess CSR using proxies for corporate stakeholder 
concerns, such as environmental, social, and governance policies which measure both engagement 
and compliance. In particular, by means of large-scale public and proprietary databases of CSR 
engagement and compliance to ESG issues, we find that legal origins are the main predictors of cross-
country CSR adoption and performance, whereas political institutions such as democratic 
participation and constraints on government, culture, firm-level corporate governance, and financial 
performance do not show consistent results. Country-level regressions confirm our firm-level results: 
legal origins are the most consistent factors that are significantly correlated with sustainability, while 
other factors are not. 
Our results yield a different picture of legal origins than that described by LLSV and numerous 
other law and finance studies. Whereas LLSV show that the English common law origin is superior 
in terms of judicial efficiency, protection against state expropriation, accounting standards, financial 
development, and more active IPO and acquisition markets, we find that the English legal origin 
fosters CSR performance significantly less than countries under civil law origins. Our results are 
consistent with those of LLSV in that English legal origin comprises a shareholder-orientation whereas 
civil law is more stakeholder-oriented which stimulates CSR. We find that companies under the 
Scandinavian legal origin assume most CSR; companies under the German legal origin outperform in 
terms of the adoption of environmental policies, while companies under the French legal origin focus 
on social and labor-related issues. Our results hold for both CSR engagement and CSR compliance, 
which further suggests that CSR is not merely a corporate strategic action (engagement) to boost 
financial performance, nor is it simply compliance to the rules. Rather, either compliance or 
engagement is fundamentally driven by systematic differences in legal regimes across countries. 
Moreover, civil law countries obtain higher country-level environmental, social, and governance 
sustainability ratings than common law countries. 
None of our empirical results and arguments are to deny the importance of finance and 
shareholder value to a society. As pointed out by Shiller (2012), a well-functioning system of financial 
capitalism with strong corporate governance can indeed contribute to a good (or a better) society, 




CSR, and Tobin’s Q. Our key argument here is that protecting the rights of other stakeholders, besides 
those of shareholders, are also important for achieving a sustainable society and the maximization of 
firm value. Therefore, protecting stakeholder rights is not necessarily contradictory to protecting 
shareholder rights. Overall, this study has implications useful for policymakers aiming at stimulating 
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Table 1. Intangible Value Assessment (IVA) Data Description 
IVA Factor IVA Subscore weight Key Metrics 
Strategic 
governance 
SG1) Strategy  <2% Overall governance; rating composed of total 
scores of non-Key Issues  
SG2) Strategic 
Capability / Adaptability  
<2% Management of CSR issues, partnership in multi-
stakeholder initiatives  
SG3) Traditional 
Governance Concerns  
<2% Board independence, management of CSR issues, 
board diversity, compensation practices, 
controversies involving executive compensation 
and governance. 
Human capital HC1) Workplace 
Practices  
<2% Workforce diversity, policies and programs to 
promote diversity, work/life benefits, 
discrimination-related controversies 
HC2) Labor Relations 20% KEY ISSUE: Labor Relations  
Benefits, strikes, union relations, controversies, risk 
of work stoppages, etc. 
HC3) Health & Safety  <2% H&S policies and systems, implementation and 
monitoring of those systems, performance (injury 






<2% Customer initiatives, customer-related 
controversies, firm’s support for public policies 
with noteworthy benefits for stakeholders  
SC2) Local 
Communities  
<2% Policies, systems and initiatives involving local 
communities (esp. indigenous peoples), 
controversies related to firm’s interactions with 
communities  
SC3) Supply Chain <2% Policies and systems to protect supply-chain 
workers’ and contractors’ rights, initiatives toward 







<2% Beneficial products and services, including efforts 
that benefit the disadvantaged, reduce 
consumption of energy and resources, and 
production of hazardous chemicals; average of two 
scores  
PS2) Product Safety  <2% Product quality, health and safety initiatives, 
controversies related to the quality or safety of a 




EM1) EM Strategy  <2% Default = 5, unless there is company specific 
exposure that is highly significant   
EM2) Human Rights/ 
Child and Forced Labor  
<2% Policies, support for values in Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, initiatives to 
promote human rights, human rights controversies  
EM3) Oppressive 
regimes  
<2% Controversies, substantive involvement in 
countries with poor HR records  
Environmental 
risk factors 
ER1) Historic Liabilities <2% Controversies including natural resource-related 
cases, widespread or egregious environmental 
impacts  
ER2) Operating Risk <2% Emissions to air, discharges to water, emission of 
toxic chemicals, nuclear energy, controversies 







<2% Water management and use, use of recycled 
materials, sourcing, sustainable resource 
management, climate change policy and 
transparency, climate change initiatives, absolute 
and normalized emissions output, controversies  
ER4) Industry Carbon 
Specific Risk  
25% KEY ISSUE: Carbon 
Targets, emissions intensity relative to peers, 






<2% Policies to integrate environmental considerations 
into all operations, environmental management 
systems, regulatory compliance, controversies  
EMC2) Corporate 
Governance  
<2% Board independence, management of CSR issues, 
board diversity, compensation practices, 
controversies involving executive compensation 
and governance.  
EMC3) Environmental 
Management Systems  
<2% Establishment and monitoring of environmental 
performance targets, presence of environmental 
training, stakeholder engagement  








<2% Presence of environmental training and 
communications programs for employees  
EMC7) Certification <2% Certifications by ISO or other industry- and 
country-specific third party auditors  
EMC8) Products/ 
Materials  
<2% Positive and negative impact of products & 
services, end-of-life product management, 







<2% Policies to integrate environmental considerations 
into all operations and reduce environmental 
impact of operations, products & services, 




35% KEY ISSUE: Opportunities in clean technology  
Product development in clean technology, R&D 
relative to sales and trend, innovation capacity   
EO3) Performance <2% Percent of revenue represented by identified 




Table 2. Average CSR Score across Different Legal Origins. 
The Overall IVA Rating is the weighted average score for different subcategories onwards. EcoValue 21 
Rating and Social Rating are from RiskMetrics. A higher score signifies that the company put more effort 












General Ratings      
Overall IVA Rating 2.72 (1.74) 3.10 (1.73) 1.26 (1.21) 2.83 (1.72) 3.93 (1.74) 
EcoValue 21 Rating 2.65 (1.77) 2.92 (1.78) 1.20 (1.21) 3.59 (1.85) 3.88 (1.70) 
Social Rating 2.75 (1.73) 2.99 (1.75) 1.40 (1.36) 2.84 (1.63) 3.85 (1.66) 
Strategic Governance 5.42 (1.85) 5.58 (1.85) 3.89 (1.57) 5.49 (1.82) 6.66 (1.73) 
Strategic Governance Strategy 5.47 (2.23) 5.91 (2.23) 4.01 (2.09) 6.01 (2.05) 6.76 (2.02) 
Strategic Capability Adaptability 5.28 (2.30) 5.63 (2.15) 3.83 (2.17) 5.76 (2.16) 6.38 (2.17) 
Traditional Governance Concerns 5.57 (1.97) 5.31 (2.00) 4.56 (2.21) 4.93 (2.07) 6.60 (1.84) 
Human Capital 5.56 (1.69) 5.88 (1.74) 4.06 (1.67) 5.44 (1.73) 6.39 (1.72) 
Employee Motivation 
Development 
5.93 (2.00) 6.30 (2.01) 4.85 (2.12) 5.71 (1.92) 6.61 (2.10) 
Labor Relations 5.26 (1.85) 5.62 (2.03) 4.25 (2.25) 5.51 (1.76) 6.13 (2.01) 
Health Safety 5.45 (2.14) 5.51 (2.01) 3.75 (1.97) 5.27 (2.09) 6.07 (2.11) 
Stakeholder Capital 5.33 (1.87) 5.44 (1.86) 3.97 (1.25) 5.23 (1.78) 5.78 (1.91) 
Customer Stakeholder Partnerships 5.21 (2.14) 5.46 (2.14) 4.01 (2.03) 5.42 (2.00) 6.09 (2.10) 
Local Communities 5.86 (2.21) 5.63 (2.10) 4.84 (1.88) 5.51 (2.01) 5.28 (1.96) 
Supply Chain 5.12 (2.31) 5.09 (2.20) 3.65 (2.32) 5.21 (2.15) 5.75 (2.38) 
Products and Services      
Intellectual Capital Product 
Develop. 
5.42 (2.34) 5.78 (2.25) 3.98 (1.96) 6.18 (2.29) 6.34 (1.95) 
Product Safety 5.17 (2.02) 5.37 (2.25) 3.84 (2.34) 5.39 (2.11) 5.88 (2.07) 
Emerging Market      
Emerging Market Strategy 5.37 (1.90) 5.61 (1.87) 4.54 (1.85) 5.27 (1.80) 5.85 (1.97) 
Human Rights Child and Forced 
Labor 
5.10 (2.12) 5.16 (2.05) 4.60 (2.08) 5.11 (1.94) 5.98 (2.13) 
Oppressive Regimes 5.11 (2.13) 5.00 (1.98) 4.78 (2.08) 4.97 (1.97) 5.34 (2.05) 
Environment (Overall) 4.66 (1.64) 4.87 (1.76) 3.06 (1.29) 5.49 (1.70) 5.70 (1.56) 
Environmental Risk Factors 5.13 (1.92) 5.09 (1.75) 3.57 (1.38) 5.47 (1.57) 6.03 (1.40) 
Historic Liabilities 5.22 (2.59) 4.92 (2.35) 3.21 (1.64) 5.25 (2.14) 6.02 (2.03) 
Operating Risk 4.96 (2.40) 4.52 (2.46) 3.01 (2.08) 5.14 (2.22) 5.59 (2.48) 
Leading Sustainability Risk 
Indicator 
4.80 (2.02) 5.01 (1.99) 3.41 (1.65) 5.63 (1.94) 5.83 (1.90) 




Environmental Mgmt. Capacity 4.07 (2.19) 4.55 (2.13) 3.21 (1.76) 5.46 (2.13) 5.59 (2.17) 
Environmental Strategy 4.93 (2.41) 5.34 (2.38) 4.06 (2.13) 6.15 (2.28) 6.54 (2.24) 
Corporate Governance 4.00 (2.45) 4.06 (2.30) 3.38 (2.18) 5.09 (2.31) 4.90 (2.31) 
Environmental Management 
Systems 
3.93 (2.57) 4.68 (2.66) 2.98 (2.20) 5.83 (2.64) 5.77 (2.62) 
Audit  4.03 (2.77) 4.26 (2.79) 3.36 (2.66) 5.35 (2.84) 5.20 (2.94) 
Environmental Accounting/ 
Reporting 
3.54 (2.54) 4.26 (2.47) 2.72 (2.18) 5.57 (2.90) 5.39 (2.71) 
Environmental Training 
Development 
4.18 (2.77) 4.71 (2.64) 3.52 (2.62) 5.67 (2.60) 5.69 (2.84) 
Certification  2.75 (2.54) 3.07 (2.52) 2.13 (2.11) 3.46 (2.55) 3.57 (2.85) 
Products Materials 3.51 (2.53) 4.11 (2.43) 2.28 (1.81) 4.94 (2.68) 5.36 (2.61) 
Environmental Opportunity 
Factors 
5.14 (1.89) 5.17 (2.09) 4.17 (1.62) 5.59 (1.90) 6.09 (1.83) 
Strategic Competence 4.38 (2.54) 4.92 (2.48) 3.52 (1.93) 6.06 (2.43) 5.98 (2.51) 
Environmental Opportunity 4.47 (2.25) 4.93 (2.21) 3.49 (1.83) 5.75 (2.21) 5.87 (2.08) 




Table 3. Non-parametric Tests on the Means of CSR indices by Legal Origins. 
(Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test Statistics) 
The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney signed-rank test compares two subsamples of different legal origins to assess whether their population firm-time 
mean ranks differ. *, **, *** stand for statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Standard errors (not reported) are clustered at 














Civil vs. common legal origin 18.676*** 58.391*** 19.059*** 23.905*** 22.369*** 34.366*** 
French vs. English origin 16.044*** 15.241*** 12.046*** 16.333*** 1.855* 4.907*** 
German vs. English origin 3.994*** 58.977*** 5.906*** 13.480*** 22.050*** 33.680*** 
Scandinavian vs. English origin 29.299*** 40.474*** 32.592*** 24.327*** 24.112*** 33.527*** 
French vs. German origin 11.026*** -30.546*** 6.623*** 5.194*** -13.318*** -18.235*** 
French vs. Scandinavian origin -18.879*** -28.764*** -23.121*** -12.277*** -19.137*** -25.728*** 
German vs. Scandinavian origin -26.137*** -8.600*** -29.329*** -17.580*** -11.923*** -16.326*** 




Table 4. Random-Effect GLS and Pooled OLS Models 
The dependent variables are the ordinal (ranging from 0 to 6) CSR ratings from MSCI, including the overall intangible value 
assessment (IVA) rating, the RiskMetrics EcoValue rating (environmental rating), and the RiskMetrics Social rating. Models 
(1)-(6) use random-effect GLS (RE GLS) estimations, and models (7)-(9) are estimated using pooled OLS. “Financial 
controls” include ROA, interest coverage, financial constraints (investment-cash flow sensitivity), and financial slacks (current 
ratio), and are controlled for in all regressions. *, **, *** stand for statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 









































French origin 0.399 1.076** 0.486 2.134*** 2.291*** 2.084*** 0.724** 1.614*** 1.462*** 
 (0.320) (0.474) (0.321) (0.578) (0.544) (0.610) (0.278) (0.555) (0.366) 
German origin 0.774*** 1.205**  0.506* 4.154*** 3.854*** 3.895*** 1.797** 1.435** 2.875*** 
 (0.249) (0.458) (0.276) (0.552) (0.666) (0.595) (0.633) (0.664) (0.524) 
Scandinavian origin 0.874*** 1.714*** 0.915*** 3.453*** 2.735*** 3.244*** 1.682*** 1.873** 2.958*** 
 (0.150) (0.355) (0.142) (0.502) (0.638) (0.412) (0.450) (0.816) (0.381) 
Citizenry preference 0.0060 -0.0008 0.0050 0.0537*** 0.0519**  0.0519*** 0.00530 0.00864 0.0361* 
 (0.0133) (0.0226) (0.0138) (0.0121) (0.0200) (0.0108) (0.0246) (0.0239) (0.0178) 
Regulatory quality -0.469 0.125 -0.434 0.144 1.186* 0.414 0.932** 1.240* 0.108 
 (0.445) (0.494) (0.421) (0.449)    (0.608) (0.669) (0.409) (0.648) (0.461) 
Democratic part.    -0.167*** -0.101*** -0.133*** 0.0393* -0.0624 -0.137*** 
    (0.0296) (0.0254) (0.0339) (0.0199) (0.0427) (0.0227) 
Executive constraints    -0.378 0.158 -0.560 -1.520* 0.172 -0.434 
    (0.552) (0.412) (0.502) (0.741) (0.486) (0.254) 
Ln(GDP per capita) 0.183 0.120 0.308 -1.093*** -0.17 -0.842* -1.144*** 0.273 -0.479 
 (0.227) (0.295) (0.208) (0.311) (0.278) (0.416) (0.198) (0.233) (0.280) 
Globalization index 0.0554*** -0.0130 0.0361*** 0.198*** 0.0523 0.136*** 0.122*** -0.0274 0.116*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0139) (0.0104) (0.0351) (0.0331) (0.0353) (0.0242) (0.0308) (0.0277) 
Ownership disper. 0.0396 0.0105 0.0366 -0.0169 -0.150 0.0182 -0.204* -0.307*** -0.0505 
 (0.0244) (0.0217) (0.0236) (0.131) (0.127) (0.118) (0.102) (0.0872) (0.118) 
Supervisory board 0.539**  0.227 0.700*** 0.316 -0.315 0.102 0.150 0.560* 0.453* 
 (0.205) (0.278) (0.178) (0.203) (0.241) (0.307) (0.464) (0.315) (0.256) 
UO – state    -0.507 0.220 -0.741* -2.689*** 0.124 0.193 
    (0.524) (0.738) (0.406) (0.621) (0.444) (0.342) 
UO – families    -0.567 0.467 -0.246 -3.103*** 0.547 0.563* 
    (0.349) (0.362) (0.307) (0.729) (0.468) (0.325) 
UO – foundation    2.161*** 2.261*** 2.038*** 3.907*** 2.475** 3.140*** 
    (0.448) (0.438) (0.437) (0.347) (1.011) (0.856) 
UO – financial     -0.656 1.173*** -0.561 -1.720*** -0.366 0.821** 
    (0.406) (0.191) (0.353) (0.528) (0.345) (0.355) 
UO – pension     -1.306* -0.0286 -0.891 -2.441*** 0.307 0.0737 
    (0.728) (0.841) (0.763) (0.770) (0.577) (0.511) 
UO – VC/PE    -1.798*** -1.206* -1.628** -5.278*** -1.804** -1.890** 
    (0.561) (0.635) (0.696) (1.307) (0.825) (0.786) 
Financial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 5. Random-Effects Ordered Probit Models 
The dependent variables are the ordinal (ranging from 0 to 6) CSR ratings from MSCI, including the overall intangible value assessment (IVA) rating, the RiskMetrics 
EcoValue rating (environmental rating), and the RiskMetrics Social rating. Models (1)-(9) are estimated using random-effect ordered probit models. *, **, *** stand 
for statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
DV= CSR ratings IVA Eco Value Social IVA Eco Value Social IVA Eco Value Social 
French origin 1.403*** -0.048* 0.181*** 0.729*** 1.881*** 0.448*** 1.750*** 0.374*** 0.352*** 
 (0.030) (0.027) (0.024) (0.053) (0.032) (0.036) (0.157) (0.059) (0.061) 
German origin 2.377*** 0.929*** 0.040 1.756*** 1.647*** 0.0502 2.304*** 1.335*** 0.428*** 
 (0.033) (0.027) (0.026) (0.039) (0.029) (0.032) (0.082) (0.050) (0.070) 
Scandinavian origin 2.557*** 1.204*** 2.128*** 3.082*** 1.084*** 0.701*** 3.769*** 1.658*** 0.773*** 
 (0.044) (0.031) (0.051) (0.069) (0.034) (0.035) (0.222) (0.036) (0.044) 
Corruption control    -0.108**      
    (0.049)      
Executive constraints     -0.059*** -0.224*** -1.045*** 0.188** -0.022 
     (0.020) (0.019) (0.073) (0.074) (0.084) 
Citizenry preference       0.001*** -0.007*** 0.024*** 
       (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Regulatory quality    0.371*** 0.498*** -0.370*** 0.199** 0.345*** -0.554*** 
    (0.093) (0.037) (0.061) (0.083) (0.055) (0.076) 
Ln(GDP per capita)    0.604*** 0.752*** 0.944*** 2.168*** -0.187*** 0.610*** 
    (0.046) (0.027) (0.047) (0.093) (0.036) (0.050) 
Board tier structure    -0.142*** -0.098*** 0.034*** -0.484*** 0.027*** 0.005 
    (0.029) (0.004) (0.004) (0.096) (0.004) (0.005) 
Ownership dispersion    -0.002 0.615*** 1.399*** 0.0183** -0.383*** 1.666*** 
    (0.005) (0.030) (0.037) (0.009) (0.03) (0.055) 
ROA    -1.201*** -0.682*** -0.741*** -1.298*** -1.046*** -0.349* 
    (0.190) (0.111) (0.190) (0.204) (0.148) (0.185) 
Interest coverage    -0.0004 0.0039* 0.0015 -0.0003 0.0097*** 0.0043 
    (0.0004) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0004) (0.0030) (0.0031) 
Financial constraints    0.0056* 0.0008*** -0.0000 0.0055 0.0012*** -0.0007** 
    (0.0031) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0034) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Financial slack    -0.019** -0.038*** -0.024** -0.030*** -0.052*** -0.020*** 
    (0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
N 47775 90496 61119 26855 51211 33596 23311 36775 24152 




Table 6. Testing Effects of Legal Origins on Other CSR Data (Random-Effects GLS) 
The dependent variables are the different ESG Ratings from MSCI Impact Monitor, Vigeo ESG Ratings, and the Asset4 database, respectively. The independent 
variables are the same as in Table 5 except that citizenry preference is not included. The democratic participation index used in all columns is from the Vanhanen 
index. *, **, *** stand for statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the country level and reported in parentheses. 
 MSCI Impact Monitor Vigeo ESG Asset 4 ESG 
DV = CSR ratings Overall Score Corporate Governance Human Resources 
Rating 
Consumer & Supplier 
Rating 
Environmental Rating Social Rating Overall CSR Rating 
 (1) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Laws               
French origin 1.616* (0.792) -16.51*** (2.333) 11.628* (6.501) 7.360** (3.282) 17.87* (10.11) 17.27* (10.26) 10.20 (9.512) 
German origin 1.861*** (0.386) -21.57*** (2.270) 7.786*** (2.454) 0.273 (2.276) 15.57*** (4.920) 1.218 (5.921) -11.00** (5.053) 
Scandinavian origin 1.517*** (0.517) -17.05*** (4.372) 8.929*** (3.126) 6.892*** (2.406) 31.85*** (9.735) 26.39*** (10.07) 25.44*** (8.640) 
Political institutions               
Democratic participation 0.029 (0.033) 0.096 (0.169) -0.007 (0.115) -0.299** (0.132) 0.277 (0.648) -0.084 (0.646) -0.245 (0.558) 
Executive constraints -0.256 (0.194) 1.176 (2.323) -1.241 (4.035) 2.719 (2.621) -3.263 (5.091) -1.580 (4.874) 0.003 (4.377) 
Regulatory quality 2.706** (1.179) 4.608 (5.504) 7.559 (6.971) 10.291*** (2.948) 23.61*** (7.540) 21.26** (8.615) 25.79 (7.955) 
Corruption control         -19.49*** (2.762) -23.24*** (3.287) -25.60*** (3.117) 
Economic development               
Ln(GDP per capita) -2.643*** (0.829) -2.475 (4.621) -16.42*** (2.727) -12.066*** (2.818) 9.860* (5.207) 9.537* (5.535) 14.08** (5.598) 
Globalization index -0.080 (0.048) 0.850*** (0.190) 0.497*** (0.210) -0.032 (0.112) -0.536 (0.643) 0.061 (0.664) -0.072 (0.573) 
Ownership and governance               
Ownership dispersion -0.063 (0.040) 0.463*** (0.114) 0.097 (0.148) 0.025 (0.129) 0.310 (0.290) 0.179 (0.354) 0.622* (0.330) 
Supervisory board -0.317 (0.777) 4.393* (2.530) 0.953 (2.506) 3.043 (1.945) 8.787 (5.542) 16.57** (6.549) 18.29*** (6.291) 
Controls               
ROA -3.483* (1.818) 0.156** (0.077) -0.134** (0.066) -0.067 (0.059) 3.894 (3.732) 3.845 (6.265) 27.31*** (6.173) 
Interest coverage 0.014*** (0.003) -0.042*** (0.007) -0.013 (0.020) -0.014 (0.018) -0.036*** (0.009) -0.026** (0.011) -0.011 (0.013) 
Financial constraints -0.010 (0.020) 0.001 (0.003) -0.014*** (0.001) -0.012*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.007*** (0.001) 
Financial slack -0.180 (0.174) 0.746 (0.903) -1.641*** (0.620) -0.857 (0.979) -0.410 (0.636) -0.441 (0.658) -0.985 (0.613) 
               
Constant 36.75*** (8.012) -9.544 (55.07) 156.5**** (36.67) 142.18*** (30.10) -8.911 (48.05) -41.69 (52.21) -89.19* (51.27) 
No. of observations 751  4283  4283  4283  13583  13583  13583  





Table 7. Investor Protection, Cultures, and Corporate Social Responsibility 
(Random-Effects GLS) 
The dependent variables are the ordinal (ranging from 0 to 6) overall IVA rating, RiskMetrics EcoValue rating (environmental 
rating), and RiskMetrics social rating, respectively. The independent variables are legal origins (omitting the English legal origin 
as the base case), anti-director rights index (ADRI), the Vanhanen democratic participation index, political executive constraints, 
regulatory quality, ownership dispersion, tier structure or a supervisory board dummy, the ultimate owner (UO] dummies, and 
financial controls (ROA, financial constraints, interest coverage, financial slack). The democratic participation index used in all 
columns is from the Vanhanen index. The five cultural dimensions are from Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) and measured at 
the country-level. *, **, *** stand for statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are clustered 
at the country level and reported in parentheses. 
DV = CSR ratings IVA Rating EcoValue21 Rating Social Rating 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
Law             
French origin 1.207*** (0.314) 1.036 (0.684) 0.922** (0.443) 1.677*** (0.563) 0.829*** (0.218) 0.601 (0.591) 
German origin 1.185*** (0.290) 2.050*** (0.388) 0.662* (0.347) 1.101* (0.565) 1.118*** (0.259) 2.210*** (0.301) 
Scandinavian origin 1.337*** (0.346) 1.849*** (0.478) 1.661*** (0.463) 1.193* (0.640) 1.181*** (0.253) 1.928*** (0.476) 
Adjusted ADRI 0.343*** (0.063) 0.699*** (0.090) 0.294*** (0.064) 0.737*** (0.159) 0.369*** (0.070) 0.605*** (0.082) 
Political institutions             
Democratic part. -0.013 (0.010) -0.038** (0.018) -0.013 (0.014) -0.049** (0.020) -0.009 (0.011) -0.031* (0.017) 
Exec. Constraints 0.309** (0.131) -0.524* (0.292) 0.064 (0.136) 0.283 (0.435) 0.111 (0.231) -0.672** (0.257) 
Regulatory quality 0.097 (0.319) -0.775* (0.446) 0.639* (0.355) -0.221 (0.411) -0.469 (0.405) -0.894** (0.353) 
Cultural dimensions             
Power distance 0.008 (0.011) -0.015 (0.016) 0.005 (0.008) -0.036 (0.024) -0.001 (0.014) -0.013 (0.014) 
Individualism 0.004 (0.002) 0.047*** (0.008) -0.0004 (0.005) 0.014* (0.008) 0.008 (0.008) 0.041*** (0.006) 
Masculinity 0.001 (0.006) -0.021** (0.008) 0.011* (0.007) -0.007 (0.008) 0.0003 (0.004) -0.020** (0.009) 
Uncertainty avoid. -0.009 (0.006) 0.014 (0.011) 0.002 (0.008) -0.009 (0.013) -0.009 (0.006) 0.018* (0.010) 
Pragmatism -0.026*** (0.006) -0.037*** (0.010) -0.011*** (0.004) -0.000 (0.014) -0.026*** (0.005) -0.041*** (0.008) 
Ownership and governance             
Ownership disper. 0.051** (0.025) 0.129 (0.165) 0.027 (0.021) -0.008 (0.144) 0.056** (0.022) 0.147 (0.151) 
Supervisory board 0.379* (0.202) 1.421*** (0.240) 0.410 (0.204) 0.763*** (0.270) 0.225 (0.182) 0.676*** (0.202) 
UO – state   -0.180 (0.510)   0.444 (0.642)   -0.223 (0.413) 
UO – families   -1.108*** (0.370)   -0.551* (0.321)   -0.987** (0.357) 
UO – foundation   0.208 (0.393)   0.992*** (0.351)   0.183 (0.282) 
UO – financial   0.786** (0.347)   1.084*** (0.320)   0.600* (0.305) 
UO – pension   -1.806*** (0.498)   -1.862*** (0.434)   -1.731*** (0.418) 
UO – VC/PE   -1.180 (1.064)   0.036 (0.709)   -0.969 (1.161) 
Controls             
ROA -0.351 (0.317) -1.534 (2.202) -0.599** (0.289) -0.527 (2.106) -0.488 (0.387) 0.047 (2.305) 
Interest coverage 0.001 (0.001) 0.004 (0.004) 0.001 (0.001) -0.004 (0.004) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.003) 
Fin. Constraints 0.004** (0.002) 0.016 (0.096) -0.0004 (0.004) 0.005 (0.091) 0.004 (0.004) -0.082 (0.128) 
Financial slack -0.012 (0.017) -0.041 (0.086) -0.042** (0.020) 0.090 (0.078) -0.029 (0.018) 0.013 (0.063) 
Constant 0.174 (1.120) 4.823 (2.727) -0.457 (1.106) -0.140 (3.382) 2.106 (1.785) 5.746** (2.407) 
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry FE No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  
R-squared adj. 9.8%  69.5%  9.4%  62.5%  8.5%  63.7%  







Table 8. The Determinants of Country-Level Sustainability 
The table shows OLS regressions for the cross-section of countries. The dependent variables are the 2013 country-level 
overall sustainability rating, environmental sustainability rating, social sustainability and solidarity rating, and the 
institutional sustainability rating from Vigeo. The independent variables in Panel A are legal origins (omitting the English 
legal origin as the base case), anti-director rights index (ADRI), the Vanhanen democratic participation index (average 
across 1960-2000), political executive constraints index (average across 1996-2008), regulatory quality index (average across 
1960-2012), the logarithm of GDP per capita, and the globalization index. The independent variables in Panel B are similar 
to those in Panel A except that the Vanhanen index is replaced by the Polity IV democracy index (average across 1960-
2008), and the political executive constraints index is replaced by the corruption control index (average across 1996-2008). 
*, **, *** stand for statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the country 
level and reported in parentheses. 
Panel A.  








 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Legal origins         
French origin 5.412*** (1.700) -0.235 (2.458) 6.124* (3.111) 12.053*** (3.190) 
German origin 8.157*** (2.746) 8.073*** (2.915) 5.610 (4.021) 10.205* (5.594) 
Scandinavian origin 11.661*** (2.337) 9.335** (3.568) 13.076*** (3.035) 11.601*** (3.301) 
Adjusted ADRI  0.852 (0.798) 0.119 (1.048) 0.397 (1.457) 2.645* (1.357) 
Political institutions         
Democratic part. (1960-2000) 0.100 (0.104) -0.135 (0.128) 0.251 (0.186) 0.264 (0.216) 
Regulatory quality (1996-2012) 2.487 (2.343) 0.191 (3.988) 5.043 (3.523) 3.385 (3.955) 
Exec. constraints (1960-2008) 0.245 (0.423) 0.581 (0.536) -0.008 (0.771) 0.208 (0.706) 
Economic development         
Ln(GDP per capita) (1960-2011) 1.715 (2.058) -0.074 (2.214) 5.357** (2.150) 1.748 (3.388) 
Globalization index (1970-2010) 0.064 (0.064) -0.029 (0.147) -0.053 (0.212) 0.160 (0.287) 
Observations 41  41  41  41  
Adj. R-square 80.7%  35.4%  85.7%  75.5%  
Panel B.  








Legal origins         
French origin 5.325*** (1.956) -1.986 (1.874) 6.817** (3.308) 13.213*** (3.711) 
German origin 8.208*** (2.563) 10.684*** (3.577) 4.318 (3.610) 8.513 (5.225) 
Scandinavian origin 13.224*** (2.895) 11.928** (4.684) 14.673*** (3.088) 12.295*** (4.056) 
Adjusted ADRI  0.878 (0.914) 0.557 (0.920) 0.629 (1.616) 1.761 (1.713) 
Political institutions         
Polity IV democ. (1960-2008) 0.824 (1.507) 0.137 (1.232) 0.205 (1.920) 3.139 (2.174) 
Corruption control (1996-2008) -3.109 (3.447) -10.255** (3.900) -0.970 (4.755) 2.847 (5.889) 
Regulatory quality (1996-2012) 5.356 (3.724) 9.718* (5.275) 5.379 (5.818) 1.504 (5.793) 
Exec. constraints (1960-2008) -0.572 (1.578) 0.182 (1.538) 0.181 (2.456) -3.107 (2.343) 
Economic development         
Ln(GDP per capita)  1.682 (1.789) 0.625 (2.067) 6.016** (2.262) -0.426 (3.804) 
Globalization index 0.127 (0.131) 0.048 (0.129) 0.039 (0.224) 0.189 (0.291) 
Observations 41  41  41  41  




Table 9. Quasi-Natural Experiments: Multiple Listing across Legal Regimes 
The dependent variables are the overall CSR rating, the environmental rating, and the social rating from the ASSET4 corporate ESG database. Each row reports the result from one model. 
The differences-indifferences (DiD) estimator in all models is the coefficient on “Cross-listing × year”, where cross-listing is a dummy variable indicating the firm had cross-listing history 
and year is a dummy variable indicating which year the firm was dual-listed across legal regimes. All regressions control for country, year, and industry fixed effects. Panel A reports results 
of cross-listing from common law countries to French civil law countries, and Panel B reports results of cross-listing from French civil law countries to common law countries. *, **, *** 
stand for statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the country level and reported in parentheses. 
Panel A. The Effect of Cross-Listing from Common Law to French Civil Law on Firm CSR Ratings 
DV = CSR ratings Cross listing×year Cross listing Tobin’s Q CF rights CF rights sq. ROA Ln(Assets) Ln(age) Ln(GDP) Globalization 
(1) Overall CSR 4.058*** 10.36*** 0.456*** -0.238** 0.0015 13.04*** 7.882*** 3.324*** 1.730 1.273** 
  (0.981) (2.237) (0.118) (0.105) (0.0011) (4.993) (0.522) (0.569) (2.122) (0.554) 
    Country, Year, Industry fixed effects: Yes R-squared: 43.5% Obs: 10295 
(2) Environmental 4.538*** 14.68*** 0.449*** -0.164 0.0014 1.744** 8.026*** 2.483*** -2.266 -0.173 
  (1.144) (4.881) (0.110) (0.0999) (0.0010) (0.827) (0.406) (0.450) (3.995) (0.345) 
    Country, Year, Industry fixed effects: Yes R-squared: 47.3% Obs: 10430 
(3) Social 2.796*** 11.86*** 0.526*** -0.179** 0.0016 1.525** 7.630*** 2.475*** 4.715* 0.839* 
  (0.777) (3.445) (0.101) (0.0827) (0.0010) (0.676) (0.337) (0.522) (2.488) (0.508) 
    Country, Year, Industry fixed effects: Yes R-squared: 42.8% Obs: 10430 
(4) Overall CSR 0.200 9.853*** 0.321*** -0.232* 0.0014 4.103** 7.510*** 2.926*** 1.591 0.931*** 
 (t+1) (0.566) (1.963) (0.0970) (0.129) (0.0014) (1.767) (0.405) (0.465) (2.205) (0.326) 
    Country, Year, Industry fixed effects: Yes R-squared: 41.7% Obs: 9027 
(5) Environmental 2.300*** 13.00*** 0.217 -0.170* 0.0013 1.586 8.147*** 2.307*** -2.926 -0.272 
 (t+1) (0.715) (4.299) (0.140) (0.102) (0.0012) (1.015) (0.482) (0.358) (4.414) (0.287) 
    Country, Year, Industry fixed effects: Yes R-squared: 47.0% Obs: 9332 
(6) Social  2.382*** 10.48*** 0.468*** -0.182 0.00170 3.344** 7.286*** 2.510*** 3.711* 0.812* 
 (t+1) (0.800) (2.792) (0.101) (0.136) (0.0017) (1.543) (0.425) (0.578) (2.047) (0.428) 
    Country, Year, Industry fixed effects: Yes R-squared: 42.5% Obs: 9332 
Panel B. The Effect of Cross-Listing from French Civil Law to Common Law on Firm CSR Ratings 
(7) Overall CSR 3.545 -0.483 0.466*** -0.241** 0.0015 13.083*** 8.012*** 3.326*** 1.700 1.274** 
  (4.322) (9.870) (0.116) (0.104) (0.0011) (4.993) (0.510) (0.572) (2.134) (0.556) 
    Country, Year, Industry fixed effects: Yes R-squared: 43.5% Obs. 10295 
(8) Environmental 5.296 4.096 0.458*** -0.168* 0.0014 1.784** 8.173*** 2.469*** -2.308 -0.171 
  (7.316) (11.315) (0.107) (0.098) (0.0010) (0.824) (0.431) (0.447) (3.975) (0.347) 
    Country, Year, Industry fixed effects: Yes R-squared: 47.3% Obs: 10430 
(9) Social -2.390 3.226 0.532*** -0.182** 0.0016* 1.568** 7.744*** 2.455*** 4.716* 0.840* 
  (4.945) (9.522) (0.097) (0.081) (0.0010) (0.662) (0.341) (0.522) (2.491) (0.509) 




Table 10. Quasi-Natural Experiments: Scandals and Disasters 
The dependent variables are the product responsibility rating from ASSET4 in Panel A, the amount of corporate donations from Datastream in Panel B, and the 
overall environmental rating (environmental score) from ASSET4 in Panel C. Each row reports the result from one model. The differences-indifferences (DiD) 
estimator is the coefficient on “Civil law × 2009” in Panel A, the coefficient on “Civil law × 2005” in Panel B, and the coefficient on “Civil law × 2010” in Panel C. 
The control variables are the same as in Table 9. All regressions control for country, year, and industry fixed effects. *, **, *** stand for statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the country level and reported in parentheses. 
Panel A. The Effect of the China Milk Scandal on Customer & Product Responsibility in Food-Related Industries Across Legal Origins 
DV = CSR  Civil law × 2009 Civil law Tobin’s Q CF rights CF rights2 ROA Ln(Assets) Ln(age) Ln(GDP) Globalization 
Product Responsibility 7.654* 31.39*** 0.756 -0.097 0.0014 -3.572 1.653 1.854 -2.906 -0.134 
 (4.580) (11.82) (0.597) (0.200) (0.0023) (6.854) (1.221) (1.687) (8.219) (1.044 
   Country, Year, Industry fixed effects: Yes R-squared: 15.9% Obs: 1087 
 
Panel B. The Effect of Asian Earthquake and Tsunami on Corporate Donations in All Industries Across Legal Origins 
 Civil law × 2005 Civil law Tobin’s Q CF rights CF rights2 ROA Ln(Assets) Ln(age) Ln(GDP) Globalization 
Corporate Donations 4.976* 23.92 0.361** -0.089 0.001 -4.468** 6.415*** 2.285*** 4.993* -0.426 
 (2.875) (24.39) (0.162) (0.0709) (0.001) (1.862) (0.387) (0.577) (2.705) (0.315) 
   Country, Year, Industry fixed effects: Yes R-squared: 24.6% Obs: 10353 
 
Panel C. The Effect of Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill on Corporate Environmental Performance in Energy-Related Industries Across Legal Origins 
 Civil law × 2010 Civil law Tobin’s Q CF rights CF rights2 ROA Ln(Assets) Ln(age) Ln(GDP) Globalization 
Environmental Score 7.041** 15.56 0.517 -0.303* 0.0033* -0.801 9.226*** 1.950 -4.195 1.667* 
 (3.124) (16.46) (0.432) (0.157) (0.002) (3.123) (0.806) (1.420) (7.711) (0.868) 
 





Table 11. CSR and Shareholder Value: Two Stage Least Squares Regressions 
This table reports the 2nd stage results from the instrumental variable (IV) approach with 2SLS estimations. The IV for CSR in the 1st stage is the country-level political orientation (left, center, right) of 
the government. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q measured by the winsorized (at 5% level) market-to-book ratio of equity in models (1)-(5), and the winsorized (at 5% level) market-to-book ratio 
of assets in models (6)-(10). The subtitle under each model indicates which CSR measure is used as the independent variable in the 2nd stage (predicted from the 1st stage): the overall IVA rating, the 
EcoValue rating (environmental rating), the social rating, the labor relations rating, and the environmental opportunity rating, all from the MSCI IVA sample. All regressions control for firm fixed 
effects. *, **, *** stand for statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. 
 DV = MTB equity, winsorized at 5% DV = MTB assets, winsorized at 5% 
CSR measures: IVA rating EcoValue rating Social rating IVA rating EcoValue rating Social rating 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Political orientation 0.333***  0.305***  0.331***  0.331***  0.301***  0.329***  
 (0.018)  (0.013)  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.013)  (0.016)  
CSR (predicted from 1st stage)  0.181***  0.291***  0.283***  -0.0089  0.0358**  0.0262* 
  (0.0416)  (0.0407)  (0.0404)  (0.0143)  (0.0148)  (0.0137) 
Largest shareholder ownership 0.003*** 0.0006* 0.001*** 0.0008** 0.003*** -0.0000 0.003*** 0.0000 0.001*** -0.0002** 0.003*** -0.0003** 
 (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0001) 
Sales growth rate -0.010*** 0.008*** -0.005*** 0.008*** -0.008*** 0.010*** -0.010*** 0.001*** -0.005*** 0.002*** -0.008*** 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.0008) (0.001) (0.0006) (0.001) (0.0007) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.0002) 
Dividend payout ratio 0.0001 -0.0167** 0.002*** 0.0003 0.004*** 0.0033*** -0.0001 -0.0063*** 0.002*** -0.0006*** 0.004*** 0.0007*** 
 (0.009) (0.0069) (0.001) (0.0006) (0.001) (0.0007) (0.0089) (0.0023) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.0002) 
Leverage, winsorized -0.014* 0.321*** -0.012** 0.298*** -0.018*** 0.292*** -0.014* 0.0261*** -0.012** 0.0230*** -0.019*** 0.0278*** 
 (0.007) (0.0056) (0.005) (0.0045) (0.006) (0.0049) (0.007) (0.0019) (0.005) (0.0016) (0.006) (0.0017) 
Ln(assets) 0.021*** -0.055*** 0.226*** -0.156*** 0.025*** -0.076*** 0.021*** -0.025*** 0.225*** -0.055*** 0.024*** -0.036*** 
 (0.007) (0.0049) (0.005) (0.0076) (0.006) (0.0046) (0.007) (0.0017) (0.005) (0.0028) (0.006) (0.0015) 
ROA 0.399 16.57*** 0.781*** 11.59*** 0.325 15.07*** 0.394 8.623*** 0.790*** 5.946*** 0.318 7.559*** 
 (0.295) (0.227) (0.171) (0.160) (0.235) (0.199) (0.295) (0.0775) (0.171) (0.0575) (0.235) (0.0674) 
Financial constraints -0.037*** -0.022*** -0.008** -0.042*** -0.025*** -0.032*** -0.037*** -0.004* -0.009** -0.017*** -0.026*** -0.012*** 
 (0.009) (0.0070) (0.004) (0.0035) (0.007) (0.0064) (0.009) (0.0024) (0.004) (0.0013) (0.007) (0.0022) 
Current ratio -0.193*** -0.039*** -0.189*** 0.036*** -0.168*** 0.005 -0.193*** 0.010** -0.190*** 0.047*** -0.169*** 0.031*** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004) (0.012) (0.004) 
CapEx/Sales -0.238** 0.386*** -0.059 0.335*** -0.281*** 0.385*** -0.237*** 0.209*** -0.053 0.215*** -0.280*** 0.207*** 
 (0.111) (0.086) (0.097) (0.090) (0.104) (0.089) (0.111) (0.029) (0.097) (0.032) (0.104) (0.030) 
Constant 2.723*** 1.151*** 0.907*** 1.946*** 2.589*** 1.110*** 2.731*** 1.408*** 0.925*** 1.686*** 2.594*** 1.449*** 
 (0.108) (0.177) (0.076) (0.100) (0.092) (0.166) (0.108) (0.061) (0.076) (0.036) (0.092) (0.056) 
N 14727 14727 25803 25803 18388 18388 14744 14744 25849 25849 18492 18429 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.0051 0.4208 0.0098 0.3037 0.0047 0.3751 0.0051 0.5493 0.0098 0.3792 0.0048 0.5052 




Table 12. CSR, Entrenchment, and Shareholder Value 
The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q (market-to-book ratio of assets) winsorized at 5% level for all regressions. Entrenchment Index 1 is the sum 
of the following dummy variables from Datastream: the presence of (1) a poison pill, (2) a golden parachute, (3) a supermajority requirement for 
amending bylaw and charter, (4) a classified board, and (5) other anti-takeover provisions, treating non-available values as zeros. Entrenchment 
Index 2 has the similar composition as Entrenchment Index 1 (and hence also treats non-available values as zeros), except that “classified board” 
(directors’ terms can be different) is replaced by “staggered board” (directors’ terms are uniform). CSR is measured by ASSET4’s overall CSR rating 
for columns (1)—(2), ASSET4’s aggregate environmental rating for columns (3)—(4), and ASSET4’s aggregate social rating for columns (5)—(6). 
Other financial controls are the same as in Table 11, which include: (winsorized) sales growth rate, (winsorized) dividend payout ratio, (winsorized) 
leverage, the logarithm of total assets, ROA, financial constraints, current ratio, (winsorized) and CapEx/sales, etc. All specifications include country 
fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. *, **, *** stand 
for statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 Overall CSR rating Environmental rating Social rating 
DV = Tobin’s Q, winsorized at 5% (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CSR 0.0011** 0.0010** -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0005 0.0002 
 (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Entrenchment Index 1 -0.0314**  -0.0304**  -0.0385***  
 (0.0141)  (0.0126)  (0.0135)  
Entrenchment Index 2  -0.0325***  -0.0298***  -0.0440*** 
  (0.0126)  (0.0115)  (0.0121) 
CSR × Entrenchment Index 0.0005** 0.0004** 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 0.0006*** 0.0007*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Largest shareholder ownership 0.0009 0.0009 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Other financial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 14877 14877 15044 15044 15044 15044 





Appendix. Definitions of Independent Variables 
Variable  Definition 
I. Law 
Legal origins The legal origin of the company law or commercial code of each country in which the focal firm is 
headquartered. We distinguish five major legal origins: English common law, French commercial code 





The anti-director rights index (ADRI) was first developed in LLSV (1998) as a measure of investor 
protection against corporate management, and later on revised in La Porta et al. (2008) and Spamann 
(2010). All the three ADRIs consist of the same six key components: (1) proxy by mail allowed; (2) 
shares not blocked before shareholder meeting; (3) cumulative voting/ proportional representation; (4) 
oppressed minority protection; (5) preemptive rights to new share issues; (6) percentage of share 
capital to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting. Each component is a dummy variable and the 
ADRI is formed by aggregating the value of all six components. The index ranges from 0 to 6, 
whereby a higher value of the index indicates stronger shareholder protection. Source: LLSV (1998); 
La Porta et al. (2008); Spamann (2010). 





Tutu Vanhanen’s index of democracy is computed by multiplying the political competition and 
political participation variables (also defined and calculated by WDR2011) and by dividing the 
outcome by 100. Higher value of the index implies higher level of democracy. The Vanhanen’s 
measure on political competition is used to denote the electoral success of the smaller parties (i.e., the 
proportion of the votes won by those parties in parliamentary and/or presidential elections) to indicate 
the degree of competition in a political system. This index is calculated by subtracting the percentage 
of the votes won by the largest party from 100 percent. The Vanhanen’s measure on political 
participation is the percentage of the population that actually voted in these elections (electoral 
participation). The total population is used as denominator and not the adult or enfranchised 
population). A combination of the two variables is expected to yield a more realistic indicator of 
democratization than either as a stand-alone measure. The Index value is taken for 2000, the initial year 




Institutionalized Democracy: Democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements: (i) 
the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences 
about alternative policies and leaders; (ii) the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise 
of power by the executive; (iii) the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in 
acts of political participation. Other aspects of plural democracy, such as the rule of law, systems of 
checks and balances, freedom of the press, and so on are means to, or specific manifestations of, these 
general principles. The Democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10). Higher value of 




Political Executive Constraints (Decision Rules): (1) Unlimited Authority: There are no regular 
limitations on the political executive’s actions (as distinct from irregular limitations such as the threat 
or actuality of coups and assassinations); (2) Intermediate Category; (3) Slight to Moderate Limitation 
on Political Executive Authority: There are some real but limited restraints on the executive; (4) 
Intermediate Category; (5) Substantial Limitations on Political Executive Authority: The executive has 
more effective authority than any group to which is it is accountable but the executive is subject to 
substantial constraints that group imposes in it; (6) Intermediate Category; (7) Executive Parity or 
Subordination: Accountability groups have effective authority equal to or greater than the executive in 
most areas of activity. Source: Polity IV. 
Corruption 
control 
The extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as the “capture” of the state by elites and private interests. Coded from -2.5 to 2.5 
with higher values corresponding with better governance outcomes. Source: World Governance 
Indicator – World Bank. 
Regulatory 
quality 
The ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit 
and promote private sector development. Coded from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher values corresponding 
with better governance outcomes. Higher value of the index implies a higher level of regulatory quality. 







The political orientation data measures the chief executive party’s orientation with respect to economic 
policy, coded based on the description of the party in the sources, using the following criteria: “Right” 
(coded as 1) is for parties that are defined as conservative, Christian democratic, or right-wing. 
“Center” (coded as 2) is for parties that are defined as centrist or when party position can best be 
described as centrist (e.g. party advocates strengthening private enterprise in a social-liberal context). 
Not described as centrist if competing factions “average out” to a centrist position (e.g. a party of 
“right-wing Muslims and Beijing-oriented Marxists”). “Left” (coded as 3) is for parties that are defined 
as communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing. “0” is for all those cases which do not fit into 
the above-mentioned category (i.e. party’s platform does not focus on economic issues, or there are 
competing wings), or no information. “NA” is for those cases in which there is no executive. 
III. Economic Development 
GDP per 
capita 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross 
value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies 
not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation 
of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current U.S. 
dollars. Source: World Bank. 
Globalization 
index 
The KOF Index of Globalization measures the three main dimensions of globalization: (1) economic, 
(2) social, and (3) political. In addition to three indices measuring these dimensions, an overall index of 
globalization and sub-indices are also calculated referring to (1) actual economic flows, (2) economic 
restrictions, (3) data on information flows, (4) data on personal contact, and (5) data on cultural 
proximity. Data are available on a yearly basis over the period 1970-2010. A higher score indicates 




The fraction of surveyees in each country who answered “A great deal” or “Quite a lot” (relative to 
“Not very much” and “None at all”) to the following question: How much confidence do you have in 
major companies (to take social responsibility). Source: World Value Survey (assembled by the 
Association of Religion Data Archives: www.TheARDA.com) 
Power distance “Power distance” deals with the fact that all individuals are not equal and is defined as the extent to 
which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect 
and accept that power is distributed unequally. The concept captures whether or not a society’s 
inequality is endorsed by the followers as much as by the leaders. A higher score signifies a large power 
distance between individuals. Source: Hofstede and Hofstede (2005). 
Individualism Individualism is the degree of interdependence a society maintains among its members and 
defines people’s self-image in terms of “I” or “We”. In individualist societies, people are supposed to 
look only after themselves and their direct family whereas in collectivist societies people belong to ‘in 
groups’ that take care of them in exchange for loyalty. A higher score indicates more individualism in 
society. Source: Ibid. 
Masculinity/ 
Femininity 
A high score on the Masculinity/Femininity dimension indicates that a masculine society is driven by 
competition, achievement and success, with success being defined by the “winner” or “best-in-the-
field.” A low score means that the dominant values in the feminine society consist of caring for others 
and quality of life. A feminine society is one where quality of life is the sign of success and standing 
out from the crowd is not admirable. Source: Ibid. 
Uncertainty 
avoidance 
Uncertainty avoidance represents how a society deals with the fact that the future is uncertain: should 
one try to control the future or just let it happen? The extent to which the members of a culture 
feel threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations and have created beliefs and institutions 
that try to avoid these is reflected in the UAI score. A higher score implies a higher level of 
uncertainty avoidance. Source: Ibid. 
Pragmatism Pragmatism describes how every society has to maintain some links with its own past while dealing with the challenges 
of the present and future. Normative societies who score low on this dimension, for example, prefer to 
maintain time-honored traditions and norms while viewing societal change with suspicion. Those with 
a culture which scores high, on the other hand, take a more pragmatic approach: they encourage thrift 
and efforts in modern education as a way to prepare for the future. Source: Ibid. 






Bureau van Dijk’s Independence indicator shows different categories ranging from A to D. Category A 
(divided into A+, A, and A-) represents the group of “independent companies” and consists of 
companies without any shareholders holding more than 25% of the direct or total ownership. Category 
B (divided into B+, B, and B-) consists of companies without shareholders holding more than 50% of 
direct, indirect or total ownership, but with one or more shareholders holding more than 25% of direct 
or total ownership. Category C (divided into C+ and C) represents the group of “indirectly majority 
owned companies” and consists of companies without shareholder holding more than 50% of direct 
ownership, but with one shareholder holding more than 50% of total ownership. Category D 
represents the group of “directly majority owned companies” and consists of companies with one 
shareholder holding more than 50% of direct ownership. The ratings translated into these numbers: 
A+ = 9, A= 8, A-= 7, B+= 6, B= 5, B-= 4, C+= 3, C= 2, D= 1. Source: Orbis. 
Ultimate owner 
(UO) 
UO stands for the percentage of direct voting rights owned by this shareholder who is identified by 
following the path of uninterrupted control rights (at 50%) throughout the ownership pyramid. UO – 
state: the ultimate owner of the subject company is the state, the government or a public authority; UO 
– families: the ultimate owner is one or more named individuals or families; UO – foundation: the 
ultimate owner is a foundation or research institute; UO – financial: the ultimate owner is a bank or 
financial company, or an insurance company; UO – pension: the ultimate owner is a mutual fund or 
pension fund, or a nominee/trust/trustee from the pension fund; UO – VC/PE: the ultimate owner is 
a venture capital or private equity firm; UO – industrial the ultimate owner is an industrial 
conglomerate (corporations). Source: Orbis. 
Supervisory 
board 









Following the original Entrenchment Index with US coverage by Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell (2009), 
the Entrenchment Index 1 is constructed for firms from 64 countries across the world during the 
period 2002-2013, and is the sum of the five dummy variables from Datastream’s ASSET4 sample 
based on the presence of: (1) a poison pill, (2) a golden parachute, (3) a supermajority requirement for 
amending bylaw and charter, (4) a staggered board (the terms of board members are uniform), and (5) 
other anti-takeover provisions. Entrenchment Index 2 has the similar composition as Entrenchment 
Index 1, except that “classified board” (directors’ terms can be different) is replaced by “staggered 
board” (directors’ terms are uniform). Missing values are treated as zeros. Source: ASSET4 
(Datastream). 
VI. Financial Performance and Constraints 
ROA Return on assets: net income divided by total assets. Source: Compustat. 
Fin. 
Constraints 




Earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) divided by interest expenses. Source: Compustat. 
Financial slack Current ratio, calculated as the current debts divided by current assets. Source: Compustat. 
Sales growth 
rate 
One-year annual growth rate of sales revenue of the firm. Source: Datastream. 
Dividend 
payout ratio 
Rolling 12 month dividend per share (adjusted). It is intended to represent the anticipated payment 
over the following 12 months and for that reason may be calculated on a rolling 12-month basis, or as 
the "indicated" annual amount, or it may be a forecast. Special or once-off dividends are generally 
excluded. Dividends per share are displayed gross, inclusive of local tax credits where applicable, 
except for France, Belgium, Ireland and the UK, where dividends per share are displayed net. Source: 
Datastream. 
CapEx/sales The ratio of capital expenditure to annual sales revenue. Source: Datastream. 
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ABSTRACT 
In the corporate finance tradition starting with Berle & Means (1923), corporations should 
generally be run so as to maximize shareholder value. The agency view of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) considers CSR as a managerial agency problem and a waste of corporate 
resources, since corporate insiders do good with other people’s money. We evaluate this agency 
view using large-scale datasets with global coverage (59 countries) on firm-level corporate 
engagement and compliance with respect to environmental, social, and governance issues. Using 
an instrumental variable approach, we document that CSR ratings are higher for companies with 
fewer agency problems (using standard proxies such as having lower levels of free cash flow and 
higher dividend payout and leverage ratios). Moreover, CSR is associated with increased executive 
pay-for-performance sensitivity and the maximization of shareholder value. 
Key words: corporate social responsibility, agency problems, value enhancement, corporate 
governance  
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“If the unity of the corporate body is real, then there is 
reality and not simply legal fiction in the proposition 
that the managers of the unit are fiduciaries for it and 
not merely for its individual members, that they are… 
trustees for an institution [with multiple constituents] 
rather than attorneys for the stockholders.”  
E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. Harvard Law Review, 1932 
Introduction 
The desirability of corporations engaging in “socially responsible” behavior has long been hotly 
debated among economists, lawyers, and business experts. Back in the 1930s, two American 
lawyers, Adolf A. Berle Jr and E. Merrick Dodd Jr., had a famous public debate on the issue of “to 
whom are corporations accountable?” Berle argued that the management of a corporation should 
only be held accountable to shareholders for their actions whereas Dodd argued that corporations 
were accountable to both the society in which they operated and their shareholders (Macintosh, 
1999). The lasting interest in this debate reflects the fact that the issues it raises touch on the basic 
role and function of corporations in a capitalist society.  
Two general views, often reflecting the issues raised in the Berle-Dodd debate, on corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) prevail in the literature. The CSR “value-enhancing view” argues that 
socially responsible firms, such as firms that promote efforts to help protect the environment, 
promote social equality, improve community relationships, can and often do adhere to value-
maximizing corporate governance practices. Indeed, well-governed firms are more likely to be 
socially responsible. In short, CSR can be consistent with shareholder wealth maximization as well 
as achieving broader societal goals. Some proponents of the value-enhancing view further argue 
that firm value maximization can incorporate stakeholder value, and not merely shareholder value 
(e.g., Edmans, 2011; Deng, Kang, and Low, 2013). The opposite view on CSR begins with Milton 
Friedman’s (1970) well-known claim that ‘the only social responsibility of corporations is to make 
money’. Extending this view, several researchers argue that CSR is often simply a manifestation of 
managerial agency problems inside the firm (Benabou and Tirole, 2010; Cheng, Hong, and Shue, 
2013; Masulis and Reza, 2014) and hence problematic (“agency view”). That is to say, socially 
responsible firms tend to suffer from agency problems which enable managers to engage in CSR 
that benefits themselves at the expense of shareholders (Krueger, 2013). Furthermore, managers 
engaged in time-consuming CSR activities may lose focus on their core managerial responsibilities 
(Jensen, 2001). Overall, according to the agency view, CSR is generally not in the interests of 




making a profit is to “harm the foundations of a free society” (1970). Of course, reality might lie 
somewhere between the value-enhancing and agency views of CSR. Some CSR related corporate 
policies may be shareholder value-enhancing whereas others may be driven by agency problems. 
The empirical literature testing these two views is mixed and thus has left the issues raised in 
the Berle-Dodd debate largely unresolved. For instance, a number of papers document that firm 
participation in certain social issues—such as not engaging with ‘sin’ industries, avoiding nuclear 
energy, and charity giving—is negatively associated with shareholder wealth maximization (e.g., 
Hillman and Keim, 2001; Brown, Helland, and Smith, 2006; Navarro, 1988; Brammer and 
Millington, 2008; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2013). In a recent study based on the KLD dataset, 
Cheng et al. (2013) find empirical evidence supporting the argument that managers of large US 
firms enjoy private benefits from investing in CSR. On the other hand, other papers document – 
largely using the same KLD dataset – that a higher CSR score is on average associated with lower 
idiosyncratic risk and a lower probability of financial distress (Lee and Faff, 2009; Goss, 2009), a 
lower cost of capital (Goss and Roberts, 2011; El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, and Mishra, 2011; 
Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, and Yang, 2011; Albuquerque, Durnev, and Koskinen, 2013), more positive 
sell-side analysts’ recommendations (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2010a; Bushee, 2000; Bushee & Noe, 
2001; Eccles, Krzus, and Serafeim, 2011), and higher abnormal returns and long-term post-
acquisition returns (Deng et al., 2013).  
The CSR empirical literature to date has two major limitations. First, much of the literature is 
largely focused only on the ex post effects of CSR. That is, the principal research focus is measuring 
shareholder reactions’ to CSR as captured by abnormal stock returns (e.g., Dimson, Karakas, and 
Li, 2013), the cost of capital (e.g., El Ghoul et al., 2011), and ownership changes (e.g., Cheng et al., 
2013), or on the financial consequences of CSR spending (e.g., Lee and Faff, 2009). However, both 
the value-enhancing and agency views are concerned to a significant extent with managerial 
incentives, which are ex ante in nature. More specifically, in the agency view, the managerial 
incentive to engage in CSR is a reflection of the generally poor incentives of managers at socially 
responsible firms, i.e. these firms suffer from agency problems. These agency problems then 
manifest themselves in the form of CSR activities. Conversely, according to the value-enhancing 
view, well-run firms, meaning firms where management is generally properly incentivized, will tend 
to have managers engaging in appropriate CSR conduct. In this way, the debate over CSR connects 
up with the general corporate finance literature on agency problems and ex ante managerial 
incentives, a fact that we will exploit in our empirical analyses. Second, the objective function being 
maximized is often implicitly assumed in the literature to be exclusively shareholder wealth 




regard, it is worth noting that in many countries firms are required by law or social norms to be 
not only concerned with shareholders. Given differing opinions concerning the appropriate 
objective function within the literature, an important research question is whether well-governed 
firms are more likely to be socially responsible.  
In this paper, we take a comprehensive look at the CSR agency and value-enhancing views 
around the globe. By means of a rich and partly proprietary CSR dataset with global coverage 
across a large number of countries and covering thousands of the largest global companies, we 
test these two views by examining whether traditional corporate finance proxies for firm agency 
problems, such as capital spending cash flows, managerial compensation arrangements, ownership 
structures, and country-level investor protection laws, account for firms’ CSR activities. While 
other studies using within-country quasi-experiment approach (e.g., Hong, Kubik, and 
Scheinkman, 2012; Cheng et al., 2013) focus on the marginal effect of variation in agency problems, 
our data and empirical setting allow us to examine its average effect. Based on this comprehensive 
analysis we fail to find evidence that CSR conduct is a function of firm agency problems. Rather, 
consistent with the value-enhancing view, well-governed firms are more likely to be socially 
responsible. CSR is associated with increased managerial pay-for-performance and maximization 
of firm value, which suggests that CSR in general is not inconsistent with shareholder wealth 
maximization. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II identifies several proxies drawn from the corporate 
finance literature for firm agency problems and their possible relationship to CSR. Section III 
describes the samples and specifications we will use when testing the CSR agency view. Section IV 
reports and discusses the empirical results. Section V concludes. 
 
Agency Theory and CSR: Hypotheses 
Agency problems manifest themselves through non-value-maximizing investment choices 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1989; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2000) and managerial 
pay that is not tied to performance (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Economists have focused on 
possible mechanisms constraining these agency problems, such as contract design, incentive 
systems, and internal controls (see Holmstrom and Tirole (1989), Prendergast (1999), and Bebchuk 




product markets (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983), and institutional arrangements, including 
legal rules (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2002). 
To assess whether CSR should be regarded as an agency cost or a value-enhancing strategy, 
we try to explore the underlying mechanisms based on ex ante managerial incentives, which 
connects the quality of corporate governance to CSR. More specifically, in better governed firms, 
managers are better incentivized and their interests and behavior are more aligned with that of 
shareholders. Therefore, under the value-enhancing view if CSR is beneficial to shareholders, it is 
also more likely to be carried out by managers. In addition, if CSR improves firm performance, 
managers are compensated for good performance and thus also have greater incentive to engage 
in CSR. That is, good corporate governance induces more CSR activities. In contrary, under the 
agency cost view CSR is detrimental to shareholder value but is more favored by managers to 
extract private benefits, i.e., bad corporate governance induces more CSR activities. We further 
elaborate these mechanisms below. 
Ex Ante Agency Problems 
First, we will explore in our analysis hypotheses based on agency theory at the firm-level in 
the spirit of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986), which has played a foundation role in 
the corporate governance literature (Morck & Yeung, 2005). Agency theory focuses on managers’ 
ex-ante incentives. According to this literature, agency problems can be particularly acute when 
the firm generates substantial free cash-flows in excess of those required to finance all positive 
NPV projects (Servaes and Tamayo, 2014) leading to serious agency problems (Berle and Means, 
1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers and Rajan, 1998). Since cash is the most liquid among all 
corporate assets, it provides managers with the most latitude as to how and when to spend it, and 
its value is the most likely to be influenced by agency conflicts between managers and shareholders 
(Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2009). When liquid assets are abundant, firms do not have to submit to 
the scrutiny of the capital markets that occurs when new capital is needed, and the managers have 
discretion to invest the funds as they please. Firms’ capital expenditure decisions are another 
channel of empire building and private benefits extraction (Bae, Kang, and Wang, 2011), and it 
directly reflects whether the firm has abundant cash to spend. On the other hand, dividends (La 
Porta et al., 2000; Morck and Yeung, 2005) and debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986), 
given their demands on cash flow, can constrain managers from diverting cash or committing cash 
to unprofitable projects that generate private benefits to insiders. When cash is tight managers will 





This literature focusing on free cash flow creating an agency problem suggests a causal effect 
running from corporate liquidity and leverage to managerial incentives to divert firm value (Jensen, 
1986). This suggests the following hypothesis reflecting the CSR agency view: a higher level of 
CSR is induced by higher cash holdings, free cash flows, and capital expenditure, and lower 
leverage and dividend payout. This hypothesis is consistent with the contention that CSR usually 
requires long-term investments that do not necessarily contribute to shareholder value 
maximization but do contribute to managers’ private benefits of control (Cheng et al., 2013). In 
contrast, the CSR value-enhancing view suggests the opposite hypothesis: CSR should be 
associated with fewer agency concerns and better managerial decisions, thus higher leverage and 
lower liquidity (cash and free-cash flows) (Krueger, 2013). The latter hypothesis is consistent with 
the agency theory that when cash is tight, the firm tends to be better governed as the manager is 
motivated to run the firm efficiently. Both hypotheses, it is worth noting, are based on the ex-ante 
incentives of managers as identified in the corporate finance literature: the abundance or scarcity 
of cash creates bad or good managerial incentives. 
Second, we consider this ex ante agency literature from a managerial incentive-performance 
perspective in the spirit of Jensen and Murphy (1990), and hence investigate hypotheses 
concerning the relationship between CSR and managerial pay-for-performance. As argued by 
Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2009), executive compensation is among the central issues in the debate 
over the effects of weak corporate governance. In the corporate finance literature, executive 
compensation helps align the interests of managers and of shareholders, and higher pay-
performance sensitivity leads to less severe agency problems (and thus shareholder value-
enhancement). On the other hand, weak pay-for-performance sensitivity has been widely regarded 
as a major form of incentive misalignment and a symbol of bad governance (Masulis et al., 2009). 
Therefore, weak managerial pay-for-performance can be viewed as a proxy for agency problems 
at the firm (“pay without performance”, Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Accordingly, the CSR value-
enhancing view would hypothesize that CSR is associated with stronger pay-for-performance 
sensitivity whereas the agency view would predict the opposite. 
Investor Protection Laws and CSR 
Of course, CSR and agency problems can emerge simultaneously as they are both choices of 
the firm in some sense. This simultaneity (or endogeneity) creates an obvious empirical challenge 
for investigating the relationship between CSR and firm agency problems. Several studies resort 
to policy and market-wide shocks as quasi-experiments to help identify a causal relationship 




this approach is hard to apply in a multi-country context. Therefore, we employ exogenous 
variation in country-level investor protection laws as instrumental variables for firm-level agency 
problems. The relevant country-level investor protection laws are those that provide legal 
protection of shareholder rights (La Porta et al., 2000), but do not directly regulate the protection 
of stakeholders other than shareholders. Broadly speaking, the investor protection laws that aim 
at addressing agency problems and investor expropriation, concern corporate decision-making and 
voting (corporate law), information disclosure in securities transactions (securities law), and 
regulation of related parties transactions (anti-self-dealing law), as well as the effectiveness of their 
enforcement (La Porta et al., 2006; Djankov et al., 2008).  
If these country-level investor protection laws help constrain firm-level agency problems, 
then being a firm in a country with such laws can be viewed as a proxy for fewer firm-level agency 
problems. Just as with free-cash flow, leverage, pay-for-performance, and dividend payouts, we 
will therefore use country-level laws as a proxy for firm-level agency problems in exploring the 
CSR agency and value-enhancing views. Again, the CSR value-enhancing view would hypothesize 
that firms in countries with strong legal protections will engage in more CSR relative to firms in 
countries with weak protections. The CSR agency view would predict the opposite. 
Large Shareholders and CSR 
In countries other than the United States, the U.K., and Australia, large firms typically have 
shareholders that own a significant fraction of equity (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; 
Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002). It is worth noting that ownership patterns are very stable 
in general, especially outside the United States, and are shaped largely by the companies’ histories 
and their founding/controlling families (La Porta et al., 2002). Therefore, large shareholders’ 
ownership concentration could also be considered as largely exogenous to particular decisions of 
a firm (Faccio and Lang, 2002). 
The association between the level of concentrated ownership and firm-level agency problems 
is theoretically unclear. On the one hand, ownership in the hands of one or a few large shareholders 
could create agency problems between controlling and minority shareholders (Bozec & Laurin, 
2008; Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010). The concern is diversion of firm value from the minority to 
the controlling shareholder. The possibility of diversion, and hence this type of agency problem, 
can be heightened as the firm’s free cash flow increases and leverage and dividend payouts decrease 
(as there is now more to divert). On the other hand, the controlling shareholders can effectively 
steer manager decision making, and hence also function as a mechanism to curb managerial agency 




agency problems are present within the firm, and can also be used as proxy for firm-level agency 
problems. Once again, country-level laws (corporate, securities, and anti-self-dealing laws) can help 
constrain the agency problem created by controlling shareholders and thus can be used a proxy 
for agency costs for this reason.  
Data and Methodology 
CSR Data 
Our data provide information on both the legally mandated and the voluntarily initiated 
aspects of CSR. Our primary data on CSR are from MSCI’s Intangible Value Assessment (IVA) 
database and the Vigeo corporate ESG database. Both databases are built by means of different 
proprietary data sources and employ different rating metrics, which enables us to cross-validate 
our results. The IVA indices measure a corporation’s environmental and social risks and 
opportunities, and are compiled using company profiles, ratings, scores, and industry reports, and 
are available from 1999 to 2011. Its coverage comprises the top 1,500 companies of the MSCI 
World Index (expanding to the full MSCI World Index over the course of the sample period); the 
top 25 companies of the MSCI Emerging Markets Index; the top 275 companies by market cap of 
the FTSE 100 and the FTSE 250 (excluding investment trusts); and the ASX 200. For this large 
sample with global coverage, MSCI constructs a series of 29 Environmental, Social, and 
Governance (ESG) scores25 covering the following categories: (1) Strategic governance, which 
relates to traditional corporate governance concerns and whether the firm adopts or has the ability 
to adopt certain strategic governance strategies; (2) Human capital, which concerns labor relations 
as well as employees’ motivation and health safety; (3) Stakeholder capital, which concerns 
relationships with customers, suppliers, and local communities; (4) Products and services that 
relates to product safety and intellectual capital product development; (5) Emerging markets, 
which concerns issues related to human rights, child and forced labor, and oppressive regimes 
arising from firms’ trade and operations in emerging markets; (6) Environmental risk factors, 
which include environmental-based liabilities based on operating risks, industry-specific carbon 
                                                          
25 A key ESG issue is defined as an environmental and/or social externality that has the potential to become 
internalized by the industry or the company through one or more of the following triggers: (a) Pending or 
proposed regulation; (b) A potential supply constraint; (c) A notable shift in demand; (d) A major strategic 
response by an established competitor; (e) Growing public awareness or concerns. Once up to five key issues 
have been selected, analysts work with sector team leaders to make any necessary adjustments to the 
weightings in the model. Each key issue typically comprises 10-30% of the total IVA rating. The weightings 
take into account the impact of companies, their supply chains, and their products and the financial 
implications of these impacts, illustrated in the Appendix. On each key ESG issue, a wide range of data are 




risks, and performance in leading sustainability risk indicators; (7) Environmental management 
capacity, which includes environmental audit, accounting, reporting, training, certification, and 
product materials; (8) Environmental opportunity factors such as the firm’s competence in 
embedding certain environmental opportunities in their strategies. Among all these 29 sub-
dimensions, Labor Relations, Industry-Specific Carbon Risk, Environmental Opportunity categories receive 
the highest weights in a firm’s global rating (they add up to 80%). Furthermore, the IVA ratings 
are complemented with the RiskMetrics EcoValue21 Rating and the RiskMetrics Social Rating scores, 
which are provided by RiskMetrics Group (now part of MSCI) and capture the environmental and 
social aspects of CSR, respectively. Companies in the sample are rated from CCC to AAA, which 
we then transform into numeric ratings from 0 to 6. The whole IVA sample (including the 
RiskMetrics ratings) covers 91,373 firm-time observations from 59 countries.  
The Vigeo corporate ESG data set focuses more on CSR compliance, as it applies a check-
the-box approach to rate how a firm and the country where it operates comply with the 
conventions, guidelines, and declarations by international organizations such as UN, ILO, and 
OECD. The Vigeo ratings cover six evaluation categories: (1) environment, (2) human rights, (3) 
human resources, (4) business behavior (which concerns relationship with suppliers and 
customers), (5) community involvement, and (6) traditional corporate governance. These six 
domains are further broken down into 38 ESG criteria (sustainability drivers and risk factors) 
based on universally defined social responsibility objectives and managerial action principles. The 
range of indices used by Vigeo include: Euronext Vigeo World 120, Euronext Vigeo Europe 
120, Euronext Vigeo Eurozone 120, Euronext Vigeo US 50, Euronext Vigeo France 20, Euronext 
Vigeo United Kingdom 20 and Euronext Vigeo Benelux 20, and are updated every six months. 
The whole Vigeo sample covers 7,048 firm-time observations from 28 countries and 36 sectors. 
Both the MSCI sample and the Vigeo sample cover the well-established equity indices of the largest 
companies across the world, rather than just select a specific sample of firms that engage in CSR. 
An important note is that for both the MSCI and Vigeo samples, firms are rated relative to 
their industry peers from both domestic and international markets, thus the ratings do not depend 
on the cross-country difference in jurisdiction, regulation, and the local CSR situation. This makes 
our cross-country data more credible and helps guaranteeing that our CSR ratings are not biased 
by country-specific characteristics. It also largely eliminates the concern that optimal CSR 
investment is country specific, and thus gives some credibility to using country-level IVs for firm-
level endogenous variables. In addition, we supplement our proprietary CSR data with the publicly 
available ASSET4 data from Thomson Reuters—also with global coverage and the similar rating 




descriptions of the MSCI IVA and the Vigeo ESG samples are shown in Appendix 1a and 1b, and 
their country distributions (as well as that of ASSET4) are shown in Appendix 2a-c. 
Finally, we obtained a cross-sectional dataset on country-level sustainability ratings from 
Vigeo, which rates each country based on the laws and regulations that fulfill the country’s (1) 
environmental responsibility (commitment to and performance in environmental protection), (2) 
institutional responsibility (rule of law and governance), and (3) social responsibility and solidarity 
(commitment to protecting human rights, political and economic freedom, and other social issues). 
These three country-level domains echo the firm-level ‘E’, ’S’, and ’G’, respectively. The metrics 
of the Vigeo country-level sustainability index and the MSCI firm-level ESG ratings are different: 
the latter measures corporate CSR engagement and compliance, whereas the former measures a 
country’s legal and regulatory framework in sustainability and is thus not just an aggregation of 
firm-level CSR data (see Appendix 3 for definitions). 
Empirical Strategy 
Our empirical strategy is to test the effects of proxies for agency problems on CSR. Based on 
our earlier discussion of the academic literature, we utilize five such agency proxies (putting aside 
for the moment managerial compensation): a. capital expenditure (CapEx); b. cash holdings; c. free 
cash flow measured as EBIT after tax minus the change in net assets (CapEx, minus depreciation 
and amortization, plus or minus the change in net working capital); d. dividend payout ratio; and 
e. leverage, measured as the ratio of total debt over total equity. Higher values of the first three 
variables (a—c) are related to agency costs caused by excessive capital spending, and higher values 
of the last two (d and e) relate to mechanisms that can curb managerial agency problems.  
Of course, the issue of endogeneity is as always important to consider. Country-level laws and 
ownership structures, as discussed, can help address this difficult issue by serving as instrumental 
variables (IV). The effects of law and ownership on our five agency proxies have been well 
documented in the literature. For example, countries with better investor protection (e.g., common 
law countries) have significantly fewer cash holdings (Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, & Servaes, 2003), 
lower free cash flows, lower investment sensitivity to cash flows (McLean, Zhang, & Zhao, 2012), 
higher leverage adjustment speeds (Öztekin & Flannery, 2012), and higher payouts (La Porta et al., 
2000). Given this, we conduct a two-stage least square (2SLS) model in which the agency proxies 
are regressed on country-level laws and ownership concentration in the first stage. Subsequently, 
the predicted value of each proxy enters into the second stage regression where CSR is the 
dependent variable. This model also includes other firm-level covariates (ROA, equity market-to-




measured by the current ratio). It should be noted that higher cash holdings, free cash flows, and 
more capital expenditures do not necessarily mean higher agency costs, as long as there are 
sufficient investment opportunities. The Jensen (1986) argument predicts the firms with larger free 
cash flow but with limited investment opportunities will suffer from the agency problem of misusing 
the money. Therefore, controlling for investment opportunities as proxied by Tobin’s Q (market-
to-book ratio of assets) in all our regressions in necessary. The approach of using country-level 
variables as IVs for firm-level endogenous variables has been applied in many studies (for example, 
Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2011) that consider cross-country variations in the 
dependent variables (CSR activities in our case).  
The country-level legal protection data come from well-established sources. Regarding the 
country-level laws, we use the anti-director rights index (ADRI) which was first developed by La 
Porta et al. (1998) and revised in Djankov et al. (2008) and Spamann (2010). For securities law, we 
use the private enforcement index concerning information disclosure and liabilities standard 
developed by La Porta et al. (2006). Since public enforcement was not found to play a significant 
role in investor protection as in La Porta et al. (2006), we do not use it as an IV (the Sargan-Hansen 
test also suggests that it is not a valid IV). For the regulations on self-dealing, we use the anti-self-
dealing index (ASDI) developed by Djankov et al. (2008), which contains ex ante control of self-dealing, 
ex post control of self-dealing, and public enforcement variables. As suggested by Djankov et al. (2008), the 
ASDI is better grounded in theory than the anti-director rights index, and focuses more on insiders’ 
related-party transactions. We further include the one-share one-vote index (mandatory 
proportionality of voting and cash flow rights) and the mandatory dividend index (percentage of 
net income that the company law or commercial code requires firms to distribute as dividends 
among ordinary shareholders) as used in Spamann (2010). We conducted the Sargan-Hansen over-
identification test on the overall validity of our instrumental variables: almost all test statistics fail 
to reject the null hypothesis that the IVs are valid. Therefore, our identification strategy and the 
results are robust. Given that our CSR data is constructed in a way so as to be comparative to 
industry peers (that is, the industry effect has already been eliminated by construction), we do not 
control for industry fixed effects but rather cluster standard errors at the industry level.  
Turning to managerial compensation, we test the relation between CSR and managerial pay-
for-performance by regressing executive pay on the CSR indicators, the performance indicators, 
and their interactions, along with other firm-level and country-level covariates. In the literature, 
executive compensation is usually measured as both the cash-based pay (salaries and bonuses) and 
equity-based pay (stock options, restricted stock of Long Term Incentive Plans). The average total 




dependent variable. The main independent variables include the different ESG ratings, Tobin’s Q, 
and their interactions. Following the traditional literature on the determinants of executive 
compensation (e.g., Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, and Makri, 2003), we also include a set of 
control variables, such as return of assets (ROA), the number of employees (Ln(employee)) as a 
proxy for the physical size of the company, the leverage ratio as proxy for creditors’ involvement 
into the firm, the number of analysts following the company (Ln(analyst coverage)) as a proxy for 
market discipline, and the percentage of a company’s shares owned by the largest shareholder. 
Industry- and time- fixed effects and controlled for in all regressions. The descriptive statistics of 
our variables are provided in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about Here] 
We correlate the country-level sustainability ratings—the country’s environmental 
responsibility, institutional responsibility, and social responsibility and solidarity—with the firm-
level CSR ratings from the MSCI IVA, the Vigeo ESG, and the ASSET4 ESG databases. We do 
this so as to see whether our firm-level CSR measurements are significantly related to country-
level sustainability ratings. The Pearson correlations coefficients between these firm- and country-
level sustainability indices are shown in Table 2. On average, the coefficients are around 20 to 30 
percent, which are high given that the country-level and the firm-level ratings use completely 
different rating metrics. The correlation between Vigeo’s ‘human resource concern’ and ‘country 
institutional responsibility’ is as high as 47 percent, which implies that corporate behavior 
benefiting its employees and properly putting its human resources into service is largely governed 
by the rule of law and country governance. Such high correlations imply that our firm-level CSR 
measurements are in fact closely related to country-level societal sustainability ratings.  
We also measure for a US subsample the correlation between our firm-level CSR ratings with 
Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell’s (2009) entrenchment index (the E-index) which is believed to drive 
corporate governance quality. The E-index consists of 6 governance provisions—staggered board, 
limits to shareholder amendments of the bylaws, supermajority requirements for mergers, 
supermajority requirements for charter amendments, poison pills and golden parachutes. The 
correlations between the E-index and the CSR scores for our US subsample are rather low (merely 
6%) and negative, which suggests that CSR is not adopted by an entrenched management and 
hence expresses an agency problem. We perform a more thorough analysis of this issue in the 
regression analysis of the next section. 






In Table 3, we examine the relationship between CSR and our five agency proxies: cash 
holdings, free cash flow, CapEx, dividend payout ratio, and leverage. The agency view predicts a 
positive relation between CSR and the first three proxies and a negative relationship for the last 
two. The value-enhancing view on CSR predicts the opposite. 
Panel A shows the regression results for the MSCI IVA sample, and Panel B shows those for 
the Vigeo ESG sample. In both panels, the five proxies are instrumented by the country-level legal 
shareholder protection measures and the firm-level ownership concentration. One important note 
is that the correlations between the five proxies are rather small, ranging from -0.8% to 23% for 
both the MSCI IVA and the Vigeo ESG samples, thus mitigating multicollinearity concerns. In 
the second stage, CSR ratings are regressed on the five “predicted” agency proxies as estimated 
from the first stage, and on the other control variables, with bootstrapping-adjusted standard 
errors. As we are interested in testing the CSR agency view (in relation to the CSR value-enhancing 
view), we only report the second-stage results. The dependent variables in Panel A are the Overall 
IVA Ratings (covering all ESG dimensions), the RiskMetrics EcoValue Ratings (focusing on 
ecological efficiencies), the RiskMetrics Social Ratings (focusing on social issues), as well as the three 
sub-indices that receive the highest weights: Labor Relations, Industry-specific Carbon Risks, and 
Environmental Opportunities, and three aggregate subscores: Strategic Governance (including traditional 
governance), Human Capital, and Stakeholder Capital. We switch between using ROA and Tobin’s 
Q (measured by the equity market-to-book ratio), and between unwinsorized and winsorized 
dividend payout ratio to cross-validate our results. The dependent variables in Panel B are the 
Overall Vigeo ESG, Environment, Human Resource, Human Rights, Community Involvement, Customers & 
Suppliers, and Corporate Governance.  
In Panel A, the coefficients on the three liquidity-focused agency proxies—cash holdings, free 
cash flows, and capital expenditures—are mostly negative and statistically significant, whereas the 
coefficients on the financial constraint-focused agency proxies – dividend payouts and leverage 
are mostly positive. These findings therefore do not support the CSR agency view. The economic 
significance is large, although it should be interpreted with caution, because the IVs mostly are at 
the country-level (within a range of 0-5) while the endogenous variables are at the firm-level 
(Ayyagari et al., 2011): one percent decrease in the cash holdings to assets ratio or in free-cash 




a one percent change in the CapEx to assets ratio induces a 1 grade change in the ESG rating in 
most cases. For Panel A, we find strong support for the ‘doing good when doing well’ hypothesis, 
as the coefficients on either ROA or market-to-book ratios are mostly positive. In addition, the 
financial constraint proxies are mostly negatively correlated with the ESG ratings, while financial 
slack (as measured by the current ratio) are mostly positively associated with the ESG ratings. 
Similar patterns are observed in Panel B where the Vigeo ESG ratings are the dependent variables, 
and time fixed effects are controlled for—at the rating date level for columns (1)—(5) and at the 
year-level for columns (6)—(7) so as to check the robustness. Once again, these results do not 
support the CSR agency view. Again, we are cautious in interpreting the economic magnitudes of 
coefficients from 2SLS, given that we use country-level variables as IVs. The main focus is on the 
sign of coefficients which directly links to our theoretical predictions. 
We note that for human resources and human rights, country-level legal protection indices 
seem to be weak instruments as the p-values of the Sargan-Hansen test are below 0.1, which may 
indicate that the legal protection of investor rights can also affect human resource and human 
rights through other channels than the agency channel. However, the results for other CSR 
indicators are mostly consistent with the previous results, with the economic effects being large.  
In terms of causation, the interpretation of our results ought to be done with care. Still, given 
our identification strategy and the Sargan-Hansen’s test statistics which support the validity of our 
IVs, we tend to interpret them as follows: well-governed firms suffer less from agency concerns: 
when cash is tight—less cash reserves, free cash flows and capital spending, and more dividend 
payouts and interest payouts— managers are motivated to run the firm more efficiently and care 
more about the long run through engaging in CSR activities, and are more willing to disburse 
earnings to shareholders and other stakeholders. 
[Insert Table 3 about Here] 
In Table 4 we examine the relationship between CSR, executive compensation, and firm 
performance. The dependent variable is the average compensation of executives at the firm, and 
the independent variables include CSR scores, Tobin’s Q, and their interaction term, together with 
other control variables that are used in the previous literature on executive compensation. Again, 
Panel A reports the results with CSR measured by MSCI’s IVA ratings, while Panel B reports the 
results with CSR proxied by Vigeo’s ESG ratings. As mentioned before, the agency view argues 
that CSR activities will be associated with reduced managerial pay-for-performance sensitivity, and 




The value-enhancing view argues that CSR strengthens pay-for-performance, and thus predicts a 
positive sign of the interaction term.  
The results on pay-for-performance again reject the agency view, but support the value-
enhancing view. The coefficients on the interaction terms between CSR (overall IVA, 
environmental, social) performance and firm valuation (Tobin’s Q) are consistently positive, which 
indicates that engaging in CSR is actually associated with increased pay-for-performance sensitivity. 
The economic effects are non-trivial: the effects of performance on pay (scaled by total assets) in 
more socially responsible firms (with one-grade higher in CSR ratings) are on average 10% higher 
than less socially responsible firms. The coefficient on the interaction term is not statistically 
significant in the regression with social ratings with the CSR measure, which may potentially imply 
that social issues such as human rights are relatively peripheral to firm performance, thus are not 
priced in managerial compensation. The coefficients on leverage are mostly negative, which 
confirm to the disciplinary role of debt: leverage can reduce the likelihood of managerial 
entrenchment through monitoring by creditors and the threat that the CEO loses his job following 
bankruptcy-induced liquidation.  
[Insert Table 4 about Here] 
Our interpretation of these regression results largely hinges on the assumption that our 
instruments are valid, that legal protection of shareholder rights and ownership concentration 
affect CSR through addressing agency concerns, rather than via other channels. With respect to 
our instruments, one may argue—as do, for example, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001)—that ownership structure might also be endogenously determined and is thus 
also a choice variable. To deal with the potential endogeneity of ownership to corporate policies, 
we also instrument the ownership variable with legal protection indices that were used before—
ADRI, ASDI, private enforcement of securities law, the revised one-share one-vote rule 
(mandatory proportionality of voting and cash flow) index, the revised mandatory dividend index, 
and the direct ownership of large shareholders. Reverse causality is not of concern because legal 
protection is clearly exogenous to CSR. In unreported tests, the results are very similar to those in 
Table 3, in that liquidity-focused agency proxies are mostly negatively correlated with CSR, while 
the coefficients on dividend payouts and leverage have a positive sign.  
Even if legal protection were a weak instrument and were to affect CSR through unobservable 
channels other than the agency channel (for example, through difficult to quantify cultural norms), 
the coefficients’ signs still would not support the agency view. Even if other unobservable factors 




abundance of cash and CSR; as long as the coefficients are not positive and significant, the agency 
view is unsubstantiated. As a robustness check, we more directly test the agency view in relation 
to the value-enhancing view without an IV setting in the next section. 
Country-level investor protection and firm-level CSR 
As mentioned above, although our instruments pass the Sargan-Hansen test, one may still 
question whether the legal protections of shareholder rights at the country level are really valid 
instruments for the agency problems of cash at the firm level. If country-level factors can induce 
firm-level agency conflicts through multiple channels, an omitted variable bias may still exist 
making causal interpretation of the relationship between cash flows and CSR less credible.  
As the main purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether CSR investments result from agency 
problems, we also measure the “direct” correlation between legal protection and CSR (setting aside 
for a moment the instrumental approach as performed in previous section, which may be 
considered as problematic). The reason is straightforward: in countries with stronger legal 
protections of shareholder rights, agency problems are also likely to be lower. If CSR activities are 
due to agency problems, they should also be lower. That is, the CSR agency cost view predicts a 
negative association between legal protection and CSR. To test this hypothesis, we regress CSR 
ratings on various legal protection indices and report the results in Table 5. We proxy the degree 
of shareholder-orientation embedded in company law by means of the ADRI index as adjusted by 
Spamann (2010). The legal rules on constraining insiders’ self-dealing are proxied by the ASDI and 
the public enforcement index, developed by Djankov et al. (2008). We do not report the parameter 
estimates of the control variables which comprise cash holdings (scaled by total assets), leverage 
ratio, ROA, Tobin’s Q, financial constraints, interest coverage, current ratio, ownership dispersion 
(the Bureau van Dijck’s independence indicator), as well as industry- and time-fixed effects, to save 
space.  
According to the CSR agency view, stronger legal protection of shareholder rights, as proxied 
by ADRI (the aggregation of six shareholder protection rules) and other legal indices, should 
reduce the incentive and ability of corporate insiders (directors and officers) to extract private 
benefits through CSR-related spending. In contrast, the CSR value-enhancing view predicts that 
CSR-spending is positively related to shareholder protection, as managers under stricter laws are 
motivated to generate more shareholder value through CSR projects. Both company law (the 
adjusted ADRI) and anti-self-dealing regulation (ASDI) in fact significantly, positively predict 
firms’ CSR engagement (Panel A, the MSCI IVA sample). As a robustness test, we include the 




decompose the anti-self-dealing index into ex ante private control which concerns the approval 
process and mandatory extensive disclosure, and ex post private control which concerns the ease of 
proving wrongdoing (for definitions, see the Appendix and Djankov et al. (2008)), into our models 
and find that our above results survive. The persistent positive correlations between corporate law 
and CSR suggest that when legal rules are stronger in disciplining corporate behavior towards 
“good conduct” for investors, especially minority shareholders (as both ADRI and anti-self-
dealing indices mainly concern minority shareholder protection against corporate insiders and 
controlling shareholders), firms are also more likely engage in social responsibilities. Furthermore, 
the coefficients of explanatory variables of these tests do not differ much from those in the 2SLS 
regressions, indicating that agency concerns are the main/only channel through which legal 
protection of shareholder rights affect CSR. In Panel B where the dependent variables are the 
Vigeo ESG ratings that focus more on CSR compliance (rather than on the CSR practice or 
engagement of Panel A), company law (the adjusted ADRI) still plays a positive role, but the anti-
self-dealing rules do not. The insignificance of the coefficients on the anti-self-dealing index and 
the public enforcement of self-dealing index is not that surprising, given that the two indices 
measure transactions while compliance to CSR standards mainly concerns the firm’s daily operations, 
such as sticking to labor regulations and obtaining an ISO14000 certification, rather than 
(intercorporate) transactions that are measured by the anti-self-dealing index.  
[Insert Table 5 about Here] 
Large shareholders’ ownership and control and CSR 
Similar concerns on IV validity may apply to ownership concentration. Therefore, we 
investigate the direct relationship between large shareholder ownership structure and CSR in this 
section. The previous tests mostly concern managerial agency problems, but controlling 
shareholders can also engage in rent extraction which constitutes another type of agency problem 
(“large shareholder agency problem”). With respect to CSR spending, prior research suggests that 
large shareholders may have conflicting interests with minority shareholders (Barnea and Rubin, 
2010; Benabou and Tirole, 2010; Cheng et al., 2013). However, the existence of both the 
convergence-of-interest effect and the entrenchment effect (of major shareholders) complicates 
the relationship between large shareholders’ ownership stakes and CSR practice. In general, CSR 
is costly for shareholders if perceived as an agency problem, and therefore higher cash-flow rights 
(ownership stakes) should lead - other things equal - to lower CSR expenditure, because large 
shareholders also internalize the costs of CSR (e.g. McConnell and Servaes, 1990). Consequently, 




when their ownership stakes are high, which is more likely to be driven by the incentive effect 
derived from cash flow rights (ownership stakes). Some argue, in contrast, that higher insider 
ownership makes these insiders more powerful in decision making thus more entrenched, resulting 
in an increased ability of insiders to overinvest in CSR. Therefore, the relation between large 
shareholders’ ownership and CSR performance is non-monotonic in nature, which makes a direct 
testing of large shareholders’ ownership on CSR difficult to interpret from the agency cost 
perspective. 
One way to circumvent this problem is to disentangle the incentive and entrenchment effects 
of large shareholders on CSR, which is usually achieved through separating control rights from 
cash flow rights. Controlling shareholders can establish control over firms with only minimal cash-
flow rights (ownership) when a deviation from the ‘one share, one vote’ rule applies (La Porta et 
al., 1999; Bebchuk, Kraakman, & Triantis, 2000; Classens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000; Claessens et 
al., 2002; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Lins, 2003). According to Bebchuk et al. (2000), such separation 
can create agency costs an order of magnitude larger than the costs associated with a controlling 
shareholder who also has a majority of the cash-flow rights in her own corporation. A similar 
approach has been used by Claessens et al. (2002), in which they separate the largest shareholder’s 
voting rights and cash flow rights, and find that firm value increases with the cash-flow ownership 
of the largest shareholder, consistent with a positive incentive effect, but firm value falls when the 
control rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash-flow ownership, consistent with an 
entrenchment effect.  
We test the effects of the largest shareholder’s voting rights in excess of its cash-flow rights 
on CSR and use the ASSET4 sample, which comprises standardized data on largest shareholder’s 
voting rights and cash flow rights for a set of global companies. Our model specifications follow 
those of Claessens et al. (2002), Morck et al. (1988), and Bebchuk et al. (2009) in that we capture 
the non-monotonic effects of large shareholders’ cash flow rights. What we have done in addition 
is that we control for country, industry, and year fixed effects (whereas the earlier only controlled 
for industry dummies). Our main explanatory variables are: Wedge1, which is the difference 
between the largest shareholder’s voting and cash flow rights (voting rights minus cash flow rights), 
and Wedge2, which is the ratio of voting rights and cash flow rights. The inclusion of both Largest 
Shareholder Ownership and its square captures the non-monotonic effects of the controlling 
shareholder. To control for “doing good by doing well”, we include the Equity Market-to-Book 
Ratio as a control but also test other standard control variables (used by Claessens et al. (2002) and 
Bebchuk et al. (2009)). In view of CSR as a large shareholder agency problem, the controlling 




approving CSR projects that only benefit themselves. Therefore, a positive association between 
CSR and control wedge is expected under the agency view. 
The results from the GLS regressions are shown in Table 6. Some interesting observations 
can be made: First, throughout all specifications, the coefficients on both Wedge1 and Wedge2 
are positive and significant. A ten-percent increase in the different between voting and cash flow 
rights on average reduces the CSR rating by one. This negative sign does not support the agency 
view which considers CSR spending as a result of controlling shareholders’ entrenchment and 
expropriation of minority shareholders. Second, the effect of the largest shareholder’s ownership 
seems to be non-monotonic on different aspects of CSR, as the coefficients on largest 
shareholder’s ownership are all negative and significant, while that on the square of ownership are 
all positive. This is consistent with the previous literature that both incentive and entrenchment 
mechanisms of controlling shareholders affect corporate outcomes. The simplified specifications 
(only controlling for equity market-to-book ratio) and the more complex ones (including also other 
traditional financial controls) yield both qualitatively and quantitatively similar results, although the 
sample size for the latter shrinks. These results also hold for various ESG subindices which we do 
not report for reasons of conciseness. In terms of control variables, the positive coefficients on 
Equity Market-to-Book mostly support the “doing good by doing well” hypothesis. Firm size and 
year since incorporation also have positive loadings on CSR, indicating that larger and more 
established companies are more likely to engage in social issues. Overall, the direct effects of 
controlling shareholder’s ownership and control (wedge between voting and cash flow rights) 
imply that CSR is not likely to be used as a self-serving tool for controlling shareholders to extract 
private benefits, shirk, or build empires, though large shareholders do reduce their spending on 
CSR due to the internalization of its costs. This reflects that a CSR policy is expensive, but does 
not by itself provide support for the agency view.  
[Insert Table 6 about Here] 
CSR, Agency Problems, and Shareholder Value 
Finally, we consider the association between CSR, agency problems and shareholder value 
altogether in a cross-country setting, which has not been explored in the extant literature of “doing 
well by doing good”. To further explore the role of CSR in facilitating value-enhancement and 
triangulate our previous results, we test whether CSR could counter-balance the negative effects 
of agency problems and poor corporate governance on firm value. To do so, we utilize the rich 
coverage of corporate governance provisions in the ASSET4 ESG sample, and construct a global 




constructed following the structure of the original US-based E-index as in Bebchuk et al. (2009). 
We have tried our best to mimic the exact construct of the original E-index by applying the same 
governance provisions across countries; only slight differences relative to the original US index 
occur due to data availability in Datastream. The provisions in our global E-index include the 
presence of: (1) a poison pill; (2) a golden parachute; (3) a classified board, (4) other anti-takeover 
devices, and (5) supermajority requirements for both amending charters and amending bylaws.26 
It is worth noting that ‘classified board’ is a general term which refers to the situation that the 
terms of board directors can be different from each other, while another concept, 
namely ’staggered board’, refers to the situation when the terms of board directors are uniform. 
Though these are different entries in Datastream, such difference does not seem to matter for our 
regression results. 
We conduct our test on a panel dataset of more than 4,700 largest public firms from 60 
countries in the ASSET4 sample from 2002 to 2013. The dependent variable for all specifications 
is Tobin’s Q, defined as the ratio of market value of equity to the book value of equity, winsorized 
at the 5% level. The key explanatory variables are the global E-index, the CSR rating (which is 
measured by ASSET4’s overall CSR score, environmental score, and social score, respectively), 
and an interaction between the E-index and CSR (Entrenchment Index × CSR). If CSR enhances 
firm value, it can counterbalance the negative impact of managerial agency problems as proxied 
by the E-index. Therefore, we expect a negative coefficient of the E-index, a positive coefficient 
of CSR, and a positive coefficient of their interaction. We use standard financial controls, such as 
firm size (measured as Log(Assets)), the largest shareholder’s cash flow rights and its square, return 
on equity (ROE), leverage ratio, capital expenditure, dividend per share, as well as year dummies, 
country dummies, and industry dummies (based on Thomson Reuter’s industry classification). 
Panel A shows the results from the whole ASSET4 sample (worldwide sample). While some may 
be concerned that the entrenchment index is more relevant for dispersed ownership structure, we 
also show in Panel B the results from the subsample of companies in the U.S., U.K., and Australia, 
and in Panel C the results from the subsample of more countries with dispersed ownership as 
classified by La Porta et al. (1999), which further includes Canada, Ireland, Switzerland, and Japan.  
The coefficients on the three measures of our global E-index are mostly negatively associated 
with Tobin’s Q throughout all panels, which is consistent with the results using the original E-
                                                          
26 Inevitably, there are missing values for some firms in some years from Datastream, and we either treat these 
missing values as “missing” (Entrenchment Index 1), or treat these missing values as “zeros” (Entrenchment 
Index 2). As a further robustness check of  our “global E-index”, we create Entrenchment Index 3 by replacing 




index as in Bebchuk et al. (2009), and confirms that our new index functions similarly with respect 
to firm value. The main effects of various CSR ratings are mostly positive in Panel A, suggesting 
that higher CSR rating is associated with higher firm value. The most interesting results are on the 
interaction term between CSR and the global E-index: for almost all CSR ratings (environmental, 
social, and overall), the coefficients are positive and statistically significant. This reinforces our 
earlier findings supporting the value-enhancing view rather than the agency view, and suggests that 
CSR rather than being an agency problem, can actually attenuate the negative effects of agency 
problems (managerial entrenchment) on firm value. Similar results are found in Panels B and C 
when we focus on dispersed ownership countries, which confirm our previous findings based on 
the world sample. Of course, potential endogeneity issues may still exist, and unfortunately there 
might be no readily single instrumental variable that capture all aspects of CSR as well as of 
“entrenchment”. Therefore, our interaction results should be interpreted with caution. 
Nevertheless, corporate charters and bylaws are very stable over time (Bebchuk et al., 2009), which 
could partly eliminate endogeneity concerns, and the pure correlations between “CSR × 
Entrenchment” at least offer no ground for justifying the agency view.  
[Insert Table 7 about Here] 
Conclusion 
In most Anglo-American countries, there is consensus that corporate governance is about “how 
investors get the managers to give them back their money” (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997: 738). 
Corporate social responsibility, because of its focus on stakeholders in addition to shareholders, is 
often considered as cash diversion and an agency problem. In contrast to this view, is the value-
enhancing CSR view in which CSR activities can be consistent with maximizing firm value. In this 
debate it is important to note that legal rules and ownership structures are very different outside 
the Anglo-American world, which significantly influences the executives’ incentives, the fiduciary 
duties of the management and the board of directors, as well as the decision making process. The 
debate on the role of corporate social responsibility therefore often reflects the varieties of 
capitalism across countries and the boundaries of the firm. 
In this paper, we utilize public and proprietary data on corporate compliance and engagement 
in stakeholder issues to comprehensively trade off the prominent agency view against the value-
enhancing view of CSR. Our empirical set-up is well-grounded in fundamental economic theory: 
incentives, information asymmetry, and control. We do not find empirical evidence that CSR is 




between managerial pay and corporate performance. Rather, higher CSR performance is closely 
related to tighter cash—usually a proxy for better-disciplined managerial practice in the traditional 
corporate finance literature (Jensen, 1986)—and higher pay-for-performance sensitivity. In 
addition, firms in countries with better legal protection on shareholder rights receive higher CSR 
ratings. Moreover, the relation between CSR and large shareholders’ ownership exhibits a non-
monotonic relationship. Furthermore, CSR can counterbalance the negative effects of managerial 
entrenchment, and lead to higher shareholder value as proxied by Tobin’s Q. Our empirical results 
(based on an instrumental variables-estimation) suggest that good governance causes high CSR, 
and that a firm’s CSR practice is consistent with shareholder wealth maximization. Therefore, our 
findings support the positive stance on CSR, which is also found in Dimson et al. (2013), Deng et 
al. (2013), and Ioannou & Serafeim (2010, 2012).  
While the vast majority of the literature has emphasized the agency costs of managerial 
entrenchment and large shareholders’ control, as well as their economic consequences such as 
distorting resource allocation and impeding economic growth, our empirical findings show that 
these costs are at least not made through CSR activities. Rather, as shown in our results based on 
the self-constructed global entrenchment index, CSR engagement can actually counterbalance the 
negative impact of entrenchment and agency problems on firm value. In fact, the high correlations 
of CSR ratings and country-level sustainability ratings (which incorporate economic development 
and governance) may imply that CSR activities in general are conducive to achieving sustainable 
development (Moon, 2007). Of course, none of this is to say that more CSR is always better. 
Undertaking some CSR activities may indeed be driven by managerial utility considerations, such 
as the satisfaction of some personal or moral imperative of the manager, rather than the 
enhancement of shareholder wealth (Moser and Martin, 2012). Moreover, shareholders always 
internalize the costs of CSR expenditures, and as their ownership stakes increase, they reduce 
spending on CSR. Our main argument is that in general, corporate social responsibility need not to 
be inevitably induced by agency problems, but can actually preserve a core value of capitalism—
generating more returns to investors—through enhancing firm value and shareholder wealth.  
If we take the evidence in this paper at face value, several policy implications emerge for the 
improvement of corporate governance, particularly in the area of corporate social responsibility. 
Undoubtedly, governments have their responsibility of dealing with market failures and 
externalities, but the government may not always be incentivized and effective in achieving this 
goal—governments can be corrupt, inefficient, and even predatory to private sectors (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1998), in which case they fail to provide public goods. Therefore, corporate social 




Shimshack, 2012)—becomes necessary for preserving social welfare. While many researchers 
believe that such private provision of public goods may be associated with agency problems that 
divert shareholder wealth and even undermine the foundations of capitalist spirits, we cast doubt 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics  
Panel A. MSCI IVA sample and Vigeo ESG sample 
Variables 
MSCI IVA sample Vigeo ESG sample 
Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max. Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Cash holdings (scaled by assets) 77,061 0.075 0.045 0.086 0 0.994 5,995 0.076 0.051 0.081 0 0.787 
Free cash flows (scaled by assets) 65,728 0.059 0.057 0.073 -1.362 1.565 4,804 0.105 0.094 0.068 -0.368 0.611 
Capital expenditure (scaled by assets) 67,091 0.052 0.042 0.046 0 1.037 4,984 0.049 0.040 0.043 0 0.498 
Dividend payout ratio 55,670 0.816 0.288 13.766 -70.176 598.420 3,744 0.573 4.817 0.364 -82.172 211.000 
Leverage ratio (winsorized) 78,004 0.615 0.613 0.208 0.228 0.955 5,877 6.466 0.094 118.485 0 3967.62 
ROA (winsorized) 74,993 0.050 0.043 0.044 -0.02 0.149 5,876 0.050 0.040 0.057 -0.414 0.517 
Equity market-to-book (winsorized) 76,417 2.820 2.247 1.875 0.790 8.045 6,766 2.571 1.935 1.938 0.620 8.020 
Tobin’s Q (winsorized) 72,949 0.677 0.445 0.688 0.042 2.702 5,904 0.326 0.322 0.198 0.028 0.712 
Financial constraints (winsorized) 62,076 0.264 0.006 0.495 0 1.832 4,738 0.296 0.035 0.500 0 1.784 
Interest coverage (winsorized) 73,948 17.093 5.975 29.411 0.414 122.817 5,821 12.891 5.388 19.369 0.471 79.452 
Financial slacks (current ratio) 63,342 1.721 1.365 1.572 0.038 184.984 4,852 0.850 0.774 0.472 0 6.527 
Direct ownership of large shareholders 54,746 35.572% 23.12% 33.918% 0 100% 6,755 35.314% 23.560% 34.268% 0 100% 
Largest shareholder's total ownership 37,005 22.914% 12.46% 23.274% 0 100% 4,282 23.531% 11.615% 24.147% 0 100% 
Independent director ratio 31,019 0.719 0.727 0.175 0 1 5,052 0.770 0.800 0.155 0 0.962 
Female CEO 74,996 0.014 0 0.119 0 1 5,539 0.017 0 0.128 0 1 
CEO’s international work 74,998 0.437 0 0.496 0 1 5,540 0.424 0 0.494 0 1 
CEO’s overseas education 74,986 0.195 0 0.396 0 1 4,874 0.337 0 0.473 0 1 
Total compensation (thousand USD) 24,049 859.509 404.750 2559.806 5.417 75001 1,611 1089.324 483.500 1956.063 3 16668 
Employees 71,697 41,917 17,245 82,271 0 2,100,000 5,535 58,897 25,898 102,827 0 2,100,000 
Analyst coverage 67,289 14.421 13 7.852 1 54 3,764 18.075 17 8.576 1 51 
Investment opportunities 67,049 0.093 0.047 0.797 -0.043 170.824 4,983 0.085 0.046 0.141 -0.003 2.669 
Blockholders’ direct ownership 54,746 0.356 0.231 0.339 0 1 6,755 0.353 0.236 0.343 0 1 
Largest shareholder’s total ownership 37,005 0.229 0.125 0.233 0 1 4,282 0.235 0.116 0.241 0 1 
Adjusted anti-director rights index 89,765 3.371 4 1.184 2 5 7,006 3.757 4 1.098 2 5 
Anti-self-dealing index 89,947 0.617 0.650 0.212 0.170 1 7,047 0.546 0.500 0.240 0.2 1 
Public enforcement of anti-self-dealing 89,947 0.197 0 0.339 0 1 7,047 0.331 0 0.403 0 1 
Private enforcement of securities law 89,799 0.772 0.747 0.217 0.18 1 7,006 0.655 0.705 0.226 0.18 1 
Revised one-share one-vote index 89,765 0.135 0 0.342 0 1 7,006 0.102 0 0.302 0 1 




Table 1 (Cont). Descriptive Statistics 
Panel B. ASSET4 Sample 
 Obs Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Wedge1 (voting minus cash flow rights) 20,573 1.165% 0 7.245% -89.84% 99.99% 
Wedge2 (voting over cash flow rights) 20,562 4.039 1 170.790 0 10000 
Largest Shareholder's Ownership 23,797 22.029% 13.6% 19.578% 0 100% 
Largest Shareholder's Voting Rights 20,716 23.590% 14.3% 20.881% 0 100% 
Equity Book-to-Market (winsor.) 46,583 2.359 1.800 1.757 0.500 7.280 
Firm Size (Total Assets) 31,133 3612965 6123 2.15×108 0 3.06×1010 
Firm Age 23,374 34.740 23 31.655 0 185 
Annual Sales Growth Rate (winsor.) 46,799 12.627% 8.16% 21,157% -19.070% 69.830% 
CapEx to Sales Ratio (winsor.) 29,015 0.017 0.001 0.044 2.54×10-6 0.185 
Leverage 31,061 21.081% 15.932% 382.758% -0.034% 67392% 
Dividend Per Share (winsor.) 47,541 4.014 0.345 9.940 0 41 
ROE 31,082 0.117 0.118 2.331 -212.5 141.742 
Entrenchment Index 1 12,132 1.245 1 1.227 0 5 
Entrenchment Index 2 53,472 0.690 0 1.037 0 5 




Table 2. Correlation between Corporate ESG and Country Sustainability 
The MSCI IVA Rating, RiskMetrics EcoValue21 Rating, and RiskMetrics Social Rating are firm-level ESG scores 
provided by MSCI IVA. The Overall Country Score, Country Environmental Responsibility, Country Institutional 
Responsibility, and Country Social Responsibility and Solidarity are country-level sustainability indices provided by 
Vigeo. Overall Country Score is the average of the other three responsibility domain scores. *** stands for statistical 
significance at 1% level. 












MSCI IVA     
MSCI IVA overall 
rating 
0.29*** 0.21*** 0.28*** 0.26*** 
RiskMetrics 
EcoValue21 rating 
0.31*** 0.31*** 0.28*** 0.25*** 
RiskMetrics Social 
rating 
0.29*** 0.21*** 0.28*** 0.26*** 
Vigeo ESG     
Overall Vigeo rating 0.23*** 0.10*** 0.29*** 0.11*** 
Human resources rating 0.40*** 0.004 0.47*** 0.35*** 
Environmental rating 0.31*** 0.11*** 0.33*** 0.25*** 
Customers & suppliers 0.14*** -0.001 0.18*** 0.09*** 
Corporate governance 0.04*** 0.11*** 0.14*** -0.20*** 
Community 
involvement 
0.17*** -0.005 0.23*** 0.10*** 
Human rights 0.19*** 0.07*** 0.22*** 0.14*** 
ASSET4 ESG     
CSR score 0.13*** 0.05*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 
Environmental score 0.26*** 0.22*** 0.25*** 0.21*** 







Table 3. CSR and Agency Concerns: Two Stage Least Square Regressions 
2SLS regression results for various ESG ratings. In the 1st stage regression (not reported), the dependent variables are cash holdings, free cash flows, capital expenditure, dividend payout ratio, and leverage, 
respectively, and the independent variables are the country-level revised anti-director rights index (ADRI) as in Spamann (2009), anti-self-dealing index (ASDI) as in Djankov et al. (2008), the private enforcement 
of securities law index as in La Porta et al. (2006), the revised one-share one-vote rule (mandatory proportionality of voting and cash flow) index as in Spamann (2010), the revised mandatory waivable dividend 
index as in Spamann (2010), and the direct ownership of large shareholders who hold more than 5% of the firm’s equity. In the second stage, the dependent variables are various ESG ratings, and the independent 
variables are the “predicted” cash holdings, free cash flows, CapEx, dividend payouts, and leverage, together with other control variables. Standard errors are adjusted for the second stage and clustered at the 
industry level. *, **, *** stand for significant at the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level respectively. 
Panel A. Dependent variables are ESG ratings (overall ratings and subdimensional ratings) from the MSCI IVA sample 
Dependent variable (2nd stage): IVA rating EcoValue rating Social rating Labor relations Industry risk Environ. Opportunity Strategic governance Human capital Stakeholder capital 
Cash holding (scaled) -0.216 -0.287*** -0.061 0.110 -0.358*** -0.056 0.118 0.241** 0.063 
 (0.197) (0.082) (0.101) (0.073) (0.080) (0.038) (0.104) (0.112) (0.086) 
Free cash flow (scaled) -0.801* -1.091*** -2.096*** -1.425*** -0.221 -0.629*** -1.050*** -0.512*** -0.344*** 
 (0.432) (0.247) (0.482) (0.311) (0.218) (0.119) (0.271) (0.161) (0.100) 
Capital expenditure (scaled) -2.317* -2.176*** -1.418** -0.832* -0.407* -0.806*** -0.282 -1.038** -0.986*** 
 (1.295) (0.370) (0.634) (0.436) (0.243) (0.154) (0.247) (0.425) (0.302) 
Dividend payout (winsor.) -1.914 -0.062 12.700*** 6.910** 4.195*** 0.169 5.732*** 9.343** 5.248** 
 (1.594) (1.344) (4.490) (3.047) (1.344) (0.628) (2.009) (3.703) (2.433) 
Leverage (winsor.) 0.433** 0.144*** 0.209** 0.127* 0.029 -0.017 0.016 0.064 0.050* 
 (0.219) (0.062) (0.098) (0.067) (0.031) (0.628) (0.032) (0.050) (0.030) 
ROA 1.007** 1.005*** 1.881*** 1.284*** 0.168 0.548*** 0.992***   
 (0.515) (0.201) (0.387) (0.248) (0.186) (0.096) (0.270)   
Market-to-book equity         0.582* 0.433* 
        (0.332) (0.228) 
Financial constraints  -0.340 -0.108*** -0.279*** -0.014 -0.095*** -0.032** -0.077 -0.209* -0.246*** 
 (0.235) (0.031) (0.083) (0.031) (0.025) (0.015) (0.056) (0.108) (0.077) 
Interest coverage 0.070 0.047*** 0.017 -0.002 0.034*** -0.001 -0.021*** 0.022 0.027*** 
 (0.048) (0.015) (0.023) (0.016) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.014) (0.009) 
Financial slack 1.885 0.592* 1.066*** 0.426 1.183*** -0.274* -0.206 -0.360 -0.198 
 (1.320) (0.338) (0.388) (0.272) (0.232) (0.153) (0.161) (0.332) (0.221) 
CapEx-to-sales ratio 36.451 29.775*** -7.899 -8.537 5.947 5.127 -12.270* 17.227* 17.661** 
 (26.793) (8.485) (21.128) (14.477) (5.453) (3.866) (6.614) (9.931) (7.025) 
Ln(GDP per capita) -0.505 -1.061*** -0.321 -0.100 0.499*** -0.363** 0.378** -0.430 -0.678*** 
 (0.686) (0.315) (0.477) (0.332) (0.191) (0.144) (0.156) (0.344) (0.239) 
Globalization index -0.027 0.042*** -0.006 0.006 -0.036*** 0.034*** 0.017 0.028 0.024 
 (0.045) (0.012) (0.017) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.024) (0.018) 
Constant -7.990 13.460*** -2.460 0.348 1.489 12.796*** -0.178 4.196 9.571** 
 (7.915) (4.159) (3.238) (2.170) (3.101) (2.008) (3.939) (4.767) (3.748) 
Sargan-Hansen test P-value 0.326 0.423 0.509 0.167 0.434 0.654 0.613 0.959 0.608 
No. observations 14981 26697 18878 18912 22812 26090 14765 14709 14705 




Table 3 (Cont). CSR and Agency Concerns: Two Stage Least Square 
Regressions 
2SLS regression results for various ESG ratings. In the 1st stage regression (not reported), the dependent variables are cash 
holdings, free cash flows, capital expenditure, dividend payout ratio, and leverage, respectively, and the independent variables are 
the country-level revised anti-director rights index (ADRI) as in Spamann (2009), anti-self-dealing index (ASDI) as in Djankov et 
al. (2008), the private enforcement of securities law index as in La Porta et al. (2006), the revised one-share one-vote rule 
(mandatory proportionality of voting and cash flow) index as in Spamann (2010), the revised mandatory waivable dividend index 
as in Spamann (2010), and the direct ownership of large shareholders who hold more than 5% of the firm’s equity. In the second 
stage, the dependent variables are various ESG ratings, and the independent variables are the “predicted” cash holdings, free cash 
flows, CapEx, dividend payouts, and leverage, together with other control variables. Standard errors are adjusted for the second 
stage and clustered at the industry level. *, **, *** stand for significant at the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level respectively. 
Panel B. Dependent variables are ESG ratings (overall and subdimensional ratings) from the Vigeo corporate ESG sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 












Agency concerns        
Cash holding (scaled) -0.497 0.804 4.111 -1.817 -0.406 -0.762 -10.474 
 (1.671) (1.988) (3.811) (2.541) (1.985) (1.454) (7.556) 
Free cash flow (scaled) -2.723* -4.341** -6.092* 0.176 -3.698** -2.758** 1.552 
 (1.430) (1.701) (3.261) (2.175) (1.699) (1.224) (6.360) 
CapEx (scaled) -3.258 -0.327 4.618 -7.001* 0.969 -0.904 -23.217** 
 (2.469) (2.938) (5.631) (3.755) (2.933) (2.173) (11.291) 
Dividends payout (winsor.) 0.136 0.258 0.323 0.205 0.124 -0.090 0.173 
 (0.178) (0.212) (0.407) (0.271) (0.212) (0.161) (0.835) 
Leverage 0.785*** 0.195 1.421** 0.702* 0.886*** 0.372* 0.891 
 (0.264) (0.314) (0.603) (0.402) (0.314) (0.219) (1.136) 
Control variables        
ROA 2.969*** 3.329*** 3.848 1.232 3.528*** 2.830*** 4.207 
 (1.041) (1.238) (2.373) (1.583) (1.236) (0.947) (4.918) 
Financial constraints -0.459 0.315 1.208 -0.570 0.558 -0.104 -4.575* 
 (0.597) (0.710) (1.361) (0.908) (0.709) (0.510) (2.651) 
Financial slack -14.458 2.372 -1.280 -20.341 -18.142 -8.706 -73.506 
 (10.451) (12.434) (23.835) (15.894) (12.417) (9.883) (51.924) 
CapEx-to-Sales ratio 0.366 -0.451 -1.273 1.394* -0.494 -0.145 4.509* 
 (0.549) (0.653) (1.252) (0.835) (0.652) (0.489) (2.540) 
Ln(GDP per capita) 2.857 -8.402 1.526 2.007 3.914 4.367 11.291 
 (5.354) (6.371) (12.212) (8.143) (6.361) (4.240) (22.033) 
Globalization index 0.169 0.156 0.599 -0.064 0.123 0.239 -0.918 
 (0.371) (0.441) (0.845) (0.563) (0.440) (0.347) (1.801) 
Constant -40.795 86.301 -158.932 -2.717 -58.098 -30.309 124.078 
 (92.024) (109.491) (209.883) (139.954) (109.335) (80.498) (418.261) 
Sargan-Hansen test P-value 0.996 0.449 0.086 0.850 0.035 0.187 0.263 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. observations 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 





Table 4. CSR and Executive Pay-for-Performance 
The dependent variable is the average pay for all executives that are recorded in the BoardEx database, scaled by total assets. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level. The dependent variable for each specification is the equity-based compensation. 
Panel A. The MSCI Intangible Value Assessment sample 






















Tobin’s Q × CSR 0.010 0.170*** -0.039 0.258*** 0.302*** 0.260*** 0.195*** 0.207*** 0.306*** 0.150*** 
 (0.064) (0.059) (0.064) (0.069) (0.084) (0.053) (0.048) (0.047) (0.051) (0.044) 
CSR -0.153 0.232 -0.563 -0.680** 0.237 -0.196 1.473* 1.014 0.865 -0.027 
 (0.521) (0.446) (0.400) (0.329) (0.384) (0.353) (0.883) (0.808) (0.736) (0.541) 
Tobin’s Q -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.005** -0.005*** -0.005** -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ROA 0.990*** 1.012*** 1.245*** 1.013*** 0.932**** 0.858*** 0.795*** 0.769*** 0.750*** 0.868*** 
 (0.131) (0.140) (0.153) (0.151) (0.135) (0.141) (0.121) (0.129) (0.120) (0.130) 
Leverage -0.137*** -0.108*** -0.101*** -0.133*** -0.105*** -0.131*** -0.158*** -0.176*** -0.175*** -0.164*** 
 (0.028) (0.038) (0.035) (0.045) (0.039) (0.050) (0.033) (0.032) (0.034) (0.031) 
Analyst coverage -0.075 -0.018 0.046 -0.035 -0.001 -0.018 -0.208*** -0.160** -0.173** -0.115 
 (0.082) (0.070) (0.072) (0.074) (0.082) (0.071) (0.074) (0.080) (0.077) (0.084) 
Ln(Employees) -6.972*** -8.608*** -8.029*** -8.261*** -7.394*** -8.486*** -7.365*** -7.329*** -7.311*** -7.017*** 
 (0.795) (0.725) (0.714) (0.672) (0.739) (0.672) (0.868) (0.862) (0.816) (0.809) 
Largest shareholder’s ownership 0.046 0.096*** 0.085*** 0.104*** 0.068*** 0.102*** 0.084** 0.064** 0.066** 0.057* 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.030) (0.029) (0.026) (0.029) (0.036) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) 
Independent director ratio -0.462*** -0.376*** -0.384*** -0.398*** -0.343*** -0.388*** -0.464*** -0.456*** -0.461*** -0.465*** 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.053) (0.052) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.046) (0.049) (0.047) 
CEO gender (male) -9.898*** -0.386 -0.319 -1.563 -9.930*** -1.295 -10.529*** -11.958*** -11.304*** -12.592*** 
 (2.612) (4.411) (4.412) (4.262) (2.349) (4.436) (3.177) (2.838) (2.429) (2.601) 
CEO overseas work -3.437*** -2.490*** -1.327 -1.236 -1.197 -2.317*** -3.790*** -3.166*** -3.159*** -3.247*** 
 (0.785) (0.884) (0.842) (0.853) (0.927) (0.884) (0.825) (0.788) (0.800) (0.808) 
CEO overseas education 4.353*** 2.147** 2.619*** 2.639*** 1.958* 2.021** 4.489*** 4.271*** 4.801*** 4.282*** 
 (0.900) (0.968) (1.020) (1.013) (1.052) (0.992) (0.917) (0.897) (0.959) (0.886) 
Constant 78.049*** 62.863*** 61.935*** 65.908*** 62.324*** 65.355*** 72.331*** 73.417*** 74.433*** 80.129*** 
 (4.206) (5.434) (5.383) (4.903) (4.370) (5.338) (5.254) (5.251) (0.287) (4.443) 
No. of obs. 4419 5929 5234 5244 5399 5817 4357 4357 4419 4357 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 4 (Cont). CSR and Executive Pay-for-Performance 
The dependent variable is the average pay for all executives that are recorded in the BoardEx database, scaled by total assets. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The dependent variable for each specification is the equity-based 
compensation. 
Panel B. The Vigeo Corporate ESG sample 














Tobin’s Q × CSR 0.011** 0.009** 0.008 0.011*** 0.011** 0.014*** 0.020*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
CSR -0.001 -0.025 -0.045* -0.022 -0.012 -0.085*** -0.015 
 (0.037) (0.021) (0.025) (0.030) (0.028) (0.031) (0.024) 
Tobin’s Q 0.033 0.088 0.138 0.023 -0.014 0.019 -0.241 
 (0.153) (0.063) (0.150) (0.153) (0.177) (0.157) (0.185) 
ROA 0.322*** 0.352*** 0.369*** 0.328*** 0.316*** 0.342*** 0.223*** 
 (0.093) (0.094) (0.095) (0.089) (0.084) (0.093) (0.082) 
Leverage 0.087 0.088 0.089 0.089 0.087 0.096 0.094 
 (0.062) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.064) (0.064) (0.062) 
Ln(Employees) -1.931*** -1.848*** -1.751*** -1.867*** -2.013*** -1.744*** -1.919*** 
 (0.560) (0.535) (0.536) (0.557) (0.548) (0.519) (0.546) 
Analyst coverage -0.181*** -0.173 -0.175*** -0.180*** -0.171*** -0.159*** -0.173*** 
 (0.054) (0.055) (0.053) (0.054) (0.055) (0.054) (0.054) 
Largest shareholders’ ownership -0.000 0.0004 0.001 0.0005 0.0004 0.003 0.006 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Independent director ratio -0.141*** -0.138*** -0.132*** -0.139*** -0.138*** -0.132*** -0.113*** 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.032) (0.034) 
CEO overseas work 0.426 0.347 0.275 0.381 0.035 0.390 0.741 
 (0.571) (0.571) (0.577) (0.572) (0.571) (0.573) (0.571) 
CEO overseas education -1.602** -1.650*** -1.852*** -1.650*** -1.639*** -1.545** -1.419** 
 (0.626) (0.626) (0.613) (0.631) (0.630) (0.618) (0.627) 
Female CEO 2.087 2.220 2.168 2.113 2.534 2.117 0.738 
 (6.375) (6.354) (6.231) (6.339) (6.523) (6.192) (6.314) 
Constant 27.138*** 27.419*** 27.474*** 27.683*** 27.475*** 28.478*** 24.548*** 
 (3.766) (3.834) (3.771) (3.767) (3.778) (4.051) (3.776) 
No. of obs. 487 487 487 487 487 487 487 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 5. Direct Effects of Legal Protection of Shareholder Rights on CSR 
The dependent variables are various ESG indices, and the key explanatory variables are the adjusted anti-director rights index (ADRI), anti-self-dealing index (ASDI), and the public enforcement of the anti-
self-dealing regulation. Control variables include legal origins (French, German, and Scandinavian; the English origin is taken as benchmark and omitted from regressions), logarithm of GDP per capita, 
return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q, financial constraints, interest coverage, current ratio, the ownership dispersion indicator, investment opportunities, and year and industry dummies. Standard errors are 
clustered at the country level and reported in the parentheses. *, **, *** stand for significant at the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level respectively. 
Panel A. Dependent variables are ESG ratings (overall ratings and subdimensional ratings) from the MSCI IVA sample 
 IVA rating EcoValue rating Social rating Labor relations Industry-specific carbon risks Environmental opportunities 
Adjusted ADRI 0.297***   0.333***   0.269***   0.243***   0.221***   0.151***   
 (0.110)   (0.060)   (0.055)   (0.070)   (0.053)   (0.046)   
ASDI  1.329   1.966***   1.184   1.003   1.302**   0.967***  
  (1.325)   (0.676)   (1.174)   (0.940)   (0.489)   (0.307)  
Public enforce.   0.753***   0.158   0.725***   0.523***   0.004   -0.018 
   (0.229)   (0.211)   (0.208)   (0.169)   (0.202)   (0.128) 
No. of obs. 25449 25549 25549 48858 48958 48958 32495 32483 32483 32504 32604 32604 40508 40606 40606 47976 48075 48075 
Controls  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Year FE  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry FE  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
R-squared 13.5% 12.2% 12.9% 18.3% 17.5% 16.3% 10.7% 9.5% 10.4% 14.0% 13.2% 13.5% 41.3% 41.6% 41.2% 27.3% 27.2% 27.0% 
Panel B. Dependent variables are ESG ratings (overall and subdimensional ratings) from the Vigeo corporate ESG sample 
 Overall ESG Environment Human resources Customers & suppliers Human rights Community involvement 
Adjusted ADRI 1.969***   2.789***   3.363***   0.980   2.558***   2.622***   
 (0.585)   (0.520)   (1.123)   (0.674)   (0.811)   (0.762)   
ASDI  -5.395   7.104   0.665   -3.116   -4.828   -7.227  
  (9.169)   (10.904)   (11.472)   (9.148)   (9.046)   (10.608)  
Public enforce.   -0.323   -2.337   0.698   -1.623   0.908   1.325 
   (1.516)   (1.711)   (2.255)   (1.376)   (1.688)   (1.384) 
No. of obs. 3586 3610 3610 3586 3610 3610 3586 3610 3610 3586 3610 3610 3586 3610 3610 3586 3610 3610 
Controls  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Year FE  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry FE  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  





Table 6. Direct Effects of Large Shareholders’ Ownership and Control on CSR 
The dependent variables are various ESG indices from the ASSET4 sample, and the key explanatory variables are the largest shareholder’s cash flow rights (ownership) and its square, and the wedge 
between the largest shareholder’s voting rights and cash flow rights. Wedge1 stands for voting rights minus cash flow rights, wedge2 stands for the ratio of voting rights to cash flow rights. Control 
variables include market-to-book ratio of equity (winsorized at 5%), the logarithm of total assets (size), the logarithm of firm age, annual sales growth rate (winsorized at 1%), and CapEx to sales ratio 
(winsorized at 1%). All regressions control for country, industry, and time fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** stand for significant 
at the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level respectively. 
Dependent variables are ESG ratings (overall ratings, environmental ratings, and social ratings) from the ASSET4 sample 
 Overall CSR Rating Environmental Rating Social Rating 
Ownership and Control             
Wedge1 (Voting Rights - Ownership) -0.118***  -0.089**  -0.072**  -0.066*  -0.088***  -0.079**  
 (0.032)  (0.036)  (0.031)  (0.036)  (0.031)  (0.035)  
Wedge2 (Voting Rights/ Ownership)  -0.002***  -0.001***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.001***  -0.001** 
  (0.0002)  (0.0004)  (0.0002)  (0.0003)  (0.0002)  (0.0004) 
Largest Shareholder Ownership -0.274*** -0.278*** -0.310*** -0.315*** -0.223*** -0.215*** -0.234*** -0.232*** -0.175*** -0.181*** -0.223*** -0.226*** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.073) (0.073) (0.053) (0.054) (0.079) (0.078) (0.054) (0.054) (0.076) (0.076) 
Largest Shareholder Ownership Square 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.001** 0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.001) ()0.001 
Control Variables             
Equity Market-to-Book 0.129 0.121 0.375** 0.376** -0.046 -0.052 0.352* 0.350* 0.168 0.162 0.470** 0.472** 
 (0.134) (0.135) (0.189) (0.189) (0.132) (0.132) (0.181) (0.182) (0.135) (0.136) (0.197) (0.198) 
Log(Size)   7.261*** 7.265***   7.689*** 7.691***   7.195*** 7.199*** 
   (0.486) (0.486)   (0.462) (0.461)   (0.474) (0.473) 
Log(Age)   3.940*** 3.962***   2.647*** 2.657***   2.919*** 2.945*** 
   (0.614) (0.615)   (0.607) (0.607)   (0.617) (0.617) 
Annual Sales Growth Rate   0.002 0.002   -0.015*** -0.015***   -0.013** -0.013** 
   (0.005) (0.005)   (0.005) (0.005)   (0.006) (0.006) 
CapEx to Sales Ratio   -0.077** -0.077**   0.012 0.012   -0.048 -0.048 
   (0.034) (0.033)   (0.040) (0.040)   (0.038) (0.037) 
Constant   -64.214*** -64.822***   -44.976*** -45.233***   -39.148*** -39.790*** 
   (7.664) (7.665)   (8.071) (8.046)   (7.384) (7.372) 
No. of Observations 18905 18894 9064 9060 19467 19456 9193 9189 19467 19456 9193 9189 
Country, Industry, Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 7. CSR, Entrenchment, and Firm Value: ASSET4 Sample 
The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q (the ratio of equity market capitalization to equity book value) winsorized at 5% level for all regressions. Entrenchment Index 1 is the 
sum of the following dummy variables from Datastream: the presence of (1) a poison pill, (2) a golden parachute, (3) a supermajority requirement for amending bylaw and 
charter, (4) a classified board, and (5) other anti-takeover provisions, treating non-available values as missing. Entrenchment Index 2 has the same composition as 
Entrenchment Index 1, but treating non-available values as zeros. Entrenchment Index 3 has the same composition as Entrenchment Index 2 (also treating non-available 
values as zeros), except that “classified board” (directors’ terms can be different) is replaced by “staggered board” (directors’ terms are uniform). CSR is measured by 
ASSET4’s overall CSR rating for columns (1)—(3), ASSET4’s aggregate environmental rating for columns (4)—(6), and ASSET4’s aggregate social rating for columns (7)—
(9). All specifications include country fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. 
Panel A. The World Sample 
Dep. var. = Tobin’s Q winsorized 5% Overall CSR rating Environmental rating Social rating 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Entrenchment Index 1 -0.0724   -0.0761**   -0.0864**   
 (0.0474)   (0.0384)   (0.0429)   
Entrenchment Index 2  -0.0767**   -0.0707***   -0.0780***  
  (0.0318)   (0.0274)   (0.0299)  
Entrenchment Index 3   -0.0689**   -0.0618**   -0.0805*** 
   (0.0296)   (0.0254)   (0.0275) 
CSR 0.0023 0.0021** 0.0022** 0.0007 0.0005 0.0007 0.0013 0.0016* 0.0014 
 (0.0015) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0010) (0.001) (0.0015) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
CSR × Entrenchment Index 0.0009 0.0011** 0.0008* 0.0014** 0.0012*** 0.0009** 0.0014** 0.0013*** 0.0011*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Log(Assets) -0.2287*** -0.2775*** -0.2772*** -0.3385*** -0.2694*** -0.2692*** -0.3437*** -0.2784*** -0.2784*** 
 (0.0379) (0.0284) (0.0283) (0.0372) (0.0275) (0.0275) (0.0376) (0.0280) (0.0280) 
Largest Shareholder Ownership -0.0004 0.0017 0.0015 -0.0014 0.0007 0.0005 -0.0012 0.0009 0.0008 
 (0.0058) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0058) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0058) (0.0042) (0.0042) 
Largest Shareholder Ownership Square 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Leverage -0.0044 0.0008 0.0008 -0.0046 0.0005 0.0005 -0.0045 0.0005 0.0005 
 (0.0040) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0040) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.004) (0.0029) (0.0029) 
Dividend Per Share 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
ROE 0.0161 0.0227 0.0226 0.0164 0.0230 0.0229 0.0162 0.0229 0.0229 
 (0.0146) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0147) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0147) (0.0151) (0.0151) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. observations 6527 16077 16077 6566 16278 16278 6566 16278 16278 





Table 7 (Cont). CSR, Entrenchment, and Firm Value: ASSET4 Sample 
The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q (the ratio of equity market capitalization to equity book value) winsorized at 5% level for all regressions. Entrenchment Index 1 is the sum of 
the following dummy variables from Datastream: the presence of (1) a poison pill, (2) a golden parachute, (3) a supermajority requirement for amending bylaw and charter, (4) a 
classified board, and (5) other anti-takeover provisions, treating non-available values as missing. Entrenchment Index 2 has the same composition as Entrenchment Index 1, but 
treating non-available values as zeros. Entrenchment Index 3 has the same composition as Entrenchment Index 2 (also treating non-available values as zeros), except that “classified 
board” (directors’ terms can be different) is replaced by “staggered board” (directors’ terms are uniform). CSR is measured by ASSET4’s overall CSR rating for columns (1)—(3), 
ASSET4’s aggregate environmental rating for columns (4)—(6), and ASSET4’s aggregate social rating for columns (7)—(9). All specifications include country fixed effects, industry 
fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. 
Panel B. The Subsample of Dispersed Ownership Countries: U.S., U.K., and Australia 
Dep. var. = Tobin’s Q winsorized 5% Overall CSR rating Environmental rating Social rating 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Entrenchment Index 1 -0.0516   -0.0418   -0.0629   
 (0.0528)   (0.0422)   (0.0479)   
Entrenchment Index 2  -0.0847**   -0.0600*   -0.0810**  
  (0.0419)   (0.0341)   (0.0387)  
Entrenchment Index 3   -0.0822**   -0.0540*   -0.0900** 
   (0.0390)   (0.0317)   (0.0353) 
CSR 0.0022 0.0022 0.0020 0.0021 0.0011 0.0014 0.0015 0.0014 0.0006 
 (0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0017) (0.0019) 
CSR × Entrenchment Index 0.0006 0.0012* 0.0011* 0.0008 0.0012** 0.0009 0.0011 0.0014** 0.0015** 
 (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Control Variables and Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. observations 4649 8782 8782 4676 8872 8872 4676 8872 8872 
R-squared 25.1% 23.2% 23.2% 25.1% 22.9% 22.9% 25.3% 23.1% 23.1% 
Panel C. The Subsample of Dispersed Ownership Countries: U.S., U.K., Australia, Canada, Ireland, Switzerland, and Japan 
Dep. var. = Tobin’s Q winsorized 5% Overall CSR rating Environmental rating Social rating 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Entrenchment Index 1 -0.0731   -0.0599   -0.0827*   
 (0.0497)   (0.0402)   (0.0449)   
Entrenchment Index 2  -0.0967***   -0.0691**   -0.0936***  
  (0.0357)   (0.0298)   (0.0327)  
Entrenchment Index 3   -0.0886***   -0.0587**   -0.0962*** 
   (0.0327)   (0.0274)   (0.0296) 
CSR 0.0018 0.0017 0.0015 0.0016 0.0011 0.0013 0.0008 0.0011 0.0005 
 (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0014) 
CSR × Entrenchment Index 0.0010 0.0014*** 0.0012** 0.0011* 0.0012** 0.0009** 0.0015** 0.0016*** 0.0016*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Control Variables and Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. observations 5373 11426 11426 5412 11572 11572 5412 11572 11572 





Appendix 1a. MSCI Intangible Value Assessment Data Description 
IVA Factor IVA Subscore weight Key Metrics 
Strategic 
governance 
SG1) Strategy  <2% Overall governance; rating composed of total scores of non-
Key Issues  
SG2) Strategic Capability  <2% Management of CSR issues, partnership in multi-stakeholder 
initiatives  
SG3) Traditional 
Governance Concerns  
<2% Board independence, management of CSR issues, board 
diversity, compensation practices, controversies involving 
executive compensation and governance. 
Human capital HC1) Workplace 
Practices  
<2% Workforce diversity, policies and programs to promote 
diversity, work/life benefits, discrimination-related 
controversies 
HC2) Labor Relations 20% KEY ISSUE: Labor Relations  
Benefits, strikes, union relations, controversies, risk of work 
stoppages, etc. 
HC3) Health & Safety  <2% H&S policies and systems, implementation and monitoring 
of those systems, performance (injury rate, etc.), safety-





<2% Customer initiatives, customer-related controversies, firm’s 
support for public policies with noteworthy benefits for 
stakeholders  
SC2) Local Communities  <2% Policies, systems and initiatives involving local communities 
(esp. indigenous peoples), controversies related to firm’s 
interactions with communities  
SC3) Supply Chain <2% Policies and systems to protect supply-chain workers’ and 
contractors’ rights, initiatives toward improving labor 
conditions, supply-chain-related controversies  
Products and 
services 
PS1) Intellectual Capital/ 
Product Development  
<2% Beneficial products and services, including efforts that 
benefit the disadvantaged, reduce consumption of energy and 
resources, and production of hazardous chemicals; average of 
two scores  
PS2) Product Safety  <2% Product quality, health and safety initiatives, controversies 
related to the quality or safety of a firm’s products, including 
legal cases, recalls, criticism  
Emerging 
markets 
EM1) EM Strategy  <2% Default = 5, unless there is company specific exposure that is 
highly significant   
EM2) Human Rights/ 
Child and Forced Labor  
<2% Policies, support for values in Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, initiatives to promote human rights, human 
rights controversies  
EM3) Oppressive regimes  <2% Controversies, substantive involvement in countries with 
poor HR records  
Environmental 
risk factors 
ER1) Historic Liabilities <2% Controversies including natural resource-related cases, 
widespread or egregious environmental impacts  
ER2) Operating Risk <2% Emissions to air, discharges to water, emission of toxic 





<2% Water management and use, use of recycled materials, 
sourcing, sustainable resource management, climate change 
policy and transparency, climate change initiatives, absolute 
and normalized emissions output, controversies  
ER4) Industry Carbon 
Specific Risk  
25% KEY ISSUE: Carbon 
Targets, emissions intensity relative to peers, estimated cost 






<2% Policies to integrate environmental considerations into all 
operations, environmental management systems, regulatory 
compliance, controversies  
EMC2) Corporate 
Governance  
<2% Board independence, management of CSR issues, board 
diversity, compensation practices, controversies involving 





Management Systems  
<2% Establishment and monitoring of environmental 
performance targets, presence of environmental training, 
stakeholder engagement  
EMC4) Audit <2% External independent audits of environmental performance  
EMC5) Environmental 
Accounting/Reporting  
<2% Reporting frequency, reporting quality  
EMC6) Environmental 
Training & Development  
<2% Presence of environmental training and communications 
programs for employees  
EMC7) Certification <2% Certifications by ISO or other industry- and country-specific 
third party auditors  
EMC8) Products/ 
Materials  
<2% Positive and negative impact of products & services, end-of-
life product management, controversies related to 






<2% Policies to integrate environmental considerations into all 
operations and reduce environmental impact of operations, 
products & services, environmental management systems, 
regulatory compliance  
EO2) Environmental 
Opportunity  
35% KEY ISSUE: Opportunities in clean technology  
Product development in clean technology, R&D relative to 
sales and trend, innovation capacity   
EO3) Performance <2% Percent of revenue represented by identified beneficial 




Appendix 1b. Vigeo Corporate ESG Data Description 
Key domain Subdimension Description 
Environment ENV1.1 Environmental strategy and eco-design 
 ENV1.2 Pollution prevention and control 
 ENV1.3 Development of Green products and services 
 ENV1.4 Protection of biodiversity 
 ENV2.1 Protection of water resources 
 ENV2.2 Minimizing environmental impacts from energy use 
 ENV2.3 Environmental supply chain management 
 ENV2.4 Management of atmospheric emissions 
 ENV2.5 Waste management 
 ENV2.6 Management of environmental nuisances: dust, odor, noise 
 ENV2.7 Management of environmental impacts from transportation 




HRS1.1 Promotion of labor relations 
HRS1.2 Encouraging employee participation 
 HRS2.1 Career Development 
 HRS2.2 Training and Development 
 HRS2.3 Responsible management of restructurings 
 HRS2.4 Carrer management and promotion of employability 
 HRS3.1 Quality of remuneration systems 
 HRS3.2 Improvement of health and safety conditions 
 HRS3.3 Respect and management of working hours 
Business 
behavior 
C&S1.1 Product safety 
C&S1.2 Information to customers 
(Customer & 
supplier) 
C&S1.3 Responsible Contractual Agreement 
C&S2.1 Integration of CSR in purchasing processes 
 C&S2.2 Sustainable Relationship with suppliers 
 C&S2.3 Integration of environmental factors in the supply chain 
 C&S2.4 Integration of social factors in the supply chain 
 C&S3.1 Prevention of corruption 
 C&S3.2 Prevention of anti-competitive practices 
 C&S3.3 Transparency and integrity of influence strategies and practices 
Human rights HR1.1 Respect for human rights standards and prevention of violations 
 HR2.1 Respect for freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining 
 HR2.2 Elimination of child labour 
 HR2.3 Abolition of forced labour 
 HR2.4 Non-discrimination 
Community 
involvement 
CIN1.1 Promotion of social and economic development 
CIN2.1 Social impacts of company’s products and services 
 CIN2.2 Contribution to general interest causes 
Corporate 
governance 
CGV1.1 Board of directors 
CGV2.1 Audit and Internal Controls 
 CGV3.1 Shareholders’ Rights 
 CGV4.4 Executive Remuneration 





Appendix 2a. MSCI Intangible Value Assessment Country (Region) Coverage 













Australia 2.95 2.75 2.97 2,877 240 Morocco 1.00 0.67 1.33 3 1 
Austria 3.44 3.13 3.23 370 14 Netherlands 3.35 3.62 3.29 1,496 34 
Belgium 2.98 2.97 3.00 680 19 New Zealand 2.70 2.95 2.97 256 13 
Bermuda Islands 2.02 1.35 2.06 283 16 Norway 4.06 4.35 3.94 485 16 
Brazil 2.68 3.28 2.68 
 
426 33 Pakistan 1.50 1.25 1.75 4 2 
Canada 3.24 2.87 3.26 3,347 129 Papua New Guinea 2.62 2.00 3.05 21 2 
Cayman Islands 2.60 1.94 2.95 101 3 Peru 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 1 
Chile 1.59 1.50 1.72 46 9 Philippines 0.04 0.89 0.04 28 1 
China 0.54 0.46 0.63 181 35 Poland 2.03 1.55 1.76 194 7 
Colombia 2.00 2.67 2.33 3 2 Portugal 2.67 2.60 2.12 451 11 
Cyprus 4.00 3.00 4.00 5 1 Puerto Rico 1.06 1.53 1.06 32 1 
Czech Republic 2.43 2.38 2.73 124 22 Romania 1.00 0.78 1.00 23 1 
Denmark 3.43 3.31 3.33 
 
843 22 Russia 0.79 0.64 1.07 227 19 
Egypt 1.71 0.76 1.65 17 3 Singapore 2.03 2.08 2.08 740 40 
Finland 3.85 3.78 
 
3.84 927 27 South Africa 4.26 3.50 4.33 167 17 
France 3.95 3.39 3.62 3,660 89 Spain 3.48 3.08 3.45 1,610 45 
Germany 3.83 4.06 3.74 2,779 66 Sweden 4.19 4.09 4.11 1,600 42 
Greece 2.23 2.05 2.14 554 16 Switzerland 3.18 3.10 3.11 3,184 60 
Hong Kong 1.79 1.96 1.92 1,447 62 Taiwan 2.15 2.04 2.19 156 17 
Hungary 1.74 1.83 1.63 95 4 Thailand 2.53 1.04 2.58 82 6 
India 2.03 1.66 2.09 150 26 Turkey 2.20 1.13 2.04 109 7 
Indonesia 1.47 0.53 1.59 34 4 United Arab Emirates 1.00 3.00 1.00 1 1 
Ireland 1.89 2.09 1.88 892 24 United Kingdom 3.62 3.24 3.52 14,203 315 
Israel 1.09 1.64 1.09 78 11 United States 2.38 2.44 2.45 31,819 778 
Italy 
 
2.31 1.99 2.33 2149 54       
Japan 2.57 3.67 2.59 11,270 384 (Not included in the World Bank data)  
Korea, South 2.59 2.96 2.61 466 28 British Virgin Islands 1.00 2.00 0.00 1 1 
Luxembourg 1.96 2.65 1.99 145 9 Guernsey 2.03 1.28 1.80 87 2 
Macao, China 2.00 4.00 1.50 2 2 Gibraltar 3.00 2.48 3.09 23 2 
Malaysia 1.47 1.18 1.90 154 14 Jersey 1.27 1.08 1.31 26 3 
Mexico 2.05 2.69 2.18 239 17 (Total: 59 countries)    91,373  




Appendix 2b.Vigeo ESG Country (Region) Coverage 





















Australia 34.91 25.12 22.08 34.71 32.86 37.69 56.72 154 72 
Austria 28.72 23.95 29.32 35.22 29.40 32.02 40.28 57 16 
Belgium 35.45 36.78 38.65 38.49 39.10 41.28 41.25 120 22 
Bermuda 30.00 21.00 33.00 38.00 55.00 19.00 39.00 1 1 
China 14.80 4.80 6.20 20.60 25.60 23.60 22.00 5 3 
Canada 35.20 26.29 24.70 37.53 38.07 41.45 51.54 133 52 
Denmark 29.60 27.62 29.59 36.18 30.75 35.76 34.30 97 27 
Finland 40.15 40.49 41.72 42.55 33.24 42.37 50.89 123 24 
France 42.40 41.22 47.18 48.15 47.53 45.91 43.66 1038 121 
Germany 40.55 43.29 43.91 46.25 42.25 44.37 45.11 508 75 
Greece 27.61 26.54 27.81 30.10 33.32 34.37 29.67 57 12 
Hong Kong, China 23.36 15.22 15.31 25.05 22.50 27.06 35.53 96 43 
Iceland 21.50 5.75 8.00 22.25 9.75 33.75 39.00 4 4 
Ireland 27.08 22.85 25.59 30.04 31.95 35.07 51.56 97 18 
Italy 36.75 34.28 40.97 41.62 39.85 42.94 12.09 291 52 
Japan 25.19 27.47 19.39 31.87 26.25 33.46 16.37 655 290 
Luxembourg 33.31 29.03 35.90 40.00 43.30 40.57 44.60 30 5 
Netherlands 42.65 43.19 42.35 45.35 47.67 48.55 53.85 288 47 
New Zealand 29.43 28.86 17.43 27.14 19.86 29.14 48.86 7 3 
Norway 40.94 34.00 39.90 48.14 38.96 41.10 51.60 67 19 
Portugal 35.86 35.15 37.90 37.60 42.97 43.08 36.00 61 10 
Russia 32.00 31.00 20.00 18.00 16.00 43.00 56.00 2 1 
Singapore 25.62 16.16 14.35 23.84 23.84 27.89 44.19 37 17 
Spain 36.52 36.40 38.60 40.91 40.85 41.97 41.87 259 51 
Sweden 37.10 35.76 32.99 45.71 32.41 42.29 42.08 194 43 
Switzerland 37.02 35.79 32.45 40.49 36.04 40.72 44.44 301 54 
United Kingdom 42.24 39.47 33.14 42.04 45.85 42.65 64.77 1,157 255 




























Abu Dhabi (UAE) 19.65 38.32 25.68 12 1 Kuwait 18.92 24.30 36.60 48 4 
Austria 43.29 38.13 38.77 4,020 335 Luxembourg 55.00 58.48 52.83 60 5 
Australia 44.46 51.84 50.40 252 21 Malaysia 42.32 41.12 50.21 540 45 
Belgium 53.16 54.88 49.63 336 28 Mexico 38.96 46.03 49.47 324 27 
Brazil 55.02 55.19 67.72 1,008 84 Morocco 21.57 20.13 53.42 36 3 
Canada 47.59 37.64 38.65 3,864 322 Netherlands 75.30 68.86 75.36 540 45 
Channel Islands 52.05 49,82 53.02 24 2 New Zealand 49.47 45.42 42.40 144 12 
Chile 33.41 43.66 45.61 252 21 Nigeria 7.18 10.89 19.71 12 1 
China 25.59 33.38 32.78 984 82 Norway 56.90 55.26 58.87 300 25 
Colombia 34.40 34.52 40.94 108 9 Oman 27.00 27.42 33.00 12 1 
Cyprus 39.18 30.20 36.71 12 1 Peru 41.33 31.05 34.41 12 1 
Czech Republic 48.56 48.72 60.01 48 4 Philippines 39.59 36.07 40.79 252 21 
Denmark  48.45 56.43 52.69 324 27 Poland 33.22 33.62 42.06 312 26 
Dubai 37.39 44.24 33.76 12 1 Portgual 67.52 66.20 73.95 144 12 
Egypt 14.55 19.29 27.22 132 11 Quatar 10.77 12.87 24.64 24 2 
Finland 72.26 73.25 66.86 324 27 Russian Federation 37.52 39.92 50.64 408 34 
France 71.45 75.70 76.36 1,212 101 Saudi Arabia 19.22 32.12 25.65 72 6 
Germany 58.25 67.07 67.16 1,068 89 Singapore 34.66 33.58 35.60 648 54 
Greece 35.42 47.10 49.62 300 25 South Africa 66.17 56.74 73.06 1,092 91 
Hong Kong 30.27 33.72 35.51 1,800 150 South Korea 47.12 62.00 56.77 1,212 101 
Hungary 73.29 76.18 80.80 48 4 Spain 66.26 68.54 73.82 696 58 
Iceland 29.02 20.45 36.06 36 3 Sri Lanka 51.25 51.09 66.59 12 1 
India 47.16 51.60 57.93 960 80 Sweden 62.79 66.58 63.91 660 55 
Indonesia 45.46 41.95 60.83 300 25 Switzerland 57.88 58.71 56.98 852 71 
Ireland 43.04 42.65 39.33 216 18 Taiwan  29.02 44.74 36.30 1,536 128 
Israel 38.44 42.65 39.33 168 14 Thailand 55.76 47.93 56.73 264 22 
Italy  52.92 53.05 62.93 708 59 Turkey 44.33 48.36 52.90 288 24 
Japan  38.18 61.62 45.47 5,196 433 United Kingdom 64.32 59.63 63.16 4,776 398 
Jordan 52.16 60.71 62.99 12 1 United States 51.91 40.22 44.17 14,436 1203 










The anti-director rights index (ADRI) was first developed in La Porta et al. (1998) as a measure of 
investor protection against corporate management, and later on revised in Djankov et al. (2008) and 
Spamann (2010). All the three ADRIs consist of the same six key components: (1) proxy by mail 
allowed; (2) shares not blocked before shareholder meeting; (3) cumulative voting/ proportional 
representation; (4) oppressed minority protection; (5) preemptive rights to new share issues; (6) 
percentage of share capital to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting. Each component is a 
dummy variable and the ADRI is formed by aggregating the value of all six components. The index 
ranges from 0 to 6, whereby a higher value of the index indicates stronger shareholder protection. 
Source: LLSV (1998); La Porta et al. (2008); Spamann (2010). 
Anti-self-dealing 
index (ASDI) 
The anti-self-dealing index (ASDI) was developed by Djankov et al. (2008) and is an average of ex 
ante and ex post private control of self-dealing. The ex ante private control of self-dealing 
transactions includes approval by disinterested shareholders and ex ante disclosure by the buyer, the 
insider, and independent review. The ex post private control of self-dealing transactions include the 
disclosure in periodic filings and the ease of proving wrong doing (holding the insider and the 





voting and cash 
flow) 
Equals one if the company law or commercial code of the country requires that ordinary shares 
carry one vote per share, and zero otherwise. Equivalently, this variable equals one when the law 
prohibits the existence of both multiple-voting and nonvoting ordinary shares and does not allow 
firms to set a maximum number of votes per shareholder irrespective of the number of shares 
owned, and zero otherwise. “Ordinary shares” means all shares that do not carry a preference of any 
kind, neither for dividends nor for liquidation. For voting rights, a literal interpretation is adopted, 
under which the equal number of votes, not the proportionality of votes and cash-flow rights is 
decisive. In addition, strict proportionality between voting and cash-flow rights is required. Source: 




Equals the percentage of net income that the company law or commercial code requires firms to 
distribute as dividends among ordinary stockholders. It takes a value of zero for countries without 
such a restriction. The shareholder assembly can waive the right to the dividend. Source: LLSV 




Index of public enforcement if all disclosure and approval requirements have been met. Ranges 
from 0 to 1. One-quarter point when each of the following sanction is available: (1) fines for the 
approving body, (2) jail sentences for approving body, (3) fines for the insider, (4) jail sentences for 




The combination of the disclosure requirements index and the liability standard index. The 
disclosure requirements index includes six sub-dimensions: (1) prospectus; (2) compensations of 
directors and key officers; (3) shareholders ownership structure; (4) insider ownership; (5) irregular 
contracts; and (6) transactions between the securities issuer and its directors, officers, and/or large 




The index of public enforcement is the average of five subindices related to the “Supervisor” of 
securities regulation: (1) supervisor characteristics index, including appointment, tenure, and focus; 
(2) rule-making power index, including the power of the supervisor to issue regulations regarding 
primary offerings and listing rules on stock exchanges; (3) investigative powers index, including 
document and witness; (4) orders index, including orders issuer, orders distributor, and orders 
accountant; (5) criminal index, including criminal director, criminal distributor, and criminal 
accountant. Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006). 
GDP per capita GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross 
value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in 
current U.S. dollars. Source: World Bank. 





Free cash flows Computed as EBIT multiplied by (1 – tax rate), and plus the Depreciation & Amortization, and then 




The capital expenditure recorded on the balance sheet, scaled by total assets. Source: Compustat. 
Dividend payout 
ratio 
Calculated as the common dividends divided by net income, as recorded on the company’s financial 
statement. Source: Datastream. 
Leverage  Calculated as the book value of total liabilities divided by book value of total equity of the company 
(MSCI and Vigeo samples), or the book value of total liabilities divided by the book value of total 
assets of the company (ASSET4 sample). Source: Compustat. 
Total 
compensation 
Executives’ compensation including salaries and cash bonuses, stock options, equity-linked LTIP 
cash plan, equity-linked LTIP option plan, equity-linked LTIP share plan, LTIP share matching 
plan, etc. The score is then calculated by averaging the equity based compensation of all executives 
reported in BoardEx for the focal company. Source: BoardEx Director Report. 
Analyst coverage The number of analyst forecast reports for the focal company. Source: I/B/E/S. 
Employee  The total number of employees of the company. Source: Compustat. 
Market 
capitalization 
The total market value of equity of the company. Source: Datastream. 
Blockholders’ 
direct ownership 
The cumulative direct ownership of all shareholders who directly hold over 5% of the company’s 




The total ownership (both direct and indirect) held by the largest shareholder of the company. Thw 
ownership data are cross-sectional and reflect the most recent information at the time of collecting 
these data. Source: Datastream and Orbis. 
Control wedge The ratio of the voting rights to the ownership for the largest shareholder of the company. Wedge1 
stands for the difference between the voting rights and the cash flow rights of the largest 
shareholder. Wedge2 stands for the ratio of the voting rights to the cash flow rights of the largest 
shareholder. Source: Datastream. 
Independent 
director ratio 
The ratio of the number of all independent directors to the number of all directors on the board. 
Source: BoardEx. 




The dummy variable equals one if the CEO of the company worked in another country before the 
current position. Source: BoardEx. 
CEO overseas 
education 
The dummy variable equals one if the CEO received education degrees overseas. Source: BoardEx. 
ROA Return on assets: net income divided by total assets. Source: Compustat. 




Measured by the ratio of the change in short-term investment to the change in operational cash 
flow. Source: Compustat. 
Interest coverage Earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) divided by interest expenses. Source: Compustat. 
Financial slack Current debts divided by current assets. Source: Compustat. 
CapEx to sales 
ratio 
The ratio of capital expenditure to the total sales revenue, a measure following Berger and Ofek 
(1995). Source: Compustat. 
Firm size The book value of total assets of the firm. Source: Compustat. 






Rolling 12 month dividend per share (adjusted). It is intended to represent the anticipated payment 
over the following 12 months and for that reason may be calculated on a rolling 12-month basis, or 
as the "indicated" annual amount, or it may be a forecast. Special or once-off dividends are generally 
excluded. Dividends per share are displayed gross, inclusive of local tax credits where applicable, 
except for France, Belgium, Ireland and the UK, where dividends per share are displayed net. 
Source: Datastream. 
ROE Return on equity: net income divided by total assets. Source: Compustat. 
Annual sales 
growth rate 








Country-level sovereign ESG scores and benchmarks based on 120 ESG risk and performance 
indicators in three domains: (1) environmental protection, (2) social protection and solidarity, (3) 
rule of law and governance. Countries are graded on a scale of 100 on their commitment and 
performance in these indicators (e.g., ratification of the Kyoto convention, the Vienna convention, 
the Stockholm convention, CO2 emissions per head, Gini index, etc). Source: Vigeo. 
Entrenchment 
Index 1 
Following the original Entrenchment Index with US coverage by Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell (2009), 
the Entrenchment Index 1 is constructed for firms from 64 countries across the world during the 
period 2002-2013, and is the sum of the five dummy variables from Datastream’s ASSET4 sample 
based on the presence of: (1) a poison pill, (2) a golden parachute, (3) a upermajority requirement 
for amending bylaw and charter, (4) a classified board, and (5) other anti-takeover provisions. Non-
available values are treated as missing. Source: Datastream. 
Entrenchment 
Index 2 
Following the original Entrenchment Index with US coverage by Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell (2009), 
the Entrenchment Index 1 is constructed for firms from 64 countries across the world during the 
period 2002-2013, and is the sum of the five dummy variables from Datastream’s ASSET4 sample 
based on the presence of: (1) a poison pill, (2) a golden parachute, (3) a supermajority requirement 
for amending bylaw and charter, (4) a classified board, and (5) other anti-takeover provisions. 
Missing values are treated as zeros. Source: Datastream. 
Entrenchment 
Index 3 
Following the original Entrenchment Index with US coverage by Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell (2009), 
the Entrenchment Index 1 is constructed for firms from 64 countries across the world during the 
period 2002-2013, and is the sum of the five dummy variables from Datastream’s ASSET4 sample 
based on the presence of: (1) a poison pill, (2) a golden parachute, (3) a supermajority requirement 
for amending bylaw and charter, (4) a staggered board (the terms of board members are uniform), 






Chapter 3. Concentrated Wealth and 
Stakeholder Value 
 
Hao Liang 27 
 
Abstract 
In the majority of firms around the world, corporate ownership is very concentrated, and is 
especially held by wealthy families and states. In this paper, I investigate the effects of family- and 
state-control on stakeholder value as proxied by a firm’s engagement in and compliance to 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) issues. Using extensive public and proprietary CSR data on 
firms in 60 countries, I find that: (1) Ownership concentration has a significant but non-linear 
impact on stakeholder value but not shareholder value. (2) The type of controlling shareholder has 
a strong impact on stakeholder value: family-controlled firms have significantly worse CSR 
performance, whereas state-controlled firms have significantly better CSR performance. (3) The 
CSR performance is lowest in family firms where family members — especially of the second and 
following generations — serve as CEOs, and CSR performance is highest in state firms with 
politically-connected CEOs. (4) The negative effect of family-control on stakeholder value further 
translates into lower firm value, whereas the positive effect of state-control does not lead to higher 
firm value. All results survive after controlling for various country- and firm-level factors as well 
as country, industry, and year fixed effects, implementing an instrumental variable strategy, and 
performing quasi-natural experiments to get proper identification. My findings entail a critical 
evaluation on the role of family-control on corporate social responsibility and a more benevolent 
view of government ownership in dealing with market externalities. 
Keywords: Ownership Concentration, Family-Control, State-Control, Corporate Social 
Responsibility, Shareholders Value, Stakeholder Value 
JEL Code: D23, G30, M14 
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“... [B]ut I am sure that Mexico is much better off 
with [Carlos] Slim’s contribution in running 
businesses well than it would be without him” 
     —Bill Gates, Comments on Why Nations 




Modern corporations typically face two fundamental tradeoffs. The first is the tradeoff between a 
dispersed ownership structure and a concentrated ownership structure—especially around wealthy 
families and states (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung, 
2000; Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang, 2002; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Morck, Wolfenzon, and 
Yeung, 2005)—which concerns whether the founder/controller wants to give up some equity 
stakes to other investors (Bebchuk & Roe, 1999; La Porta et al., 1999). The second is the tradeoff 
between shareholders and other stakeholder (Tirole, 2001; Allen, Carletti, and Marquez, 2009; 
Benabou and Tirole, 2010), which concerns the decision of engaging in activities that generate 
highest financial returns versus engaging in social responsibility that increases stakeholder welfare, 
sometimes at the cost of sacrificing financial returns.  
These two tradeoffs create four quadrants of relationships between control and value, as 
shown in Figure 1: (1) the relationship between dispersed ownership and shareholder value, which 
focuses on agency conflicts between managers and shareholders (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Jensen, 1989; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997); (2) The relationship between concentrated ownership and 
shareholder value, which focuses on conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders (e.g., Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Bebchuk, Kraakman, & Triantis, 2000; Morck, 
Stangeland, & Yeung, 2000; Claessens et al., 2002; La Porta et al., 2002); (3) The relationship 
between dispersed ownership and stakeholder value, which focuses on conflicts between manager 
and stakeholders as in the traditional stakeholder theory (e.g., Freeman, 1984; Dyer and Whetten, 
2006); (4) The relationship between concentrated ownership and stakeholder value, which focuses 
on conflicts between controlling shareholders and other stakeholders (e.g., Barnea & Rubin, 2010). 
While the first three relationships have been well documented in the literature, studies on the 
fourth quadrant are rather scarce. This scarcity echoes some theoretical and empirical puzzles in 
economic and management research. For example, many studies argue that controlling 




their holding companies suffer from poor financial performance and value discount. However, 
large shareholders themselves would internalize the costs of value discount, which implies that 
they have incentives to increase firm value (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988; Claessens, et al., 
2002). Such puzzles may indicate that firm value incorporates aspects other than pure shareholder 
value such as stakeholder value (Jensen, 2001), or that mechanisms of how controlling 
shareholders affect firm value are different, or at least more complicated, than what has been 
known in the literature. 
[Insert Figure 1 about Here] 
It has been widely accepted that ownership structures are among the foremost important 
factors in driving corporate policies and valuation (e.g., Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 2009). 
Ownership structures are important along two dimensions: the first is how much the ownership 
is concentrated, and the second is who actually owns the firm (ownership heterogeneity). These 
two questions have been answered in the groundbreaking work of La Porta et al. (1999), which 
found that ownership is very concentrated worldwide, and such concentration is mostly around 
wealthy families and the states, who themselves are key corporate stakeholders (Freeman, 1984). 
Therefore, the effects of ownership concentration on other stakeholders’ welfare is an important 
yet largely unexplored question. In this context, corporate social responsibility (CSR) is an ideal 
ground for disentangling and testing the effects of ownership concentration and ownership 
heterogeneity, as different owners may have different non-financial preferences, and CSR better 
captures such preferences. Therefore, the focus of this paper is on the effects of family-control 
and state-control— both their type and the degree of their ownership concentration— on 
corporate stakeholder value as measured by CSR performance. 
The deficit of research in the aforementioned fourth “quadrant” may be largely due to the 
fact that cross-country firm-level data on “stakeholder value” did not exist until recently, though 
ownership concentration is predominant worldwide (La Porta et al., 1999) and cross-country 
ownership data have already been extensively used in the academic literature. In recent years, some 
data providers such as MSCI, Vigeo, and Thomson Reuters have begun to merge with other data 
companies and consolidate data on CSR and societal sustainability from different countries under 
unified rating metrics. These ratings focus on firms’ engagement in and compliance to key 
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues, and are believed to be best representative for 
stakeholder value (Deng, Kang, & Low, 2013). In this paper, I make use of these new data to 




a global scale, and how it is related to and different from the relationship between ownership 
concentration and traditional shareholder value.  
There are some disclaimers before I further proceed. First, the focus of this paper is on 
family-controlled firms and state-controlled firms, as they account for the majority of firms with 
controlling shareholders in many crucial sectors worldwide. For example, the majority of media 
around the world are owned by the state and by the controlling families (Djankov, Mcliesh, 
Nenova, and Shleifer, 2003). Other types of controlling shareholders, such as banks, hedge funds, 
private equity, insurance companies, etc., are far less prevalent as families and states (La Porta et 
al., 1999; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Claessens et al., 2002), thus their effects are not particularly 
investigated in this paper. Second, the family- and state-controlled firms in my sample are very 
large corporations, similar to those in La Porta et al. (1999), rather than small and medium-sized 
family firms or governmental vehicles. In this sense, the context of this study is on large firms that 
are included in major equity indices and dominant in the global economy, and my results mostly 
speak of the effects of such large firms rather than small ones. Third, I am well aware of the 
deficiencies of existing cross-country CSR ratings, thus have tried my best to find the most 
objective data sources that give ratings based on the relative performance of the firm to its industry 
peers, rather than based on differences across countries and jurisdictions. They also reflect both 
engagement and compliance, and both the firm’s commitment to ESG issues and the effectiveness of 
its actions. The current sample I use— Thomson Reuters’ ASSET4— is probably the best data 
that one can have in order to study the issue of stakeholder value. Another typical critic on these 
commercial ESG ratings is that there is a black-box aspect to the scores. Unlike an extra dollar of 
charitable donations, it is unclear what exactly an increase in the score represents, and as a result, 
there is skepticism about what exactly these scores capture. Nevertheless, there is mounting 
evidence in the literature that these CSR scores are indeed informative of stakeholder value, as 
they are strong predictors of firms’ future pollution and environmental regulatory violations 
(Chatterji, Levine, & Toffel, 2009), donations (Cheng, Hong, & Shue, 2013), the values of investors 
and CEOs (Di Guili & Kostovetsky, 2011), and easier access to finance (Cheng, Ioannou, & 
Serafeim, 2014). Therefore, I am confident with the quality of the extensive CSR data, which has 
also been used in Ioannou & Serafeim (2012) and Cheng et al. (2014). Also, as shown in the 
following empirical section, those results are consistent throughout various robustness tests and 





Family, State, and Stakeholder Value 
Wealth Concentration in the Hands of Wealthy Families and Powerful States 
Business history is replete with examples of spectacular ascents of wealthy family controlling for 
the large corporate sector, such as Sabanci family in Turkey, Berlusconi family in Italy, Heineken 
family in the Netherlands, Carlos Slim family in Mexico, Lauder family in France, Li Ka-Shing 
family in Hong Kong, Merck family in Switzerland, and the Rothschild family in the United 
Kingdom. Examples of powerful state controlling for a large part or the whole economy also 
abound, such as the Communist-party-led government in China, GIC and Temasek in Singapore, 
Government Pension Fund of Norway, and the Russian national wealth fund and reserve fund 
which own large oil companies. The Italian government holds direct and indirect stakes through 
the largest oil, gas, electricity, carrier, and aerospace and defense companies in Italy (Bortolotti & 
Faccio, 2009). These wealthy families and states, along with other types of ultimate owners such 
as banks, foundations, and various financial institutions, represent different types of important 
stakeholders in society. Families and states typically have control power over firms that are 
significantly in excess of their cash flow rights, primarily through the use of pyramids and 
participation in management (Bebchuk et al., 2000). In addition, family-control and state-control 
often reinforce each other: many of a country’s leading politicians are also members of the same 
powerful families that control their largest firms (Faccio and Lang, 2002; Faccio, 2006; Morck and 
Yeung, 2004; Fogel, 2006).  
The economics literature generally focuses on the financial performance of wealthy family- 
and state-controlled firms to gauge their welfare implication— mostly the welfare of shareholders 
measured by firm valuation (e.g., Tobin’s Q). However, no conclusion has been reached regarding 
whether family-control or state-control is associated with higher or lower shareholder value, 
especially on a global scale (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Perez-Gonzalez, 2006; Bennedsen, 
Nielsen, Perez-Gonzalez, & Wolfenzon, 2007; Khanna & Yafeh, 2007; Masulis, Pham, & Zein, 
2011; Lins, Volpin, & Wagner, 2013). Moreover, in theory, both types of firms emerge largely not 
for the pure pursuit of financial returns. State-owned firms emerge to deal with negative 
externalities and market failure, and family-controlled firms emerge because of the inheritance 
cultures and norms of maintaining blood kin in control and the long-term survival of their 
businesses (Donnelley, 1964). Therefore, using financial returns and shareholder value 
maximization as value criteria for firms with significant wealth concentration in the hands of 




far, little is known about whether concentrated wealth by families and states really trades off 
shareholder welfare and stakeholder welfare, and if so, the mechanisms of how they make such 
tradeoffs, and what are the implications on stakeholder value besides shareholder value.  
Corporate Social Responsibility and Stakeholder Value  
The topics of CSR and stakeholder value abound in the academic literature, but the questions 
as to whether corporations should engage in CSR, whether CSR represents stakeholder value, and 
whether stakeholder value is incorporated into firm value have long been fiercely debated 
(Macintosh, 1999). Economists’ view of how society should be organized has traditionally rested 
on the assumption that corporations’ responsibility is to pursue economic efficiency and profit-
maximization, and they have no reason to fit the society’s moral standards (Friedman, 1970; 
Benabou and Tirole, 2010). Mainstream economics has thus long embraced the shareholder-value 
approach, which argues that firms should be controlled by profit-maximizing shareholders while 
other stakeholders are protected by contracts and regulations. However, in reality, CSR is often 
deemed as material by corporate executives and even shareholders, and has been increasingly 
becoming a mainstream business activity. Firms are investing more and more resources in public 
goods provision, and many companies reduce negative externalities below levels required by law.28 
In addition, numerous empirical studies have documented that CSR is closely linked to better firm 
performance (e.g., Lee and Faff, 2009) and higher shareholder value (e.g., Edmans, 2011; Deng, 
Kang, and Low, 2013; Dimson et al., 2013). Benabou and Tirole summarize this trend as: “caring 
about the environment, the welfare of people in poor countries, and other good causes is a normal 
good….the richer our societies, the higher the demand for [socially responsible behavior].” (2010: 
16). 
In the original stakeholder theory of Freeman (1984), “stakeholder value” is created 
through corporations engaging in social responsibility (Freeman, Wicks, & Parmar, 2004). In 
practice, the “stakeholder value” criterion has formed the foundations of many CSR standards and 
initiatives such as ISO 26000 and Global Reporting Initiative. Many empirical studies also 
document that various CSR practices are strongly associated with “value”, which is usually 
measured by financial returns, profitability, productivity and operational efficiency, and welfare 
(Chatterji et al., 2009; Deng, Kang, & Low, 2013; Edmans, 2011; Larkin, 2013; Cheng et al., 2014; 
Eccles, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014). Overall, the close link between CSR and stakeholder value 
                                                          
28 For example, according to a survey by Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012), more than half  of  Fortune Global 
250 firms now provide regular public statements exclusively discussing CSR, and more than one-third of  large 
firms have voluntary external certifications for social and environmental standards, and nearly 11 percent of  




have been established both theoretically and empirically. However, even if one accepts that CSR 
signifies stakeholder value, the relationships between concentrated ownership and CSR are still 
theoretically ambiguous. Therefore, before I systematically assess these relationships, I first briefly 
review below the different theoretical predictions on the effects of family-control and state-control 
on stakeholder value. 
Concentrated Wealth and Stakeholder Value 
Theoretically, the effects of corporate wealth concentration on stakeholder value can be both 
positive and negative, and such effects are further complicated by different types of ownership. 
On the positive side, concentrated ownership helps reduce managerial entrenchment, opportunism 
and myopia (Fama and Jensen, 1983), thus leads to higher stakeholder value. For family-controlled 
firms, the unique ownership structure gives them a long-term orientation and insulates their 
managers from opportunistic shareholder pressures (Kachaner, Stalk, & Bloch, 2012). They also 
have higher levels of trust from key stakeholders compared to traditional public firms (Donnelley, 
1964), and care more about their image and reputation among stakeholders (Dyer and Whetten, 
2006). In addition, family-CEOs usually have hard-to-obtain, firm-specific knowledge that 
professional CEOs lack (Cadbury, 2000). Moreover, the pyramid structure of family business 
groups can create financing advantages for affiliated firms under poor institutions and capital 
market conditions (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Masulis et al., 2011). For 
state-controlled firms, their legitimacy is rooted in the idea that these organizations were created 
by state capital, managed by political apointees, and chartered to serve the collective good of the 
country and society at large, even at the cost of their own financial profits (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1998). This perception is closely related to the so-called “public interest theory” (or “Pigouvian 
theory”, Pigou, 1938), which argues that governments aim to maximize the welfare of the society, 
as the benevolent social planner can efficient allocate resources and prevent market failure. In this 
sense, government ownership as a way for the state to provide public goods is beneficial for 
broader stakeholders in a society. Therefore, even though state-owned firms (SOEs) underperform 
financially, this is largely due to the fact that they trade off shareholder value with stakeholder 
value, thus they should outperform socially. 
On the negative side, large shareholders have the incentives to expropriate the interests of 
minority shareholders and other stakeholders, resulting in lower stakeholder value. For family-
controlled firms, the expropriation view argues that wealthy families are highly self-interested and 
merely want to protect their own parochial interests, which is termed as “amoral familism” by 




flow rights protect the controlling families from losing power, thus allow their entrenchment and 
extraction of private benefits from the firm’s assets at the cost of other investors (La Porta et al., 
1999; Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer, 2003; Morck & Yeung, 2003, 2004). Therefore, families that 
own various enterprises would not be inclined to improve the welfare of the broader society in 
which their firms are embedded (Morck and Yeung, 2004). In other words, entrenched billionaires 
have a vested interest in preserving the value of old capital and control, thus crowd out other 
stakeholders. For state-controlled firms, the negative view is closely related to the so-called “public 
choice theory”, which considers SOEs as rent-seeking tools for politicians and bureaucrats 
(Tullock, 1967; Shleifer, 1998). Under this view, political elites who control SOEs seek rents from 
the society at the costs of other stakeholders, which can reduce economic efficiency through 
corruption, poor resource allocation, reduced innovation and wealth creation, and increased 
inequality (Olson, 1963, 1982; Krueger, 1974; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Shleifer, 1998). Similar 
control pyramids and superior voting shares let the state controls the greater part of a country’s 
large corporate sector and stymie the institutional development (Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung, 
2005). Therefore, despite their easier access to finance and stronger market power, state-owned 
firms should underperform socially due to their lack of managerial incentives and politicians’ rent-
seeking through SOEs (e.g., Megginson, Nash, and van Randenborgh, 1994; Faccio, 2006). 
In summary, the relationship between stakeholder value and wealth concentration by 
families and states is rather ambiguous. By far, little is known about the direct impact of wealth 
concentration by families and states on stakeholder value, let alone its association with shareholder 
value. Between long-term orientation, expropriation, public interest, and public choice, the net 
impact of family- and state-control on stakeholder welfare is a matter of empirical investigation. 
While I recognize the family- and state-control could impact the stakeholder value in multiple ways, 
my focus is on the net effect.  First, I believe that the overall effect is of ultimate interest to the 
debate on the role of wealthy families and states in society. Second, I realize the empirical difficulty 
in measuring the relative contribution of the different effects. Nevertheless, I try to explore several 
governance mechanisms as potential channels that may explain the effects of control on CSR, 
which may shed light on the relevance of different effects. In the next section, I will empirically 
disentangle the mechanisms and impact of concentrated wealth on both shareholder value and 






Data and Methodology 
Data 
As mentioned above, I use a firm’s CSR ratings as proxies for its “stakeholder value”. The primary 
CSR data is from Thomson Reuter’s ASSET4 ESG database. The ASSET4 sample covers more 
than 4500 global publicly listed companies that are included in the S&P 500, Russell 1000, 
NASDAQ 100, MSCI Europe, FTSE 250, ASX 300, STOXX 600, the MSCI World Index, the 
MSCI Emerging Market index, among other major equity indices. Its ratings consist of more than 
750 environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) data points, including all exclusion 
(ethical screening) criteria and all aspects of sustainability performance. Every data point goes 
through a multi-step verification process, including a series of data entry checks, automated quality 
rules and historical comparisons. These data points reflect more than 280 key performance 
indicators and are rated as both a normalized score (0 to 100) and the actual computed value. It 
covers a time span from 2002 to 2012. All ratings are provided at the corporate subsidiary-level 
and on a yearly basis. For all companies, at least 3 year of history is available, and most companies 
are covered for 10 years. It is worth mentioning that firms in the ASSET4 sample are rated based 
both on their ESG compliance (regulatory requirements) and on their ESG engagement (voluntary 
initiatives), and according to both their commitment to these ESG issues and the effectiveness of 
their endeavor. Therefore, the CSR ratings reflect a comprehensive evaluation of how a firm 
engages in stakeholder issues and complies with regulations. To make better statistical inference, I 
use the normalized CSR score in all the analyses. The detailed compositions, as well as the country 
and industry coverage of the ASSET4 sample are reported in the Appendix.  
One may raise the concern that the ASSET4 world sample is biased toward certain countries 
such as the U.S. However, as described above, the sample exclusively follows major equity indices 
that cover the largest companies around the world, as those in other cross-country studies. 
Undoubtedly, companies in the U.S., U.K. Japan and Germany are on average larger than 
companies from other countries. My further check of the data confirms that almost all major 
multinational corporations in Fortune 1000 are in the sample. Therefore, the results from my 
sample can be interpreted as CSR for the world’s largest companies regardless of their countries, 
which is consistent with the perception that large firms have bigger social impact. To further 
validate my results from the ASSET4 sample, I conduct similar tests on Vigeo’s corporate ESG 




Assessment (IVA) sample, which mainly measures firm CSR engagement. The results (unreported) 
are very similar to those obtained from the ASSET4 sample. 
Data on family control, state control, and identifiers of other types of ultimate owner are 
from Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database. “Ultimate control” is defined as above a 25% threshold 
of ownership stake at every level along the pyramidal control chain. Besides, I manually collected 
data on executives’ backgrounds of family- and state-controlled firms from BoardEx, annual 
reports, and online media such as Forbes and BusinessWeek. In particular, I classified family-
controlled firms into several categories following the literature (e.g., Villalonga & Amit, 2006; 
Perez-Gonzalez, 2006; Bennedsen et al., 2007): (1) founder-CEO firms, (2) heir-CEO firms, (3) 
professional-CEO firms, and (4) family/founder-chairman firms. I classified state-controlled firms 
into two categories: (1) politician-CEO firms (the CEOs have political backgrounds), and (2) 
professional-CEO firms.  
Firm-level time-series data on the extent of ownership concentration (the percentage of 
ownership stakes of the largest owner) and the “wedge” (difference) between the voting rights and 
cash flow rights of the largest owner are obtained from Datastream. Data on firm financials are 
from Datastream and Compustat. Moreover, data on various corporate governance indicators are 
also from Datastream. Country-level data on GDP per capita and political institutions are from 
World Bank, and that on globalization are from ETH KOF Index of Globalization. Finally, 
cultural data are from World Value Survey and the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions. 
Empirical Strategy 
My sample is a balanced panel with missing observations, which consists of 4,456 firms over 2002-
2013. For the tests on shareholder value, the dependent variable is Tobin’s Q, which is measured 
either as the market-to-book ratio of equity or as the market-to-book ratio of assets, and the 
independent variables include ownership structures (family- and state-control dummies, the cash 
flow rights of the largest owner, etc.) and those standard financial variables as used in the literature. 
For the tests on stakeholder value, the dependent variables are various CSR ratings capturing 
different aspects of stakeholder value (the overall rating, the environmental rating, and the social 
rating), and the independent variables are ownership structures as before and other firm-level 
financial variables (such as ROA, Tobin’s Q, dividends per share, earnings per share, firm size, 





To correct for within-economy correlations, I use a random-effects specification that assumes 
each sample has a common explanatory variable component, which may differ across economies. 
That is, I do not treat corporations in a given economy as independent observations, and this 
specification takes explicit account of the correlated errors among my observations within an 
economy and produces consistent standard errors. Moreover, a random-effects specification is 
preferable to fixed effects when the sample represents the population, which is the case in my 
setting as my CSR sample covers the whole world. Nevertheless, I control for country fixed effects, 
which largely eliminates the simultaneity concern that ownership concentration and stakeholder 
value are jointly determined by legal systems, political institutions, and cultural norms. I also 
control for industry and year fixed effects, given that CSR and Tobin’s Q can be industry-specific 
and are also influenced by year-specific events. Standard errors in all regressions are clustered at 
the firm level. 
In addition, I use an instrumental variable approach by instrumenting family- and state-
controls with country-level legal and cultural variables. I also conduct a quasi-natural experiment 
on a global scale by using the signature of the Copenhagen Accord as an exogenous shock to 
corporate environmental awareness worldwide and compare whether family- and state-controlled 
firms reacted differently in relation to other firms. 
The descriptive statistics of the key dependent variables and explanatory variables are shown 
in Table 1. A correlation check between different explanatory variables suggests that none of the 
variables are highly correlated, thus the multicollinearity issue is not a concern. 




In this section, I empirically test the different theoretical predictions on the relationship between 
concentrated ownership— family- and state-control— and stakeholder value as outlined above. 
Before moving to the regression analysis, I first explore the nature of the data, particularly how 
CSR and various governance provisions differ across different types of ultimate owners. 
Table 2 descriptively shows the mean value of each CSR rating and governance provision 




company), financial institution (institutional investor), insurance company, mutual fund or pension 
fund, private equity, foundation or research institution, manager, and no ultimate owner (widely-
held firms). This division of ultimate owner directly follows the standard classification in the 
literature (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999; Faccio & Lang, 2002; Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; 
Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 2009). One may notice that firms that are ultimately owned by 
foundations or research institutions, managers, and private equity are of special cases, both due to 
their limited observations and the special purposes or financial situations of these firms. Therefore, 
my focus is on the rest of ultimate owners, except these three. 
Several interesting observations emerge from Table 2. First, despite the massive ongoing 
privatization and market development worldwide over the last three decades and fifteen years after 
the publication of the paper by La Porta et al. (1999), ownership across the globe is still very 
concentrated— even among the world’s largest multinational corporations. The average cash flow 
right by the largest shareholder is 22%, and the median is 13.6%, and some companies are 100% 
owned by a single large shareholder. Second, ownership is mostly concentrated around wealthy 
families and states. On average, families own more than 40% of corporate assets, and the states 
own almost 48% (the median is almost 51%) of corporate assets. Other types of ultimate owners 
on average own considerably less: banks own 19%, institutional investors (other financial 
institutions) own 24.8%, industrial companies own 15.8%, insurance companies own 15.6%, 
mutual funds own 24.3%, and private equity and venture capital own 22%. The largest owner’s 
voting rights are also very concentrated around families (46.18%) and states (47.53%)— much 
higher than other types of owners— while the difference between family control and state control 
is very marginal (7.8% for cash flow rights and 1.35% for voting rights). 
However, in terms of CSR performance, a different picture is shown. For the aggregate CSR 
rating, the environmental rating, and the social rating, family-controlled firms score relatively low 
(42.91), while state-controlled firms score relatively high (55.25). Firms owned by banks, 
institutional investors, and industrial companies score more or less in the middle of the spectrum. 
Firms controlled by mutual funds on average score even lower than those controlled by family, 
which is consistent with the notion that these active investors usually seek for quick exit from their 
investment and thus care less about long-term investment and stakeholder relationship. For the 
environmental rating and the social rating, very similar orders of CSR ratings across different types 
of owner are found, except that firms controlled by institutional investors score slightly lower than 
those controlled by families. The differences between family control and state control range from 
13.15 (for the aggregate CSR rating) to 15 (for the environmental rating) on a scale of 100, which 




the differences in cash flow rights and voting rights. These descriptive statistics seem to indicate 
that while ownership and power concentration are similar between family control and state control, 
their focuses on stakeholders are fundamentally different, which we will further investigate in the 
next section.  
Fourth, I also compare in Table 2 the differences across different ultimate owners along 
several dimensions of corporate governance. Similar to voting rights, veto power or golden shares 
are also much more concentrated around families and states than other owners. Dual-class shares 
and multiple voting rights are commonly used in family-controlled firms, but not in state-
controlled firms and other ones. The wedge between voting rights and cash flow rights of the 
largest owner is much larger in family-controlled firms, but very marginal in state-controlled firms 
and other firms. In addition, with my ASSET4 sample I am able to construct a global entrenchment 
index (E-index) from Datastream (ASSET4) that is similar to the US E-index constructed by 
Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell (2009), which I will explain its use in the next section.29 Among firms 
with concentrated ownership, the E-index is significantly lower in family-controlled and state-
controlled firms than in firms that are ultimately controlled by banks, insurance companies, 
institutional investors, industrial companies, mutual funds, private equity, etc. The uses of other 
governance provisions also differ significantly across different types of owners, and their roles will 
be discussed in more details later on in the regression analysis.   
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Regression Results 
The focus of this paper is on the ownership foundations of corporate tradeoff between 
shareholder value and stakeholder value. Therefore, the main explanatory variables are those 
ownership-related ones. More specifically, to test the ownership heterogeneity effect, I include in the 
baseline regressions two dummy variables, one indicating whether the ultimate owner of the firm 
is a wealthy family (or individual), and the other indicating whether the ultimate owner is the state. 
To test the effect of the degree of ownership concentration, I include the cash flow rights of the largest 
owner, the square of the largest owner’s cash flow rights, and the wedge between voting rights and 
cash flow rights of the largest owner. As mentioned earlier, due to the stability of the control 
structure by families and states over time, controlling for firm fixed effects is not feasible, as it will 
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parachute; (3) a staggered board, (4) other anti-takeover devices, and (5) supermajority requirements for both 




inevitably omit the family- and state-control dummies. Alternatively, in all regressions, I control 
for country-, industry-, and year-fixed effects to eliminate concerns on alternative channels to the 
largest extent. 
Ownership Concentration and Shareholder Value 
Before testing the effects of ownership concentration and identity on stakeholder value (CSR), 
I first test their effects on shareholder value as proxied by Tobin’s Q. The aim is also to compare my 
(more comprehensive and potentially more rigorous) results with the results in the existing 
literature. I include the typical set of control variables that are used in the literature (e.g., Claessens 
et al., 2002; Bebchuk et al., 2009). The results are reported in Table 3, with Column 1 only including 
the ownership heterogeneity variables (family- and state-control dummies), Column 2-3 only 
including only the ownership concentration variables (the combination between largest owner’s 
cash flow rights and its square, and the wedge between voting and cash flow rights), Column 4-5 
including both (but Column 5 does not control for industry fixed effects and firm-level covariates 
so as to be more comparable to the specifications in previous studies), Column 6-8 including all 
control variables and fixed effects, but with different Q measures as the dependent variable. 
As shown in Columns 1-4, none of the coefficients of the ownership heterogeneity dummies 
(family-control and state-control) and the ownership concentration variables (cash flow rights, 
voting rights, and the wedge between voting and cash flow rights of the largest owner) are 
statistically significant, though the correlations between ownership heterogeneity variables and 
ownership concentration variables are not high (26-29%). This is an interesting result, especially 
compared with several cross-country studies on corporate ownership with comparable sample 
sizes and firm coverage (mostly large firms on major equity indices, e.g. La Porta et al., 1999; 
Claessens et al., 2002). Without controlling for industry fixed effects and firm-level covariates 
(Column 5), family-control is associated with higher Tobin’s Q, and state-control is associated with 
lower Tobin’s Q, both are consistent with the empirical literature (e.g., Villalonga & Amit, 2006; 
Dewenter & Malastesta, 2001). Such inconsistency with the existing studies on the significance of 
ownership effects may seem surprising, but as argued by Petersen (2009), many existing empirical 
studies are subject to the problem of not empirically taking into account of correlations across 
groups and over time by clustering standard errors at the appropriate level. In addition, most cross-
country studies have a cross-sectional setting, which may not fully capture unobserved common 
characteristics at the country, industry, and year levels through controlling for fixed effects. 
Understandably, controlling for year-, industry-, and country-fixed effects may be necessary for 




in shareholder value in the literature (e.g., Claessens et al., 2002; Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz, 2007). 
Very similar results on the insignificance of ownership are found when all variables are pooled 
together (Column 7), and when the dependent variable Tobin’s Q is measured as the market-to-
book ratio of assets, either winsorized (Column 8) or unwinsorized (Column 9). In addition, the 
coefficients and economic significances are comparable to the empirical findings in cross-country 
studies such as Claessens et al. (2002), but smaller than those in US studies such as Villalonga & 
Amit (2006), which is consistent with the findings that US companies (or common law companies) 
have higher Tobin’s Q in general (Doidge et al., 2007). On the contrary to ownership effects, much 
of the variation in Tobin’s Q seems to be explained by traditional corporate finance variables (size, 
capital expenditure, sales growth, leverage, etc) and country-level GDP per capita, as their 
coefficients are mostly statistically significant. 
Besides the potential differences in econometrical treatments through clustering standard 
errors and controlling for country-, industry-, and year-fixed effects between my results and results 
in several existing studies, one may simply interpret the “insignificant” results of ownership and 
control as that they do not matter for shareholder value. It might be the case, but such explanation 
also goes against the theoretical arguments and empirical findings in extant studies. Another 
explanation may be that the effects of family- and state-control on firm value differ significantly 
across countries, and my results merely reflect the aggregate effects of all countries. In unreported 
regressions, I conducted the same tests on regional subsamples as in the previous studies: (1) the 
subsample of US firms; (2) the subsample of non-US firms; (3) the subsample of firms in the US, 
UK, and Australia (dispersed ownership countries); (4) the subsample of firms in countries other 
than US, UK, and Australia; (5) the subsample of firms in Eastern Asian countries as in Claessens 
et al. (2000); (6) the subsample of firms in Western European countries as in Faccio and Lang 
(2002). The results from these subsample tests are very similar to those from the global sample in 
Table 3: the coefficients on family- and state-control dummies and the largest owner’s cash flow 
rights are mostly insignificant, and that on financial control variables are mostly significant, which 
refute the “aggregate effects” explanation. A more reasonable explanation might be that my results 
reflect the equilibrium of costs and benefits of family- and state-control. For family control, the 
insignificance of ownership may be due to the fact that the benefits of family ownership are offset 
by the costs of family excess vote-holdings and expropriation. For the effects of state control, 
existing empirical results are limited, but the similar arguments may apply. In sum, my results on 




and shareholder value is rather insignificant.30 The next question is: would this also be the case for 
stakeholder value? 
[Insert Table 3 about Here] 
 
Ownership Concentration and Stakeholder Value 
To answer the above question, I then move to the effects of ownership on firm-level CSR 
ratings. Understandably, the set of control variables are different from that in the Tobin’s Q 
regressions, and the choice of control variables is made by following the literature on “doing good 
by doing well” and on global CSR (e.g., Hong, Kubik, and Scheinkman, 2012; Ioannou and 
Serafeim, 2012; Liang and Renneboog, 2014). The results are shown in Table 4, with Column 1-6 
reporting the results from pooling ownership heterogeneity and concentration variables together, 
while Column 7-8 also including their interactions (but not the interactions with the square of 
largest owner’s cash-flow rights). The dependent variables are aggregate CSR rating, the 
environmental rating, and the social rating, respectively, as indicated at the top of each column. 
Columns 1, 3, and 5 include all control variables, which inevitably reduce the number of 
observations, while Columns 2, 4, and 6 exclude a few economically duplicated control variables 
(e.g. ROA as an alternative measure of “doing well”, Log(assets) as a measure of firm size, and 
Globalization as an alternative measure of economic development) to preserve the number of 
observations. 
Several interesting observations emerge. First, among various covariates, the ownership 
variables— family-control dummy, state-control dummy, largest owner’s cash flow rights and its 
square, are the most significant ones throughout Columns 1-6, while that of other financial control 
variables are mostly insignificant, or at least their significances and signs are mixed. This indicates 
that much of the firm-level variation in CSR stems from ownership structures, both ownership 
heterogeneity and ownership concentration. Second, among these ownership variables, the 
coefficient on largest owner’ cash flow rights (largest shareholder’s ownership) is negative and 
significant, while the coefficient on its square is positive and significant. This is consistent with the 
findings on the non-linear effects of ownership concentration in the literature (e.g., Morck et al., 
1988; Cleassens et al., 2002; Bebchuk et al., 2009). Combining this result with the previous results 
in Table 3, while the previous studies find that insiders’ (including large shareholders’) ownership 
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is non-linearly associated with shareholder value, as measured by Tobin’s Q, my analysis— after 
clustering standard errors and controlling various fixed effects— reveals that such non-
monotonicity of ownership effects are mainly manifested on the value of stakeholders (which 
includes shareholders) but not on that of shareholders. The wedge between voting rights and cash 
flow rights of the largest owner, a proxy for large shareholders’ entrenchment and expropriation 
(Claessens et al., 2002), is negatively associated with CSR ratings. Economically, a one-standard-
deviation increase in the wedge between voting and cash flow rights lead to 0.01% decrease in the 
overall CSR rating, which is marginal. Third, regarding the effects of ownership heterogeneity, the 
coefficient on the family control dummy is negative and statistically significant, while that on state-
control dummy is positive and significant. The economic magnitude is non-trivial: ceteris paribus, 
a firm controlled by wealthy family on average scores more than 7.5 grades lower (on a scale of 
100) in the overall CSR rating compared to other firms, and more than 6 grades lower in both the 
environmental and the social ratings. These results seem to give support to the negative view 
(expropriation theory) of family control, but to the positive view (public interest theory) of state 
control. 
Regarding the sign and significance of the coefficients on other control variables, those on 
Tobin’s Q (market-to-book ratio of equity) and ROA are mostly positive in the fully specified 
models, supporting the “doing good by doing well” hypothesis. A one standard deviation increase 
in Q is associated with 0.7 (=0.397×1.757) percentage increase of the overall CSR rating, 0.5 (= 
0.298×1.757) percentage increase of the environmental rating, and 0.9 (0.500×1.757) percentage 
increase of the social rating. Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in ROA correspond to 0.9 
(= 0.06 × 14.77) percentage increase in the overall CSR rating, and around 0.15 percentage increase 
in the environmental and social ratings. Interestingly, “earnings per share” is negatively associated 
with CSR ratings when interaction terms are included, but are not so without interactions. Even 
when it’s statistically significant, the economic effect is much smaller: a one standard deviation 
increase in EPS correlates with only 0.01 percentage decrease in CSR ratings. In addition, higher 
dividend per share—a proxy for good governance for minority shareholders—is positively 
correlated with CSR, but also with much smaller economic effect (a one standard deviation 
increase in DPS corresponds to 0.02 percentage increase in CSR). Firm size is also positively 
associated with CSR rating, supporting the argument that larger multinational companies also take 
more social responsibilities. Degree of globalization matters for the overall CSR rating, consistent 
with the trend of convergence in international CSR conventions, but the effects are much weaker 




and macroeconomic controls are not as strong predictors as ownership variables, and have much 
smaller economic efffects.  
To further investigate different effects of ownership concentration and ownership 
heterogeneity on stakeholder value, I interact the family- and state-control dummies with the cash 
flow rights of the largest owner, a proxy for the degree of ownership concentration, as in Columns 
(7)-(9) of Table 4. Interestingly, none of the coefficients on these interaction terms are statistically 
significant, indicating that the ownership effects on CSR largely stem from ownership 
heterogeneity (family-control or state-control), rather than from the incremental change in the 
controller’s ownership stakes. In other words, it is who actually controls the firm, not how much 
they control, that matters most for stakeholder value. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Instrumental Variable Strategy 
The above results show that CSR is negatively related to family control and positively related to 
state control, and non-linearly correlates with the degree of ownership concentration. One 
potential concern is that control and ownership concentration are not exogenous. In particular, 
more socially responsible firms may also tend to be more (or less) willing to give up ownership to 
a broader group of stakeholders. Due to the stability of ownership concentration and family- and 
state-control, dynamic panel data models (dynamic GMM) and other methods using lagged 
independent variables are not feasible. To address the endogeneity concern, I first explore the 
exogenous source of ownership concentration in the hands of wealthy families and state by using 
an instrumental variable approach. The choice of the instruments is a crucial task, since, while they 
must be highly correlated with ownership concentration, they should not directly influence a firm’s 
CSR engagement. Also, I include more IVs than endogenous ownership variables, such that I can 
conduct an overidentification test (Sargan-Hansen test) for the validity of IVs.  
For state control— together with the largest owner’s cash flow rights and its square, and the 
voting-cash flow wedge— I use four political variables assembled by World Bank: regulatory 
quality (RQ), political stability and absence of violence (PV), corruption control (CC), and 
government efficiency (GE), as well as the Stability index from Database of Political Institutions 
(DPI), as their IVs. The choice of these IVs is motivated by the literature which argues that post-
privatization state ownership and control are direct results of regulatory and governmental 




and Saffar, 2011). Also, stronger corruption control makes political rent-seeking less profitable, 
leading to less concentrated government ownership (La Porta et al., 2002; Djankov et al., 2003). 
Similar choice of IVs is made by Boubakri, Cosset, and Saffar (2013). 
For family-control and ownership concentration, I use the index measuring a country’s 
collectivism culture and that measuring a country’s uncertainty avoidance culture (from Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions), as well the World Value Survey index on the importance of family in one’s 
life (coded as a dummy variable which equals one if it is classified as a high family value country 
and zero if classified as a low family value country). Collectivism, as opposed to individualism, 
concerns individuals’ reliance and commitment to their families or extended families. Uncertainty 
avoidance expresses the extent to which the members of a society feel uncomfortable with 
uncertainty and ambiguity, and stronger uncertainty avoidance is widely documented to be 
associated with higher family value (e.g., Mehrotra et al., 2013). Although one may argue that 
cultures can also influence CSR (e.g., Parboteeah, Addae, & Cullen, 2012; Ioannou & Serafeim, 
2012), as shown by Griffin, Guedhami, Kwok, Li, & Shao (2014), the cultural dimensions influence 
firm behavior and performance primarily through the channel of corporate governance— which 
includes ownership arrangement— rather than through other direct channels. However, due to 
the limitation of cultural variables as reasonable IVs, I have to limit the number of endogenous 
ownership variables to be instrumented in the family-control regressions. Therefore I only 
instrument family control dummy and the continuous ownership concentration variable (when its 
square is included, the IV results are similar, though in this “exactly identified” case, it is not 
possible to test for IV validity because the number of IVs equals the number of endogenous 
ownership variables).  
The results from IV estimation are reported in Table 5. Columns (1)—(6) show the 2SLS 
results for state control and ownership variables as instrumented variables, and columns (7)—(12) 
show the 2SLS results for family control and ownership variables as instrumented variables. The 
previous control variables are included, but not reported to preserve space. Due to the fact that I 
use country-level IVs, it is not feasible to control for country fixed effects in the first stage. As 
shown in Table 5, most of the previous results are still upheld: family control is negatively 
associated with all measures of CSR, and state control is positively related to these CSR ratings. 
The magnitudes of the coefficients are inflated by 6-8 times— similar to (and smaller than) the 
estimations in Boubakri, Cosset, and Saffar (2013)— mostly due to the fact that these IVs are at 
the country-level. The Sargan-Hansen statistics indicate that the null hypothesis (IVs are valid) is 
not rejected for estimations on state control with overall CSR rating and environmental rating as 




estimations on family control, the Sargan-Hansen test does not reject the validity of IVs for the 
overall CSR ratings, but reject that for environmental rating and social rating, which may indicate 
that those broad cultural measures are likely to influence corporate environmental and social 
engagement through channels other than family ownership. Of course the IV approach in my 
empirical setting is not perfect due to cross-country data limitation, but the results are still 
consistent with previous estimations. 
[Insert Table 5 about Here] 
 
The heterogeneous effects of family-control and state-control may seem puzzling, as the 
majority of the literature on ownership heterogeneity and corporate valuation suggest that wealthy 
families and states as controlling shareholders are entrenched and expropriate minority 
shareholders and other stakeholders, thus both of their controlling blocks suffer from a valuation 
discount. However, according to Claessens et al. (2002), such entrenchment effect should be 
captured by the wedge variable already. Indeed, the coefficient on the wedge variable is negative 
and significant, supporting the expropriation view of large shareholders. Then, the question as to 
what extra factors, beside large shareholder’s expropriation and ownership identity per se, explain 
the different effects is worth further investigation. 
Entrenchment as an Alternative Channel? 
One of the most widely debated mechanisms of ownership and control on corporate policies 
is managerial incentive. A classical measure of managerial incentive is the degree of “entrenchment” 
of managers and corporate insiders, such as the entrenchment index (E-index) constructed by 
Bebchuk et al. (2009). On one hand, the entrenchment of managers produces managerial 
opportunism and significant agency costs. On the other hand, many have argued that 
“entrenchment” can have positive effect by insulating managers and the board from opportunistic 
shareholder pressure, preserving management stability, and strengthening long-term commitment 
to value creation (Cremers, Litov, & Sepe, 2013). Given the mixed theoretical arguments and 
empirical evidence on the effect of managerial entrenchment, it may function differently in family- 
and state-controlled firms and explain their heterogeneous effects on CSR.  
To investigate whether managerial entrenchment is the main channel that drives different 
effects between family- and state-control, I utilized the detailed data coverage of the ASSET4 
sample on various governance provisions and self-constructed a “global entrenchment index” 




(2009). More specifically, the provisions in my global E-index include the presence of: (1) a poison 
pill; (2) a golden parachute; (3) a classified board, (4) other anti-takeover devices, and (5) 
supermajority requirements for both amending charters and amending bylaws. 31  The same 
indexing method has been used in Liang & Renneboog (2014) and Ferrell, Liang, & Renneboog 
(2014). In unreported regressions, I first regress the global E-index on a series of dummies 
representing different types of ultimate control (by family, state, bank, mutual funds, insurance 
companies, and industrial companies). Consistent with the descriptive statistics, the E-index is 
negatively associated with family- and state-control, but positively correlated with other types of 
control, indicating the managerial entrenchment is likely to be a feature that distinguishes family- 
and state-firms from other firms, and may potentially serve as a channel. In Panel A of Table 6, I 
show the results of regressing CSR ratings on the E-index, as well as its interaction with family-
control dummy and with state-control dummy, along with other covariates. Overall, the E-index 
is positively associated with CSR. However, its effect on CSR is worsened in firms controlled by 
families, as the coefficient on the interaction term “Family control  E-index” is negative and 
statistically significant. The inclusion of the E-index also eats up the statistical significance of the 
family-control dummy. For state-controlled firms, the E-index does not seem to matter, as the 
interaction term “State control × E-index” is not statistically significant. These suggest that the 
negative effects of family control are partially explained by managerial entrenchment, but the 
effects of state control are not. As a comparison, I also do the similar tests by using Tobin’s Q as 
the dependent variable, and the results are shown in Panel B of Table 6. Family control per se 
seems to be associated with higher Tobin’s Q, but the E-index negatively moderates such 
association, as the coefficient on the interaction term “Family control  E-index” is negative and 
marginally significant. For state control, such moderating effect still does not exist, and state 
control per se does not seem to matter for Tobin’s Q. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Some may argue that the E-index is mainly relevant for dispersed ownership structure, thus 
cannot capture the effect of “entrenchment” or power concentration by families and states as 
controlling shareholders. However, the entrenchment effects in firms with controlling 
shareholders are already captured by the wedge between voting and cash flow right, a measure of 
                                                          
31 Inevitably, there are missing values for some firms in some years from Datastream, and I treat these missing 





large shareholders’ power. Besides managerial entrenchment and large shareholders’ entrenchment, 
what other factors may serve as potential channels that explain the heterogeneous effects of family-
control and state-control on CSR? To answer this question, I further explore the roles of family 
members and politicians in management in the next section. 
Management by Family Members 
In most economies, large firms controlled by their founders financially outperform, while 
those controlled by biological heirs underperform, a stylized fact that has been well documented 
in the literature (See Bertrand and Schoar, 2006 for a comprehensive survey; also see Villaonga 
and Amit, 2006). This is usually related to the preference of family firms to limit the influence of 
outsiders. Some have argued that succession by inheritance is inefficient because top management 
positions go, not to the most capable, but, at best, to the most capable member of the controlling 
family (Mehrotra et al., 2013). In addition, nepotism based on blood kinship significantly limits the 
pool of potential talents to run the firm, thus hurts the competitiveness of family firms in the long 
run (e.g., Perez-Gonzalez, 2006). Such form of “crony capitalism” implies that talents are 
misallocated in a society, which has negative effects on economic growth (Murphy, Shleifer, and 
Vishny, 1991). Perez-Gonzalez (2006) empirically finds that firms that promote family CEOs 
significantly underperform after successions relative to firms that hire unrelated professional 
CEOs. In contrast, Mullins and Schoar (2014) argue that in firms where the founder or the family 
owners are more involved in the management and control, the CEO tends to run a more 
hierarchical management structure, but places more weight on protecting stakeholders such as 
workers. 
Following these arguments and empirical findings, I relate family management to the context 
of stakeholder value, and test whether the negative association between family control and CSR 
rating is partially driven by family members serving in the corporate management. The results are 
shown in Table 7. I first conduct my tests on the subsample of only family-controlled firms, as in 
Columns 1-2 (for the overall CSR), 5-6 (for the environmental rating), and 9-10 (for the social 
rating). I then conduct the same tests on the whole sample, assuming that the CEO of a non-
family firm is not a family member (Column 3-4, 7-8, 11-12). Interestingly, for the overall CSR 
rating in Columns 1-4, the coefficients on “Family CEO” are negative and statistically significant, 
which may indicate that within family-controlled firms, family management is further associated 
with significantly worse CSR performance. When I decompose family-CEO into founder-CEO 
and heir-CEO, and include founder or family member serving as the chair of the board, only the 




the negative effect of family-CEO on family-firms’ CSR mainly stems from “heirs”. When I replace 
the dependent variable with firm environmental score (Columns 5-8) and social score (Columns 
9-12), the coefficients on these family-CEO variables are not significant for environmental 
performance, but significant for social performance. This is consistent with the argument by 
Morck & Yeung (2004) that a high level of trust within family management is associated with a 
low level of trust in society at large, which is detrimental to social welfare. My results further 
suggest that such detrimental effects are largely manifested by corporate social engagement, rather 
than environmental engagement. Overall, the results are again consistent with the expropriation 
view rather than the “long-term management” view of family control.  
[Insert Table 7 about Here] 
 
Management by Politically-Connected CEOs 
Similar to family-controlled firms, state-controlled firms may be managed by CEOs with 
political connections. A vast literature has documented that politically connected CEOs help carry 
out the state’s political missions (e.g., Faccio, 2006; Bortolotti & Faccio, 2009). Therefore, if the 
state is willing to steer better CSR practices, it may more easily to do so through firms with CEOs 
that have political backgrounds. Following the literature, I define “Politically-connected CEO” (a 
dummy variable) as that the CEO worked in the government, political party committee or military, 
or is/was a member of the Congress. I then conduct similar tests to those for family management 
and report the results in Table 8: I first test within the subsample of state-controlled firms 
(Columns 1, 3 and 5), and then test on the whole sample (Columns 2, 4 and 6). Note that I manually 
collected political connection data for all firms in the whole sample—both state-controlled firms 
and non-state-controlled firms. As Table 8 shows, within state-controlled firms, politician 
management (the CEO has political background) is associated with higher CSR ratings. Similar 
results are found when I conduct the same tests on the whole sample (including both state-
controlled and non-state-controlled firms) and include the variable “State control”. These results 
further give support to the positive effect of state control on stakeholder value as advocated by 
the public interest theory, and may indicate that such effect is partially through appointing 
politically connected CEOs. 
[Insert Table 8 about Here] 
 




So far I have conducted several tests exloring potential channels— including the self-
constructed entrenchment index and CEO backgrounds— through which family control and state 
control can affect stakeholder value. Due to the cross-country nature of my sample, it is not 
feasible to investigate all potential channels in my empirical setting; instead, I have chosen a few 
governance mechanisms that have been extensively discussed in the traditional corporate 
governance literature and for which data are available. More specifically, I investigate the following 
governance mechanisms as potential candidates for “channels”. 
Veto Powers or Golden Shares. The strongest mechanism for the largest shareholder to exert 
control is to possess veto powers or golden shares. A golden share (usually accompanied with veto 
powers) is a nominal share which is able to outvote all other shares in certain specified 
circumstances. This variable mainly refers to whether the biggest owner (by voting power) hold 
the veto power or own golden shares. While golden shares are usually in the hands of the 
government, they are also widely held in other types of large shareholders (Bortolotti & Faccio, 
2009). As shown in the descriptive statistics, families, banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, 
private equity, and other financial institutions all hold substantial amount of golden shares (or veto 
power).  
Dual Class Shares. Dual class shares are the most common forms of voting rights in excess of 
cash flow rights across the world. In a typical dual-class company in the US, there is a publicly 
traded “inferior” class of stock with one vote per share and a non-publicly traded “superior” class 
of stock with ten votes per share. The superior class is usually owned mostly by the insiders and 
large shareholders of the firm and causes a significant wedge between their voting and cash-flow 
rights (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2010). In contrast, pyramid and cross-holding are not that 
prevalent across the world, especially in common law countries. 
Multiple or Double Voting Rights Shares. Multiple or double voting rights shares are similar to 
dual class shares, and are shares issued by a company giving different voting rights based on an 
investment of equal value. For example, one type of stock gives one vote per unit of par value, a 
second type of stock gives 0.25, 2, 5 or 10 votes per unit of par value. They are primarily used to 
prevent outside capital from gradually taking over the issuing company.  
Non-Voting Shares. These are shares with no voting rights that carry no special cash-flow rights 
(such as a preferential dividend) to compensate for the absence of voting rights. They also include 
non-voting shares issued with special cash-flow rights to compensate for the absence of voting 




Nonvoting shares are also often used to thwart hostile takeover attempts. Preferred stocks typically 
have nonvoting qualities. 
Unlimited Authorized Capital or Blank Check. These refer to the situation when the board of 
directors has authority determining voting rights, dividends, and conversion without separate 
shareholder approval. While it can be used to enable a company to meet changing financial needs, 
its most important use is to implement poison pills or to prevent takeover by placing this stock 
with friendly investors. Because of this role, blank check preferred stock is a crucial part of a “delay” 
strategy (Gompers, Ishii, and Metricks, 2003). 
Priority Shares or Transfer Limitations. Priority shares are similar to golden shares. These shares 
grant their holders specific powers of decision or veto rights in a company, irrespective of the 
proportion of their equity stake. The rights attributed to the holders of priority shares vary from 
company to company and can range from the entitlement to propose specific candidates to the 
board of directors, to the right to directly appoint board members, or to veto a decision taken at 
the general meeting.  
To investigate which governance mechanisms may serve as potential channels that partially 
explain the previous findings, I create interaction terms separately between these variables and the 
family control dummy and the state control dummy. I then regress CSR (only the overall CSR 
rating for simplicity) on these interaction terms, together with their individual components and 
other control variables, similar to what I did with the entrenchment index. The results are shown 
in Table 9. Interestingly, throughout all specifications, only the interactions between “Classified 
board” and family- and state-control (Columns 13 and 14) are statistically significant. However, 
the coefficient on the interaction between classified board and family control is positive, while that 
for classified board and state control is negative, which potentially indicates that the existence of 
classified board structure moderates the effects of family control and state control on stakeholder 
value. Put differently, de-classifying the board amplifies the negative impact of family control and the 
positive impact of state control on stakeholder value. When both interaction terms “Governance 
 family control” and Governance  State control” (where “Governance” refers to the existence 
of a classified board structure) are included in the same regression (Column 15), their coefficients 
are still statistically significant. These findings echo the existing literature on the dual effects of the 
classified board structure: on one hand it insulates directors from market discipline, which 
diminishes director accountability and encourages self-serving behaviors by incumbents such as 
shirking, empire building, and private benefits extraction (Bebchuk & Cohen, 2005; Cohen & 




stability and strengthen long-term commitments by helpfully insulating the board from 
opportunistic shareholder and stakeholder pressures (Cremers, Litov, & Sepe, 2013). In the 
context of my study, the “long-term commitment” function of the classified board is exemplified 
in family-controlled firms, while the “self-serving” function is exemplified in state-controlled firms. 
I am cautious here in interpreting the results as indications of these governance mechanisms 
serving as intermediate channels. But to the least, my results suggest the relevance of classified 
board— in relation to other corporate governance mechanisms— to the significant correlations 
between family- and state-control and CSR performance.  
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
Other Robustness Checks and Alternative Explanations 
One may argue that concentrated wealth in the hands of families and states is a proxy for poor 
institutions, lack of trust, and cultures. However, if time-persistent institutional factors drive the 
variations of CSR and the formation of family- and state-control simultaneously, they should have 
been captured by country fixed effects. Similarly, given that cultures, trusts, and social norms are 
highly time-invariant, the country fixed effects will already take them in account. Of course, 
regulatory environment can vary over time, and therefore I include regulatory quality and rule of 
laws as two additional control variables, and interact them with family-control and state-control 
dummies. Interestingly, none of the coefficients on the interaction terms are statistically significant, 
indicating that the regulation-contingent effects of concentrated wealth are not strong. Particularly, 
for the regression in which regulatory quality is included, the coefficients on both family- or state-
control and regulatory quality are significant, but the coefficients on their interaction terms are not. 
These results do not seem to suggest a joint effect of ownership structure and country-level 
regulatory framework, neither do they suggest that family- and state-control are proxies for laws 
and regulations in the stakeholder context. Instead, ownership seems to be associated with 
stakeholder value independently. In addition, in some countries such as China, CSR is mandated 
by governments and government ownership is prevalent. I therefore drop Chinese firms from the 
sample and re-run all the regressions, but find similar results. To preserve space, the results from 
these additional robustness tests are not reported. 
Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach (2009) bring forth two competing explanations regarding the 
relationship between large shareholder heterogeneity and corporate policies. One is an “influence” 




explanation, meaning that blockholders systematically select firms in which they invest major 
stakes based on a preference for certain policies (e.g., CSR). While their context is US firms in 
which large shareholders are mostly institutional investors, activists, pension funds, corporations, 
individuals, private equity, and mutual funds, my context is global firms with their controlling 
shareholder being either wealthy families and states, who do not really “select” firms, but rather 
create and then control them. This feature rules out the “selection” explanation, thus my results 
are consistent with the “influence” explanation that families and states influence CSR policies by 
their preference, monitoring, and expropriation. 
Another alternative explanation is that family-controlled firms may be more financially 
constrained, as their control structures make them more isolated from the capital market, and 
therefore they are less able to spend on costly CSR projects. State-controlled firms, on the contrary, 
have abundant resources at discretion, and are more able to afford CSR expenditures. This 
argument is in line with the “doing good by doing well” hypothesis, and does not directly imply 
whether these firms care more about stakeholder value. However, this argument does not seem to 
be supported by the control variables in my tests such as dividend per share and leverage ratio, 
which are widely regarded as proxies for financial constraints. In fact, their coefficients are mostly 
positive, largely rule out this explanation. Using similar datasets, Ferrell, Liang, & Renneboog (2014) 
argue that the positive coefficients on dividend payout and leverage in CSR regressions indicate 
that better-governed firms also tend to score higher in CSR ratings, which further refutes the 
“financial constraints” argument.    
 
A Quasi-Natural Experiment: Copenhagen Climate Summit 
To further identify the causal effects of ownership concentration by wealthy families and states on 
corporate CSR performance, I use a quasi-natural experiment approach by exploring a potentially 
exogenous “shock”. However, exogenous shocks to control transfer on a global scale were very 
rare, and even such control change existed (such as massive privatizations worldwide), they did 
not happen uniformly during my sample period. Therefore, I resort to a shock to worldwide CSR 
awareness and investigate whether family-controlled and state-controlled firms in my sample 
reacted differently.  
The exogenous shock that I focus on is the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit held in 
Copenhagen in 2009. The major milestone of the Summit was the passage of the Copenhagen 
Agreement, which is a document that delegated at the 15th session of the Conference of Parties 




of” at the final plenary on 18 December 2009. The Accord was drafted by the United States and a 
coalition of the BASIC countries (China, India, South Africa, and Brazil), and was aimed to be the 
successor to the Kyoto Protocol, whose round ended in 2012. The Copenhagen Summit and the 
passage of the Copenhagen Accord were largely exogenous to the corporate environmental 
performance in the recent decade, because the Accord was mainly aimed to serve as a continuation 
of the Kyoto Protocol that naturally expired, thus was not a direct response to corporate 
environmental performance. Arguably, the Conference and the Accord had raised governmental 
and corporate awareness of the severity of climate change and other environmental problem, 
which shifted the demand for CSR by governments and corporations worldwide. I argue that the 
exogenous shock of the Copenhagen Summit moved firms out of equilibrium in a way that 
magnifies both the benefits and costs of family control and state control. Many people have 
criticized that the Copenhagen Accord is a failure because it is not legally binding. However, this 
“non-legally-binding” feature is actually an advantage of my empirical setting, as it enables me to 
test on corporations’ voluntary engagement (rather than compliance to regulations) in 
environmental issues.  
I conduct a Difference-in-Difference (DiD) test, with the treatment being family-control (or 
state-control), and the year 2010 dummy representing the “shock” of the Copenhagen Accord that 
moves global firms out of equilibrium. I use firm’s overall environmental performance (the 
Environmental Pillar score from the ASSET4 database) as the dependent variable, as the 
Copenhagen Accord mainly concerns corporate responses to environmental issues, rather than 
other aspects of CSR such as human rights. In addition, I do not focus on a particular industry but 
rather analyze the whole sample, as climate change, or environmental concerns in general, are 
relevant to all industries, though more so to energy and manufacturing industries. Nevertheless, I 
control for industry fixed effects to take into account the heterogeneity across different industries. 
In addition, country- and year-fixed effects are also controlled for. 
The results are shown in Table 10. The coefficients on “Family control  2010” and “State 
control  2010” are DiD estimators. As shown, the coefficient on “Family control  2010” is 
negative but not statistically significant, while that on “State control  2010” is positive and also 
statistically significant. Understandably, when a firm has already achieved certain CSR standards, 
it is not likely that such a positive shock would induce the firm to reduce its CSR performance, 
even if it is less socially responsible. However, a more socially responsible firm would react more 
positively to such a shock, and significantly upgrade its environmental performance. Therefore, 




significant coefficient on the “State control  2010” variable confirm my earlier conjecture that 
state-controlled firms are more socially responsible, while family-controlled firms are not. Again, 
the results from this quasi-experiment further support my previous findings that state-control is 
associated with higher CSR, while family-control is not. 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
Family- and State-Control, CSR, and Firm Value 
Finally, I investigate whether the underperformance in CSR by family-controlled firms and the 
outperformance in CSR by state-controlled firms translate into firm value. To do so, I create 
interaction terms “Family control × CSR” and “State control × CSR”, and regress the assets-based 
Tobin’s Q (market-to-book ratio of assets) on these interaction terms and their individual 
components, together with other control variables and fixed effects as specified before. The results 
are shown in Table 11. The CSR score used in Columns (1)-(3) is the overall CSR rating, the 
environmental rating in Columns (4)-(6), and the social rating in Columns (7)-(9). In Columns 1, 
4, and 7, both interaction terms “CSR × Family Control” and “CSR × State Control” are included 
in the same regression, whereas in other columns only one interaction term enters into the 
regression each time. Some interesting observations can be made. First, for all CSR ratings, the 
coefficients of “CSR × Family Control” are consistently negative and statistically significant at 10% 
level in two of the three CSR ratings (overall CSR and environmental rating), though insignificant 
when the social rating is used. Second, throughout all specifications, the coefficients of “CSR × 
State Control” are all positive but statistically insignificant. These results on interaction terms may 
imply that the negative effects of family control on stakeholder value (CSR) further translate into 
lower firm value (assets-based Q), while the positive effects of state control do not directly translate 
into higher firm value. Third, looking at the main effects of CSR, the coefficients on various CSR 
ratings throughout all specifications are positive and statistically significant. The economic 
significances are non-trivial: an increase of one standard deviation in the CSR rating on average 
leads to 6% increase in Q. Taken together, these results may be interpreted as that while 
stakeholder value (CSR) is positively related to firm value, such value connection also crucially 
depends on the ownership structure of the firm. In family-controlled firms, lower CSR translate 
into lower firm value, while in state-controlled firms, such connection does not exist. 





Using a large panel date set of more than 4000 firms in 60 countries, I present robust evidence in 
this paper that systematic differences in CSR— which signifies corporate stakeholder value— are 
closely related to a firm’s ownership structure, especially the presence of wealthy families and states 
as controlling shareholders. In particular, family control is associated with worse CSR performance, 
while state control is associated with better CSR performance. In contrast, I find little evidence 
that ownership concentration in the hands of families and states is significantly related to 
shareholder value as proxied by Tobin’s Q. The negative association between family control and 
CSR is partially explained by managerial entrenchment and the expropriation of controlling 
families on other stakeholders, as well as the incentive problem of family members being in 
corporate management. In contrast, the positive association between state control and CSR is 
partially explained by the presence of politically-connected CEO and the “declassified” board 
structure. These findings are robust after the inclusion of various control variables and country, 
industry, and year fixed effects, different estimation methods, as well as in a global quasi-natural 
experiment setting. 
Overall, these results challenge some empirical findings from a single-country setting on the 
role of concentrated wealth in driving economic welfare. In particular, while the financial 
economics literature generally focuses on the incentive and expropriation problems of large 
shareholders as a whole, my results show that it is actually the heterogeneity of owners that matters 
more for corporate policies such as CSR. In addition, while economics and management studies 
generally advocate the social responsibility of family-controlled firms (e.g., Dyer & Whetten, 2006), 
my findings cast doubts on this belief, in particular the “long-term management” view of family 
control. Bertrand and Schoar (2006: 75) describe such long-run strategy as “a focus on maximizing 
long-run returns and the desire to pursue investment opportunities that more myopic widely held 
firms would not”. CSR as a future-oriented corporate strategy— caring about sustainability and 
reputation among stakeholders— is a natural ground for testing this long-term management 
hypothesis. Apparently, the negative association between CSR and family-control does not support 
this view, but rather give more credits to the expropriation view. Moreover, while the literature 
generally argues that SOEs were less efficient than private companies (see reviews in Megginson 
& Netter, 2001; Vickers & Yarrow, 1988), my results give some credits to the role of state control 
of corporations in promoting social welfare, at least in the global post-privatization era. In fact, 
nowadays, some of the countries that are classified as being highly state-owned by La Porta et al. 




Norway, Singapore and Finland. These countries succeed through building a welfare state, and 
state control in corporations may play an important role in dealing with market externalities in 
their economies. 
Taking the results in this paper at the face value, several theoretical and practical implications 
emerge. First, the findings in this paper shed lights on the nature of different types of ultimate 
owners and their welfare consequences. The conventional understanding on the role of large 
shareholders lies along two dimension: monitoring and expropriation, and studies mostly focus on 
their joint effects on financial performance and shareholder value. Besley & Ghatak (2001) argue 
that ownership (especially the types of the owner) matters significantly for public goods provision 
(stakeholder welfare), which is confirmed by my empirical findings. Second, my findings contribute 
to the debate on varieties of capitalism, especially the existence of “crony capitalism” or 
“patrimonial capitalism” across the world (Zingales, 2012). Capitalist economic activities require a 
more individualistic form of entrepreneurship and the absence of nepotism (Bertrand and Schoar, 
2006). My analyses show that wealth concentration and inheritance by wealth families— the so-
called crony or patrimonial form of capitalism— can significantly undermine the foundations of 
the stakeholder-orientation that is aimed at welfare-enhancement in the corporate sector. Such 
corporate crony capitalism is further related to lower shareholder value, which is believed to be an 
important building block of the capitalist system (Williamson, 1985). Third, this study adds to the 
debate on the role of state involvement in the economy to deal with market externalities and 
maximize social welfare. While the traditional economic view based on the notion of market 
efficiency suggests that governments should deal with market failures and externalities through 
regulations rather than through direct ownership and control in corporations. However, in reality, 
regulations may be inefficient and fail in economies without strong institutions and enforcement 
of legal rules to protect the interests of various stakeholders. State ownership, through strong 
influence in corporate decision making, may serve as a complementary and more effective 
mechanism to enhance public interests. Of course, corruption and political rent seeking may exist 
in state-controlled firms, and my results mainly speak of the net effects of state control taking into 
account both its benefits and its costs. None of my results and arguments are to deny the merits 
of privatization. As pointed out by Megginson et al. (2001), privatized firms are more economically 
efficient along many dimensions. Instead, my findings suggest that at least in the global post-
privatization era, state ownership in corporations may function to preserve social welfare in key 
strategic areas that are related to environmental protection and social justice. Finally, my findings 
have strong implications on what contribute to firm value. Liang and Renneboog (2014) and Ferrell, 




is strongly related to higher shareholder value. In other words, firm value may incorporate not only 
the shareholder value, but also the value of various stakeholders. In this paper, I further show that 
such stakeholder-shareholder value connection crucially depends on who ultimately control the 
firm. In family-controlled firms, lower stakeholder value translates into lower firm value, but such 
value translation does not seem to happen in state-controlled firms. Therefore, the relationship 
between concentrated ownership and stakeholder value is particularly important for reassessing 
what factors, under what condition, contribute to firm value maximization. Overall, despite the 
extensive focus on family firms and SOEs in the literature, the roles of wealthy families and the 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Overall CSR rating 28404 50.520 49.23 30.687 2.42 98.57 
Environmental rating 29288 49.618 45.47 31.900 8.31 97.18 
Social rating 29288 50.027 48.57 30.919 3.44 98.96 
Family control 53472 0.062 0 0.241 0 1 
State control 53472 0.044 0 0.204 0 1 
Largest owner’s cash flow rights 23797 22.03% 13.6% 19.58% 0% 100% 
Largest owner’s voting rights 20716 23.59% 14.3% 20.88% 0% 100% 
Wedge 1 (voting – cash flow) 20573 1.17% 0% 7.25% -89.84% 99.99% 
Wedge 2 (voting / cash flow) 20562 4.04 1 170.79 0 10000 
Tobin’s Q (equity M/B), winsorized 46583 2.359 1.80 1.757 0.50 7.28 
Tobin’s Q (assets M/B), winsorized 46262 1.7456 1.335 1.172 0.668 7.598 
Return on assets (ROA) 31084 0.052 0.0454 0.060 -0.0727 0.179 
Earnings per share (EPS), winsorized 47464 16.226 1.56 36.599 0 145.84 
Dividends per share (DPS), winsorized 47541 4.014 0.345 9.940 0 41 
Firm size (total assets)  31133 3612965 6123 2.15108 0 3.061010 
Firm age 23374 34.740 23 31.655 0 185 
Leverage, winsorized 48159 0.364 0.355 0.245 0 .8347 
GDP per capita 42066 36842.12 39503.31 14909.46 345.41 112028.5 
Globalization index 40436 76.773 76.9 9.251 44.01 92.5 
CapEx-to-Sales ratio, winsorized 34380 0.130 0.052 0.191 0.006 0.767 
Sales growth rate, winsorized 46799 0.126 0.082 0.212 -0.191 0.698 
Entrenchment index 53472 0.889 0 1.239 0 5 
Family CEO 3239 0.395 0 0.489 0 1 
Founder CEO 3232 0.204 0 0.403 0 1 
Heir CEO 3227 0.184 0 0.388 0 1 
Family chair 3182 0.568 0 0.495 0 1 
Politician CEO 23270 0.186 0 0.389 0 1 
Integrated strategy 29054 0.497 0 0.500 0 1 
Dual-class shares 29054 0.082 0 0.274 0 1 
Golden shares or veto power 24467 0.114 0 0.318 0 1 
Unlimited authorized capital or blank check 24785 0.236 0 0.424 0 1 
Non-voting shares 29054 0.025 0 0.156 0 1 
Multiple or double voting shares 29054 0.051 0 0.220 0 1 
Priority shares or transfer limitations 29054 0.046 0 0.210 0 1 




Table 2. Ownership, Governance, and CSR in Firms with Different Types of Ultimate Owners 
            










Foundation Manager Others 
Largest owner’s cash flow rights 40.15% 47.93% 19.00% 15.81% 24.80% 15.61% 24.29% 22.05% 39.15% 36.27% 26.96% 
Largest owner’s voting rights 46.18% 47.53% 20.18% 16.57% 26.90% 16.17% 26.82% 29.45% 41.69% 38.61% 28.05% 
Integrated strategy 0.452 0.620 0.483 0.511 0.466 0.410 0.397 0.331 0.695 0.439 0.484 
Veto power or golden shares 0.324 0.463 0.063 0.041 0.135 0.067 0.141 0.145 0.281 0.091 0.177 
Dual class shares 0.230 0.054 0.068 0.058 0.107 0.043 0.117 0.246 0.227 0.024 0..088 
Classified board structure 0.032 0.010 0.030 0.035 0.021 0.018 0.013 0.054 0.045 0.128 0.030 
Blank check 0.159 0.035 0.256 0.242 0.211 0.357 0.448 0.298 0.089 0 0.226 
Multiple or double voting rights 0.198 0.015 0.040 0.036 0.038 0.037 0.055 0.277 0.095 0.268 0.047 
Priority shares 0.048 0.055 0.040 0.037 0.060 0.056 0.094 0.038 0.112 0.098 0.058 
Nonvoting shares 0.055 0.030 0.022 0.019 0.040 0.020 0.039 0.008 0.024 0 0.026 
E-index 0.828 0.599 1.102 1.128 0.924 1.473 1.181 0.870 0.925 0.727 0.416 
Wedge 1 (voting – cash flow) 5.87% -0.16% 0.63% 0.57% 0.02% 2.38% 7.12% 1.31% 2.656 1.379 1.068 
Wedge 2 (voting / cash flow) 39.07 0.995 1.030 1.092 1.222 1.023 1.112 1.589 1.264 1.057 1.085 
Aggregate CSR rating 42.10 55.25 50.48 54.35 43.07 50.71 41.64 38.74 61.75 56.64 42.52 
Environmental rating 42.91 57.91 44.77 54.20 42.72 39.39 35.51 37.16 62.67 70.41 43.68 
Social rating 45.31 59.91 51.42 52.48 41.53 45.47 37.33 35.29 66.13 64.15 45.71 
Market-to-book equity (winsor.) 2.614 2.133 1.812 2.341 1.731 2.186 2.538 2.280 2.460 2.596 2.242 
Market-to-book assets (winsor.) 1.791 1.518 1.228 1.611 1.173 1.568 1.781 1.330 1.805 1.362 1.654 







Table 3. Ownership Concentration and Shareholder Value 
All regressions are estimated by random-effect GLS. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q (measured as market-to-book ratio of equity for Columns 1-6, and market-to-book 
ratio of assets for Columns 7-8), winsorized at 5% level except for Column 8. Family control and State control are dummy variables indicating the identity of the ultimate 
owner of the firm, while cash-flow rights is the continuous variable that measures the percentage ownership of the largest owner (by voting power). Standard errors clustered 
at the firm level are reported in bracket. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
DV = Winsorized q MTB equity MTB equity MTB equity MTB equity MTB equity MTB equity MTB assets 
MTB assets 
(unwinsorized) 
Family control 0.147   0.167 0.283*** 0.135 0.0577 0.0912 
 (0.103)   (0.113) (0.107) (0.119) (0.0559) (0.0976) 
State control 0.0843   0.0644 -0.328*** 0.166 0.0557 -0.0050 
 (0.106)   (0.118) (0.0994) (0.125) (0.0586) (0.0963) 
Cash Flow rights  -0.0003 0.0008 -0.0010 0.0055 -0.0026 -0.0007 -0.0013 
  (0.0044) (0.0017) (0.0044) (0.0038) (0.0048) (0.0018) (0.0062) 
Cash-flow rights squared  0.00001  0.00002 -0.0001 0.00004 0.00002 0.0001 
  (0.0001)  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00002) (0.0001) 
Wedge (voting – CF rights)   -0.0011   -0.0015 -0.0011 -0.0017 
   (0.0029)   (0.0031) (0.0009) (0.0023) 
Log(Assets) -0.115*** -0.261*** -0.283*** -0.261***  -0.323*** -0.246*** -0.365*** 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027)  (0.028) (0.016) (0.029) 
CapEx/Sales 0.294*** -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0005***  0.429*** 0.166** 0.290** 
 (0.101) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.141) (0.070) (0.146) 
Sales growth rate 0.176*** 0.275*** 0.218*** 0.274***  0.233*** 0.359*** 0.569*** 
(winsorized) (0.052) (0.066) (0.070) (0.066)  (0.069) (0.034) (0.059) 
Leverage 1.090*** 0.069 0.102 0.068  1.441*** -0.495*** -0.620*** 
 (0.123) (0.122) (0.124) (0.122)  (0.175) (0.065) (0.106) 
Ln(GDP per capita) 0.936*** 0.518*** 0.480*** 0.520*** 0.364*** 0.499*** 0.044 0.066 
 (0.100) (0.160) (0.177) (0.160) (0.129) (0.175) (0.0785) (0.127) 
Constant -5.715*** -0.302 0.130 -0.342 -0.624 -0.208 2.984*** 3.757*** 
 (1.077) (1.671) (1.884) (1.675) (1.308) (1.853) (0.831) (1.332) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 4. Ownership Concentration and Stakeholder Value 
All regressions are estimated by random-effect GLS. The dependent variable is the CSR rating (overall CSR rating for columns 1, 2, & 7, environmental rating for columns 3, 4, & 8, and 
social rating for columns 5, 6, & 9) on a scale of 0 to 100. For columns 7-9, the interaction terms between family control and cash flow rights of the largest owner, and between state 
control and the cash flow rights of the largest owner are included. Family control and State control are dummy variables indicating the identity of the ultimate owner of the firm, while 
cash-flow rights is the continuous variable that measures the percentage ownership of the largest owner (by voting power). All regressions control for country, industry, and year fixed 
effects. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in bracket. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
DV= CSR ratings (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Overall CSR Overall CSR Environment Environment Social Social Overall CSR Environment Social 
Family control  CF rights       0.059 0.038 -0.008 
       (0.055) (0.050) (0.055) 
State control  CF rights       0.116 0.101 0.034 
       (0.072) (0.080) (0.069) 
Family control -7.628*** -7.534*** -6.756*** -5.910*** -6.598*** -6.218*** -9.829*** -8.208*** -6.407** 
 (1.694) (1.656) (1.673) (1.647) (1.783) (1.671) (2.578) (2.376) (2.633) 
State control 4.717** 9.602*** 4.240** 9.654*** 4.685** 9.319*** -0.0933 -0.123 3.193 
 (2.244) (2.112) (2.137) (2.030) (2.307) (2.071) (3.706) (3.905) (3.723) 
Cash flow rights -0.237*** -0.279*** -0.153** -0.226*** -0.137** -0.176*** -0.147*** -0.059** -0.058* 
 (0.059) (0.058) (0.062) (0.058) (0.064) (0.059) (0.029) (0.028) (0.031) 
Cash-flow rights squared 0.0015** 0.0020*** 0.0014* 0.0021*** 0.0011 0.0014**    
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007)    
Wedge (voting – CF rights) -0.066** -0.098*** -0.033 -0.058* -0.045 -0.075** -0.068** -0.038 -0.053 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.032) (0.034) 
MTB Equity 0.397** 0.0983 0.298* -0.0479 0.500*** 0.228 0.422*** 0.302** 0.509*** 
 (0.160) (0.143) (0.153) (0.140) (0.163) (0.143) (0.160) (0.154) (0.164) 
ROA 14.77***  2.215*  2.596**  15.15*** 2.351** 2.852** 
 (4.142)  (1.183)  (1.281)  (4.237) (1.194) (1.323) 
Earnings per share 0.0090 0.0330*** -0.0125 0.0173 -0.0178 0.0138 -0.0003** -0.0003** -0.0004*** 
(winsorized) (0.0140) (0.0117) (0.0136) (0.0111) (0.0145) (0.0121) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Dividend per share 0.270*** 0.352*** 0.108 0.117 0.231*** 0.241*** 0.00250** 0.00193** 0.00238** 
(winsorized) (0.072) (0.073) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.070) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log(Assets) 7.659***  7.332***  7.221***  7.767*** 7.352*** 7.256*** 





Table 4 (Cont). Ownership Concentration and Stakeholder Value 
DV= CSR ratings (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Overall CSR Overall CSR Environment Environment Social Social Overall CSR Environment Social 
Leverage -0.999 -0.128** 0.170 0.049 0.324 0.118*** -1.049 0.166 0.303 
 (0.714) (0.060) (0.433) (0.060) (0.433) (0.0342) (0.725) (0.431) (0.431) 
Ln(GDP per capita) 0.182 3.392 -4.281 -0.191 0.687 3.691* 0.077 -4.288* 0.754 
 (2.397) (2.144) (2.605) (2.217) (2.389) (2.065) (2.401) (2.605) (2.396) 
Globalization Index 0.820***  -0.444  0.417  0.859*** -0.423 0.464* 
 (0.283)  (0.288)  (0.258)  (0.285) (0.287) (0.261) 
Constant -94.52** -2.341 56.68 33.47 -68.85** -10.39 -98.63*** 53.82 -74.77** 
 (36.77) (23.07) (39.12) (23.68) (35.06) (22.10) (36.89) (39.00) (35.30) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 13512 17273 13699 17562 13699 17562 13512 13699 13699 
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Table 5. Instrumental Variable Results 
The table shows the results from two-stage least square estimations using instrumental variable (IVs) approach. For columns 1-6, the endogenous variables are state control, cash 
flow rights of the largest owner and its square, and wedge between voting and cash flow rights of the largest owner, and their IVs are country-level regulatory quality (RQ), 
political stability and absence of violence (PV), corruption control (CC), and government efficiency (GE) from World Bank, as well as the Stability index from Database of 
Political Institutions (DPI). For columns 7-12, the endogenous variables are family control and the cash flow rights of the largest owner (without its squared), and their IVs are 
the country-level collectivism index (IDV) and uncertainty avoidance index (UAI) from Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, as well the World Value Survey on the importance of 
family in one’s life (coded as a dummy variable which equals one if it is classified as high family value country and zero if classified as low family value country). The previous 
control variables are included in both stages but are not reported to preserve space. First-stage coefficients on other ownership and control variables (cash flow rights of the 
largest owner and its square, and wedge between voting and cash flow rights of the largest owner) are not reported to preserve space. The Cragg-Donald F-test statistics (weak 
instrument test) are reported for the first stage. The Sargan-Hansen over-identification test statistics and their P-values are reported. Standard errors clustered at the firm level 
are reported in bracket. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 Overall CSR rating Environmental rating Social rating Overall CSR rating Environmental rating Social rating 
DV = CSR ratings (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
World bank RQ -2.924***  -0.054***  -0.054***        
 (0.478)  (0.013)  (0.013)        
World bank GE 1.333***  -0.023*  -0.022*        
 (0.452)  (0.012)  (0.012)        
World bank PV 0.835***  0.080***  0.080***        
 (0.199)  (0.005)  (0.005)        
World bank CC 1.379***  0.011  0.011        
 (0.323)  (0.009)  (0.009)        
DPI stability -0.00002  -0.001***  -0.001***        
 (0.008)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)        
Hofstede UAI       0.003***  0.002***  0.002***  
       (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  
Hofstede IDV       -0.0001  0.00001  0.0000  
       (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  
Family importance       0.022**  0.022**  0.022**  
       (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  
State control  40.60**  79.26***  53.83***       
  (17.54)  (23.49)  (19.12)       
Family control        -76.93***  -28.84*  -76.44*** 
        (17.42)  (17.30)  (18.33) 
Cash flow rights  0.659  0.063  0.498  -1.591***  -1.067***  -1.085*** 
  (0.491)  (0.635)  (0/514)  (0.152)  (0.129)  (0.143) 
Cash-flow rights sq.  -0.010  0.006  0.001       
  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.007)       
Wedge   -0.868*  2.594***  -0.234       
  (0.513)  (0.686)  (0.559)       
Other controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  13826  14006  14006  8451  8537  8537 
Cragg-Donald F-stat 9.00  9.09  9.10  47.45  38.31  40.60  
Sargan-Hansen stat   1.301  1.048  4.048  0.268  26.046  3.704 
P-value  0.2541  0.3059  0.0442  0.6045  0.0000  0.0543 
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Table 6. Managerial Entrenchment and Stakeholder Value 
Panel A. Regressions of CSR 
DV = CSR ratings (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 (1) Overall CSR Overall CSR Environmental Environmental Social Social 
Family control -7.026*** -7.062*** -4.391** -3.674* -3.311 -4.038** 
 (2.237) (2.090) (2.098) (1.961) (2.228) (2.018) 
State control 5.633** 10.23*** 5.122* 9.254*** 5.309* 9.779*** 
 (2.771) (2.587) (2.695) (2.477) (2.843) (2.530) 
Cash flow rights -0.234*** -0.274*** -0.147** -0.221*** -0.129** -0.170*** 
 (0.059) (0.058) (0.062) (0.057) (0.063) (0.059) 
Cash-flow rights squared 0.0015** 0.0020*** 0.0014* 0.0020*** 0.0010 0.0014** 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) 
Wedge (voting – CF rights) -0.061* -0.095*** -0.025 -0.052 -0.033 -0.067** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Entrenchment index 1.188*** 1.345*** 0.882*** 0.986*** 1.438*** 1.383*** 
 (0.271) (0.235) (0.303) (0.261) (0.273) (0.237) 
Family control  E-index -0.234 -0.137 -1.383* -1.262* -1.895** -1.183 
 (0.848) (0.785) (0.796) (0.748) (0.772) (0.740) 
State control  E-index -0.714 -0.456 -0.625 0.294 -0.400 -0.322 
 (1.180) (1.072) (1.160) (0.972) (1.117) (0.978) 
MTB equity (winsorized) 0.402** 0.110 0.297* -0.0418 0.498*** 0.238* 
 (0.160) (0.143) (0.153) (0.140) (0.163) (0.143) 
ROA 14.90***  2.268*  2.699**  
 (4.145)  (1.194)  (1.302)  
Earnings per share 0.008 0.032*** -0.013 0.017 -0.019 0.013 
(winsorized) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.015) (0.012) 
Dividend per share 0.276*** 0.356*** 0.113 0.120 0.239*** 0.246*** 
(winsorized) (0.072) (0.073) (0.074) (0.075) (0.074) (0.071) 
Log(Assets) 7.628*** -0.130** 7.302*** 0.048 7.166***  
 (0.398) (0.061) (0.371) (0.059) (0.385)  
Leverage -1.009 -0.130** 0.169 0.048 0.316 0.117*** 
 (0.723) (0.061) (0.435) (0.059) (0.436) (0.033) 
Ln(GDP per capita) 0.321 3.339 -4.104 -0.236 0.927 3.663* 
 (2.399) (2.142) (2.607)  (2.383) (2.057) 
Globalization Index 0.827***  -0.432  0.428*  
 (0.281)  (0.287)  (0.258)  
Constant -97.29*** -2.903 53.13 32.98 -73.25** -11.38 
 (36.75) (23.07) (39.16) (23.63) (35.02) (22.04) 
N 13512 17273 13699 17562 13699 17562 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 6 (Continued). Managerial Entrenchment and Shareholder Value 
Panel B. Regressions on Tobin’s Q (Market-to-Book Ratio of Equity) 
DV = winsorized Q (1) MTB Equity (2) MTB Equity (3) MTB Assets    (4) MTB Assets 
Family control 0.261** 0.248 0.165** 0.212* 
 (0.119) (0.167) (0.0803) (0.122) 
State control 0.060 0.178 -0.050 0.080 
 (0.112) (0.174) (0.069) (0.100) 
Cash flow rights  -0.0025  0.0012 
  (0.0048)  (0.0033) 
Cash-flow rights squared  0.00004  0.00002 
  (0.00006)  (0.00004) 
Wedge (voting – CF rights)  -0.0013  -0.0018 
  (0.0031)  (0.0016) 
Entrenchment index 0.050*** -0.009 0.006 0.003 
 (0.012) (0.018) (0.007) (0.010) 
Family control  E-index -0.100* -0.069 -0.044 -0.078* 
 (0.052) (0.067) (0.028) (0.044) 
State control  E-index 0.043 -0.007 0.019 -0.026 
 (0.045) (0.084) (0.024) (0.034) 
Log(Assets) -0.123*** -0.322*** -0.183*** -0.336*** 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.024) (0.024) 
CapEx/Sales 0.299*** 0.424*** 0.115 0.241** 
(winsorized) (0.101) (0.141) (0.091) (0.109) 
Sales growth rate 0.186*** 0.234*** 0.525*** 0.503*** 
(winsorized) (0.052) (0.069) (0.039) (0.050) 
Leverage 1.094*** 1.443*** -0.733*** -0.602*** 
 (0.123) (0.175) (0.071) (0.093) 
Ln(GDP per capita) 0.964*** 0.502*** 0.415*** 0.0388 
 (0.102) (0.175) (0.070) (0.109) 
Constant -5.859*** -0.250 0.188 3.765*** 
 (1.094) (1.859) (0.701) (1.156) 
N 26401 13317 27183 13547 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
All regressions are estimated by random-effect GLS. The dependent variables in Panel A are the CSR ratings (overall 
CSR rating for columns 1-2, environmental rating for columns 3-4, and social rating for columns 5-6) on a scale of 0 to 
100. The dependent variables in Panel B are different measures of Tobin’s Q (market-to-book ratio of equity for columns 
1-2, and market-to-book ratio of assets for columns 3-4). Family control and State control are dummy variables indicating 
the identity of the ultimate owner of the firm, while cash-flow rights is the continuous variable that measures the 
percentage ownership of the largest owner (by voting power). The Entrenchment index is on a global scale (not only for 
US firms) and is constructed by summing up the following dummy variables from Datastream: the presence of (1) a 
poison pill, (2) a golden parachute, (3) a supermajority requirement for amending bylaw and charter, (4) a classified board, 
and (5) other anti-takeover provisions, treating missing values as zeros. All regressions control for country, industry, and 
year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in bracket. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 




Table 7. Family Management and Stakeholder Value 
All regressions are estimated by random-effect GLS. The dependent variables are the CSR ratings (overall CSR rating for columns 1-4, environmental rating for columns 5-8, and 
social rating for columns 9-12) on a scale of 0 to 100. Family CEO is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO of the firm is a member of the controlling family, and 0 otherwise. 
Founder CEO is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is the founder of his/her family-controlled firm, and 0 otherwise. Heir CEO is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO 
is the heir of his/her family-controlled firm, and 0 otherwise. Family chair is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the chairperson of the board of directors is a member of the controlling 
family, and 0 otherwise. Family control and State control are dummy variables indicating the identity of the ultimate owner of the firm, while cash-flow rights is the continuous 
variable that measures the percentage ownership of the largest owner (by voting power). All regressions control for country, industry, and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered 
at the firm level are reported in bracket. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 









Environ. Environ. Environ. Environ. Social Social Social Social 
Family CEO -6.052*  -5.676*  1.256  2.187  -5.270*  -4.158*  
 (3.538)  (3.000)  (2.187)  (1.940)  (2.756)  (2.337)  
Founder CEO  -3.538  -3.029  2.563  3.324  -2.837  -2.427 
  (3.799)  (3.246)  (2.275)  (2.041)  (3.125)  (2.857) 
Heir CEO  -9.524*  -9.322**  -0.932  -0.317  -8.383**  -6.601** 
  (5.017)  (4.337)  (3.693)  (3.346)  (3.671)  (3.196) 
Family chair  0.734  1.562  1.469  1.967  1.977  1.972 
  (2.513)  (2.368)  (2.662)  (2.449)  (2.617)  (2.454) 
Family control   -6.016*** -6.767***   -7.770*** -8.571***   -5.500*** -6.453*** 
   (1.899) (1.948)   (1.808) (1.981)   (1.884) (2.017) 
Cash flow rights -0.500*** -0.500*** -0.229*** -0.230*** -0.390*** -0.394*** -0.147** -0.148** -0.198 -0.202 -0.130** -0.131** 
 (0.167) (0.167) (0.059) (0.059) (0.149) (0.150) (0.062) (0.062) (0.187) (0.188) (0.064) (0.064) 
CF rights square 0.0050*** 0.0050*** 0.0015** 0.0015** 0.0043** 0.0043** 0.0014* 0.0014* 0.0018 0.0019 0.0010 0.0010 
 (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Wedge -0.022 -0.020 -0.062* -0.062* -0.011 -0.012 -0.033 -0.033 0.030 0.028 -0.042 -0.042 
 (0.080) (0.081) (0.033) (0.033) (0.074) (0.076) (0.033) (0.033) (0.075) (0.075) (0.033) (0.033) 
MTB equity  0.754 0.746 0.400** 0.398** 0.653 0.649 0.300* 0.299* 0.248 0.241 0.502*** 0.500*** 
(winsorized) (0.478) (0.470) (0.160) (0.160) (0.487) (0.484) (0.153) (0.153) (0.464) (0.455) (0.164) (0.163) 
ROA 4.762 4.880 14.72*** 14.73*** 3.686 3.729 2.252* 2.245* 1.207 1.302 2.566** 2.569** 
 (3.201) (3.264) (4.127) (4.127) (2.466) (2.483) (1.184) (1.182) (1.180) (1.204) (1.271) (1.270) 
EPS -0.027 -0.030 0.009 0.008 -0.017 -0.018 -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 -0.016 -0.018 -0.018 





Table 7 (Cont). Family Management and Stakeholder Value 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 









Environ. Environ. Environ. Environ. Social Social Social Social 
DPS 0.212 0.213 0.271*** 0.271*** -0.262 -0.257 0.110 0.111 0.134 0.145 0.232*** 0.233*** 
(winsorized) (0.152) (0.154) (0.0724) (0.0726) (0.180) (0.180) (0.074) (0.074) (0.182) (0.184) (0.074) (0.074) 
Log(Assets) 8.494*** 8.494*** 7.713*** 7.715*** 7.446*** 7.440*** 7.373*** 7.373*** 6.164*** 6.167*** 7.273*** 7.272*** 
 (1.177) (1.180) (0.395) (0.395) (1.185) (1.173) (0.368) (0.368) (1.437) (1.421) (0.385) (0.385) 
Leverage -9.316* -9.194* -1.007 -1.000 -4.034 -3.925 0.158 0.162 -2.860 -2.696 0.315 0.320 
 (5.147) (5.067) (0.715) (0.715) (3.937) (3.878) (0.434) (0.434) (4.071) (4.001) (0.433) (0.433) 
Ln(GDP pc) -13.37 -12.99 0.0803 0.105 -10.93 -10.83 -4.346* -4.339* -8.101 -8.042 0.598 0.598 
 (9.142) (9.279) (2.398) (2.402) (7.778) (7.838) (2.603) (2.605) (9.122) (9.218) (2.392) (2.394) 
Globalization  0.950 1.093 0.809*** 0.817*** -0.259 -0.182 -0.446 -0.442 0.986 1.111 0.408 0.413 
 (1.112) (1.102) (0.283) (0.283) (1.144) (1.141) (0.288) (0.288) (0.884) (0.877) (0.258) (0.258) 
Constant 34.70 18.68 -92.68** -93.54** 121.9 114.1 57.39 57.03 -9.171 -20.82 -67.30* -67.69* 
 (139.1) (139.6) (36.76) (36.79) (123.3) (124.1) (39.10) (39.12) (129.2) (130.5) (35.10) (35.13) 
N 1205 1205 13512 13512 1230 1230 13699 13699 1230 1230 13699 13699 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table 8. Politically-Connected CEOs and Stakeholder Value 
All regressions are estimated by random-effect GLS. The dependent variables are the CSR ratings (overall CSR rating for columns 
1-2, environmental rating for columns 3-4, and social rating for columns 5-6) on a scale of 0 to 100. Politically-connected CEO is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO had work experience in government, political party committee, military, or is/was a 
member of the Congress, and 0 otherwise. Family control and State control are dummy variables indicating the identity of the 
ultimate owner of the firm, while cash-flow rights is the continuous variable that measures the percentage ownership of the largest 
owner (by voting power). All regressions control for country, industry, and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the firm 
level are reported in bracket. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
DV = CSR ratings (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Overall CSR Overall CSR Environmental Environmental Social Social 
Politically-connected CEO 8.067** 2.747*** 9.712** 1.567 3.208 2.040* 
 (3.899) (1.036) (4.606) (1.209) (3.900) (1.096) 
State control  3.262  3.168  4.437 
  (2.999)  (2.817)  (3.056) 
Cash flow rights -0.637*** -0.267*** -0.278 -0.186** -0.390 -0.153* 
 (0.232) (0.0743) (0.267) (0.0775) (0.288) (0.0792) 
Cash-flow rights squared 0.004* 0.002* 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.00261) (0.001) 
Wedge (voting – CF rights) -0.580*** -0.175*** -0.543*** -0.0982** -0.319** -0.144*** 
 (0.197) (0.043) (0.178) (0.041) (0.150) (0.040) 
MTB equity (winsorized) 2.136** 0.608*** 1.417 0.513** 1.054 0.669*** 
 (1.084) (0.218) (1.362) (0.206) (1.508) (0.227) 
ROA 85.42** 13.38** 12.34 2.402* 58.82* 3.087* 
 (37.24) (5.648) (46.72) (1.345) (34.00) (1.792) 
Earnings per share 0.009 -0.001 -0.039 0.0001 -0.043 -0.002 
(winsorized) (0.040) (0.002) (0.047) (0.002) (0.049) (0.002) 
Dividends per share 0.0152 0.0110 0.196 0.00565 0.174 0.00299 
(winsorized) (0.184) (0.0101) (0.215) (0.00774) (0.218) (0.0127) 
Log(Assets) 6.290*** 8.173*** 3.547* 8.050*** 5.877** 7.724*** 
 (2.015) (0.488) (1.922) (0.483) (2.388) (0.478) 
Leverage 15.16 -1.471* -1.365 0.398 16.50 0.124 
 (12.70) (0.887) (11.82) (0.725) (16.00) (0.748) 
Ln(GDP per capita) -1.573 0.600 3.080 -3.702 -0.234 -0.670 
 (13.64) (3.279) (15.95) (3.653) (15.69) (3.385) 
Globalization index 4.833*** 1.219*** 1.498 -0.484 5.062*** 0.360 
 (1.187) (0.391) (1.430) (0.407) (1.680) (0.382) 
Constant -421.7** -137.4*** -134.1 46.50 -444.5* -56.55 
 (194.8) (51.78) (207.2) (58.18) (251.7) (52.58) 
N 281 8142 283 8240 283 8240 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 9. Alternative Governance Channels 
All regressions are estimated by random-effect GLS models. The dependent variable in all specification is the overall CSR rating. “Governance” is a dummy 
variable which refers to the existence of each governance mechanism in the corporate charter or bylaw, including black check, dual-class shares, veto power, 
prority shares, multiple voting shares, non-voting shares, and classified board. Other control variables include the previously specified ones: cash flow rights of 
the largest owner and its square term, the wedge between voting and cash flow rights of the largest owner, market-to-book ratio of equity (winsorized), ROA, 
earnings per share (winsorized), dividend per share (winsorized), the logarithm of total assets, the leverage ratio (debt-to-assets ratio), the logarithm of the 
country’s GDP per capita, and the country’s globalization index. All regressions control for country, industry, and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at 
the firm level are reported in bracket. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
DV = Overall CSR rating Blank check  Dual-class shares Veto power Priority shares 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Governance  Family control -2.557  -2.373  -3.094  4.916  
Governance  State control  4.433  3.574  -2.185  3.146 
Family control -7.449***  -7.327***  -6.893***  -8.215***  
State control  6.531***  5.459**  6.798***  5.460** 
Governance provision -0.599 -0.767 -0.346 -1.124 3.537** 2.536 -0.780 -0.686 
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country, industry, and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 11922 11922 13512 13512 12209 12209 13512 13512 
R-squared 0.4436 0.4411 0.4372 0.4343 0.4460 0.4435 0.4362 0.4338 
                  
  Multiple voting shares Non-voting shares Classified board Classified board 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)  
Governance  Family control 0.0152  -2.488  9.324*  9.230*  
Governance  State control  1.460  -8.434*  -5.776* -5.090*  
Family control -7.735***  -7.824***  -8.399***  -8.082***  
State control  5.499**  5.897***  5.920*** 4.943**  
Governance provision -1.846 -2.238 5.488** 5.676** -3.044* -2.305 -2.967*  
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Country, industry, and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
N 13512 13512 13512 13512 13147 13147 13147  





Table 10. Environmental Response by Family- and State-Controlled Firms After 
Copenhagen Climate Summit 
The table shows results from Diff-in-Diff estimation. The dependent variable is the overall environmental 
rating from ASSET4. Family control and State control are dummy variables indicating the identity of the 
ultimate owner of the firm, while cash-flow rights is the continuous variable that measures the percentage 
ownership of the largest owner (by voting power). Year 2010 is a dummy variable indicating the year. All 
regressions control for country, industry, and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are 
reported in bracket. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
DV = Environmental rating (1) (2) (3) 
Family control  year 2010 -1.476 -1.587  
 (1.169) (1.168)  
State control  year 2010 2.721*  2.817* 
 (1.633)  (1.636) 
Family control -8.028*** -8.321***  
 (2.125) (2.125)  
State control 8.653**  9.332*** 
 (3.487)  (3.488) 
Cash flow rights -0.249*** -0.241*** -0.269*** 
 (0.079) (0.079) (0.078) 
Cash-flow rights squared 0.0024** 0.0024** 0.0024** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Wedge (voting – CF rights) -0.073** -0.071** -0.089** 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) 
MTB equity (winsorized) -0.019 -0.019 -0.028 
 (0.175) (0.175) (0.175) 
Dividend per share (winsorized) 0.594*** 0.604*** 0.592*** 
 (0.187) (0.191) (0.187) 
Earnings per share (winsorized) 0.026* 0.026* 0.027* 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Log(age) 4.061*** 4.032*** 4.098*** 
 (0.664) (0.665) (0.666) 
Ln(GDP per capita) -0.924 -0.876 -0.892 
 (3.228) (3.231) (3.228) 
Globalization Index -0.391 -0.372 -0.387 
 (0.343) (0.346) (0.343) 
Constant 60.13 58.05 59.35 
 (48.98) (49.30) (48.99) 
N 10795 10795 10795 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 




Table 11. Family- and State-Control, CSR, and Firm Value 
All regressions are estimated by random-effect GLS models. The dependent variable in all specification is Tobin's Q, as measured by the market-to-book ratio of assets. 
CSR as the independent variable is the overall CSR rating in columns (1)-(3), the environmental rating in columns (4)-(6), and the social rating in columns (7)-(9). Family 
control and State control are dummy variables indicating the identity of the ultimate owner of the firm, while cash-flow rights is the continuous variable that measures the 
percentage ownership of the largest owner (by voting power). Standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in bracket. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
DV = Tobin’s q  Overall CSR rating Environmental rating Social rating 
(MTB assets) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
CSR × family 
control  -0.005* -0.005*  -0.006* -0.006*  -0.002 -0.003  
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003)  
CSR × state control  0.001  0.002 0.001  0.002 0.002  0.002 
 (0.002)  (0.002) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.002)  (0.002) 
CSR 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Family control  0.306* 0.312**  0.362* 0.366*  0.222 0.228  
 (0.159) (0.157)  (0.195) (0.194)  (0.151) (0.151)  
State control  -0.094  -0.140 -0.088  -0.132 -0.110  -0.140 
 (0.136)  (0.135) (0.126)  (0.125) (0.140)  (0.140) 
CF rights  0.0002 0.0002 0.0005 -0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0005 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
CF rights sq.  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
wedge  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  13068 13068 13068 13535 13535 13535 13535 13535 13535 
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Appendix A. ASSET4 Data Description 
ESG Dimension Description 
Environmental 
Performance 
The environmental pillar measures a company’s impact on living and non-living natural systems, 
including the air, land and water, as well as complete ecosystems. It reflects how well a company uses 
best management practices to avoid environmental risks and capitalize on environmental opportunities 
in order to generate long term shareholder value. 
Emission 
reduction 
Measures a company’s management commitment and effectiveness towards reducing environmental 
emission in the production and operational processes. It reflects a company’s capacity to reduce air 
emissions (greenhouse gases, F-gases, ozone-depleting substances, NOx and Sox, etc), waste, hazardous 
waste, water discharges, spills or its impacts on biodiversity and to partner with environmental 
organizations to reduce the environmental impact of the company in the local or broader community. 
Product 
innovation 
Measures a company’s management commitment and effectiveness towards supporting the research 
and development of eco-efficient products or services. It reflects a company’s capacity to reduce the 
environmental costs and burdens for its customers, and thereby creating new market opportunities 




Measures a company’s management commitment and effectiveness towards achieving an efficient use 
of natural resources in the production process. It reflects a company’s capacity to reduce the use of 




The social pillar measures a company’s capacity to generate trust and loyalty with its workforce, 
customers and society, through its use of best management practices. It is a reflection of the company’s 
reputation and the health of its license to operate, which are key factors in determining its ability to 




Measures a company’s management commitment and effectiveness towards creating value-added 
products and services upholding the customer’s security. It reflects a company’s capacity to maintain its 
license to operate by producing quality goods and services integrating the customer’s health and safety, 
and preserving its integrity and privacy also through accurate product information and labelling. 
Society/ 
Community 
Measures a company’s management commitment and effectiveness towards maintaining the company’s 
reputation within the general community (local, national and global). It reflects a company’s capacity to 
maintain its license to operate by being a good citizen (donations of cash, goods or staff time, etc.), 
protecting public health (avoidance of industrial accidents, etc.) and respecting business ethics (avoiding 
bribery and corruption, etc.). 
Society/ Human 
rights 
Measures a company’s management commitment and effectiveness towards respecting the fundamental 
human rights conventions. It reflects a company’s capacity to maintain its license to operate by 




Measures a company’s management commitment and effectiveness towards maintaining diversity and 
equal opportunities in its workforce. It reflects a company’s capacity to increase its workforce loyalty 
and productivity by promoting an effective life-work balance, a family-friendly environment and equal 




Measures a company’s management commitment and effectiveness towards providing high-quality 
employment benefits and job conditions. It reflects a company’s capacity to increase its workforce 
loyalty and productivity by distributing rewarding and fair employment benefits, and by focusing on 
long-term employment growth and stability by promoting from within, avoiding lay-offs and maintain 





Health & safety 
Measures a company’s management commitment and effectiveness towards providing a healthy and 
safe workplace. It reflects a company’s capacity to increase its workforce loyalty and productivity by 
integrating into its day-to-day operations a concern for the physical and mental health, well-being and 




Measures a company’s management commitment and effectiveness towards providing training and 
development (education) for its workforce. It reflects a company’s capacity to increase its intellectual 
capital, workforce loyalty, and productivity by developing the workforce’s skills, competences, 




The corporate governance pillar measures a company’s systems and processes, which ensure that its 
board members and executives act in the best interests of its long term shareholders. It reflects a 
company’s capacity, through its use of best management practices, to direct and control its rights and 
responsibilities through the creation of incentives, as well as checks and balances in order to generate 




Measures a company’s management commitment and effectiveness towards several best practice 
corporate governance principles related to board activities and functions. It reflects a company’s 





Measures a company’s management commitment and effectiveness towards several best practice 
corporate governance principles related to a well-balanced membership of the board. It reflects a 
company’s capacity to ensure a critical exchange of ideas and an independent decision-making process 





Measures a company’s management commitment and effectives towards several best practice corporate 
governance principles related to competitive and proportionate management compensation. It reflects a 
company’s capacity to attract and retain executives and board members with the necessary skills by 




Measures a company’s management commitment and effectiveness towards the creation of an 
overarching vision and strategy integrating financial and extra-financial aspects. It reflects a company’s 
capacity to convincingly show and communicate that it integrates the economic (financial), social and 
environmental dimensions into its day-to-day decision-making processes. 
Shareholder/ 
Shareholder rights 
Measures a company’s management commitment and effectiveness towards several best practice 
corporate governance principles related to a shareholder policy and equal treatment of shareholders. It 
reflects a company’s capacity to be attractive to minority shareholders by ensuring them equal rights 
and privileges and by limiting the use of anti-takeover devices.  
Economic 
Performance 
The economic pillar measures a company’s capacity to generate sustainable growth and a high return on 
investment through the efficient use of all its resources. It is reflection of a company’s overall financial 




Measures a company’s management commitment and effectiveness towards maintaining a stable cost 
base. It reflects a company’s capacity to improve its margins by increasing its performance (production 




Measures a company’s management commitment and effectiveness towards generating a high return on 
investments. It reflects a company’s capacity to maintain a loyal shareholder base by generating 




Measures a company’s management commitment and effectiveness towards generating sustainable and 
long-term revenue growth. It reflects a company’s capacity to growth, while maintaining a loyal client 




Appendix B. Variable Definitions 
Variable Name Description Source 
Family control 
A dummy variable that equals one if the ultimate owner is one or more named individuals 
or families, and zero otherwise. Ultimate owner is defined as the shareholder for whom 
the percentage of direct voting rights owned by this shareholder who is identified by 




A dummy variable that equals one if the ultimate owner is the state, the government or a 
public authority, and zero otherwise. Ultimate owner is defined as the shareholder for 
whom the percentage of direct voting rights owned by this shareholder who is identified 




cash flow rights 
The percentage ownership of the single biggest owner (by voting power) of the company. Datastream 
Largest owner’s 
voting rights 
The percentage voting right of the single biggest owner (by voting power) of the 
company. 
Datastream 
Wedge (voting - 
cash flow rights) 
The percentage difference between the cash flow rights and the voting rights of the 
largest owner (by voting power) of the company. 
Datastream 
Tobin’s Q (equity 
M/B), winsorized 
Calculated as the ratio of the market capitalization of equity to the book value of equity 
of the company, winsorized at 5% level. 
Datastream 
Tobin’s Q (assets 
M/B), winsorized 
Calculated as the ratio of the market value of total assets to the replacement value of total 
assets of the company (the sum of book value of equity and book value of liabilities), 
winsorized at 5% level 
Datastream 
Return on assets 
(ROA) 
Calculated as the ratio of net income to the book value of total assets of the company. Compustat 
Earnings per share 
(EPS), winsorized 
Latest annualized earnings per share that may reflect the last financial year or be derived 
from an aggregation of interim period earnings, winsorized at 5% level. 
Datastream 
Dividends per share 
(DPS), winsorized 
Rolling 12 month dividend per share (adjusted). It is displayed gross, inclusive of local tax 
credits where applicable, winsorized at 5% level. 
Datastream 
Firm size  The logarithm of the company’s total assets. Compustat 
Firm age Years since the firm’s incorporation year. Datastream 
Leverage, 
winsorized 
The ratio of total liabilities to total assets of the company, winsorized at 5% level. Datastream 
GDP per capita  
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the 
sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes 
and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without 
making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation 
of natural resources. 
World Bank 
Globalization index 
The KOF Index of Globalization measures the three main dimensions of globalization: 
(1) economic, (2) social, and (3) political. In addition to three indices measuring these 
dimensions, an overall index of globalization and sub-indices are also calculated referring 
to (1) actual economic flows, (2) economic restrictions, (3) data on information flows, (4) 
data on personal contact, and (5) data on cultural proximity. Data are available on a yearly 






Appendix B (Continued). Variable Definitions 
Variable Name Description Source 
CapEx-to-Sales 
ratio, winsorized 
The ratio of capital expenditure to annual sales revenue, winsorized at 5% level. Datastream 
Sales growth rate, 
winsorized 
One-year annual growth rate of sales revenue of the firm, winsorized at 5% level. Datastream 
Entrenchment 
index 
Following the original Entrenchment Index with US coverage by Bebchuk, Cohen, & 
Ferrell (2009), the Entrenchment Index 1 is constructed for firms from 64 countries 
across the world during the period 2002-2013, and is the sum of the five dummy 
variables from Datastream’s ASSET4 sample based on the presence of: (1) a poison 
pill, (2) a golden parachute, (3) a supermajority requirement for amending bylaw and 
charter, (4) a staggered board (the terms of board members are uniform), and (5) other 




A dummy variable that equals one if the CEO of the company is a family member of 
the controlling family of the company, and zero otherwise. 
BoardEx, 
Forbes, 
Business Week,  
Founder CEO 
A dummy variable that equals one if the CEO of the company is the founder of the 





A dummy variable that equals one if the CEO of the company is a heir of the company 





A dummy variable that equals one if the chairperson of the board of directors of the 






A dummy variable that equals one if the CEO of the company worked in the 
government, political party committee, or military, or is/was a member of the 
Congress, and zero otherwise. 
BoardEx 
Dual-class shares 
A dummy variable that equals one if the company has dual-class stocks (class A/B, 
registered/bearer shares), and zero otherwise. 
Datastream 
(ASSET4) 
Golden shares or 
veto power 
A dummy variable that equals one if the largest owner (by voting power) of the 





or blank check 
A dummy variable that equals one if the company has unlimited authorized capital or a 




A dummy variable that equals one if the company has non-voting rights common (not 
preferred) shares, and zero otherwise. 
Datastream 
(ASSET4) 
Multiple or double 
voting shares 
A dummy variable that equals one if the company has multiple (double) voting rights 
shares, and zero otherwise. 
Datastream 
(ASSET4) 
Priority shares or 
transfer limitations 
A dummy variable that equals one if the company has shares with different rights like 






























Abu Dhabi 19.65 38.32 25.68 12 1 Kuwait 18.92 24.30 36.60 48 4 
Austria 43.29 38.13 38.77 4,020 335 Luxembourg 55.00 58.48 52.83 60 5 
Australia 44.46 51.84 50.40 252 21 Malaysia 42.32 41.12 50.21 540 45 
Belgium 53.16 54.88 49.63 336 28 Mexico 38.96 46.03 49.47 324 27 
Brazil 55.02 55.19 67.72 1,008 84 Morocco 21.57 20.13 53.42 36 3 
Canada 47.59 37.64 38.65 3,864 322 Netherlands 75.30 68.86 75.36 540 45 
Channel Islands 52.05 49,82 53.02 24 2 New Zealand 49.47 45.42 42.40 144 12 
Chile 33.41 43.66 45.61 252 21 Nigeria 7.18 10.89 19.71 12 1 
China 25.59 33.38 32.78 984 82 Norway 56.90 55.26 58.87 300 25 
Colombia 34.40 34.52 40.94 108 9 Oman 27.00 27.42 33.00 12 1 
Cyprus 39.18 30.20 36.71 12 1 Peru 41.33 31.05 34.41 12 1 
Czech Republic 48.56 48.72 60.01 48 4 Philippines 39.59 36.07 40.79 252 21 
Denmark  48.45 56.43 52.69 324 27 Poland 33.22 33.62 42.06 312 26 
Dubai 37.39 44.24 33.76 12 1 Portgual 67.52 66.20 73.95 144 12 
Egypt 14.55 19.29 27.22 132 11 Quatar 10.77 12.87 24.64 24 2 
Finland 72.26 73.25 66.86 324 27 Russian Federation 37.52 39.92 50.64 408 34 
France 71.45 75.70 76.36 1,212 101 Saudi Arabia 19.22 32.12 25.65 72 6 
Germany 58.25 67.07 67.16 1,068 89 Singapore 34.66 33.58 35.60 648 54 
Greece 35.42 47.10 49.62 300 25 South Africa 66.17 56.74 73.06 1,092 91 
Hong Kong 30.27 33.72 35.51 1,800 150 South Korea 47.12 62.00 56.77 1,212 101 
Hungary 73.29 76.18 80.80 48 4 Spain 66.26 68.54 73.82 696 58 
Iceland 29.02 20.45 36.06 36 3 Sri Lanka 51.25 51.09 66.59 12 1 
India 47.16 51.60 57.93 960 80 Sweden 62.79 66.58 63.91 660 55 
Indonesia 45.46 41.95 60.83 300 25 Switzerland 57.88 58.71 56.98 852 71 
Ireland 43.04 42.65 39.33 216 18 Taiwan 29.02 44.74 36.30 1,536 128 
Israel 38.44 42.65 39.33 168 14 Thailand 55.76 47.93 56.73 264 22 
Italy  52.92 53.05 62.93 708 59 Turkey 44.33 48.36 52.90 288 24 
Japan  38.18 61.62 45.47 5,196 433 United Kingdom 64.32 59.63 63.16 4,776 398 
Jordan 52.16 60.71 62.99 12 1 United States 51.91 40.22 44.17 14,436 1203 





Appendix D. ASSET4 Industry Coverage 
TRBC Industry Group Obs Firms 
Overall 
CSR Environ. Social TRBC Industry Group Obs Firms 
Overall 
CSR Environ. Social 
Aerospace & Defense 492 41 64.75 60.83 60.10 Insurance 1,908 159 50.21 39.49 46.30 
Automobiles & Auto Parts 1,164 97 59.63 76.02 61.64 Investment Banking & Investment Services 1,488 124 42.09 31.20 41.01 
Banking Services 3,864 322 47.32 44.05 51.50 Leisure Products 276 23 41.86 42.66 44.97 
Beverages 600 50 54.74 59.44 54.61 Machinery, Equipment & Components 2,484 207 55.52 65.01 53.94 
Biotechnology & Medical Research 456 38 42.65 32.05 44.63 Media & Publishing 1,332 111 39.12 34.28 40.36 
Chemicals 1,644 137 63.27 70.88 63.64 Metals & Mining 3,600 300 45.86 46.34 45.14 
Coal 540 45 35.96 34.00 36.91 Multiline Utilities 348 29 67.07 64.21 60.84 
Collective Investments 120 10 35.47 36.87 37.76 Natural Gas Utilities 276 23 55.15 54.83 55.42 
Communications & Networking 300 25 61.18 59.47 54.66 Office Equipment 156 13 64.19 77.35 68.53 
Computers, Phones & Household Electronic 708 59 59.65 67.69 61.01 Oil & Gas 2,748 229 51.30 47.67 48.15 
Construction & Engineering 1,128 94 54.79 61.35 56.37 Oil & Gas Related Equipment and Services 1,092 91 47.00 35.36 43.82 
Construction Materials 504 42 61.36 65.60 59.88 Other Specialty Retailers 1,308 109 46.50 36.46 43.58 
Containers & Packaging 324 27 60.06 64.06 51.43 Paper & Forest Products 372 31 65.80 74.11 61.74 
Diversified Retail 732 61 45.97 42.85 44.67 Passenger Transportation Services 720 60 47.42 51.39 48.67 
Diversified Trading & Distributing 180 15 50.76 68.92 59.95 Personal & Household Products & Services 708 59 55.28 50.75 55.06 
Electric Utilities & IPPs 1,560 130 60.93 64.96 61.02 Pharmaceuticals 948 79 54.15 56.49 58.08 
Electronic Equipments & Parts 156 13 52.00 67.63 58.52 Professional & Commercial Services 1,560 130 54.39 44.76 52.42 
Food & Drug Retailing 708 59 58.98 53.08 57.01 Real Estate Operations 1,656 138 30.36 38.84 29.56 
Food & Tobacco 1,500 125 53.02 52.63 54.89 Renewable Energy 252 21 44.02 58.90 43.81 
Freight & Logistics Services 744 62 46.94 47.55 48.46 Residential & Commercial REITs 1,260 105 34.45 34.85 26.47 
Healthcare Equipment & Supplies 768 64 52.31 44.03 48.72 Semiconductors & Equipment 1,140 95 53.73 58.13 49.97 
Healthcare Providers & Services 504 42 37.72 23.92 38.38 Software & IT Services 1,476 123 45.73 36.82 43.47 
Holding Companies 72 6 26.91 27.68 26.22 Telecommunications Services 1,608 134 55.14 51.03 57.35 
Homebuilding & Construction Supplies 684 57 56.44 63.69 52.95 Textiles & Apparel 528 44 50.41 52.09 57.23 
Hotels & Entertainment Services 1,176 98 48.20 40.93 48.85 Transport Infrastructure 468 39 45.86 48.99 50.90 
Household Goods 288 24 53.52 58.50 47.20 Uranium 96 8 34.74 28.63 33.12 





Chapter 4. Speaking of  Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
 
Hao Liang, Christopher Marquis, Luc Renneboog, Sunny Li Sun 32 
 
ABSTRACT 
We argue that the language spoken by corporate decision makers can significantly affect how they 
perceive future-oriented strategies, such as corporate social responsibility (CSR).  Building on 
research in economics and linguistics that shows that obligatory future-time-reference (FTR) in a 
language reduces the psychological importance of the future, we theorize that companies with 
strong-FTR languages as their official/working language will have less of a future orientation and 
so perform worse in future-oriented activities such as corporate social responsibility (CSR). 
Examining thousands of global companies across 59 countries from 1999-2011, we find support 
for our theory. Furthermore, the negative association between FTR and CSR performance is 
weaker for firms with greater exposure to diverse global languages due to (a) being headquartered 
in countries with higher degree of globalization, (b) having a higher degree of internationalization, 
and (c) having a CEO with more international experience. These results are robust after controlling 
for country fixed effects and in a quasi-natural experiment setting, and similar language effect is 
found for other future-oriented organizational behaviors such as R&D expenditure. Contributions 
to the globalization of CSR and cognitive bases of strategy are discussed. 
Keywords: Language, Future-Time-Reference, Categories, Culture, Corporate Social 
Responsibility, Sustainability 
JEL Codes: G3, Z10, Z11, G28
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Decades of research on corporate social responsibility (CSR) has shown it to vary significantly across 
countries and regions and that it is strongly influenced by the cultural and socio-economic 
environments in which firms operate (Carroll, 1979, 1991; Matten & Moon, 2008). Studies in this 
tradition typically relate CSR practices to a country’s national business system (NBS) bundles, such as 
political institutions, type of market competition, and cultural orientation (Campbell, 2007; Ioannou 
& Serafeim, 2012). In particular, a growing body of research has considered CSR as a culturally 
embedded organizational behavior, and empirically tested cultural influences on CSR using the 
Hofstede cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 1980), as well as survey-based cultural data such as GLOBE’s 
national cultural dimensions and the World Value Survey (e.g., Waldman et al., 2006a; Ringov & Zollo, 
2007). While these analyses have shown important differences between cultures in CSR practices, they 
also yield inconclusive findings. That is, these cultural measures are usually subjective, and the very 
same cultural dimensions are frequently found to have opposite effects on CSR when using different 
samples and measurements of CSR, such that deeper relationships between culture and CSR remain 
obscured.33  
In this paper, we introduce a new way to think about this underlying variation in global CSR 
practices, focusing on how differences in cross-national CSR commitment could partially stem from 
characteristics of the languages spoken across the globe, which are embedded in cultures and are 
relatively objective cultural measures. To do so, we draw on research in linguistics and economics, 
which has shown that a critical difference across languages that shapes future-oriented behavior (such 
as CSR) is whether or not they require speakers to grammatically mark future events. That is, does the 
language separate present and future into different conceptual categories of time, or are they combined? 
For some languages, such as English, grammatically separating the future and the present is mandatory, 
while for other languages, such as German, differentiating between the present and future is optional. 
Linguistics research has argued that by having the present and the future in different conceptual 
categories, obligatory future-time reference (FTR) in a language reduces the psychological importance 
of—and hence a person’s concern for—the future, as it makes the future feel more distant (Dahl, 
2000; Thieroff, 2000).  Consistent with these arguments, Chen (2013), who even after controlling for 
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other well-known cross-national explanatory factors such as legal origins, finds that strong-FTR 
speakers save less, retire with less wealth, smoke more, practice less safer sex, and are more obese. 
The conclusion is that being required to speak in a distinct way about future events leads speakers to 
take fewer future-oriented actions.  
While research has shown that language use in general and, obligatory FTR in particular, 
shapes individuals’ behaviors, it has not yet been established whether language patterns used by groups 
of corporate leaders are also related to corporate behaviors, especially the long-term decisions of firms. 
This is the question we intend to examine in this study. In developing our approach, we draw on 
research that has shown that different perceptual cognitive category systems of managers affect 
corporate decisions (e.g. Porac, Thomas, & Baden-Fuller, 1989; Kaplan 2011; Glynn & Navis, 2013). 
We specifically examine firm CSR practices as a future-oriented behavior because both scholars and 
practitioners have increasingly focused on CSR as indicating long-term orientation since to implement 
CSR, firms must incur short-term costs in order to benefit from the longer term future benefits 
associated with sustainability and deeper stakeholder engagement (e.g., Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 
2013; Hillman & Keim, 2001; McKinsey Quarterly, 2009). Our core research focus in this paper is: How 
does the FTR of companies’ working languages affect their adoption of, compliance to, and engagement in corporate social 
responsibility programs?  
We test these questions through a sample including the largest 1,500 global companies in the 
MSCI World Index and companies in other major global equity indices from 1999 to 2011, building a 
data panel of 91,373 firm-year observations across 59 countries. To investigate the effects of language 
on CSR, we adopt the same future-time criterion from Dahl (2000) and Chen (2013), which separates 
languages into two broad categories: those languages that require future events to be grammatically 
marked when making predictions (strong-FTR languages, like English), and those that do not (weak-
FTR languages, like German).  Our findings support our theorizing that companies with strong-FTR 
languages as their working language have less of a future orientation and so perform worse in 
corporate social responsibility (CSR). We rule out other alternative theories such as legal origins, 
institutions, regulations, and religions that may explain our FTR-CSR correlation by conducting 
within-country analysis on firms in Belgium and Switzerland, controlling for country fixed effects and 
religion, and using alternative measures of language structure. To better identify the organizational 
mechanisms underlying this relationship, in addition to our main analyses, we also conduct a number 
of extensions and robustness checks, including a quasi-experiment of how firm FTR change through 




expenditures and environmental R&Ds. All results point to the fact that leader FTR shapes corporate 
long-term orientation, including CSR.  
Our paper has two main contributions to the research literature. At a basic level, our study 
contributes to understanding international variation of management, governance, and CSR practices 
(e.g., Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1991; Bloom & Van Reenen, 2007; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 1998). While many have proposed CSR as an important management and governance practice 
influenced by institutions and cultures (e.g. Matten & Moon, 2008), little is known empirically about 
the mechanisms that can explain the national and international variation in CSR. As we show in this 
paper, language is an important underlying feature that shapes cultural values and the norms in a 
society. We build on prior research that developed the FTR language approach to distinguish our 
approach from prior research literatures that have focused on survey or other observational elements 
of different cultural systems (Hofstede, 1980; Kim & Kim, 2010). Secondly, our research contributes 
to the ways in which perceptual category systems focus the attention, and subsequently, economic 
behavior of corporations and corporate leaders. Here, we build on insights from literature on the 
behavioral bases of corporate strategy (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Kaplan, 2011; Ocasio, 2011) and 
specifically, on the effects of cognitive categories on corporate decisions (Porac et al, 1999). By 
showing that a historically determined factor—spoken language—fundamentally shapes the cognitive 
categories of global decisions makers, we bridge an acknowledged gap between assessing leaders’ 
cognitive differences and showing that they have a causal effect on organizational outcomes (Kaplan, 
2011). Our broader conclusion is that examining how and why language affects organizational 
behavior is essential to understanding differences in global organizational behaviors.  
Theory and Hypothesis 
The global CSR literature suggests that the social responsibilities of corporations reflect the 
historically determined institutions (both formal and informal) that shape durable and embedded 
national business systems (Carroll, 1979, 1991; Matten & Moon, 2008). A common denominator 
across these studies is that informal institutions such as national cultures have an important effect on 
organizations’ CSR practices. This is not surprising, as cultures are persistent and uniformly affect 
different aspects of organizational behavior (e.g., adoption, engagement, and compliance) (Hofstede 
& Hofstede, 2005), compared with more context-specific regulations and rules (Whitley, 1999). These 




power distance, individualism, masculinity vs. femininity, uncertainty avoidance, and pragmatism 
(Hofstede, 1980; Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005), as well as on the survey-based GLOBE data (Waldman 
et al., 2006a) and World Value Survey (Parboteeah, Addae, & Cullen, 2012) all which have similar 
cultural dimensions. Yet the findings in this literature are inconclusive.34  Therefore, while both the 
theoretical and empirical research literatures on CSR has shown in general that CSR is a culturally-
driven activity, the mixed empirical evidence makes it challenging to identify the underlying cognitive 
process and behavioral tendencies that affect cross-organizational and cross-national CSR variation.  
Theoretically, the inconclusive findings in the literature likely reflect the obscurity of the 
underlying mechanisms by which national cultural variation affects CSR (Matten & Moon 2008). 
Empirically, given the durable nature of culture, the conflicting results are likely to be driven by either 
omitted variable biases or the inappropriateness of survey- and observation-based culture proxies, 
rather than by cultural change between sample periods (Straub, Loch, Evaristo, Karahanna & Srite, 
2002).  More importantly, the cultural dimensions investigated in the literature rarely touch on CSR as 
a future-oriented concept, despite the fact that CSR practice is widely perceived by executives, 
investors, and regulators worldwide as crucial to corporate sustainability, and reflect the extent to 
which companies have a long-term orientation (McKinsey Quarterly, 2009).  
Future Orientation of Languages 
Research in linguistics, cognitive psychology and economics has shown that one of the most 
important (and much less subjective to judge) factors that shape cultural differences around the world 
is the characteristics of the spoken language. This research shows that languages do not merely express 
thoughts that are rooted in culture; the structure of languages also shapes the very thoughts that people 
wish to express. In the linguistics literature, linguistic relativity (popularly known as the Sapir–Whorf 
hypothesis [Whorf, 1956]) argues that the structure of a language affects the ways in which its 
respective speakers conceptualize their world, i.e. their worldview, or otherwise influences 
their cognitive processes. A recent wave of psychological and cognitive science research shows that 
                                                          
34 For example, regarding Hofstede’s power distance dimension, Waldman et al. (2006a), Ringov & Zollo (2007), 
and Ioannou & Serafeim (2012) theorize and find a negative relationship with CSR, which they attribute to 
business leaders’ use of  power for the pursuit of  personal benefit, whereas Ho, Wang, & Vitell (2012) find a 
positive relationship, which they attribute to societies’ unlikeliness to tolerate questionable environment-related 
business practice due to already strict environmental regulations. For individualism, while Ioannou & Serafeim 
(2012) find a positive relationship, Waldman et al. (2006), Ho et al. (2012) and Parboteeach et al. (2012) find a 
negative relationship, and Ringov & Zollo (2007) find no significant relationship. For masculinity, a positive 
relation is found in Ho et al. (2012) but the opposite is found in Ringov & Zollo (2007). Finally, uncertainty 





language not only profoundly influences how people perceive the world, but also their implicit 
preferences (e.g., Ogunnaike, Dunham, & Banaji, 2010; Fausey, Long, Inamori, & Boroditsky, 2010; 
Boroditsky, 2011).  For example, studies have shown that people find it easier to recognize and 
remember shades of colors for which their spoken language has a specific name (D’Andrade, 1995) 
and that people’s recognition memory was better for the focal colors of their own language than for 
those of English (Roberson & Hanley, 2010).  
One key feature of languages is that they differ in when they require speakers to specify the 
timing of events, or when timing can be left unsaid (Dahl, 2000; Thieroff, 2000). Dahl (2000) develops 
a criterion to distinguish between languages that are considered “futureless” and those which are not. 
“Futureless” languages are defined as those which do not require “the obligatory use [of 
grammaticalized future-time reference] in (main clause) prediction-based contexts”35 As noted, Chen 
(2013) empirically showed that there is a strong correlation between weak-FTR languages and future-
oriented economic behavior, and the effect of language is not attenuated when controlling for cultural 
and institutional traits. He argues that this is due to the fact that weak-FTR speakers perceive the 
future as closer.  
To illustrate, the World Atlas of Language Structures gives an example of the distinction among 
several European languages in describing the weather for the future: 
German: Morgen  ist es kalt 
   Tomorrow is.PRS it cold 
Finnish: Huomenna on kylmää 
  Tomorrow is.PRS  cold  
French: Il fera froid  demain 
 It do.FUT cold  tomorrow 
English: ‘It will be cold tomorrow’ 
As shown in the above example, English and French mandatorily require speakers to put “will” 
or a future tense (“fera” in French) in the sentence describing tomorrow’s situation, while German 
                                                          
35 As mentioned in Chen (2013), a detailed analysis of  the difference in obligatory FTR between English and 
German can be found in Copley (2009). According to Copley (2009), “futurates”—sentences about future events 
with no FTR—can only be used in English to convey information about planned/ scheduled/ habitual events. 
This restriction is not present in German, and futurates are common in German speech and writing. In addition, 
Thieroff  (2000) documents what Dahl (2000) calls a “futureless area” in Northern and Central Europe, including 




and Finnish do not. Grammatically, saying “Tomorrow is cold” is the same as “Today is cold” in 
German and Finnish. This grammatical difference, as argued by Chen (2013), makes English and 
French speakers less future-oriented in their preference and behavior relative to German and Finnish 
speakers. 
Other research on economic and management decision-making presents similar arguments on 
how different perceptions of the present and future affect individual and firm behavior. For example, 
one fundamental principle of economics is that money has a time value, and people usually apply a 
“discount factor” when they consider future value at present. That is, when people consider the future 
differently from the present, they tend to “discount” the importance of future in their utility function: 
one dollar tomorrow is worth of less than one dollar today (Fisher, 1930). In addition, the literature 
on “mental accounting” and “myopic loss aversion” also suggest that people tend to psychologically 
separate portfolios into different mental accounts (similar to cognitive categories) and individual 
behavior tends to be myopic when they focus on the “present” account while neglect the “future” 
account when future and the present are separated (Benartzi & Thaler, 1995). These concepts are 
closely related to corporate and strategic myopia theories advocated by management scholars (e.g., 
Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Laverty, 1996), who argue that temporal myopia by managers can lead to 
corporate short-termism, and neglect of longer-term strategy and initiatives. In a recent work, Chen, 
Cronqvist, Ni, & Zhang (2015) empirically find weak-FTR language firms perceive adverse credit 
market events as more imminent and have higher levels of precautionary cash holdings. Overall, all 
these linguistic, cognitive, economic, and management theories suggest that grammatically separating 
the future from the present induces speakers to be less future-oriented, as opposed to the alternative, 
that such separation makes the future more salient and thus associated with being more future-
oriented. 
Finally, this notion that language can influence the development of individual future 
orientation has also been demonstrated by research in cognitive science (Haith, Benson, Roberts, & 
Pennington, 1995). For example, language has been shown to play a crucial role in communicating 
and representing the future relative to the present and the past, especially during one’s childhood 
(Bates, Elman, & Li, 1995). More recently, research in neuro-imaging and psychology has also 
examined how people perceive the future differently under different circumstances. This research 
shows that on average future values decline as a hyperbolic function from the present (e.g.; Frederick 
et al., 2002; Glimcher et al., 2007; Glimbher, 2009; Pine et al., 2009; Monterosso & Luo, 2010). Still, 




our case, specifically, differences in the use of the future tense across languages) to intertemporal 
discounting.36  
CSR as a Future-Oriented Corporate Behavior 
The literature on temporal myopia by corporate leaders has suggested that corporate short-
termism leads companies to eschew long-term value creation through CSR (e.g., Swanson, 2014). And 
significant prior research has also shown that CSR is an effective strategy to engage non-financial 
stakeholders over the long term (e.g. Hillman and Keim, 2001). Therefore, in this study we examine 
corporate CSR performance as an indicator of future-oriented corporate behavior. This is also 
supported by a recent McKinsey Global Survey, documenting that CSR practice is widely perceived 
by executives, investors, and regulators worldwide as crucial to long-term sustainability, as it helps 
mitigate corporate crises, build reputation, and maintain harmonious relationships with the 
community and environment (McKinsey Quarterly, 2009). Furthermore, empirically, several studies have 
found a strong link between CSR and corporate long-term performance and resistance to long-run 
shocks, other than the short-term profits (e.g., Deng, Kang, & Low, 2013; Albuquerque, Durnev, and 
Koskinen, 2013). As shown later in our empirical section, various measures of CSR are strongly 
correlated with several long-term oriented corporate actions, such as R&D expenditures. Therefore, 
if we accept that culture is an important determinant of CSR, the cultural dimensions that 
fundamentally drive CSR should be closely related to the future-orientation of organizational decision 
making.  
 
Linking Future Time Reference and CSR 
While the empirical evidence of the effects of language mostly focuses on individuals’ future-
oriented behaviors, there are good reasons to believe such language effects can also be manifested in 
corporate behaviors, especially those related to long-run decisions such as CSR. Corporate decisions 
                                                          
36 The fMRI analysis by Peters and Büchel (2010) yields some interesting insights which are useful for our 
interpretation of  intertemporal discounting and linguistic references to the future. They argue and find that 
labelling of  the future by ‘episodic tags’—temporally specific, short descriptions of  events that will take place in 
the near future such as references to e.g. a birthday of  a friend, a planned city trip, etc.—reduces the discount rates 
and brings the future closer. Thus, in languages where the future is more clearly demarcated, we would expect such 
“episodic tags” to be more numerous and stronger such that there is less strong discounting.  Therefore, it may 
very well be the case that language cues about the future (in our case, how language grammatically expresses the 
future) are influencing how people regard the future and act upon it. Peters and Büchel (2010) do not explicitly test 
the grammatical use of  the future (across languages) on the intertemporal discounting and hence cannot not serve 
as a solid conceptual foundation of  our paper. Still, the study shows that adding temporal language tags related to 
the near future modulates discounting per se: “rewards paired with tags appear closer in time, thereby increasing 




are made by leaders, and are hence influenced by leaders’ cognitive processes (Hambrick & Mason, 
1984). The literature on leader cognition has shown that leaders’ conceptual categories, which are part 
of broader classification systems that vary by culture and spoken language, affect the strategic choices 
and actions of their firms and industries (e.g. Porac et al, 1995; Kaplan, 2011). Prior research has 
shown a number of critical processes by which the cognitive categories of leaders, such as the extent 
to which future and present are joined (Kaplan & Orlikowski, 2013), affect strategic outcomes (Kaplan, 
2011). An important characteristic is category sharpness, and as Glynn and Navis summarize (2013: 
1126), “when categorical classifications and boundaries are unclear or in flux (as in emerging markets 
or industries),” the perceiver (decision maker) has few, if any, benchmarks against which to sort, 
classify and assign meaning, which affects sense-making and action. Category salience is another 
important process. The more salient the categories, the greater the extent to which actors identify with 
them, and, by implication, the extent to which they affect behavior (Choi et al., 1997; Van Dick et al., 
2005). More generally, research has also shown that categories are part of broader classification 
systems that vary by culture (Glynn & Navis, 2013). Thus, a conclusion that can be drawn from this 
research is that variation in conceptual categories along the dimensions of sharpness and salience 
affects leader perceptions and accordingly, organizational behaviors and strategies. 
Conceptual categories as part of broader classification systems embedded in culture reflect 
how certain values, such as future-orientation, are coded in leaders’ cognitions and affect their decision 
making. Language as an important cultural vehicle plays a prominent role in categorizing and coding 
such values through its grammatical classification of FTR. This is in line with the Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis that language shapes people’s cognition and behavior. Therefore, it follows that for 
speakers of weak FTR languages, the categorical boundary between present and future is not as sharp 
and salient, and so it is less likely they would see the future as a separate category and consequently, 
they would feel more pressure from the future and their behavior would be more future-oriented. In 
contrast, the sharper and more salient categorical boundary between present and future in strong FTR 
languages isolate speakers from worrying about the future in their current thinking, thus focusing their 
behavior more on the present. Put in the language of economics, speakers (including corporate 
decision makers) of strong FTR languages are more likely to apply a discount factor to future events, 
which makes the future less important today. This is consistent with the argument of Chen (2013: 695) 
that “speaking about future events as if they were happening now (in the present tense), would lead 




Based on these arguments, we hypothesize that variation in cognition shaped by the linguistic 
background of corporate decision-makers induces different degrees of future-orientation between 
those speaking strong versus weak FTR languages, creating variation in firms’ propensity to act socially 
responsibly and sustainably. This is the baseline hypothesis; even controlling for cultural and 
institutional variables, we predict a negative association between strong-FTR languages as the official 
working language of the firm and corporate CSR performance.  
H1: Companies in regions with strong future-time reference (FTR) languages as 
the official working language have lower CSR performance. 
Internationalization and Effects of Language 
If language exposure and use shape decision makers’ cognitive categories and thus where they 
focus their attention, then presumably greater exposure to and use of different languages by the focal 
firm will lessen the direct effect of FTR on firm CSR. Prior research has shown that perceptual 
categories are flexible and boundaries of what is in and out of the categories can change over time and 
contexts (Porac et al., 1995) and that situational factors significantly shape where leaders place their 
cognitive attention (Ocasio, 1997). In addition, the interaction between various factors (such as 
cognitive categories and language environments) that affect CSR can happen at multiple levels: 
national, organizational, and individual (Aguilera et al., 2007). Thus, at a theoretical level, we believe 
that the relationship described above may vary depending on how a variety of multilevel features 
related to firm internationalization foster a more multi-lingual environment and communications in 
the focal organization. We anticipate that the greater internationalization of firms’ headquarters 
country, the firms’ business, and their leaders will moderate the effect of FTR on firms’ future 
orientation. Specifically, we explore several country-level, firm-level, and CEO-level factors that can 
weaken such negative effects of language FTR on CSR performance. 
Globalization of Firm’s Headquarters Country. Globalization has a significant impact on 
corporate CSR performance. Globalization and the proliferation of cross‐border trade and investment 
by multinational enterprises (MNEs) result in an increasing awareness of CSR practices relating to 
areas such as human rights, environmental protection, health and safety, and anti‐corruption 
(Gokulsing, 2011). Access to more information through global and multilingual media enables the 
public to be more informed and to more easily monitor corporate activities. In addition, in more 
globalized countries, as firms are under higher pressure from international regulations and the spillover 




that outline norms for acceptable corporate conduct and are issued by the UN, OECD, ILO, etc.—
their behaviors tend to be more socially-oriented to conform to these standards.  
Globalization is also closely related to the effects of language. The cross-country and 
interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and communications have blurred the 
boundaries between distinct languages. As with globalization, languages have evolved to adopt each 
other’s grammars and ways of expression, and as a result, speakers of different languages have 
increasingly adapted to each other’s way of thinking. For example, English has adopted words and 
phrases from many other languages, even in recent years, such as “yacht” from Dutch, “hamburger” 
and “strafe” from German, and “ski” from Norwegian. Given this, it is reasonable to believe that a 
higher level of country globalization facilitates the exchange of words and ideas, including those related 
to CSR. Companies headquartered in a more globalized environment are more exposed to a 
multilingual environment with business partners in different countries. Such multilingual environment 
makes a manager more flexible to change the perceptual categories and attention on CSR than the 
single language environment does. We focus on the headquarters country because that is typically the 
location of the firms’ top leaders (Cantwell, 2009). Therefore, the negative effect of language FTR will 
be moderated by the country-level international exposure of the firms’ headquarters location.  
H2: The negative association between CSR performance and strong FTR is weaker 
for firms headquartered in regions with a higher degree of globalization. 
Firm-level Internationalization. CSR practice is not only affected by globalization at the 
country-level, but also by MNEs’ global exposure. A large literature on CSR and FDI points out that 
FDI as a driver of the spillover of CSR standards and practice has resulted further empowerment of 
MNEs (e.g., Hasan, 2011). On the one hand, MNEs are in a powerful position to promote change in 
critical environmental and social issues such as pollution and human rights violations, especially in 
developing counties. On the other hand, MNEs have become increasingly pressured by external 
groups such as NGOs to operate with a higher level of social responsibility. For instance, Chapple 
and Moon (2005) show that companies serving customers in multiple countries engage in more CSR 
than those just serving their home country, presumably because of the need to satisfy more diverse 
stakeholders. Thus, the extent to which a firm is dependent on foreign consumer markets and 
productive resources would likely positively affect its CSR. 
Firms’ internationalization is highly related to language effects as well. MNEs are typically 




concurrently used and recursively linked through intra-corporate communication networks. The 
MNE’s language system is in accordance with organizational form, strategic choice, and expatriate 
employment in the context of evolving environmental and organizational realities (Luo & Shenkar, 
2006). Furthermore, MNEs usually operate with business partners around the world and are exposed 
to both strong- and weak-FTR languages. Multilingual communication, whether between headquarters 
and subsidiaries or among subsidiaries across different countries, will affect many MNEs activities, 
such as knowledge transfer, merger integration, global outsourcing, and global team cooperation 
(Zaheer, Schomaker, & Nachum, 2012). All these will reduce the importance of the use of a single 
language and weaken the negative effects of language FTR on CSR.37 Therefore, 
H3: The negative association between CSR performance and strong FTR is weaker 
in companies with a higher degree of internationalization. 
Firm Leaders’ International Experience. As Ocasio (1997: 197) notes, “The most critical 
players in attention regulation are typically the CEO and the top management group,” and a long line 
of research has shown that executives’ backgrounds drive the decisions they make, including CSR 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Waldman, Siegel, & Javidan, 2006b). Furthermore, CEOs’ personal 
attitudes and values have been shown to be a key driver of CSR (Hemingway & Maclagan, 2004), and 
international experience helps shape the global mindset of the CEO (Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001; 
Carpenter, Sanders, & Gregersen, 2001). Such international experience and global mindset may lead 
to a greater focus on global issues and diversity (Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001), and make the CEO 
more open to the adoption of international diversified standards of CSR. 
Leaders’ internationalization is also strongly associated with their flexibility using different 
languages, and thus their ability to moderate the effects of a single language. When exposed to a 
diversified language environment, during either work or education, CEOs better understand cultural 
dynamics and differences in social norms, and perhaps the overseas educational experience better 
shapes language and other skills (Whitley, 1999). Such multilingual experience helps CEOs change 
cognitive categories and attentions, makes them sensitive to diverse cultural expectations and 
social/ethical norms (Paul, Meyskens, & Robbins, 2011). Therefore, CEOs’ international 
                                                          
37 While firms’ internationalization—foreign operations and foreign sales—can extend to both strong-FTR and 
weak-FTR countries, data limitations prevent us from distinguish between the two. While this is not ideal, we also 
note that this results in a more conservative approach since differentiating between strong- and weak-FTR 
internationalization would allow for more precise identification of  the effect and so strengthen alignment with our 




experience—international work experience or overseas education38—should attenuate the negative 
effects of language FTR on CSR performance. 
H4a: The negative association between CSR performance and strong FTR of the 
language of the firm’s nationality is weaker if the CEO has more international work 
experience. 
 
H4b: The negative association between CSR performance and strong FTR of the 
language of the firm’s nationality is weaker if the CEO has more overseas education 
experience. 
Method 
Data and Sample 
We test our hypotheses on several large global panels. Our primary data source for a firms 
CSR performance are from Morgan Stanley Capital International’s (MSCI) Intangible Value 
Assessment (IVA) program, which measures a corporation’s environmental and social risks and 
opportunities, and is compiled using company profiles, ratings, scores, and industry reports,39 and is 
available from 1999 to 2011. This rating is frequently used as a measure of firm CSR performance 
(Ringov & Zollo, 2007; Ho et al., 2012). The data cover the well-established equity indices of the 
largest companies across the world rather than just selecting a specific sample of firms that engage in 
CSR. For example, its coverage comprises the top 1,500 companies of the MSCI World Index 
(expanding to the full MSCI World Index over the course of the sample period); the top 25 companies 
of the MSCI Emerging Markets Index; the top 275 companies by market cap of the FTSE 100 and 
the FTSE 250; and the ASX 200. For this large sample with global coverage, MSCI constructs a series 
of 29 CSR ratings for each company, covering the following dimensions: strategic governance, human 
                                                          
38 Again, our classification here does not differentiate between international experience in strong-FTR and weak-
FTR countries which leads to more conservative estimation of  the effect of  FTR. Further classifying CEOs’ 
international experience into strong- and weak-FTR would only strengthen our results. 
39 The information on which the IVA ratings are based is extracted from the following sources: (a) Corporate 
documents: annual reports, environmental and social reports, securities filings, websites, and Carbon Disclosure 
Project responses; (b) Government data: central bank data, U.S. Toxic Release Inventory, Comprehensive 
Environmental Response and Liability Information System (CERCLIS), RCRA Hazardous Waste Data 
Management System, etc.; (c) Trade and academic journals included in Factiva and Nexis; (d) Professional 
organizations and experts: reports from and interviews with trade groups, industry experts, and non-governmental 




capital, stakeholder capital, products and services, emerging markets, environmental risk factors, 
environmental management capacity, and environmental opportunity factors. Among a total of 29 
sub-dimensions of MSCI’s rating, Labor Relations, Industry Specific Risk, Environmental Opportunity receive 
the highest weights in the global rating (they account for 80%). Furthermore, we have complemented 
the IVA rating from MSCI with the RiskMetrics EcoValue21 Rating and the RiskMetrics Social Rating, 
which are provided by RiskMetrics Group and respectively capture the environmental and social 
aspects of CSR. To show the robustness of our results across different rating systems, we use these 
three CSR ratings, MCSI IVA, RiskMetrics EcoValue21 Rating, and the RiskMetrics Social Rating as 
the dependent variables in our study.  
It is also important to note that firms in our sample are rated against their industry peers 
(sectorial analysis) from both domestic and international markets, thus the ratings do not depend on 
the cross-country difference in jurisdiction, regulation and local CSR situation. This makes our cross-
country data more credible and guarantees that our CSR ratings are not biased by country-specific 
characteristics. Our main sample covers 91,373 firm-year observations from 59 countries. We classify 
our sample firms into 17 aggregated industries following the standard Kompass industry classification. 
Regression model 
We conduct our analysis using both random-effects and fixed-effects models in a panel dataset. 
Although language FTR is largely time-invariant, our CSR ratings, moderating variables, and other 
covariates are mostly time-variant, and in our robustness tests we examine the change of firm FTR 
following CEO change, thus working with panel models take into account of these time variations. 
Nevertheless, we also conduct OLS analysis later on to triangulate our results. The dependent variables 
are the three different CSR ratings described above. The key explanatory variable is the future time 
reference (FTR), a dummy variable indicating whether the firm’s official language is a strong- or weak-
FTR language.40 It is important to note that FTR is measured at the firm-level, but for most countries 
in the world, the FTR of firm-level official language coincides with that of the country-level official 
language, except for the Belgian and Swiss firms in our sample. Other explanatory variables include 
                                                          
40 Dahl & Velupillai (2011) provide a broad survey of  the future tenses of  languages around the world, and Chen 
(2013) further formalizes it. The official languages of  most countries in our sample are unitary in FTR – either 
strong or weak.  Note that this applies even to most countries that have multiple official languages.  For example, 
in Spain, the official languages of  Spanish and Catalan are both strong FTR languages (see Appendix A for more 
examples). Belgium and Switzerland are the only countries in our sample where both strong- and weak- FTR 
languages exist as official languages. We carefully classify firms based in Belgium and Switzerland according to the 




the moderating variables: country-level Globalization Index, firm-level % Foreign Assets/ Total Assets (a 
proxy for firm-level internationalization), and CEO International Work Experience and CEO Overseas 
Education Experience (proxies for leaders’ internationalization), as well as their interactions with FTR. 
The regression model is specified as: 
𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3
∙ (𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑖 × 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4 ∙ %𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5
∙ (𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑖 × %𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽6 ∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7 ∙ (𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑖 × 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽8 ∙ 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9
∙ (𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑖 × 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑡) + 𝛾 ∙ 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
where 𝛽’s are coefficients to be estimated on the variables of interests, and 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the vector 
of control variables described below.41 
The country-level control variables capturing economic and social development include Legal 
Origin (common laws versus civil laws), Rule of Law, GDP Per Capita. To avoid multicollinearity between 
legal origins and FTR, we apply a two-stage approach by regressing Legal Origin (the English common 
law dummy) on FTR in the first stage, and put its residual (which is orthogonal to FTR) as an 
explanatory variable, together with other independent variables, in the second stage regression. In 
addition, we control for potential country-level cultural channels on CSR, by including the widely-
used Hofstede’s five cultural dimensions (Kim & Kim, 2010). These cultural controls help explore 
whether non-linguistic cultural traits or norms are coincident with language to determine CSR. We 
focus on the countries of firms’ corporate headquarters because that is the location of most senior 
manager decision-makers, and so likely the external environment that has the greatest influence on 
corporate decisions (Guler, Guillén, & Macpherson, 2002). At the firm-level, we control for ownership 
concentration, proxied by the ownership stakes held by the largest shareholder, and several indicators 
of different aspects of firms’ financial performance (constraints), including ROA, Tobin’s Q, interest 
coverage, short-term investment to operating cash flow sensitivity, and slack as proxied by the current 
ratio (current debt to current assets). We also control for CEO characteristics and backgrounds, such 
as gender and international experience.  
                                                          
41 Countries with the Socialist origin are excluded from the regression due to their consistently much lower CSR 
ratings (on average more than 2 grades lower than the rest countries) in all dimensions, and their particularity in 
institutional infrastructure and legal traditions. In La Porta et al. (1998), Socialist countries were also excluded from 




Finally, we control for time fixed effects and industry fixed effects. As a robustness check, we 
also control for country fixed effects, which excludes the country-specific variables such as the culture 
measures (but not FTR mostly because of the Belgian and Swiss firms). In these analyses, discussed 
in more detail below, we find that the results on FTR and its moderators are similar to the presented 
results. Our sample’s country coverage, the official languages and their FTR are shown in Appendix 
A. A more detailed description on our key dependent variables—CSR ratings—are provided in 
Appendix B. The descriptions of our independent variables and control variables are in Appendix C. 
Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations of our independent variables, as well as their 
correlations. Few of them are highly correlated, especially with language FTR, which rules out 
multicollinearity concerns. Standard errors in all regressions are clustered at the firm level. 
[Insert Tables 1 about here] 
Results 
Baseline Results 
Tables 2—3 show the results on both the main effects of FTR, and the effects of various 
country-level and firm-level moderators as we hypothesize. The dependent variables are the overall 
IVA rating in Table 2, the RiskMetrics EcoValue rating (focusing on corporate environmental 
performance) in Panel A of Table 3, and the RiskMetrics Social rating (focusing on corporate social 
performance) in Panel B of Table 3. Table 3 contains exactly the same control variable set as in Table 
2, but does not report all of them to preserve space. We run regressions based on these CSR ratings 
with standard errors clustered at the firm-level; in unreported results based on standard errors 
clustered at the country-level, the coefficients and standard errors are similar to clustering at the firm-
level. For all three tables, the results for testing the main effect of language FTR are reported in column 
(1), and one moderator is tested in each specification for columns (2)—(5), and then all moderators 
are tested together in column (6). At a first sight, the coefficients on FTR for almost all specifications 
across the three tables are negative and statistically significant above the 95% confidence level. The 
economic significance is non-trivial either: companies in countries with strong-FTR language as their 
official/working language on average underperform those speaking weak-FTR languages by more 
than 1.2 grades of CSR rating (on a scale of 7). More specifically, companies in strong FTR countries 
scored 26% (-1.577/6) lower on the overall IVA ratings and around 21% (-1.252/6 or -1.246/6) lower 




strong language FTR (such as English, French, and Spanish) is associated with lower CSR rating, 
ceteris paribus, is supported.  
Regarding the effects of other control variables, Column (1) of Tables 2 and 3 shows the 
results of regressing CSR ratings on FTR and other country-level and firm-level variables, but without 
interaction terms. First, at the country-level, the coefficients on the degree of country globalization 
are positive and statistically significant for the overall IVA ratings and the social ratings, but not for 
the environmental ratings. However, laws and national wealth do not seem to be a predictor of CSR, 
as none of the coefficients on Rule of Law, the orthogonal component of Legal Origin (English 
Common Law), and Ln(GDP per capita) are significant. Second, at the firm-level, higher ownership 
stakes held by the largest shareholder is significantly related to lower CSR rating, though the coefficient 
is only significant for the environmental rating. Interestingly, the coefficients of most financial 
performance variables (Tobin’s Q, financial constraints, and interest coverage) are not statistically 
significant, except the one on slack (current ratio) —firms with higher current ratio actually receive 
lower CSR ratings. ROA shows some significant and positive relations with CSR, but the rest of the 
results on financial performance do not strongly support the traditional “doing good by doing well” 
conjecture. Third, at the individual level, CEOs’ gender and international experience—either work or 
education—do not seem to directly contribute to CSR performance, as none of the coefficients on 
their main effects are significant. Furthermore, the effects of cultural dimensions are not strong, either 
economically or statistically, which reinforce our argument that “culture” in general (values and norms) 
is not a persistent predictor of CSR, while the specific underlying mechanism that carries culture—
language—is the key determinant. Overall, the above results indicate that language FTR is a more 
fundamental source of CSR than the rule of law, economic development, culture, firm-level financial 
and operational concerns, and CEO attributes (or language FTR absorbs their effects). 
We then turn to the effects of the hypothesized moderators. At the country-level, column (2) 
of Tables 2 and 3 show the results of having country globalization as the moderator. It is clearly shown 
that the coefficients on the interaction term between country globalization and FTR are all statistically 
significant at the 1% level, which implies that the degree of globalization of the country is a strongly 
positive moderator for the effect of language on CSR for all three dependent variables. Economically, 
a one standard deviation increase of the globalization index of a country with strong FTR leads to an 
average of 1.8 standard deviation increase in the CSR rating, which reduces the pure economic 




At the firm-level, column (3) of Tables 2 and 3 shows that the coefficients on the interaction 
term between “% Foreign assets”—representing the degree of internationalization of the company—
and FTR are positive and statistically significant. This indicates that the degree of firm 
internationalization is also an important moderator for the negative effect of language on CSR. 
Economically, a one standard deviation increase of the percentage of foreign assets over the firm’s 
total assets in a strong FTR country induces an average of 0.48 standard deviation increase in the CSR 
rating, which also lowers that of the negative effect of FTR by more than a half. When the variable “% 
Foreign assets” is replaced by “% Foreign sales”, the effect is similar. Therefore, our H3 is upheld. 
The CEO’s overseas educational background is a strong moderator for FTR on all CSR ratings, 
as the coefficients on its interaction with FTR are all positive and statistically significant. The economic 
significance of the interaction terms is again about half of that of FTR’s main effect (a firm with a 
strong FTR language scores 1.8 grades lower in the CSR rating on average, which is weakened by 
about 1 grade if the CEO had overseas education). However, it is not so for CEO’s international work 
experience, as the coefficients on its interaction with FTR are not significant. Such lack of a work 
experience moderating effect may be a result of an expatriate enclave process such that although the 
CEO worked in an international location, they may have still lived among other expatriates so the 
international culture may not have had as strong an effect.  Overall, CEO’s international experience 
does play a significant moderating role in attenuating the negative effect of language FTR, but this 
role is mainly carried out through CEO’s overseas education. This may imply that a global mindset on 
sustainable strategies and multilingual skills are more likely to have been acquired by the CEO during 
the education rather than work experience. This result largely supports H4b, though not H4a. 
Language remains the most consistent and significant predictor of CSR. Finally, when we include all 
interaction terms together in one model (column (6) in Table 3 and 4), the statistical significance of 
most interaction terms remains, which confirms our above results. We rely on these partial models 
(column (2—5) in Table 2 and 3) for testing our moderator hypotheses, since the full model (column 
(6) of Table 2—3) may suffer from multicollinearity due to multiple interactions.  
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here] 
Robustness Checks 
The above results are robust to clustering standard errors at the country-level rather than at 
the firm-level. In fact, the standard errors between the two types of clustering are not very different 
in our sample. In addition, to triangulate the measurement of CSR (Delmas, Etzion,& Nairn-Birch, 




including MSCI Impact Monitor, Vigeo Corporate ratings, and Asset4 ratings, which are all firm-level 
panel data with global coverage (results available on request). The Vigeo and Asset4 ratings range from 
0 to 100, giving more credit to our reduced-form estimation. In addition, the Asset4 data mainly focus 
on CSR at the level of the locally listed subsidiary rather than that of the headquarters, which 
generalizes our previous findings to multilevel corporate decision making. Most of the above results 
still hold: Language FTR remains significantly negative, and the effects of all three moderating 
variables remain significant and positive.  
Excluding Colonizers and Scandinavian Countries 
To further check the robustness of these results, we conduct several additional tests and the 
results are shown in Panel A of Table 4.42 For simplicity and to preserve space, we only report the 
main effects of FTR and those key moderating variables, rather than their interactions and other 
control variables, although in unreported regressions, their effects are still there. First, we exclude the 
parent countries (Britain, France, and Germany) and Scandinavian countries from the regressions and 
only analyze the former colonies (Column 1), so as to rule out the possibility that the language effect 
is driven by a “Scandinavian bias” or a “parent-country bias”. Again, the coefficient on FTR is negative 
and significant, with similar magnitude as before. 
OLS Estimation 
Second, one may argue that OLS estimation is a more appropriate approach given the time-
invariant feature of FTR. Therefore, we estimate the same specification with both pooled OLS 
(Column 2) and cross-sectional OLS (Column 3). For cross-sectional OLS, we take the mean value of 
each variable over the sample period. Including many control variables with missing values inevitably 
shrinks our sample size to 646, but in unreported regressions when fewer control variables (thus more 
observations), the negative effect of FTR remains. 
Weak- and strong-FTR languages within one country 
Third, in order to investigate the within-country variation in CSR, we only focus on the 
subsample of Belgium and Switzerland where both strong- and weak-FTR languages. Belgium has 
three official languages: Dutch, French, and German, with Dutch and German are classified as weak-
FTR languages, and French is a strong-FTR language. Switzerland has four official languages: German, 
                                                          
42 We have also conducted a number of  other robustness tests; such as including the country-level linguistic 
concentration index and various other control variables in our model. Adding these additional control variables did 
not substantially change the effects of  FTR and other moderators. To preserve space, we don’t report all results 




French, Italian and Romansh. Three of them are classified as strong-FTR languages: French, Italian, 
and Romansh. These two countries therefore provide an interesting opportunity to examine the effect 
of language within one country, holding other country-specific institutional characteristics fixed. If we 
still observe similar patterns of CSR across different regions within the same country, it is more likely 
a language effect rather than country-specific effect. 
The results from this within-country analysis based on Belgian and Swiss firms are reported in 
Column 4 of Table 4, which again reinforce our earlier conjecture on the language effects. The 
coefficient on FTR is negative and significant, and its economic magnitude (2.808) is even as twice as 
that for the global sample. This makes our arguments even stronger, as companies within the same 
country face almost identical legal, institutional, and cultural environments, and the major different is 
their official language (thus less omitted variable bias), and one would reasonably expect that the 
language effect becomes stronger. This within-country result further eliminates the concern that the 
observed correlation between FTR and CSR is not driven by other country-level factors such as legal 
origins, institutions, and regulations which do not have significant within-country variations. 
Controlling for Religion in Christianity-Majority Societies 
Fourth, one may raise the concern that the variation in CSR performance across the world is 
driven largely by religion and religiosity—believed to shape the value and norms in a society—which 
have been documented as an important factor in influencing economic behavior (e.g., Iannaccone, 
1998; Barro & McCleary, 2003). We therefore address this concern by including a religion variable in 
a subsample of religion-dense countries (Column 5). Given that Christianity is the most widespread 
religion in the world and closely related to work and social ethics (Arruñada, 2010), we rerun the afore-
specified regressions based on a subsample of Christianity-majority countries—those with more than 
50 percent of population being Christians—and use the ratio of the percentage of Catholics to the 
percentage of Protestants as a proxy for the influence of religions. As shown in Column 5, the 
coefficient of FTR is still negative and significant, with similar magnitude, while that of the Catholic-
Protestant ratio is not. This may suggest that the language effect is not driven by religions. 
Finally, we control for country fixed effects in order to rule out concerns about alternative 
country-level processes that could endogenously affect our results. Country fixed effects take into 
account of all unobservable time-invariant country-level factors that can drive CSR. This will inevitably 
omit all our time-invariant country-level variables such as legal origins and cultures (FTR is not omitted 
because it is measured at the regional/firm level). So we only report the results on the specifications 




Expectedly, the significance of most interaction terms remains after this strong test of including 
country fixed effects, and the significance of FTR becomes even stronger both statistically and 
economically.  
[Insert Table 4 about Here] 
Alternative Measures of Language Structure 
To further triangulate our previous results and eliminate the concern that the FTR dummy is 
not a proxy for language but some other country- or firm-level factors, we replace the FTR dummy 
with two continuous measures of language structure from Chen (2013), which measure how frequently 
a language grammatically marks future time. First, we examine the Verb Ratio measure, which counts 
the number of verbs which are grammatically future-marked, divided by the total number of future-
referring verbs. In Columns (1)—(3), we report model specifications with the previously used baseline 
specification (without interaction terms to preserve space), with FTR replaced by this Verb ratio. We 
find that the lower the percentage of verbs that are grammatically future-marked, the higher the CSR 
ratings. The estimated effects are still statistically significant and economically sizable. A one standard 
deviation reduction in verb ratio (37.2%) corresponds to 0.856 (= 0.023 × 37.2%) percentage points 
higher in the overall CSR rating, and 0.707 percentage points higher in the environmental rating and 
the social rating. 
Second, we examine the sentence ratio measure, which calculates the proportion of sentences 
about the future that contains a grammatical future-marker. In Columns (4)—(6), we find that the 
smaller the percentage of sentences that are grammatically future-marked, the higher the CSR ratings. 
Again, the estimated effects are statistically significant and economically sizable. A one standard 
deviation reduction in Sentence Ratio (40.2%) corresponds to 0.925 (= 0.023 × 40.2) percentage 
points higher in the overall CSR rating, and 0.8 percentage points higher in the environmental rating 
and the social rating. Therefore, the previous conclusion of a significant relation between language 
and CSR is further supported when we consider two alternative and continuous measures of language 
structure. 
[Insert Table 5 about Here] 




One major concern of the above analysis is that they mainly show correlations, rather than 
causality, between language FTR and various firm-level CSR ratings. Controlling for the country fixed 
effects and the subsample analysis of Belgian and Swiss firms largely rule out many cross- and within-
country alternative channels, one may still concern about other unobservable firm-level factors. To 
further establish causality, we exploit a quasi-experiment by investigating firm CSR change 
surrounding the change of CEOs with different FTRs of their native languages. We employ a twofold 
difference-in-difference (DiD) design based on one treatment and two natural control groups. Our 
treatment group consists of firms that experienced a FTR change of their CEO. We first run 
regressions on the whole sample, treating all firms which did not experience CEO’s FTR change as 
the control group (Panel A of Table 6).43 We then run regressions on the subsample of firms which 
experienced CEO change (but not necessarily CEO’s FTR change), treating those firms with CEO 
change but without FTR change as the control group (Panel B of Table 6). Given that only a small 
number of companies changed CEOs with different FTRs in our sample, we have to leave out some 
control variables with many missing values so as to preserve our sample size. Nevertheless, we show 
in Table 6 the results from including few control variables to including a longer series of control 
variables.44  
Several interesting observations emerge. First, when the native language of CEO changed 
from strong-FTR to weak-FTR (Columns 1—4 in Panel A and Columns 1—3 in Panel B), the firm’s 
CSR score significantly increased by about 0.4 grades on average. Second, when the native language 
of CEO changed from weak-FTR to strong-FTR (Columns 5—6 in Panel A and Columns 4—5 in 
Panel B respectively), the firm did not experience significant CSR change. It is worth mentioning that 
in a time-series setting, once a firm achieves a certain standard of CSR, it is very unlikely that they will 
downgrade this standard, even following a change of CEOs’ native language from weak-FTR to strong-
FTR. Third, the effects of other control variables do not differ much regardless which control group 
                                                          
43 When the panel data regression is run on the whole sample, one has to control for the fact that a firm 
experienced an FTR-change, regardless in which year this change happened. Therefore we include the control 
variable “CEO’s FTR change” which takes the value of  one for all the years of  the focal firm if  an FTR-change 
happened for this firm in our sample period, and zero otherwise. 
44 The control variables we leave out are Financial constraints, Current ratio, %Foreign assets, CEO gender, CEO 
international work experience, CEO overseas education experience, and the Hofestede cultural variables. The main 
reason for leaving out those variables is that the missing observations in these variables will inevitably further reduce 
our number of observations with CEO change, the fact that there are fewer control variables in Panel B (subsample 
of CEO change) than in Panel A (the whole sample) is due to the concern of preserving sufficient number of 
observations in the subsample. If we include the full set of control variables in Panel B as in Panel A, there will be 




we use, further indicating that the CSR change is induced by CEO’s FTR change. Ideally, we could 
have investigated the change of CSR several years after CEO’s FTR change, but this will result in 
insufficient observations in our sample. Nevertheless, the immediate change of firm CSR following 
CEO’s FTR change is consistent with the previous findings and gives strong supports to our 
hypotheses from the causality perspective. 
[Insert Table 6 about Here] 
FTR and Other Future-Oriented Corporate Actions 
Finally, we also test the effects of FTR on other future-oriented corporate actions to provide additional 
validation that FTR usage leads to future-oriented corporate actions. A commonly used proxy for 
corporate future-oriented action is R&D expenditures. As a final robustness check of whether 
language FTR of corporate leaders really alters firm future-orientation, we take various measures of 
R&D expenditures as dependent variables, and regress on FTR, together with other controls and 
industry- and year-fixed effects. These different measures of R&D include a) overall R&D expenditure, 
scaled by total assets (“R&D expenditure/assets”), b) R&D expenditures on new environmentally 
friendly products or services, scaled by sales revenue (“Environmental R&D”), c) a score on 
environmental R&D ranging from 0 to 100 (“Environmental R&D - Score”), and d) a dummy variable 
indicating whether the focal firm spent on environmental R&D (“Environmental R&D - Dummy”). 
The results are shown in Table 6. First, Panel A of Table 6 shows that the three aggregate CSR 
measures—overall CSR, environmental, and social—are strongly correlated with all measures of R&D 
expenditures, both economically and statistically. This may potentially indicate that CSR and R&D 
activities share similar components. Panel B of Table 7 shows the results of regressing various R&D 
measures on FTR (Columns 1-3 are GLS estimations and Column 4 is Probit estimation). Interestingly, 
throughout all regressions, the coefficients on FTR remain to be negative and statistically significant, 
with similar economic magnitudes. This implies that, ceteris paribus, firms with strong-FTR languages 
as their official language spent less on R&D expenditures (future-oriented investment). If one accepts 
the notion that R&D expenditures signify long-term orientation, these results further support our 
previous results on CSR, and suggests that cognitive categories separately by grammatical structure do 
induce decision-makers to be less future-oriented. 




Discussion and Conclusion 
The question of  whether languages shape the way people think goes back centuries; 
Charlemagne (AD 742—814) proclaimed that “to speak another language is to possess another soul.”  
Linguists have long believed that people from culturally different backgrounds tend to order their 
worlds differently based on the language they use, such that some languages are hinged to categorical 
structures where time is conceptualized in more abstract terms. In this study, we link language as a 
culturally embedded context with corporate decision making on future-oriented behaviors, by focusing 
on whether languages with strong future-time reference (i.e., grammatically separate the current tense 
from the future tense), in which the categorical boundaries between present the future are sharper and 
more salient, lead corporate decision makers to focus more on the present while neglect (or discount 
the importance of) the future, thus significantly reduce firms’ propensity to engage in CSR activities.  
A key aspect in researching issues of  cultural and cognitive mechanisms in organizational 
context is to identify relatively exogenous factors that affect corporate behavior and strategy. In this 
sense, language, which is shaped by historical and geographical factors, can be seen as such an 
explanatory factor. Our empirical results confirm this argument: after clustering standard errors, 
adding a large set of  country- and firm-level control variables and country fixed effects, language FTR 
is the most consistent predictor of  CSR across a large sample of  global firms. Further supporting our 
theory is that several country-level and firm-level factors that are related to internationalization 
significantly act as moderators for such language-driven effects. We take this as strong evidence that 
FTR strength in corporate decision makers’ language of  use affects the extent to which they enact 
future-oriented strategies: caring about environmental and social issues in order to achieve both 
corporate and societal sustainability in the long run. We see our results as having important 
contributions to two different literatures; the globalization of  CSR, and how leader attention and 
cognition affect organizations strategies and behaviors. 
Contributions to Research on Global CSR and Management Practice 
Over recent decades, researchers have begun to understand how various institutionally-
embedded organizational behaviors, such as CSR, vary across countries, with most investigations 
focusing on the standard set of  NBS—cultural, political, legal and economic systems—examined in 
other studies (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2007; Matten & Moon, 2008; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012). While the 
NBS categories of  formal institutions such as the political and legal systems are usually context-




business ethics and behavior (Hofstede, 1980; Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005; Waldman et al., 2006a).  
However, as the inconclusive findings that aim to connect underlying cultural dimensions and 
CSR suggest, conceptualizing and measuring culture is difficult and subjective due to its broad and 
intangible nature. Our approach in focusing on linguistic differences adds insight into understanding 
the international variation in CSR practices and their cultural roots, thus our findings have important 
implications for both the research and practice on this topic. As we show, cross-national variation in 
CSR is not a direct function of  cultural perceptions as conceived by standard typologies, but stems 
from language use, which is an underlying feature that shapes cultural values and the norms in a society. 
None of  these is to deny the importance of  culture in driving organizational behavior such as CSR. 
The bottom line of  our results is that language, while reflecting culture values, can also directly affect 
organizational behavior through its impact on decision makers’ future-orientation. Our empirical 
results not only add to the debate on the fundamental determinants of  CSR, but also contribute to 
the understanding of  the fundamental roles of  languages in shaping economic behavior, and 
demonstrate that global CSR research can benefit from incorporating language into explanatory 
models. Like the Chen (2013) study that examined individual level differences as a function of  
language use, we believe our study is really only a first step in identifying a novel, yet highly important 
underlying factor that shapes cross-national organizational behavior.  
Furthermore, recent studies also argue that the spread of CSR globally is driven by isomorphic 
forces as firms and countries seek to gain institutional legitimacy (Matten & Moon, 2008). As business 
has globalized over the past decade, there has been increasing pressure on companies around the 
world to join in the global movement for corporate social responsibility (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012). 
Moreover, the multilevel interactions between individual, organizational, and social changes gradually 
eliminate the gap across countries in their CSR policies and practices (Aguilera et al., 2007). Our study 
contributes to understanding the globalization of CSR by showing that internationalization at the 
home-country level, the firm level, and the leader level interacts with culturally-embedded language, 
which can significantly reduce the negative effect of language FTR on CSR. We believe such a 
multilevel approach can be applied to study the globalization of other organizational behavior in the 
contexts of international management and global strategy. Such scope and approach echo the 
economics literature on cross-country variation in management practice (e.g., Bloom & Van Reenen, 
2007) and corporate governance practice (e.g., La Porta et al., 1998). 




There is increasing attention paid to how cognition affects corporate action. However, while 
research has focused on capturing the content and variation in leaders’ cognition, without systematic 
longitudinal data, it is difficult to rule-out the possibility that this variation reflects underlying industry 
or corporate characteristics. Even allowing for longitudinal analysis, the focus in the literature is on 
coding leaders’ cognition through archival documents such as CEO letters in Annual Reports (e.g. 
Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997; Barr et al., 1992; Cho & Hambrick, 2006), or use proxies such as 
managers’ demographic backgrounds, as is common in top management teams research (e.g. 
Hambrick & Mason, 1984). However, there are significant questions about how accurately these 
approaches capture differences in leader cognition, since it is well known that public relations and 
marketing firms are heavily involved in creating annual reports. Thus, in traditional research on the 
cognitive bases of strategy, there has been a tradeoff between accurately assessing cognition with 
detailed observational data that is difficult to collect longitudinally, and being able to firmly establish 
a causal link with a corporate level outcome.  
By identifying important linguistic differences across companies’ working languages, we have 
introduced a new, important—and exogenous—factor into this literature that allows us to make a 
valid link between assessed cognitive variation and corporate behaviors around the globe. Almost 
twenty years ago, Meindl et al. (1994: 293) predicted that “(i)n the future, the most important studies 
will clearly show linkages between cognition, behavior, and organizational outcomes.” Yet, because of 
the fundamental difficulty in assessing cognition and connecting it to outcome, studies that can firmly 
make this link are rare (Kaplan, 2011). Examining how and why language affects the conceptual 
categories of managers is essential to understanding differences in global organizational behaviors 
(Chen et al., 2015). We acknowledge that there are limitations to our research, especially on how 
languages affect other future-orientated strategic corporate decisions. We thus encourage future 
research to build on our study in a number of different directions. We believe that studies of effects 
of FTR on organizational behaviors may be able to show additional future behaviors affected by this 
important variable. Corporate social responsibility, as an obviously future-oriented behavior, was a 
natural first choice of investigation, but like the economic studies that have tied FTR use to a range 
of individual behaviors (Chen, 2013), we believe that showing how language use shapes firms at a 
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Table 1. Correlations of Independent Variables 
 Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) FTR 0.72 0.45 1.00               
(2) Rule of law 1.52 0.34 -0.00 1.00              
(3) English legal origin 0.63 0.48 0.72* 0.29* 1.00             
(4) Ln(GDP per capita) 10.5 0.36 0.02* 0.62* 0.16* 1.00            
(5) Globalization index 78.6 8.78 0.29* 0.51* 0.16* 0.15* 1.00           
(6) % Foreign assets 25.4 26.0 -0.19* 0.11* -0.24* -0.00 0.24* 1.00          
(7) % Largest owner shares 25.1 30.9 -0.08* 0.01* -0.08* -0.15* 0.21* 0.07* 1.00         
(8) Tobin’s Q (winsor.) 2.82 1.87 0.15* 0.06* 0.17* 0.04* 0.09* 0.03* -0.03* 1.00        
(9) ROA 0.05 0.07 0.07* 0.02* 0.10* 0.07* 0.01* -0.00 -0.04* 0.41* 1.00       
(10) CEO gender 0.98 0.12 -0.03* -0.04* -0.05* -0.03* -0.03* 0.00 0.02* 0.01* -0.02* 1.00      
(11) CEO intl. work 0.44 0.50 -0.15* -0.00 -0.26* -0.11* 0.24* 0.30* 0.22* -0.02* -0.04* -0.02* 1.00     
(12) CEO overseas educ. 0.20 0.40 -0.10* -0.04* -0.10* -0.14* 0.08* 0.15* 0.08* -0.01* -0.03* 0.02* 0.31* 1.00    
(13) Interest coverage  17.1 29.4 -0.17* -0.06* -0.09* 0.04* -0.24* -0.05* -0.04* 0.23* 0.39* -0.01* -0.01* -0.02* 1.00   
(14) Financial constraints 0.28 10.6 -0.01* -0.00 -0.01* -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01* -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01* 1.00  





Table 2. GLS Regression on the Determinants of CSR: Intangible Value Assessment (IVA) Ratings 
DV = IVA ratings (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Language effect             
FTR  -1.577*** (0.355) -6.434*** (1.648) -2.747*** (0.727) -1.750** (0.782) -2.069*** (0.697) -5.946*** (1.656) 
FTR × Globalization   0.062*** (0.019)       0.050*** (0.019) 
FTR × Foreign assets     0.028*** (0.009)     0.016* (0.009) 
FTR × CEO intl. work       0.210 (0.508)   -0.605 (0.489) 
FTR × CEO overseas edu         1.236*** (0.629) 0.814 (0.645) 
Economic development             
Globalization index 0.097** (0.039) -0.010 (0.054) 0.095*** (0.038) 0.096** (0.040) 0.101*** (0.038) 0.018 (0.049) 
Rule of law 0.034 (0.304) 1.224 (0.710) 0.182 (0.661) 0.071 (0.697) 0.089 (0.682) 0.995 (0.662) 
Legal origin (residual) 0.798 (1.384) -2.190 (1.547) 0.442 (1.339) 0.746 (1.413) 0.775 (1.372) -1.649 (1.424) 
Ln(GDP per capita) -0.293 (0.371) -0.576 (0.371) -0.286 (0.366) -0.291 (0.369) -0.234 (0.369) -0.482 (0.372) 
Firm structure & performance             
% Foreign assets 0.001 (0.003) -0.000 (0.003) -0.025*** (0.009) 0.001 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003) -0.014* (0.008) 
% Largest owner shares -0.003 (0.003) -0.003 (0.003) -0.003 (0.003) -0.003 (0.003) -0.003 (0.003) -0.003 (0.003) 
Tobin’s Q (winsorized) 0.063 (0.044) 0.054 (0.043) 0.064 (0.043) 0.062 (0.044) 0.068 (0.043) 0.061 (0.043) 
ROA 2.660* (1.362) 2.769** (1.380) 2.889** (1.337) 2.667** (1.360) 2.718** (1.338) 2.899** (1.354) 
CEO backgrounds             
Gender -0.465 (0.823) -0.488 (0.821) -0.476 (0.826) -0.460 (0.822) -0.486 (0.821) -0.518 (0.825) 
International work -0.035 (0.167) -0.081 (0.163) -0.047 (0.165) -0.228 (0.481) -0.040 (0.166) 0.477 (0.453) 
Overseas education 0.027 (0.229) 0.091 (0.226) 0.102 (0.230) 0.033 (0.229) -1.021* (0.605) -0.587 (0.619) 
             
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adj. R-squared 21.9%  23.2%  22.8%  21.9%  22.6%  23.9%  
N = 9756. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level and reported in parentheses. * p< 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. The cultural controls include the five 
Hofstede cultural dimensions: (1) power distance, (2) individualism, (3) masculinity, (4) uncertainty avoidance, and (5) pragmatism, and the financial controls are firm-




Table 3. GLS Regression on the Determinants of CSR: Environmental and Social Ratings 
Panel A. Dependent variable is firm-level Environmental rating 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FTR -1.252* -5.581*** -2.018*** -1.435** -1.673** -5.030*** 
 (0.690) (1.303) (0.781) (0.789) (0.721) (1.285) 
FTR × Globalization  0.055***    0.047*** 
  (0.015)    (0.016) 
FTR × foreign assets   0.019***   0.005 
   (0.010)   (0.009) 
FTR × CEO international work    0.242  -0.595 
    (0.480)  (0.560) 
FTR × CEO overseas education     1.094** 0.903* 
     (0.491) (0.550) 
Globalization index 0.014 -0.059 0.044 0.045 0.047 -0.037 
 (0.016) (0.049) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.047) 
% Foreign assets 0.005* 0.005 -0.013 0.005* 0.005* 0.0004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) 
International work 0.139 0.115 0.121 -0.086 0.143 0.669 
 (0.154) (0.152) (0.154) (0.469) (0.153) (0.533) 
Overseas education -0.002 0.061 0.045 0.010 -0.933** -0.733 
 (0.184) (0.183) (0.182) (0.186) (0.473) (0.528) 
Controls & fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 19.2% 20.2% 19.5% 19.2% 19.7% 20.5% 
N = 19936. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level and reported in parentheses. * p< 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p 
< 0.01 
Panel B. Dependent variable is firm-level Social rating 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FTR -1.246** -4.733*** -2.010*** -1.363** -1.545** -4.336*** 
 (0.582) (1.457) (0.659) (0.637) (0.546) (1.436) 
FTR × globalization  0.045***    0.038** 
  (0.017)    (0.017) 
FTR × foreign assets   0.020**   0.011 
   (0.008)   (0.008) 
FTR×CEO international work    0.154  -0.542 
    (0.447)  (0.482) 
FTR×CEO overseas education     0.890* 0.530 
     (0.546) (0.604) 
Globalization index 0.065** -0.024 0.061* 0.064* 0.064** -0.006 
 (0.032) (0.048) (0.032) (0.034) (0.033) (0.044) 
% Foreign assets 0.002 0.002 -0.016** 0.002 0.002 -0.008 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) 
International work  -0.026 0.051 -0.037 0.168 -0.028 0.444 
 (0.167) (0.163) (0.165) (0.420) (0.166) (0.444) 
Overseas education 0.143 0.204 0.201 0.149 -0.611 -0.245 
 (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) (0.208) (0.530) (0.588) 
Controls & fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 20.1% 21.0% 20.6% 20.1% 20.5% 21.3% 






Table 4. Other robustness checks 
Panel A. Subsample Analysis and OLS Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV = IVA ratings 
Excluding parent 
countries 
Pooled OLS Cross-sectional OLS Belgian and Swiss firms 
Christianity-majority 
countries 
FTR  -1.173* (0.662) -1.577** (0.651) -1.280*** (0.393) -2.808*** (0.409) -1.552*** (0.552) 
Globalization index 0.074* (0.038) 0.097** (0.040) 0.0544** (0.024) 30.245 (21.569) 0.148*** (0.032) 
% Foreign assets 0.004 (0.004) 0.0007 (0.003) -0.000521 (0.003) -0.0037 (0.023) 0.003 (0.003) 
International work -0.368** (0.175) -0.035 (0.167) 0.102 (0.157)   -0.069 (0.170) 
Overseas education -0.146 (0.277) 0.027 (0.229) 0.0239 (0.204) -3.180* (1.651) 0.178 (0.231) 
Catholic/Protestant ratio         -0.0015 (0.005) 
Other control variables Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry & year fixed effects Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  
Observations 7168  9756  646  135  9103  
R-squared 0.2616  0.2268  0.1021  0.9581  0.2699  
All columns contain the same set of control variables as in the previous table, but do not report them to preserve space. Column (1) shows the results of a subsample by excluding 
British, German, French, and Scandinavian companies from the whole sample. Column 2 shows the results from pooled OLS estimation on the whole sample. Column 3 shows the 
results from cross-sectional OLS. Control variables in all columns are as before, including the five Hofstede cultural dimensions and firm-level financial variables: interest coverage, 
financial constraints, financial slack (current ratio). Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level and reported in parentheses. * p< 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
Panel B. Controlling for Country Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FTR -4.395*** (0.851) -4.386*** (0.852) -4.896*** (0.833) -4.190*** (0.949) -5.026*** (0.896) 
FTR × globalization   -0.149*** (0.041)       
FTR × foreign assets     0.091** (0.008)     
FTR × CEO international work       -0.271 (0.298)   
FTR × CEO overseas education         0.957*** (0.201) 
Globalization index 0.029 (0.034) 0.126*** (0.040) 0.031 (0.036) 0.029 (0.034) 0.024 (0.033) 
% Foreign assets -0.000 (0.004) -0.000 (0.004) -0.017** (0.007) -0.000 (0.004) 0.000 (0.004) 
CEO international work -0.080 (0.198) -0.080 (0.198) -0.083 (0.197) 0.171 (0.298) -0.078 (0.200) 
CEO overseas education 0.103 (0.148) 0.102 (0.147) 0.139 (0.148) 0.095 (0.147) -0.727*** (0.228) 
Other control variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry & year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Country fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
R-squared 25.7%  24.9%  25.2%  24.8%  25.2%  
N = 9821. All regressions controlled for country fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and year fixed effects, as well as all time-variant control variables included in previous 
specifications. Control variables in all columns are as before, including the five Hofstede cultural dimensions and firm-level financial variables: interest coverage, financial constraints, 







Table 5. Alternative Measures of Language Structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: IVA ratings EcoValue ratings Social ratings IVA ratings EcoValue ratings Social ratings 
Verb ratio -0.023** -0.019* -0.019**    
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.009)    
Sentence ratio    -0.023** -0.020* -0.020** 
    (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) 
Rule of law 0.783 1.070 1.087* 0.712 0.977 1.021 
 (0.650) (0.682) (0.644) (0.651) (0.692) (0.649) 
Legal origin (residual) -0.598 -2.533* -1.245 -0.445 -2.488* -1.158 
 (1.424) (1.506) (1.321) (1.413) (1.509) (1.332) 
Ln(GDP per capita) 0.470 -0.165 -0.072 0.604 -0.063 0.046 
 (0.971) (0.800) (0.956) (0.974) (0.795) (0.961) 
Globalization index 0.074* -0.005 0.024 0.064 -0.011 0.016 
 (0.043) (0.041) (0.040) (0.044) (0.042) (0.040) 
%Foreign assets 0.0005 0.006** 0.003 0.0004 0.006** 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Largest owner shares -0.003 -0.007** -0.004 -0.003 -0.007** -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Tobin’s Q (winsorized) 0.050 0.105*** 0.058 0.050 0.105*** 0.058 
 (0.046) (0.040) (0.043) (0.046) (0.040) (0.043) 
ROA 3.214** 1.815 3.585** 3.221** 1.789 3.583** 
 (1.568) (1.200) (1.412) (1.565) (1.188) (1.407) 
Gender  0.775 1.046 1.174 0.774 1.042 1.173 
 (0.974) (0.718) (0.820) (0.974) (0.718) (0.820) 
International work 0.079 0.214 0.078 0.078 0.212 0.076 
 (0.179) (0.164) (0.179) (0.179) (0.164) (0.178) 
Overseas education 0.012 -0.006 0.140 0.011 -0.0111 0.138 
 (0.255) (0.202) (0.232) (0.255) (0.202) (0.232) 
Observations 8,960 18,889 11,549 8,960 18,889 11,549 
R-squared 27.2% 21.8% 25.1% 27.3% 21.8% 25.2% 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year & Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Verb ratio is the number of verbs which are grammatically future-marked, divided by the total number of future-referring verbs. Sentence ratio is the proportion of 
sentences regarding the future which contains a grammatical future-marker. These classifications are based on Chen (2013). Standard errors are clustered at the firm-
level and reported in parentheses. * p< 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. The cultural controls include the five Hofstede cultural dimensions: (1) power distance, (2) 
individualism, (3) masculinity, (4) uncertainty avoidance, and (5) pragmatism, and the financial controls are firm-level financial variables: interest coverage, financial 






Table 6. Quasi-Experiment: CEO Change and FTR Change 
 Panel A. The whole sample  Panel B. Subsample of CEO change 
DV = IVA ratings Change to weak-FTR Change to strong-FTR  Change to weak-FTR 
Change to strong-
FTR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO’s FTR change 0.428** 0.394** 0.398** 0.524** -0.190 0.238  0.392** 0.391** 0.448*** 0.482 0.502 
 Year of change (0.190) (0.190) (0.191) (0.261) (0.235) (0.409)  (0.170) (0.170) (0.172) (0.359) (0.339) 
             
CEO’s FTR change 0.838* 0.520 0.470 0.172 0.515 -0.391       
 (0.509) (0.505) (0.498) (0.633) (0.765) (1.543)       
Rule of law  -0.678*** -0.584*** -0.871***  -0.869***   2.347** 1.785*  1.871 
  (0.0935) (0.102) (0.166)  (0.166)   (0.913) (0.933)  (1.467) 
Legal origin (residual)  0.0529 0.115 0.292  0.294   -0.700 -0.682  -0.708 
  (0.124) (0.129) (0.242)  (0.243)   (0.558) (0.572)  (0.665) 
Ln(GDP per capita)  0.568*** 0.463*** 0.664***  -0.0062***   -1.455* 0.332  0.314 
  (0.0642) (0.0697) (0.120)  (0.0023)   (0.834) (0.942)  (1.723) 
Globalization index  0.0412*** 0.0396*** 0.0499***  -0.0499***   -0.0188 -0.117**  -0.112** 
  (0.00403) (0.00424) (0.00761)  (0.0101)   (0.0391) (0.0470)  (0.0561) 
Tobin’s Q (winsorized)   -0.0316*** -0.0501***  0.492*    0.244***  0.234** 
   (0.00696) (0.0101)  (0.262)    (0.0513)  (0.116) 
% Largest owner 
shares 
   -0.0062***  0.0023***       
    (0.00224)  (0.0008)       
ROA    0.477*  0.668***       
    (0.262)  (0.120)       
Interest coverage    0.0023***  0.0498***       
    (0.000752)  (0.00762)       
Constant 3.073*** -5.109*** -3.844*** -6.177*** 3.077*** -6.202***  2.249*** 15.39* 5.376 2.257*** 5.008 
 (0.0446) (0.674) (0.727) (1.264) (0.0446) (1.266)  (0.226) (8.102) (8.525) (0.704) (16.00) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 26389 25301 19967 7356 26389 7356  833 833 780 833 780 





Table 7. Language FTR and R&D Expenditures 
Panel A. Correlations between CSR Ratings and R&D Expenditures 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) IVA rating 1.0000       
(2) EcoValue rating 0.6928* 1.0000      
(3) Social rating 0.9736* 0.6283* 1.0000     
(4) R&D expenditure/assets 0.0341* 0.0203* 0.0251* 1.0000    
(5) Product Innovation - Environmental R&D score 0.1809* 0.1942* 0.1589* -0.0500* 1.0000   
(6) Product Innovation - Environmental R&D expenditure 0.1129* 0.1630* 0.1020* -0.0309* 0.2270* 1.0000  
(7) Product Innovation - Environmental R&D value 0.1811* 0.1870* 0.1608* -0.0528* 0.9886* 0.2187* 1.0000 
Panel B. The Effects of FTR on R&D Expenditures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variables: R&D expenditure/ assets Environmental R&D expenditure Environmental R&D score Environmental R&D dummy 
FTR -4.692* -3.092*** -3.118* -2.242*** 
 (2.798) (0.745) (1.644) (0.403) 
Ln(GDP per capita) 1.724 -1.950** -5.573** 1.380*** 
 (3.566) (0.919) (2.637) (0.355) 
Foreign assets% 0.00962 -0.0337*** 0.0231 0.0121*** 
 (0.0398) (0.0122) (0.0261) (0.0028) 
Ownership dispersion -0.0151 0.280 0.0705 0.0287 
 (0.498) (0.183) (0.344) (0.0738) 
Tobin’s Q, winsorized 5% 3.022*** -0.138 -0.388 0.160*** 
 (0.694) (0.187) (0.377) (0.0448) 
ROA -7.675 -22.90*** -5.315 2.978** 
 (26.43) (7.295) (13.13) (1.262) 
Interest coverage 0.0252 0.0191 -0.00541 -0.0178*** 
 (0.0397) (0.0145) (0.0270) (0.0033) 
Financial constraint 0.407 0.0528 -0.210 -0.0214 
 (0.413) (0.0696) (0.182) (0.0403) 
Current ratio (slack) -0.907 -0.0633 -0.985* 0.0296 
 (0.685) (0.277) (0.511) (0.0642) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 23855 16912 16912 16069 
R-squared 0.5578 0.1636 0.1530 Log likelihood: -2305.2122 







APPENDIX A: Language Origins and Future-Time Reference (FTR) Values 
Country Language Genus FTR Obs. Country Language Genus FTR Obs. 
Australia English Germanic Strong 2,877 Mexico Spanish Romance Strong 239 
Austria German Germanic Weak 370 Morocco Arabic Semitic Strong 3 
Belgium Flemish/French Germanic/Roman
ce 
Weak/Strong 680 Netherlands Dutch Germanic Weak 1,496 
Bermuda Islands English Germanic Strong 283 New Zealand English Germanic Strong 256 
Brazil Portuguese(BR) Romance Weak 426 Norway Norwegian Germanic Weak 485 
Canada English/French Germanic Strong 3,347 Pakistan Urdu/English Indic/Germanic Strong 4 
Cayman Islands English Germanic Strong 101 Papua New Guinea English Germanic Strong 21 
Chile Spanish Romance Strong 46 Peru Spanish Romance Strong 1 
China Mandarin Chinese Weak 181 Philippines Tagalog/English Philippine/ Germanic Strong 28 
Colombia Spanish Romance Strong 3 Poland Polish Slavic Strong 194 
Cyprus Greek/Turkish Greek/Turkic Strong 5 Portugal Portuguese(EU) Romance Strong 451 
Czech Republic Czech Slavic Strong 124 Puerto Rico Spanish/English Romance/Germanic Strong 32 
Denmark Danish Germanic Weak 843 Romania Romanian Romance Strong 23 
Egypt Arabic Semitic Strong 17 Russia Russian Slavic Strong 227 
Finland Finnish Finnic Weak 927 Singapore English Germanic Strong 740 
France French Romance Strong 3,660 South Africa Afrikaans Germanic Strong 167 
Germany German Germanic Weak 2,779 Spain Spanish/Catalan Romance Strong 1,610 
Greece Greek Greek Strong 554 Sweden Swedish Germanic Weak 1,600 
Hong Kong Cantonese Chinese Weak 1,447 Switzerland French/German/Italian Romance/Germanic Strong/Weak 3,184 
Hungary Hungarian Ugric Strong 95 Taiwan Mandarin/Hakka Chinese Weak 156 
India Hindi/English Indic/Germanic Strong 150 Thailand Thai Kam-Tai Strong 82 
Indonesia Indonesian Sundic Weak 34 Turkey Turkish Turkic Strong 109 
Ireland Irish/English Celtic/Germanic Strong 892 United Arab Emirates Arabic Semitic Strong 1 
Israel Hebrew/Arabic Semitic Strong 78 United Kingdom English Germanic Strong 14,203 
Italy 
 
Italian Romance Strong 2149 United States English Germanic Strong 31,819 
Japan Japanese Japanese Weak 11,270 British Virgin Islands English Germanic Strong 1 
Korea, South Korean Korean Strong 466 Guernsey French/English Romance/Germanic Strong 87 
Luxembourg Luxembourgish Germanic Weak 145 Gibraltar English Germanic Strong 23 
Macao, China Chinese/Portuguese Chinese/Romance Weak 2 Jersey French/English Romance/Germanic Strong 26 
Malaysia Malay Sundic Weak 154 (Total: 59 countries)   91,373 




APPENDIX B: Intangible Value Assessment (IVA) Data Description 
IVA Factor IVA Subscore weight Key Metrics 
Strategic 
governance 
SG1) Strategy  <2% Overall governance; rating composed of total scores of 
non-Key Issues  
SG2) Strategic Capability 
/ Adaptability  
<2% Management of CSR issues, partnership in multi-
stakeholder initiatives  
SG3) Traditional 
Governance Concerns  
<2% Board independence, management of CSR issues, board 
diversity, compensation practices, controversies involving 
executive compensation and governance. 
Human capital HC1) Workplace 
Practices  
<2% Workforce diversity, policies and programs to promote 
diversity, work/life benefits, discrimination-related 
controversies 
HC2) Labor Relations 20% KEY ISSUE: Labor Relations  
Benefits, strikes, union relations, controversies, risk of 
work stoppages, etc. 
HC3) Health & Safety  <2% H&S policies and systems, implementation and 
monitoring of those systems, performance (injury rate, 





<2% Customer initiatives, customer-related controversies, 
firm’s support for public policies with noteworthy 
benefits for stakeholders  
SC2) Local Communities  <2% Policies, systems and initiatives involving local 
communities (esp. indigenous peoples), controversies 
related to firm’s interactions with communities  
SC3) Supply Chain <2% Policies and systems to protect supply-chain workers’ and 
contractors’ rights, initiatives toward improving labor 






<2% Beneficial products and services, including efforts that 
benefit the disadvantaged, reduce consumption of energy 
and resources, and production of hazardous chemicals; 
average of two scores  
PS2) Product Safety  <2% Product quality, health and safety initiatives, controversies 
related to the quality or safety of a firm’s products, 
including legal cases, recalls, criticism  
Emerging 
markets 
EM1) EM Strategy  <2% Default = 5, unless there is company specific exposure 
that is highly significant   
EM2) Human Rights/ 
Child and Forced Labor  
<2% Policies, support for values in Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, initiatives to promote human rights, 
human rights controversies  
EM3) Oppressive 
regimes  
<2% Controversies, substantive involvement in countries with 
poor HR records  
Environmenta
l risk factors 
ER1) Historic Liabilities <2% Controversies including natural resource-related cases, 
widespread or egregious environmental impacts  
ER2) Operating Risk <2% Emissions to air, discharges to water, emission of toxic 
chemicals, nuclear energy, controversies involving non-




<2% Water management and use, use of recycled materials, 
sourcing, sustainable resource management, climate 
change policy and transparency, climate change initiatives, 
absolute and normalized emissions output, controversies  
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ER4) Industry Carbon 
Specific Risk  
25% KEY ISSUE: Carbon 
Targets, emissions intensity relative to peers, estimated 






<2% Policies to integrate environmental considerations into all 
operations, environmental management systems, 
regulatory compliance, controversies  
EMC2) Corporate 
Governance  
<2% Board independence, management of CSR issues, board 
diversity, compensation practices, controversies involving 
executive compensation and governance.  
EMC3) Environmental 
Management Systems  
<2% Establishment and monitoring of environmental 
performance targets, presence of environmental training, 
stakeholder engagement  








<2% Presence of environmental training and communications 
programs for employees  
EMC7) Certification <2% Certifications by ISO or other industry- and country-
specific third party auditors  
EMC8) Products/ 
Materials  
<2% Positive and negative impact of products & services, end-
of-life product management, controversies related to 






<2% Policies to integrate environmental considerations into all 
operations and reduce environmental impact of 
operations, products & services, environmental 
management systems, regulatory compliance  
EO2) Environmental 
Opportunity  
35% KEY ISSUE: Opportunities in clean technology  
Product development in clean technology, R&D relative 
to sales and trend, innovation capacity   
EO3) Performance <2% Percent of revenue represented by identified beneficial 






APPENDIX C. Descriptions of Variables 
A. Language Structures 
Future-Time Reference 
(FTR)  
FTR is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the language is a strong-FTR language, and equals 
0 if is it a weak-FTR language. For a complete classification of the languages in our sample, see 
Appendix A. Data on FTR are from Dahl (2000) and Chen (2013). 
Verb Ratio Calculated as the number of verbs which are grammatically future-marked, divided by the total 
number of future-referring verbs. In other words, in online weather forecasts in a language, 
what share of verbs about future weather are marked as future-referring? The data are 
obtained from Chen (2013). 
Sentence Ratio Similar to the Verb Ratio, the Sentence Ratio is calculated as the proportion of sentences 
regarding the future which contains a grammatical future-marker. In other words, what share 
of sentences regarding future weather contain a grammatical future marker? The data are 
obtained from Chen (2013). 
B. Economic Development 
Rule of Law To control for the potential institutional channels that can influence CSR, we control for Rule 
of Law (as a proxy for legal origins because legal origins are highly correlated with languages 
due to the history of colonization [La Porta et al., 1998]). The data on Rule of Law are obtained 
from World Bank’s World Development Research database. 
Legal Origin The legal origin of the company law or commercial code of each country in which the focal 
firm is headquartered. This dummy variable equals one if the country’s legal origin is the 
English common law, and zero otherwise. Data on legal origins are from La Porta et al. (1998). 
GDP Per Capita To control for the national wealth and income effects on CSR, we include the logarithm of 
GDP per capita of the country. The data on GDP per capita are obtained from the World 
Bank. 
Globalization Index To control for the spillover and convergence of international CSR standards across countries, 
as well as how open the domestic environment in which the firm operates is, we include the 
KOF Index of Globalization obtained from ETH Zurich. The KOF Index of Globalization 
measures three main dimensions of globalization: economic, social, and political. In addition to 
these three dimensions, the overall index is calculated by referring to (1) actual economic 
flows, (2) economic restrictions, (3) data on information flows, (4) data on personal contact, 
and (5) data on cultural proximity. 
C. Firm Structure and Performance 




Similar to the positive effects of globalization at the country-level, the degree of 
internationalization at the firm-level can also serve as a moderator variable. Following 
Carpenter, Sanders, & Gregersen (2001), we measure the degree of internationalization as the 
ratio of a company’s foreign assets (reflecting foreign productions) to its total assets. The asset 
dimension addresses a firm’s dependence on foreign consumer markets and productive 




To control for the impact of the shareholders (the shareholder-stakeholder trade off in 
corporate decision making), we include the most recent percentage ownership of the 
company's largest shareholders. Data on this variable are from Orbis database. 
Tobin’s Q  To control for the financial performance of the firm, which has been shown to affect CSR 
levels (Margolis, Elfenbein, & Walsh, 2007), we include Tobin’s Q as a market-based 
performance indicator in the regressions. We measure Tobin’s Q as the ratio of a firm’s 
market capitalization to its book value of equity, and obtain the data from Datastream. 
Return on Assets 
(ROA) 
 
To control for the operational performance of the firm, which has been shown to affect CSR 
levels (Margolis, Elfenbein, & Walsh, 2007), we further include ROA as an accounting-based 
performance indicator in the regressions. We measure ROA as the ratio of a firm’s net income 




D. CEO Background 
CEO Gender To control for the gender effect of top executives on CSR as documented in some studies (e.g., 
Marquis & Lee, 2013), we include a dummy variable CEO gender, which equals one if the CEO of 
the company is male, and equals zero if the CEO is female. The data on CEO gender are manually 
collected across companies and years from BoardEx. 
CEO International 
Work Experience 
To control for the potential effect of CEO’s international exposure and global mindset on CSR, 
we include a dummy variable CEO international work experience, which equals one if the CEO of 
the company worked in a country other than the current company’s nationality, and equals zero 




Similar to CEO international work experience, we further obtain a dummy variable CEO overseas 
education, which equals one if the CEO obtained educational degrees overseas, and zero 
otherwise. This variable further controls for the potential effect of top executives’ global mindset 
on CSR performance. The data on CEO overseas education are manually collected from BoardEx. 




The Hofstede Cultural Dimensions describe the effects of a society’s culture on the values of its 
members, and how these values relate to behavior, using a structure derived from factor analysis. 
Five dimensions are included: (1) Power distance, which addresses how a society handles 
inequalities (hierarchical orders) among people; (2) Individualism (as opposed to collectivism), 
which is defined as a preference for a loosely-knit social framework in which individuals are 
expected to take care of only themselves and their immediate families; (3) Masculinity vs. 
femininity, which represents a preference in society for achievement, heroism, assertiveness and 
material rewards for success (masculinity), versus a preference for cooperation, modesty, caring for 
the weak and quality of life (femininity); (4) Uncertainty avoidance, which expresses the degree to 
which the members of a society feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity; (5) 
Pragmatism, which represents a preference of encouraging thrift and efforts in modern education 
versus the preference of maintaining time-honoured tradition and norms while viewing societal 
change with suspicion. A higher score on a dimension indicates a higher level of the 
aforementioned cultural tendency. 
Catholic/Protestant To control for the impact of religion on CSR, we include the ratio of the percentage of Catholic 
population and the percentage of the Protestant population in the country in the subsample of 
Christianity-majority countries. Data on this variable are from the Global Religious Landscape 
Report and the International Religious Freedom Report. 
F. Controls and Other Variables 
Interest Coverage Measured by the ratio of Earnings Before Interests and Taxes (EBIT) to interest expenses. Data 
on interest coverage are from Compustat. 
Financial 
Constraints 
Measured by the ratio of the change in short-term investment to the change in operational cash 
flow. Data on financial constraints are from Compustat. 
Slacks (Current 
Ratio) 




Research and development expenses that represent all direct and indirect costs related to the 
creation and development of new processes, techniques, applications and products with 
commercial possibilities. Data on R&D expenditures are from Datastream. 
Environmental 
R&D Expenditure 
Total amount of environmental R&D costs (without clean up and remediation costs) divided by 
net sales or revenue in US dollars. Data on environmental R&D expenditure are from the Product 
Innovation category of ASSET4 database (Datastream) 
Environmental 
R&D Score 
Does the company invest in R&D on new environmentally friendly products or services that will 
limit the amount of emissions and resources needed during product use? (Score from 0 to 100). 
Data on this item are from the Product Innovation category of ASSET4 database (Datastream) 
Environmental 
R&D Dummy 
A dummy variable indicating whether the company invests in R&D on new environmentally 
friendly products or services that will limit the amount of emissions and resources needed during 





Chapter 5. The Political Determinants of  
Executive Compensation: Evidence from an 
Emerging Economy 
 
Hao Liang, Luc Renneboog, Sunny Li Sun  
 
ABSTRACT 
In regulated economies, corporate governance mechanisms such as executive compensation are 
less driven by market-based forces but more subject to political influence. We study the political 
determinants of executive compensation for all listed Chinese firms in the context of an exogenous 
shock that removed market frictions in share-tradability. Under strong political constraints, state 
ownership reduced the managerial pay levels and increased pay-for-performance sensitivity (to 
asset-based benchmarks). Board independence and compensation committees do not curb 
managerial pay, and market-based factors do not have a significant influence. However, these 
effects reversed following the governance shock (removal of market frictions in share tradability). 
Keywords: Executive compensation, political economy, state ownership, market friction 
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In competitive markets, the decision on how to compensate managers is believed to be 
molded by market forces, such as the labor market for talent (Gabaix & Landier, 2008), the market 
for corporate control (Grinstein & Hribar, 2004), institutional investors’ monitoring (Hartzell & 
Starks, 2003), and the structure of the board of directors (Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2009). Still, 
executive compensation not curbed by any internal or external corporate governance mechanisms 
could be excessive due to unrestrained managerial power (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003) or pure luck 
(Bertrand & Mullaninathan, 2001).In some countries, markets and industries are highly regulated 
and subject to political intervention, which can distort the incentives of managers and consequently 
affect compensation contracting (Joskow, Rose, & Wolfram, 1996). In this context, one may think 
about emerging markets such as China where the Party school system not only trains future 
politicians and top military but also selected business men (Shambaugh, 2008), whose ideological 
faithfulness to the Party line may guarantee them a career in both state-owned and public firms. 
Even in western countries, such as France, political connections and old boys’ networks (e.g. les 
‘Enarques’) affect the appointment and remuneration of top managers, especially in firms in which 
the state holds an equity stake (Bertrand et al., 2008).   
Market frictions such as political intervention have challenged standard economic theories on 
executive compensation policies (Groves et al., 1994; Cao et al., 2011; Chen, Lin, Lu & Zhang, 
2014). The managerial recruitment and remuneration may not only be influenced directly by 
politics but many of a firm’s corporate governance practices—of which top managerial 
compensation policy is only one—are determined by the political environment (e.g., Roe, 1999; 
Pagano & Volpin, 2005). A study of the political determinants of executive compensation reflects 
the classical dichotomy of who can/should monitor, regulate, and incentivize the manager: 
whether it is the state or the market (Shleifer. 1998). Along these lines, Joskow, Rose, & Wolfram 
(1996) were among the first to study empirically the political context of executive compensation. 
They investigated the strongly regulated U.S. electric utility industry and found that non-market 
political constraints significantly influence the compensation policies of top executives. However, 
U.S. firms may currently not be the best sample to study the political determinants of executive 
compensation, as this market is among the most competitive in the world and the direct 
involvement of the state in business is rare.  
One of the most prominent features of political involvement is the presence of the 
government as a controlling corporate shareholder, yet its impact on executive compensation has 
not been adequately addressed. The extant literature on executive compensation usually resorts to 
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managerial agency theory, which addresses the conflicts between powerful managers and weak 
shareholders in widely-held Anglo-American corporations (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen & 
Murphy, 1990; Garen, 1994). Relatively little is known about executive compensation under the 
alternative agency model, usually referred to as the controlling shareholder agency model, which 
concerns the conflicts between minority and controlling shareholders and often dominates the 
classic shareholder-manager opposition (Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010). In most economies around 
the world, controlling shareholders are usually wealthy families and the state (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999). In family firms, ownership and control are usually not separated and 
managers often have blood kinship with the controlling families, which largely eliminates the 
managerial agency problem. In contrast, in state-owned enterprises45 (SOEs), a so-called “twin-
agency” problem (Stulz, 2004) may arise: the first is the agency problem between the manager and 
the state as a controlling shareholder, the other is the agency problem between the state and the 
public citizens, because the state as a controlling shareholder may have different goals than other 
types of shareholders. Such new forms of agency conflicts that arise from the state’s power to 
control the creation of corporations or expropriate existing enterprises, Hilt (2014) argues, has also 
been a central concern at the dawn of the U.S. Corporation. Consequently, both types of agency 
problems (major vs minority shareholders, and management vs shareholders) can occur in SOEs, 
and executive compensation may be subject to political constraints exerted by the state. How the 
presence of the state as a controlling shareholder and as an important political constraint affects executive 
compensation is the central question of this study. 
Economists typically resort to two broad theories to explain executive compensation policies 
under the managerial agency model in Anglo-American companies (without a controlling 
shareholder). The optimal contracting theory views managerial pay as a remedy against agency 
problems induced by diverging objectives of management and shareholders, and it is the board of 
directors’ task to design compensation schemes that provide the managers with appropriate 
incentives to maximize shareholder value (Murphy, 1999; Core et al., 1999). The managerial power 
theory, in contrast, regards managerial pay as part of the agency problem itself, because some 
features of pay arrangements seem to reflect managerial rent-seeking rather than the provision of 
efficient incentives (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001; Bebchuk & Fried, 2003, 2004). Still, these two 
theories may not apply to companies with a controlling shareholder, especially when the 
controlling shareholder is the state, because value maximization may only be of secondary 
importance and managerial power and entrenchment may be limited. The main shareholder, in 
                                                          
45 For simplicity, we use “state-owned enterprises (SOEs)” to denote both firms that are owned by the state, 
and firms that are controlled (through minority shareholding) by the state throughout this paper. 
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this case the state, can impose a specific remuneration contract and thus set the level of pay and 
the pay-for-performance sensitivity. In addition, the state may impose specific performance 
benchmarks that direct corporate decision making towards the state’s political objectives. For 
example, it may care less about market returns for shareholders but more about the asset returns, 
thus tying managerial compensation to asset-based performance benchmarks rather than to equity-
based ones.  
In this study, we explore an exogenous policy regime change (removal of market frictions) in 
a highly regulated economy to test the impact of political determinants on executive compensation 
in the presence of the state as a controlling shareholder. We investigate the political determinants 
of executive compensation through the evolution of several governance-related mechanisms 
before and after the structural regulatory change. These mechanisms include: (1) ownership and 
control by the state, (2) performance benchmarks, (3) board independence, (4) board committees, 
and (5) market-orientation and distance from state influence (from the political center). To do so, 
we analyze a hand-collected extensive sample of all non-financial Chinese firms’ ownership 
structures, board structures, and managerial backgrounds over an 11 year period. China, as the 
world’s largest emerging economy with a pervasive presence of state-owned firms and an ongoing 
structural change towards a market economy, offers us a fertile empirical context to test alternative 
agency models. The split-share structural reform was launched in the middle of our sample period46: 
This reform converted state-owned non-tradable shares into tradable shares, which brought about 
a significant attenuation of political constraints and market frictions (Chen et al., 2012; Chen et al., 
2014). Following this reform of ownership regulation, several other aspects of corporate 
governance also underwent dramatic changes, which can partially explain the state’s grip over 
managerial compensation. For example, the state changed from a majority shareholder into a 
minority one, and the state-manager relationship changed from being strongly aligned to more 
arm’s length. Consequently, Chinese SOEs’ objectives (and hence the managerial incentives) may 
have changed due to the metamorphosis from a government-led regime towards a more market-
oriented one, and the agency conflicts may have changed from those between the state and 
minority shareholders to those between the manager and minority shareholders. The corporate 
                                                          
46 In April 2005 (effective from 2006), the Chinese government initiated the split-share structure reform of  
turning non-tradable shares into tradable ones (called the ‘share issue privatization’) for all listed domestic 
firms. More than 1,400 listed companies could “gradually” convert their tradable shares. To make the non-
tradable shares tradable, the holders of  non-tradable shares compensated holders of  tradable shares in each 
individual firm with approximately three shares per 10 shares on average, which boiled down to a dilution of  
the share stakes of  the owners of  formerly untradeable shares  (Li et al., 2011). All Chinese listed companies 
completed their negotiations by the end of  2008, and all of  their restricted shares became fully tradable by the 
end of  2011. 
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governance model, investors’ control rights, manager’s incentive structures, and the firm’s 
performance benchmarks have all experienced significant transitions. These transitions closely 
map the mechanisms of political influence outlined before, and are summarized in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
To make better sense of how corporate governance mechanisms in a political interventionist 
economy function, we conceptually illustrate the corporate governance structure of a typical 
Chinese SOE in Figure 1. Such a firm is led by both a board of directors and a supervisory board, 
though the latter board has been widely criticized for not being functional. Sitting on the board of 
directors are both executive and non-executive directors, and the latter type comprises both 
independent (or outside) directors and non-independent ones. Such mixed board structure implies 
that firms are likely to adopt a dual corporate governance model: on one hand, a firm is subject to 
standard market-based governance mechanisms such as the inclusion of outside independent 
directors, but on the other, it is required to conform to the political objectives formulated by the 
government. What is specific for Chinese SOEs is the existence of a corporate Party committee in 
parallel to the board; this committee is directly led by the Organization Department of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). However, the role of CCP in Chinese companies is mainly to ensure the 
political loyalty of the executives through e.g. appointing personnel, rather than to influence their 
compensation.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Some may worry that the use of non-cash compensation (stock options and restricted stock) 
is rare in Chinese firms and perquisite consumption more prevalent (Adithipyangkul, Alon, & 
Zhang, 2009). However, we argue that this is not likely to be a major concern for our study. First, 
equity compensation in state-owned firms is neither common in most emerging countries nor in 
the developing ones (with exception of the largest listed firms) (Gallego & Larrain, 2012). This 
validates the representativeness of our Chinese sample for those economies with pervasive 
presence of state intervention and regulations. Still, we do control for option grants in our 
empirical models. Second, although part of the monetary benefits of Chinese executives may 
consist of grey income including perquisites, which occurs around the world and even in the U.S. 
(according to Bebchuk & Fried, 2003), the focus of this study is not on grey income but rather on 
how executive compensation is formally contracted by political forces in regulated economies and 
industries. Thus, the use of registered pay in our context does not really suffer from a biased 
variable problem. Nevertheless, we try to control in our models for the extent to which rent-
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seeking opportunities exist, thus partially analyzing the potential effect of the existence of grey 
income on formal compensation. 
We find strong evidence that the state and the market are alternative mechanisms governing 
executive compensation. First, state ownership was negatively related to (or “constraining”) the 
level of managerial pay before the split-share structure reform, but such correlation became 
insignificant after the reform. Second, prior to the reform, state ownership was strongly positively 
associated with accounting-based pay-for-performance sensitivity. After the reform, the 
accounting-based pay-for-performance became weaker, while the market-based pay grew in 
importance as is common in a more market-based system. Third, before the reform, the 
compensation level was not influenced by the presence of independent directors, but positively 
related to the distance between the firm’s headquarter city and the center of political power, Beijing. 
After the reform, the independent director ratio is associated with lower compensation, and 
distance to Beijing become insignificant. 
This research makes the following contributions. First, we extend the scope of analysis of 
executive compensation by studying its political determinants as an alternative mechanism to 
market forces. While the dichotomy of the roles of the state and of the market in governing 
economic activities has been fiercely debated in the literature (e.g., Lange, 1936; Shleifer, 1998; 
Megginson & Netter, 2001), little is known about this tradeoff in terms of incentivizing top 
executives. As we show, a major political determinant of executive compensation is, besides the 
regulatory regime, the ownership stake held by the state. The state’s holding is related to the 
performance benchmarks imposed on the management, which is different from the usual 
benchmarks chosen by other types of shareholders to incentivize the managers. Second, we extend 
the literature on the influence of controlling shareholders on executive compensation. We argue 
that while the state can act as a controlling shareholder, its objectives and monitoring intensity are 
very difficult from other types of controlling shareholders. Although some recent studies (Chen, 
Lin, Lu, & Zhang (2014) and (Hou, Lee, Stathopoulos, & Tong, (2013)) examine Chinese CEOs’ 
pay-for-performance, we reach different results for our more comprehensive sample, mainly 
because we do specifically model the political constraints, whereas other studies on Chinese 
executive compensation rely on corporate governance frameworks valid for firms in western 
economies and ignore political intervention. While these studies find that, in general, executive 
pay-for-performance was strengthened after the split share reform, we disentangle different 
performance benchmarks and find that the pay-for-performance sensitivity depends on which 
benchmark was preferred by the state. In addition, these studies largely ignore the mechanisms of 
state influence on executive compensation through aspects other than ownership and control 
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arrangements; namely, board independence, tunneling opportunities, the presence of a 
compensation committee, and distance from the political center. We offer a more holistic view on 
how the state is able to influence executive compensation through various mechanisms. Our 
results are also very different from those in studies investigating the relations between executive 
compensation and other (non-state) controlling shareholders (e.g., Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, 
& Makri, 2003), which reinforces our argument that “who actually owns the firm” matters for 
setting executive compensation. Third, we extend the literature on the effects of economy-wide 
structural reforms on corporate governance. Our findings complement the results in Li, Wang, 
Cheung, & Jiang (2011), Chen et al. (2012), and Chen et al. (2014) who also use the split-share 
structural reform as a quasi-experiment (removal of a market friction and improved stock liquidity) 
to explore the changes in risk-sharing and cash holdings. While their center of attention is on better 
interest alignment between managers and shareholders, and between controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders, our study offers a new perspective on the ownership-based reform. The 
reason is that this reform did not only remove market frictions but also led to a regime shift from 
an administration-oriented governance model to more market-based governance, which may have 
implications for corporate efficiency and value, and for welfare. However, instead of treating the 
split-share reform as a clear-cut “shock”, we recognize its “transitional” feature and analyze how 
different mechanisms influencing compensation contracting evolve over the transition period. Our 
study also complements the studies by Wang & Xiao (2011) and Gao & Li (2014) which use the 
Chinese setting to investigate the relationship between large shareholders and managerial pay-for-
performance sensitivity. Our political framework further explores the particularity of the effects 
of the state as a controlling shareholder (in relation to other types of controlling shareholders 
[Hartzell & Starks, 2003]) on corporate governance. 
Data and Methodology 
Data 
Our sample consists of the firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges.47 We collected 
data on firms’ financial structure, operational performance, and corporate governance from the 
WIND database, the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database, and 
Peking University’s China Center for Economic Research (CCER) database, which comprise all 
                                                          
47 We excluded Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong or abroad, as they operate in a different institutional 
environment and are subject to different regulations. 
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A-share companies48 listed on the above exchanges since 1990. In addition, we manually gathered 
the data capturing CEOs’ characteristics and backgrounds from their curricula published in these 
databases and we cross-validated the personal backgrounds (through a labour-intensive process) 
by means of the annual reports. The dataset consists of 17,272 firm-year observations covering 
more than 92% of all the listed firms in mainland China over the period 2001 to 2011. We excluded 
financial and insurance companies as well and the firms labelled by the stock exchanges as “Special 
Treatment”. The latter are firms in financial distress or experiencing negative financial irregularities 
(e.g., negative net earnings for two consecutive years) as defined by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC). We followed the Industry Classification Guide of Listed Companies issued 
by the CSRC in April 2001 to allocate our sample firms to 21 industries.  
Methodology 
To capture the evolution of the executive compensation policies before and after the 
corporate governance reform, we partition our sample into pre-reform and the post-reform 
subsamples. We estimate the determinants of managerial pay using both random-effects and fixed-
effects models. The dependent variable is top managerial pay, which, following the extant literature, 
is defined as the logarithm of the total compensation of the top three highest-paid managers, as 
there is no transparency requirement at the individual manager or director level (Chen, Ezzamel, 
& Cai, 2011).  
Our main political variables are: (1) State Direct Ownership, the shares directly held by the 
State, (2) State Ultimate Control, a dummy variable indicating whether the ultimate controller of 
the firm is the state, and (3) Distance to Beijing , the logarithm of the distance (in kilometers) from 
the firm’s headquarter city to the Chinese capital, the political decision center . In robustness tests, 
we also include: (4) the CEO’s Political Experience, which captures managerial political power and 
is based on the manager’s political background—work experience in the government or military, 
or membership of the Chinese congress (Faccio, 2006; Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2007); and (5) Board 
Political Connections, which measures the proportion of directors on the board with political 
connections and past work experience in the government, military, or who are members of the 
Chinese Congress. Precise definitions of the above variables and control variables are presented in 
Table 2. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
                                                          
48 A-shares are stocks valued in RMB and available only to Chinese citizens; B-shares are also denominated in 
RMB, but traded in foreign currencies such as the U.S. dollar or Hong Kong dollar. 
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Other explanatory variables include (i) firm performance, proxied by Tobin’s Q (equity 
market-to-book ratio) and return on assets (ROA); (ii) board structure variables which include the 
ratio of independent directors over the whole board, the existence of a compensation committee, 
the size of the board and of the top management team; managerial background information, such 
as managers’ education (degrees), overseas education, and international work experience; (iii) the 
managers’ background such as specializations and past work experience in the technology industry, 
accounting firms, or the financial industry; (iv) and macro-economic factors proxied by the 
provincial-level market-orientation index from Fan, Wang, & Zhu (2011). Furthermore, we control 
for firm size and leverage, as well as province-, industry- and year- fixed effects. We cluster 
standard errors at the firm level to further adjust for possible correlations of unobserved 
characteristics across firms. Table 3 exhibits the summary statistics of these variables.49 
We controlled for the extent of gray income and tunneling activities by using the logarithm of 
other receivables, (Ln(Other Receivables)), on the balance sheet, as suggested by Jiang et al. (2010). 
They document that during the period 1996-2006, the management siphoned tens of billions of 
RMB from listed firms by means of inter-corporate loans to blockholders. Information on such 
inter-corporate loans is publically available but the loans do not require a ‘fair value’ test. 
Furthermore, these loans were not made as part of the firms’ normal course of business, they did 
not even accrue interest, and even when some interest was accrued, neither the interest nor the 
principal were typically ever paid back. Jiang et al. (2010) argue that China is an environment highly 
conducive to tunneling behavior.50 They also show that this practice was not uncommon, and more 
so in local-government controlled firms than for firms controlled by the central-government. 
Inter-corporate loans were booked as ‘other receivables’ on the balance sheet. The lack of clout of 
the market regulators caused the tunneling practices to persist in spite of the security regulations 
issued between 2001 and 2006. In 2006, eight government ministries threatened public disclosure 
and personal action against top management in order to stop the abuse. This entry is expected to 
capture the extent to which executives can be compensated through non-cash registered pay 
(Johnson et al., 2000). The summary statistics of the above variables are reported in Table 3. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
                                                          
49 A correlation check indicated that there is no multicollinearity problem for these variables. 
50 Jiang et al (2010) give the following reasons: (i) all Chinese listed firms have a dominant/controlling 
shareholder; (ii) prior to 2006, the trading of controlling shares was restricted, thus limiting the ownership 
benefits of price appreciation to the controlling shareholder, and increasing her incentive to obtain benefits 
through other channels; (iii) the legal system offers few options for minority shareholders to take private 
enforcement action against blockholder misconduct; (iv) public enforcement, including fines and prison terms 




La Porta et al. (2002) argue that ownership patterns are very stable, especially outside the 
United States, and are largely shaped by the histories of the companies. This is especially the case 
for SOEs, as government ownership resulting from privatization or green-field investments are 
usually caused by top-down reform rather than by corporate choices. Similar arguments apply to 
board structures and managerial backgrounds, as the managers and directors in SOEs are usually 
directly appointed by the government, rather than picked by the shareholders meeting. The major 
endogeneity concern may be that executive pay and firm performance mutually affect each other 
through both reward and motivation (Buck, Liu, & Skovoroda, 2008). Nevertheless, we tried to 
address the potential endogeneity issue for all variables by applying the Arellano-Bond linear 
estimation methods in a dynamic panel data framework, which uses the lagged values and changes 
of both the dependent variable and independent variables as instruments. 
Results 
The average state ownership in the top five industries (by market capitalization) was high in the 
beginning last decade —almost 50% in the petrochemical, metal & non-metal industries , and even 
in the information technology (IT) industry the average stake was almost 30% (Figure 2a). 
Gradually, state ownership declined over the subsequent decade to less than 10%. Given that the 
split-share reform was not a sudden policy shock, we will not implement a difference-in-difference 
approach but rather perform a split-sample analysis. In contrast, the average managerial 
compensation had gradually increased over the sample period, and Figure 2b depicts a significant 
raise around the period of reform (2005–2007).  
[Figure 2a—2b] 
The Political Determinants of Compensation and Pay-Performance Sensitivity 
To test the tradeoff between political and market forces, we focus on variables that measure 
government ownership and control (State ownership and State Ultimate Control), firm 
performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q), board structures (Independent Director Ratio, Compensation 
Committee, Managerial Duality, etc.), and the firm’s geographical distance to the capital (Distance 
to Beijing). Our random-effects GLS regressions are estimated both for the sample that includes 
the whole period (2001-2011, with 2006 being the cutoff) and the sample that excludes transition 
period (we thus exclude the years 2005-2007, and take 2001-2004 as the pre-reform period and 
2008-2011 as the post-reform period). Models (1)-(4) of Table 4 show the determinants of the 
level of managerial pay whereas the pay-for-performance sensitivity models (5)-(8) include the 
variable State Ownership and its interactions with performance.  
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Several interesting results emerge. First, in the pre-reform sample (models (1) and (2)), the 
coefficient on State Ownership is negative and statistically significant at 1% level. Its economic 
significance is also non-trivial: a ten-percent increase of State Ownership leads to 6.9 percent 
decrease in nominal compensation, which suggests that state ownership functions as an important 
constraint to executive compensation, at least in the pre-reform period (models (1)-(2) and (5)-(6)). 
However, the results from the post-reform period (Models (3)-(4) and Models (7)-(8)) suggest that 
the state does not influence executive compensation. In the pre-reform period, the coefficient on 
ROA is positive and statistically significant (models (1), (2), (5), and (6)), the one Tobin’s Q is, 
though positive, not statistically significant. This implies that managerial pay is tied to accounting-
based performance, and not to market-based performance (although the financial market was 
already reasonably well developed in the period 2001-2006). In the past-reform period when the 
corporate governance system emphasized more and more a market-based capitalism, not only 
accounting performance mattered for compensation but also Tobin’s Q (models (3), (4), (7), and 
(8)). This may suggest that the state gradually conferred its control and monitoring role to the 
market, and that managers are more likely to be compensated for increasing market value (while 
the accounting-based performance benchmark still remains an important benchmark). The fact 
that in the pre-reform period, the state was attaching more importance to accounting performance 
than in the post-reform period can be derived from the coefficients of the interaction term State 
Ownership  ROA which are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level (model (5) and 
(6) and not or marginally significant in models (7) and (8)). These results seem to suggest that state 
ownership has played a monitoring role in constraining the level of managerial pay and 
strengthening pay-for-accounting performance sensitivity before 2006, which is consistent with 
the roles of institutional investors as in Hartzell & Starks (2003). One may argue that the 
diminishing effects of state ownership in the post-reform sample may be simply due to the fact 
that the state’s equity stakes became too small to affect corporate remuneration policies. However, 
this is not likely the case, because, although the reform significantly reduced the percentage of 
shares owned by the state (Figure 1a), state ownership still remained present in most firms at a 
level that is comparable to the typical institutional ownership stake in U.S. firms. In later analyses, 
we replace State Ownership by State Ultimate Control (which implies that the state still preserved 
absolute control over the firm after the reform), and we obtain similar results. 
In Table 4, Other Receivables is negatively associated with compensation level (models (1) 
and (2)). Jiang et al. (2010) suggest that high other receivables represent inter-company loans to 
firms of controlling shareholders (which could even be the state). As the use of this type of loans 
has been shown to enable tunneling, the negative coefficient can be interpreted as state tunneling 
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of corporate assets which further constrains managerial compensation. This implies that 
managerial pay is low when controlling shareholders’ tunneling opportunities are high; in the 
specifications with interaction terms, the relation remains negative but become statistically 
insignificant. In the post-reform period, the significance of tunneling completely disappears, which 
implies that the government crackdown on this type of self-dealing has been successful (and/or 
that other channels have been found for tunneling). These results are salient given that we have 
already controlled for ownership concentration which to some extent captures the argument that 
blockholders can ‘bribe’ managers. In addition, the coefficient on Independent Director Ratio is 
not statistically significant in the pre-reform sample, indicating that outside directors do not affect 
managerial pay, which is consistent with the view that outside (independent) directors are “vase 
directors” with no real role or impact. However, in the post-reform sample, this coefficient 
becomes negative and statistically significant, which may signify that these outside directors, now 
operating in a market-based governance context, do play a monitoring role in constraining 
executive compensation. The coefficient on Managerial Duality is not statistically significant in the 
pre-reform sample, but becomes positively significant in the post-reform sample and thus implies 
that the managerial agency problem is more severe in more market-oriented environment, as a 
more powerful manager can influence (and raise) her own pay. While we control for corporate 
size, we find that firms with a larger top management team and a compensation committee, 
remunerate top management better. The latter effect is in line with the findings by Markoczy et al. 
(2013) who state that Chinese firms set up compensation committees as a symbolic management 
tool to create the appearance of legitimacy for high managerial compensation. When the general 
manager also assumes the responsibility of the chairman, his total remuneration is higher. 
Moreover, the degree to which a province’s economy and legal system is market-based (as proxied 
by the Market-Orientation Index developed by Fan, Want and Zhu (2011)) does not influence the 
level of managerial compensation. The coefficient of the Distance to Beijing, the political epicenter, 
indicates that the further away the company’s headquarter city is from the capital, the higher the 
managers get paid, even after controlling for province-fixed effects (models (1), (2), (5) and (6). 
Put differently, closeness to the political center constrains executive pay, but this was only the case 
in the pre-reform period. Subsequently, when the market friction (political constraint) is removed, 
it appears that connections to political resources become less important in terms of constraining 
managerial pay. Ownership concentration (of the largest five blockholders) is positively related to 
on managerial pay, but only in the pre-reform period.  
All in all, the results from the pre-reform sample seem to imply that political factors, rather 
than market factors (such as independent directors, market-based performance, and local market-
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orientation), affected corporate remuneration policies. As the split-share reform removed market 
frictions, the impact of political factors diminished and the effects of market factors became 
stronger. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
To check the robustness of the above results, we replace the continuous variable State 
Ownership by a dummy variable State Ultimate Control which indicates whether the ultimate 
controller is the state, and interact State Ultimate Control with ROA and Tobin’s Q, respectively. 
As most of the previous results on control variables are upheld, we do not report them in Table 5 
for reasons of conciseness. In the pre-reform sample (including the transition period), the 
coefficient on State Control×ROA is positive and statistically significant at 5% level while the 
coefficient on State control is significantly negative and that on ROA is significantly positive 
(Model (1)). This again indicates that the state monitors the manager and moderates managerial 
pay-for-performance sensitivity according to accounting-based performance benchmark. In the 
post-reform sample, the coefficient on interaction remains to be statistically significant (though 
the economic significance is reduced by about half), and the main effect of State Control becomes 
insignificant whereas those of both ROA and Tobin’s Q are both significant at the 1% level (Model 
(2)).  
When Tobin’s Q is interacted with the State control dummy (Models (3)-(4)), different results 
are unveiled. In the pre-reform period, the coefficient on “State Control × Q” is negative and 
significant at the 10% level (Model (3)), indicating that state control negatively moderated market-
based pay-for-performance. Interestingly, the coefficient of this interaction term becomes positive 
and significant in the post-reform period (Model (4)). This suggests that state control even 
strengthened market-based pay-for-performance sensitivity after the reform. These results suggest 
that the performance targets for compensating managers by the state had shifted following the 
structural reform. Before the reform, managerial pay was benchmarked on accounting-based 
performance while market-based performance was even discouraged. Since the reform, managerial 
pay is strongly tied to market-based performance, while accounting-based performance still 
remains to be an important benchmark. These results on the effects of state ownership and state 
ultimate control are also in line with both the literature on “ownership concentration matters” (e.g., 
Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001) and that on “ownership identity matters” (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999; 
Faccio & Lang, 2002). 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Dynamic Panel Data Estimation 
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We then turn to the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data estimations to address potential 
endogeneity issues. For all included variables, the GMM-in-systems takes their lagged levels and 
lagged changes as instruments. To preserve space, we report in Table 6 only the test results on 
samples excluding the transition period (years 2005-2007). First, compensation is positively, 
significantly correlated with the previous year’s compensation, indicating a strong path-
dependence in the setting of top managerial compensation. Second, the coefficient on the 
interaction term State Ownership × ROA is positive and significant at the 10% level in the pre-
reform sample, but becomes insignificant in the post-reform sample as shown in Table 4. In 
contrast, the coefficient on the interaction term State Ownership × Q is not significant in the pre-
reform sample, but becomes positive and significant at the 10% level in the post-reform sample, 
which reinforces our earlier findings. Third, whereas our market-based measure, Tobin’s Q, is not 
significant in the pre-reform period, it is in the post-reform period, which together with the 
interaction term State Ownership × Q, suggests a shift towards a market-based performance 
benchmark in compensation contracting. The coefficient on state ownership remains negative, 
though it is not statistically significant. Larger companies pay more and managerial duality leads to 
higher compensation but after the reform. Although some caution is warranted with Arellano-
Bond GMM estimations in the case of short sample periods, our dynamic panel results are 
consistent with our earlier findings obtained by means of GLS estimations. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Board and Managerial Political Connections and Other Backgrounds 
We extend the models of Table 6 by relating the top managers’ political connections (captured 
by their past work experience in the government or the military) and human capital (measured by 
expertise in specific corporate domains) to their compensation, as managerial attributes may also 
influence how managers are compensated (Graham, Li, & Qiu, 2012). The variable Board Political 
Connections stands for the percentage of board members with a political background. The results 
of including this set of individual-level dummy variables capturing managerial backgrounds do not 
reveal anything exciting (see Table 7). The previous results are mostly upheld despite of the 
inclusion of a large set of individual-level dummy variables. First, a manager’s political background, 
meaning that he is or was an official in the central government, the local government, or the 
military, has no impact on his remuneration, neither before or after the reform. This is consistent 
with the prediction by Bebchuk & Hamdani (2009) that managerial power on executive 
compensation is less of an issue in firms with a controlling shareholder (the state in our context). 
Second, work experience in technology, accounting or finance jobs does not seem to play a 
 
 221 
significant role, with exception of overseas work experience. Before the reform, academic work 
experience (Manager Academic Background) was financially rewarded more, but overseas 
education was not (Table 7). We also find little evidence that the level of education (Managerial 
Education Degree) affects compensation. Overall, the results from Table 7 imply that top 
executives’ personal backgrounds do not affect their compensation much, at least compared to the 
influence of state ownership/control. It is important to be cautious with the interpretation of the 
results about managerial backgrounds because we only measure the characteristics and experience 
of the top manager (CEO), whereas compensation is the sum of the three highest paid managers, 
which biases against finding a relation. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Other Robustness Checks 
To test the robustness of our results, we conduct some more empirical tests with different 
specifications. As alternative estimation methods, we took a one-year lead of the dependent 
variable, and estimated pooled OLS models, pure random-effect models (without controlling for 
year, industry, and province effects), and firm-fixed effect models. For conciseness, we only report 
the results from the sample that excludes the transition period. As shown in Table 8, most of our 
previous results still hold: In the pre-reform period, state ownership is negatively correlated with 
the level of pay, while the coefficients on the interaction between State ownership and ROA are 
mostly positive. This effect largely disappears in the post-reform period which captures the 
transition towards a more market-based economy and corporate governance regime. In addition, 
the coefficient on ROA is mostly positive and statistically significant both before and after the 
reform, but the ones on Tobin’s Q show that this market-based performance variable only leads 
to higher pay in the post-reform period, as anticipated. The independent director ratio is positively 
associated with compensation in the pre-reform period, and so is the existence of the 
compensation committee, but after the reform neither the percentage of independent directors 
nor the presence of a compensation committee leads to higher compensation. The results on our 
other variables are consistent with previous findings. Overall, these additional robustness checks 
confirm that political forces, especially the state ownership and control exerts a strong influence 
on the formal contracting of executive compensation in China, the level of which is difficult to 
explained by means of traditional market-based corporate governance theories. However, once the 
regulatory friction were being removed (since 2006), market forces began to play their role. 




Cultures and norms 
One potential alternative explanation is that the compensation phenomenon is related to the 
unique Chinese cultural and social norms, which would limit the generalizability of our political 
economy view. One may argue that the prevailing social norms in China prevent executives from 
being paid excessively more than other employees, especially for the managers from state-owned 
firms, which, historically, have carried the belief system that all employees should be equal. To 
address this concern, we compare our empirical results with other single- and cross-country studies 
where the counterfactual was provided by CEOs in firms (including those that were state-owned) 
from Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan, which share a similar Chinese culture, but have been 
under different political regimes (e.g., Cheung et al., 2005; Sun et al., 2010). These studies 
document strong pay-performance sensitivity and the monitoring of controlling shareholders that 
are largely consistent with the literature on western corporate governance. Moreover, in many 
transitional economies such as those in Eastern Europe that were under autocratic political regimes 
similar to the one in China, executive compensation was not tied to profitability, but rather to 
one’s political connections before crucial institutional reforms (e.g., Jones & Kato, 1996; Eriksson, 
2005). These studies confirm that the executive compensation patterns in China and other 
emerging economies under strong state involvement were a direct result of political institutions, 
rather than cultures and social norms. 
Confounding effects 
A potential alternative explanation on the dynamics of executive compensation is that non-
political factors, such as concurrent labor law reforms or entrepreneurial activities in China during 
the same periods, may stimulate labor market flows and demand for executives (Groves et al., 
1995; Xu, 2011), which are then not induced by the fact that the government loosens its control 
over SOEs. However, this conjecture can only explain the evolution of pay-performance sensitivity 
over time, but not the interaction effect of state ownership/control with firm performance. If pay-
for-performance were mainly driven by labor law reforms and labor market flow rather than 
political factors, then state ownership would not have played any significant role. The fact that 
most managerial ability measures do not have significant coefficients (see Table 7) also fails to 
support this concurrent labor reform conjecture. 
Some other minor concerns regarding our specific test results may emerge. For example, an 
alternative explanation on the negative association between state ownership control and 
managerial pay before the split-share structural reform may lie in the tradeoff between incentive 
and insurance: state ownership and the resulting state appointments insulate top executives from 
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forced turnover. Therefore, the SOE managers may be willing to accept lower compensation in 
exchange for higher job security; hence, the negative association may not be due to stronger state 
monitoring and regulation. However, we find that managerial turnover was not significantly larger 
in private firms than in SOEs. 51  Moreover, this argument also does not explain why state 
ownership would steer pay-for-performance sensitivity, as one would expect that such job security 
motivation would undermine pay-for-performance. 
Conclusion 
In standard economic theories, compensation arrangements are presumed to be shaped by 
market forces that push towards value-maximization, but are also subject to managerial influence 
that can lead to departures from that outcome because of self-dealing (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003). 
We bring a new perspective to executive compensation in China by not just trying to apply models 
applicable to western economies but by adding the political framework. The political dimension is 
indeed of central importance in countries without market-oriented institutions and well-defined 
property rights, which are the pre-requisites for the functioning of markets. Other determinants 
include a strong market for corporate control, a broad capital market, and a labor market for 
executives. Using an extensive panel data comprising all non-financial Chinese firms since 2001, 
we find that in a regulated economy, government ownership of and control over the firm is 
strongly associated with lower executive compensation, and with higher pay-for-accounting 
performance sensitivity. The use of market-based performance benchmarks such as Tobin’s Q was 
negatively affected by state ownership prior to the corporate governance reform of 2006, but has 
at least non-negative (and even positive) effect subsequent to the reform. Neither internal 
governance mechanisms such as the presence of independent directors nor the degree of market-
orientation of the local economy play a role in establishing value-related executive compensation. 
Instead, the management’s connections to politics (e.g., membership or past experience in the 
communist party or the military) seem to have a large positive impact on managerial pay. Our 
results on compensation are robust after controlling for endogeneity, various individual and firm 
characteristics, and macro-economic factors (at the provincial level). Our findings are consistent 
with neither the optimal contracting theory nor the managerial power theory which are valid only 
                                                          
51 To check this, we collected information on managerial turnover in the post-2006 subsample, and generated a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if  there was a change in managers in the year under consideration, and 0 
otherwise. The average managerial change for SOEs is 24%, while the average managerial change for private 
firms is 20%. 
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under the competitive market conditions, but echo the empirical findings by Joskow et al. (1996) 
on the political constraints of executive compensation in (at that time) regulated US industries.  
Many developing economies worldwide are or have been implementing massive privatization 
programs and establishing more market-based institutions that focus on protecting property rights, 
whereas others have also seen a rise in importance of the regulatory state (Glaeser & Shleifer, 2003). 
Hence, the patterns in the relations between political relations and managerial compensation 
revealed in this study have significant implications on how top executives are incentivized and 
corporate governance mechanisms function under different institutional arrangements. Our study 
is also an important extension of several studies on law, institutions, finance, and ownership in 
China and other emerging economies, including Sun & Tong (2003), Allen et al. (2005), Cull & Xu 
(2005), and Beck & Laeven (2006). While these studies have documented the importance of 
political institutions in influencing economic activities in China, our study goes a step further to 
the firm-level to examine how political factors influence corporate governance mechanisms, and 
how such influences have evolved over time following the institutional transitions. We show 
that—at least in terms of incentivizing managers through compensation policies—Chinese firms 
were strongly influenced by political factors through the choice of performance benchmarks, 
monitoring mechanisms, and political connections. However, since China’s institutional reforms, 
its governance practices have been converging towards those advocated by the classical economic 
theories: well-defined property rights, checks and balances at the board level, and properly 
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Figure 1. China’s corporate governance structure after privatization 
Figure 2a illustrates a conceptual internal governance structure of a typical Chinese company since the 
privatization. The two-tier board structure (the board of directors and the supervisory board) is similar to 
the German model but the combination of executive and non-executive directors within the board of 
directors is similar to the US/UK model. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) usually assigns a Party 





Figure 2a. Evolution of state ownership of the five largest industries (by market 
capitalization 
The vertical axis denotes the percentage of industry-average state ownership.  
 
 
Figure 2b. Evolution of average executive compensation for five largest industries (by 
market capitalization) 








































Table 1. Split-Share Structural Reform and Corporate Governance Transition 
  
 Before the Reform After the Reform 
State ownership Majority ownership Minority ownership 
Shares Two-thirds of company shares were non-
tradable shares restricted by the State 
Almost all shares were tradable  
Firm performance 
benchmark 
Accounting-based performance, such as 
return on assets (ROA) 
More market-based performance, 
though accounting-based 
performance is still important. 
State-manager 
relationship 
Alignment of interests; SOE managers are 
directly appointed by the state and usually 
serve as government officials, such that they 
are more politically incentivized. 
Conflicts of interest; SOE managers 
are more often elected through 
shareholder meetings and behave like 
professional managers, such that they 
have more market-related incentives. 
Agency conflicts Mainly between the State as the controlling 
shareholder and the minority shareholders 
Mainly between the manager and the 
minority shareholders 
Governance model  Unification of ownership and control (large 
non-tradable government controlled share 
blocks); more politically oriented 
administrative governance model.  
Partial separation of ownership and 
control (dispersed state ownership); 
more market-oriented governance 
model. 
SOEs’ objectives 
(incentive structure of 
SOE managers) 
Fulfilling political, social, and economic 
objectives, with political and social goals 
being the dominant ones. 
Fulfilling political and economic 
objectives, with the economic ones 
gaining importance. 
Control rights The state possessed all control rights (in 
some partially privatized SOEs, voting rights 
are proportional to shareholdings). 





Table 2. Description of Variables 
Variable Description 
Dependent Variable:  
Ln(Compensation) 
The natural logarithm of the total compensation in cash of the top three highest-paid 
top managers. Source: CSMAR (unit: RMB) 
State Ownership and Control: 
State Ownership The percentage of firm’s shares directly owned by the State. Source: WIND. 
State Ultimate Control 
 
This dummy variable equals 1 if the ultimate controlling shareholder is the State or a 
government agency, and 0 otherwise. The ultimate controlling shareholder is the 
largest shareholder (in terms of number of shares held), or the shareholder whose 
voting rights exceed those of the largest shareholder (who may be the largest in terms 
of cash flow rights), or the shareholder who holds more than 30% of cash flow and 
voting rights, or who can determine the nomination of more than half of the directors 
through exerting voting rights. The definition of ultimate controller is similar to the 
one used in La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens et al. (2000). Source: CCER database 
and CSMAR. 
Tunneling: 
Other Receivables Other receivables as on the company’s balance sheet. 
Firm Performance:  
ROA The ratio of net income to the book value total assets. Source: WIND 




Following Faccio (2006), this dummy variable equals 1 if the manager is or was an 
official in the central government, local government, or the military, and 0 otherwise. 
Source: manually collected from managers’ CVs. 
Manager Overseas Work 
Experience 
This dummy variable equals 1 if the manager has worked or is working in a foreign 
multinational firm, a foreign joint venture, an overseas subsidiary of a Chinese 
company, or has worked abroad (including Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan), and 0 
otherwise. Source: manually collected from managers’ CVs. 
Manager Overseas 
Education 
This dummy variable equals 1 if the manager was educated or obtained a degree 
abroad, and 0 otherwise. Source: manually collected from managers’ CVs. 
Manager Accounting 
Background 
This dummy variable equals 1 if the manager has worked in an accounting firm/ 
position before, and 0 otherwise. Source: manually collected from managers’ CVs. 
Manager Financial 
Background 
This dummy variable equals 1 if the manager has worked in the financial industry or a 




This dummy variable equals 1 if the manager has worked in a technology-related firm/ 





This dummy variable equals 1 if the manager has worked in academia as a university 
professor or researcher before, and 0 otherwise. Source: manually collected from 
managers’ CVs. 
Female Manager 
This dummy variable equals 1 if the manager is female, and 0 if male. Source: manually 
collected from managers’ CVs. 
Manager Foreign 
Nationality 
The dummy variable equals 1 if the manager is non-Chinese, and 0 if Chinese. Source: 
manually collected from managers’ CVs. 
Education Level 
The score ranges from 0 to 4: 0 if his highest educational level is below junior college; 
1 in case of junior college; 2 in case of a bachelor degree; 3 if the manager has 
graduated with a master’s degree; and 4 if he graduated with a doctoral degree. Source: 
manually collected from managers’ CVs. 




This ratio is the number of the independent directors divided by the total number of 
directors. Source: CSMAR. 
Board Size Total number of the company’s board members. Source: CSMAR. 
Management Team Size Total number of the company’s total management team members. Source: CSMAR. 
Compensation Committee 
This dummy variable equals 1 if the company has a compensation committee, and 0 
otherwise. Source: CSMAR. 
Managerial Duality 
This dummy variable equals 1 if the positions of the general manager (president) and 
chairman are held by the same person, and 0 otherwise. Source: CSMAR. 
Board Political 
Connections 
The number of directors with government and military work experience and Congress 
membership divided by the total number of directors on the board. Source: manually 
collected from directors’ CVs. 
Local Politicalization and Marketization: 
Market-Orientation Index 
The “China marketization index” developed by Fan, Wang, & Zhu (2011) which 
measures the province-level degree of marketization and can be decomposed into 
subindices measuring (1) government-market relations, (2) development of the non-
SOE sector, (3) development of the commodity market, (4) development of factor 
markets, and (5) intermediate/legal framework (including the development of market 
intermediaries, legal environment for businesses, protection of intellectual property 
rights, and protection of consumer rights). 
Distance to Beijing The geographical distance between the firm’s headquarter city to Beijing.   
Other Control Variables: 
Leverage 
The ratio of the book value of total debt to the book value of total assets. Source: 
WIND 
Firm Size The natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. Source: WIND 
Manager Stock Option 
The dummy variable equals 1 when the manager was granted an option plan and 0 
otherwise. Source: WIND 
Ownership Concentration Percentage of total shares owned by the five largest blockholders. Source: WIND 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
All monetary terms are in RMB. Other receivables/assets, ROA, Tobin’s Q, sales growth rate, capital intensity, ownership 
concentration, are winsorized at 5% level. A correlation analysis confirms that there is no multicollinearity (all correlation 
coefficients between the explanatory and control variables are < 40%). 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable:       
Managerial Compensation (000 RMB) 15,314 884 600 1160 0 43300 
Ownership and Control:       
State Ownership 15,544 24.56% 16.98% 25.79% 0% 100% 
State Ultimate Control 14,650 0.64 1 0.48 0 1 
Tunneling:       
Other Receivables/Assets (%) 15,356 3.60 1.60 4.68 0.11 17.63 
Firm Performance:       
ROA 15,618 3.90 3.73 5.44 -9.61 14.24 
Tobin’s Q 15,519 2.17 1.89 2.25 0.92 9.21 
Internal Corporate Governance:       
Independent Director Ratio 15,499 36.95 33.33 18.59 0 88.89 
Compensation Committee 14,183 0.66 1 0.47 0 1 
Managerial Duality 15,508 0.15 0 0.36 0 1 
Board Size 15,505 8.81 9 2.46 0 24 
Board Political Connections (%) 15,190 13 10 0.16 0 100 
Top Management Team Size 15,464 7.08 6 3.95 1 64 
Politicalization and Marketization       
Marketization index 15,322 8.01 7.97 2.25 0.33 11.80 
Distance to Beijing (kilometers) 16,132 1104 1064 610 0 2563 
Managerial Backgrounds:       
Manager Political Background 16,419 20% 0% 40% 0% 100% 
Manager Overseas Education 16,422 4% 0% 20% 0% 100% 
Manager Overseas Work Experience 16,417 6% 0% 23% 0% 100% 
Manager Education Degree 16,292 2.36 2 0.90 0 4 
Manager Academic Background 16,420 11% 0% 31% 0% 100% 
Manager Technology Background 16,421 43% 0% 49% 0% 100% 
Manager Accounting Background 16,421 12% 0% 32% 0% 100% 
Manager Financial Background 16,421 6% 0% 24% 0% 100% 
Manager Foreign Nationality 16,424 1% 0% 10% 0% 100% 
Manager Age (years) 16,353 46.43 46 6.89 21 75 
Female Manager 16,423 5% 0% 22% 0% 100% 
Other Control Variables:       
Firm Size (Ln(Assets)) 15,642 21.35 21.21 1.24 10.84 28.66 
Leverage 16,666 0.63 0.49 7.12 0 877.26 
Manager Stock Option Plan 15,282 2% 0% 16% 0% 100% 
Ownership Concentration (%) 15,329 55% 56% 14% 29% 78% 
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Table 4. Political Determinants of Executive Compensation: GLS Estimations 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the top three highest paid managers’ compensation. Independent variables are State Ownership (%), ROA (winsorized at the 95% level), Tobin’s Q 
(winsorized at the 95% level), Independent Director Ratio, Top Management Team size, Compensation Committee dummy, Managerial Duality dummy, Province-Level Marketization Index, the 
logarithm of Distance to Beijing, and other control variables such as leverage, firm size, ownership concentration of the top 5 blockholders, option granting.*, **, and *** stand for significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. 


















State Ownership -0.431*** -0.349*** -0.034 -0.002 -0.265** -0.160 -0.0543 0.031 
 (0.090) (0.081) (0.052) (0.054) (0.115) (0.100) (0.0627) (0.068) 
State Ownership×ROA (winsor) 0.035*** 0.018** 0.010* 0.011     
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007)     
State Ownership× Q (winsor)     -0.034 -0.074* 0.0184 0.004 
     (0.045) (0.040) (0.011) (0.016) 
Tobin’s Q (winsorized) 0.009 0.009 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.017 0.026** 0.012*** 0.014*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.004) (0.005) (0.013) (0.013) (0.005) (0.005) 
ROA (winsorized) 0.007* 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.024*** 0.0193*** 0.016*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Independent Director Ratio 0.036 0.080 -0.084* -0.104** 0.0334 0.0779 -0.0832* -0.104** 
 (0.104) (0.110) (0.046) (0.044) (0.104) (0.110) (0.0461) (0.0438) 
Ln(Other receivables) -0.011 -0.014 0.001 0.001 -0.0108 -0.0135 0.00035 0.00106 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.00874) (0.007) (0.0077) 
Top Management Team Size 0.034*** 0.049*** 0.017*** 0.013*** 0.034*** 0.0487*** 0.0168*** 0.0128*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.00592) (0.00333) (0.00350) 
Compensation Committee 0.116*** 0.104*** 0.052* 0.182* 0.115*** 0.104*** 0.0509* 0.180* 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.030) (0.106) (0.027) (0.0261) (0.0296) (0.106) 
Managerial Duality 0.062* 0.026 0.057* 0.082** 0.060 0.0249 0.0578** 0.0823** 




Table 4 (Cont). Political Determinants of Executive Compensation: GLS Estimations 


















Market-Orientation Index 0.026 0.050 0.008 -0.009 0.0265 0.0505 0.0095 -0.00653 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.022) (0.040) (0.0360) (0.0377) (0.0217) (0.0397) 
Ln(Distance to Beijing) 0.314*** 0.241** -0.058 -0.027 0.309*** 0.244** -0.0558 -0.0245 
 (0.113) (0.111) (0.110) (0.123) (0.114) (0.112) (0.110) (0.123) 
Leverage  -0.015 -0.027 0.002*** 0.010*** -0.00873 -0.0214 0.00194*** 0.0102*** 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.0002) (0.002) (0.0196) (0.0200) (0.0002) (0.0019) 
Firm Size 0.247*** 0.267*** 0.237*** 0.252*** 0.247*** 0.265*** 0.238*** 0.252*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.016) (0.017) (0.0205) (0.0204) (0.0157) (0.0169) 
Ownership Concentration 0.303* 0.373** 0.067 0.0546 0.305* 0.366** 0.0592 0.0528 
 (0.170) (0.161) (0.093) (0.098) (0.170) (0.162) (0.0930) (0.0981) 
Manager Stock Option Plan . -0.722*** 0.068* 0.178*** . -0.737*** 0.0663 0.176*** 
 . (0.043) (0.041) (0.052) . (0.0424) (0.0407) (0.0514) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4224 5332 6640 4185 4224 5332 6640 4185 





Table 5. Interactions of Different State Ownership Measures and Performance 
Benchmarks: GLS Estimations 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the top three highest paid managers’ compensation. Independent 
variables are State Ownership (%), State Ultimate Control (dummy), ROA (winsorized at the 95% level), Tobin’s Q 
(winsorized at the 95% level), the interactions between State Control and ROA, between State Ownership and 
Tobin’s Q, and between State Control and Tobin’s Q, independent director ratio, top management team size, 
compensation committee (dummy), managerial duality (dummy), province-level marketization index, the logarithm 
of Distance to Beijing, and other control variables such as leverage, firm size, ownership concentration of the top 
five blockholders, manager stock option plan (dummy).*, **, and *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. 










State Ultimate Control×ROA 0.012** 0.008***   
 (0.005) (0.003)   
State Ultimate Control×Q   -0.038** 0.012** 
   (0.018) (0.005) 
State Ultimate Control -0.094*** -0.011 0.003 -0.028 
 (0.035) (0.029) (0.047) (0.033) 
Tobin’s Q (winsorized) 0.009 0.015*** 0.029** 0.009* 
 (0.010) (0.004) (0.013) (0.005) 
ROA (winsorized) 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.025*** 0.020*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Independent Director Ratio 0.090 -0.099** 0.091 -0.096*** 
 (0.111) (0.047) (0.111) (0.002) 
Ln(Other Receivables) -0.014 0.001 -0.013 0.0002 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) 
Top Management Team Size 0.049*** 0.017*** 0.045*** 0.016*** 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) 
Compensation Committee 0.105*** 0.054* 0.104*** 0.055* 
 (0.026) (0.030) (0.026) (0.030) 
Managerial Duality 0.029 0.058** 0.026 0.058** 
 (0.036) (0.029) (0.036) (0.029) 
Market-Orientation Index 0.049 0.006 0.052 0.009 
 (0.038) (0.022) (0.038) (0.022) 
Ln(Distance to Beijing) 0.276** -0.044 0.277*** -0.042 
 (0.112) (0.111) (0.112) (0.111) 
Leverage -0.029 0.002*** -0.022 0.002*** 
 (0.021) (0.0002) (0.020) (0.0002) 
Firm Size 0.264*** 0.236*** 0.262*** 0.239*** 
 (0.021) (0.016) (0.021) (0.016) 
Ownership Concentration 0.119 0.058 0.120 0.044 
 (0.146) (0.095) (0.146) (0.095) 
Manager Stock Option Plan -0.732*** 0.063 -0.754*** 0.061 
 (0.044) (0.041) (0.044) (0.041) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5329 6651 5329 6651 




Table 6. Political Determinants of Executive Compensation  
(Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel Data Estimations) 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the top three highest paid managers’ compensation. Independent 
variables are one-year lagged managerial compensation, State ownership (%), ROA (winsorized at the 95% level), the 
interaction between State ownership and ROA, Tobin’s Q (winsorized at the 95% level), independent director ratio, 
top management team size, compensation committee dummy, managerial duality dummy, province-level 
marketization index, logarithm of distance to Beijing, together with other control variables. Coefficients are estimated 
by the Arellano-Bond GMM-in-systems test with one-period lag. *, **, and *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. 
DV = Ln(compensation) (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Pre-reform  Post-reform  Pre-reform  Post-reform 
Ln(compensation) (t-1) 0.773**  0.690***  0.802**  0.702*** 
 (0.314)  (0.056)  (0.317)  (0.0572) 
State Ownership × ROA (winsor.) 0.027*  0.013     
 (0.016)  (0.009)     
State Ownership × Q (winsor.)     0.0317  0.0324* 
     (0.0717)  (0.0184) 
State Ownership -0.203  -0.072  -0.212  -0.138 
 (0.185)  (0.083)  (0.228)  (0.0999) 
Ln(Other receivables) 0.018  -0.007  0.0205  -0.00748 
 (0.019)  (0.011)  (0.0194)  (0.0112) 
Tobin’s Q (winsorized) -0.003  0.009*  -0.00957  0.00368 
 (0.016)  (0.005)  (0.0237)  (0.00586) 
ROA (winsorized) 0.010  0.009***  0.0190***  0.0107*** 
 (0.007)  (0.003)  (0.00481)  (0.00220) 
Independent Director Ratio 0.231  0.028  0.231  0.0302 
 (0.211)  (0.062)  (0.215)  (0.0624) 
Top Management Team Size 0.029***  0.012*  0.0288**  0.0116* 
 (0.011)  (0.007)  (0.0112)  (0.00704) 
Compensation Committee 0.055  -0.029  0.0518  -0.0296 
 (0.063)  (0.058)  (0.0635)  (0.0580) 
Managerial Duality -0.006  0.124***  -0.00751  0.127*** 
 (0.063)  (0.046)  (0.0644)  (0.0462) 
Market-Orientation index 0.028  -0.019  0.0226  -0.0173 
 (0.116)  (0.030)  (0.117)  (0.0299) 
Ln(Distance to Beijing) 0.569*  0.265**  0.567*  0.248** 
 (0.329)  (0.109)  (0.334)  (0.110) 
Leverage 0.028  0.013*  0.0295  0.0133* 
 (0.047)  (0.008)  (0.0481)  (0.00765) 
Firm Size -0.068  0.122***  -0.0852  0.121*** 
 (0.095)  (0.030)  (0.0957)  (0.0297) 
Ownership Concentration -0.333  -0.102  -0.314  -0.0948 
 (0.522)  (0.203)  (0.533)  (0.204) 
Manager Stock Option Plan   0.038    0.0282 
   (0.080)    (0.0807) 




Table 7. Managerial and Board Political Backgrounds: GLS Estimations 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the top three highest paid managers’ compensation. Independent variables are state 
ownership (%), ROA (winsorized at the 95% level), the interaction between State ownership and ROA, Tobin’s Q (winsorized at the 
95% level), independent director ratio, top management team size, compensation committee dummy, managerial duality dummy, 
province-level marketization index, the logarithm of distance to Beijing, a series of top manager’s background dummies (political work 
experience, technology industry work experience, financial industry work experience, accounting-related work experience, academic 
work experience [universities or research institutes], overseas education experience, overseas/multinational work experience, education 
degree, foreign nationality, gender [female] and age), together with other control variables.*, **, and *** stand for significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. 













Managerial backgrounds        
Manager Political Background 0.035  0.038  0.058  0.066 
 (0.032)  (0.030)  (0.045)  (0.059) 
Manager Technology Background 0.020  0.019  -0.031  -0.031 
 (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.033)  (0.044) 
Manager Accounting Background -0.005  -0.003  0.016  -0.021 
 (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.042)  (0.047) 
Manager Finance Background -0.006  -0.005  -0.077  -0.029 
 (0.061)  (0.055)  (0.051)  (0.058) 
Manager Academic Background 0.085**  0.088**  0.004  0.022 
 (0.040)  (0.037)  (0.041)  (0.046) 
Manager Overseas Education -0.020  0.044  0.029  -0.010 
 (0.093)  (0.083)  (0.066)  (0.066) 
Manager Overseas Work Experience 0.091*  0.109**  0.169***  0.194** 
 (0.051)  (0.049)  (0.064)  (0.077) 
Manager Education Degree 0.016  0.019  0.032*  0.037 
 (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.024) 
Manager Foreign Nationality 0.114  0.149  0.204  0.098 
 (0.125)  (0.120)  (0.153)  (0.136) 
Manager Age -0.001  -0.002  0.007***  0.009*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Female Manager -0.012  -0.050  -0.044  -0.013 
 (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.046)  (0.052) 
Board Political Connections -0.074  0.034  -0.240**  -0.175 
 (0.107)  (0.105)  (0.114)  (0.146) 
Other variables        
State ownership  ROA (winsorized) 0.033***  0.014  0.010  0.011 
 (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
State ownership -0.405***  -0.315***  -0.033  -0.002 
 (0.091)  (0.082)  (0.053)  (0.055) 
Ln(Other receivables) -0.010  -0.015*  0.003  0.002 




Table 7 (Cont). Managerial and Board Political Backgrounds: GLS Estimations 













Tobin’s Q (winsorized) 0.010  0.009  0.013***  0.013** 
 (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
ROA (winsorized) 0.007*  0.020***  0.017***  0.014*** 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Independent Director Ratio -0.017  0.050  -0.061  -0.085** 
 (0.108)  (0.113)  (0.043)  (0.042) 
Top Management Team Size 0.035***  0.050***  0.019***  0.014*** 
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Compensation Committee 0.106***  0.101***  0.052*  0.178 
 (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.030)  (0.111) 
Managerial Duality 0.079**  0.043  0.035  0.047 
 (0.039)  (0.037)  (0.031)  (0.038) 
Market-Orientation Index 0.027  0.043  0.008  0.001 
 (0.036)  (0.039)  (0.022)  (0.041) 
Ln(Distance to Beijing) 0.324***  0.227*  0.027  0.069 
 (0.118)  (0.116)  (0.115)  (0.132) 
Leverage  -0.006  -0.018  0.002***  0.011*** 
 (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.0002)  (0.002) 
Firm Size 0.246***  0.267***  0.228***  0.248*** 
 (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.016)  (0.017) 
Ownership Concentration 0.272  0.325**  0.013  -0.028 
 (0.173)  (0.163)  (0.100)  (0.107) 
Manager Stock Option Plan   -0.780***  0.083**  0.185*** 
   (0.047)  (0.040)  (0.052) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Province Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 4037  5116  6195  3785 






Table 8. Robustness Tests 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the top three highest paid managers’ compensation. Independent variables are state ownership (%), ROA (winsorized at the 95% level), the 
interaction between State ownership and ROA, Tobin’s Q (winsorized at the 95% level), independent director ratio, top management team size, compensation committee dummy, managerial duality 
dummy, province-level marketization index, the logarithm of distance to Beijing, together with other control variables. Models (1)-(2) are estimated using firm and year fixed effects, models (3)-(4) 
are estimated using pure random effects, models (5)-(6) are estimated using pooled OLS, and models (7)-(8) are estimated with all independent variables being taken one-year lagged values. *, **, and 
*** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. 
 Firm fixed effects Pure random effects Pooled OLS 1-year lead-lag model 


















State Ownership  ROA (winsor) 0.034*** 0.009 0.039*** 0.011 0.041*** 0.009 0.012 0.017** 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.007) 
State Ownership -0.405*** 0.046 -0.510*** -0.099* -0.486*** -0.029 -0.159* -0.028 
 (0.155) (0.062) (0.089) (0.054) (0.093) (0.078) (0.092) (0.061) 
Ln(Other Receivables) -0.016 -0.003 -0.004 0.003 0.033*** 0.024** -0.013 0.002 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) 
Tobin’s Q (winsorized) 0.013 0.010** -0.008 0.021*** -0.013 0.025*** 0.017 0.017*** 
 (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.004) (0.014) (0.006) (0.012) (0.004) 
ROA (winsorized) 0.002 0.006*** 0.005 0.017*** 0.022*** 0.038*** 0.025*** 0.014*** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) 
Independent Director Ratio -0.011 -0.052 0.735*** -0.086** 0.859*** -0.156** 0.150 0.005 
 (0.107) (0.046) (0.078) (0.043) (0.100) (0.068) (0.122) (0.130) 
Top Management Team Size 0.030*** 0.014 0.0342*** 0.012*** 0.041*** 0.014*** 0.039*** 0.009** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) 
Compensation Committee 0.114*** 0.144 0.159*** 0.165 0.143*** 0.238** 0.067*** 0.049 
 (0.032) (0.135) (0.027) (0.102) (0.034) (0.106) (0.026) (0.058) 
Managerial Duality 0.060 0.110** 0.064* 0.076** 0.112** 0.057 0.025 0.022 





Table 8 (Cont). Robustness Tests 
 
 Firm fixed effects Pure random effects Pooled OLS 1-year lead-lag model 


















Market-Orientation Index 0.019 -0.015 0.170*** 0.087*** 0.148*** 0.086*** 0.051 0.038** 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.041) (0.019) 
Ln(Distance to Beijing) . . 0.183*** 0.166*** 0.190*** 0.162*** 0.213* 0.038 
 . . (0.031) (0.029) (0.031) (0.028) (0.115) (0.119) 
Leverage  -0.019 0.011*** -0.001 0.012*** -0.011 0.005 -0.005 0.008*** 
 (0.021) (0.003) (0.018) (0.002) (0.036) (0.005) (0.024) (0.003) 
Firm Size 0.202*** 0.150*** 0.248*** 0.276*** 0.204*** 0.252*** 0.258*** 0.223*** 
 (0.041) (0.031) (0.020) (0.016) (0.024) (0.016) (0.024) (0.017) 
Ownership Concentration  0.713* 0.222 0.223 -0.077 0.098 -0.212** 0.193 0.173* 
 (0.388) (0.176) (0.168) (0.095) (0.171) (0.107) (0.173) (0.097) 
Manager Stock Option Plan . 0.053 . 0.196*** . 0.207*** . 0.076* 
 . (0.088) . (0.051) . (0.058) . (0.039) 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No No No No No 
Industry Fixed Effects No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes 
Province Fixed Effects No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 4224 4185 4224 4185 4224 4185 4122 4467 






Chapter 6. An Anatomy of  State Control in 
the Globalization of  State-Owned 
Enterprises 
Hao Liang, Bing Ren, Sunny Li Sun 52 
 
ABSTRACT 
Integrating agency theory with institutional analysis in international business, we propose a state-
control perspective to analyze government-control mechanisms in emerging economies’ 
globalization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). We identify two types of state control that 
influence SOEs’ globalization decisions and the degree of globalization: state ownership control 
and executives’ political connections, both of which are contingent upon the home country’s 
evolving institutional environments. Using a two-step corporate globalization decision model and 
17,272 firm-year observations of non-financial, Chinese-listed companies, we find a strong impact 
of both types of state control on SOEs’ globalization, although the impacts differ between the 
periods before and after domestic governance reform and across different globalization-decision 
steps. The diminishing impact of executives’ political connections and the increasing impact of 
state ownership control on firms’ degree of globalization demonstrate the evolving relationship 
between the state and the managers, as well as the dynamics of state control in globalizing SOEs.  
Keywords: Agency theory, state control, state ownership, political connections, state-
owned enterprises, corporate globalization. 
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The spectacular growth of globalization by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from emerging 
economies over the past few decades contradicts most traditional international business (IB) 
theories. Numerous studies, which have attempted to explain the patterns and motivations behind 
SOEs’ globalization, have emphasized that “the state (government) matters.” However, the 
mechanisms by which the state matters remains largely unexplored. Corporate globalization is a 
complex decision-making process that involves conflicts among multiple constituencies, including 
the home-country state, the host-country state, SOE managers, and minority shareholders as well 
as each constituency’s underlying, evolving institutions (Cantwell, Dunning, & Lundan, 2010; Cui 
& Jiang, 2012; Luo & Wang, 2012). This complex undertaking requires an in-depth and nuanced 
analysis on state-control mechanisms at the decision-maker level—particularly in the relationship 
between state and SOE managers in different institutional environments—and has received 
comparatively little attention in the literature. In addition, IB researchers have only until recently 
realized the importance of studying the role of the managerial decision-making process in the 
actions of multinational companies (MNCs), including SOEs (Aharoni, Tihanyi, & Connelly, 2011). 
These deficiencies call for a more integrative view on the roles of the state and managerial decision 
making in SOEs’ globalization.  
We address these issues in this paper by proposing a state-control perspective on SOEs’ 
globalization to answer the question: How does state control influence the degree of SOEs’ 
globalization from emerging economies? We investigate this question primarily from the 
perspective of the state’s governance mechanisms in SOEs that shape the state-manager 
relationship and their globalization decisions. Among various theoretical perspectives related to 
this inquiry, the agency theory is probably the most appropriate in describing the state-manager 
relationship and the managerial decision-making process. However, the agency theory does not 
consider how managerial incentives and the state’s interests differ, nor has it been systematically 
applied to the context of globalization. In many emerging economies, SOE managers are often 
directly appointed by the state after serving as government officials (Brockman, Rui, & Zou, 2013; 
Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2007) and their companies go global following the guidance and capital 
control by the home state (Cui & Jiang, 2012). Correspondingly, SOE managers are incentivized 
not just by the prospect of increasing economic performance but also (and more importantly) by 
fulfilling the state’s political and social objectives in devising globalization strategies (Cuervo-




managerial incentives, and the corresponding control mechanisms in globalization can be different 
from that depicted by traditional agency theory and contingent on the institutional environments.  
Such institutional roles are closely related to the institutional analysis in strategy and IB (e.g., 
Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Peng, Sun, Pinkham, & Chen, 2009), which emphasizes the importance 
of institutional environments and firm response in the choices of multinationals’ globalization 
strategies. In our conception, institutional environment can be administrative and market-oriented. 
The administrative institutions in the home state rely on political connections and are a substitute 
for market-based pecuniary incentives abroad, which align the interests of SOE managers with 
that of the state. In contrast, the market-oriented institutions in the home state rely on an 
ownership arrangement and are compatible with pecuniary incentives internationally, but also 
increase the information asymmetry and agency costs between the state, the SOE, and foreign 
subsidiary managers. Consequently, SOEs’ degree of globalization is inherently affected by 
different governance mechanisms and the underlying institutional environment. 
We examine our state-control perspective on the globalization of SOEs from China. China 
launched its “Go Global” policy with regard to SOEs, which were hailed as “national champions,” 
and have boosted China’s soaring outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) since 2000 (Lin & 
Milhaupt, 2013). Moreover, China started the split-share structural reform in 2006 as part of its 
ongoing changes during the market transition that extensively transferred the state shares in SOEs 
to private investors (Haveman & Wang, 2013)53 and transformed the corporate governance model 
from administrative to market-oriented (Peng 2003; Ralston, Terpstra-Tong, Terpstra, Wang, & 
Egri, 2006). All these features offer us an ideal setting in which to study the dynamics of institutions 
and state control in SOEs’ globalization. In addition, such governance reforms are not unique to 
China but are widely occurring in other emerging economies (Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev, & 
Peng, 2013; Inoue, Lazzarini, & Musacchio, 2014). 
Our paper makes two main contributions to the IB and SOE literature. At the basic level, we 
disentangle the mechanisms of state control in SOEs’ globalization. While the dominant role of 
the government in globalizing SOEs has been reiterated in many studies, the underlying 
mechanisms are still far from clear. As we show in this paper, it is crucial to examine the 
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their non-tradable shares. Holders of  non-tradable shares compensated holders of  tradable shares in each 
individual firm for approximately 3 shares per 10 shares on average so as to make the non-tradable shares 
tradable. All Chinese-listed companies completed their negotiations by the end of  2008 and all of  their 




governance mechanisms—both the government ownership stakes and executives’ political 
connections—that shape managerial incentives, agency concerns, and the state-manager 
relationship in the complex globalization process. Secondly, we contribute to the understanding 
of the managerial decision-making role in globalization, which is an important yet underexplored 
area of IB research (Aharoni et al., 2011). By showing that SOEs’ globalization decisions are 
influenced by the state control mechanisms through different decision processes and institutional 
environments, we bridge an acknowledged gap between macro- and micro-level dynamics of 
globalization. Our broader conclusion is that investigating the dynamics of state control in 
globalization decisions is essential in understanding emerging SOEs’ behaviors around the globe. 
Theory and Hypothesis 
To theoretically investigate the complexity and dynamics of globalization under state control, we 
propose a state-control perspective by extending the agency theory and integrating it with the 
recently developed institutional analysis in IB. Our state-control perspective identifies two 
alternative SOE government-control mechanisms that lead to different levels of globalization. The 
high-risk features of globalization and potential conflicts of interest among multiple constituents 
require both ownership-based and connection-based means of control that complement each 
other in tackling cross-border risks and agency conflicts (Peng, 2003; Peng et al., 2009). The 
ownership-based means emphasizes direct control through government ownership and voting 
rights on corporate decision making in globalization. The connection-based means emphasizes 
indirect control that takes place through the manager’s social and psychological contract with the 
domestic state. Both means help reduce information asymmetry between the state and SOEs and 
facilitate SOEs to carry out the state’s goals in cross-border deals with lower agency costs. We 
therefore propose that the state’s ownership control and executives’ political connections are the two major 
ways in which the domestic state controls SOEs’ globalization, and managers adapt to such 
controls in formulating their globalization strategies. 
The impact of these two major mechanisms of state control on SOEs’ globalization is manifested 
by the changing institutional environment, from administrative to market-oriented, which can be 
studied in the context of the domestic ownership-based governance reform—the reform aimed at 
transferring ownership from the hands of the state to that of the market (Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 
2009b; Inoue et al., 2013). Although both are governance mechanisms, the state’s control through 
political connections is enacted more in the institutional environment dominated by administrative 




institutional environment characterized by well-functioning market disciplines and market-
oriented ownership arrangements (i.e., after governance reform). Therefore, different domestic 
institutional environments influence the extent to which certain control mechanisms are enabled. 
These mechanisms also differ in their compatibility with institutions in the host country, which 
affects the degree of globalization abroad. We summarize the evolution of the state-manager 
relationship and state-control mechanisms in Table 1, in which we attach the two general 
institutional environments to two time periods: before and after corporate governance reform. 
The contexts in Table 1 are based on Chinese experience for the easiness of illustration. However, 
the mechanisms are generalizable to SOEs in other emerging economies. We further develop 
several testable hypotheses on such dynamics of state control on SOEs’ globalization in the 
following section.  
[Insert Table 1 about here.] 
The Vertical Evolvement of State Control on SOE’s Globalization 
First, we propose that the effectiveness of the two state-control mechanisms relies on 
different enabling institutions. Consequently, the functioning of the two means of state control 
over globalization undergo changes over time (i.e., “vertically”) in accordance with changes in their 
institutional environments. Ownership control relies mainly on modern property-rights 
institutions to reduce information asymmetry and agency costs between the principal (the state) 
and the agent (the manager) domestically (Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009a; 2009b; Hoskisson et al., 
2013; Inoue et al., 2013; also see Table 1). This effect also relies on compatibility with the host-
country institutions, which helps to reduce agency costs in overseas operations. In contrast, the 
political personnel control—control through political connections—relies on administrative and 
bureaucratic institutions to align the interests of the manager with those of the state, especially 
when the market institutions are weak and the domestic governance is less compatible with host-
country institutions (Brockman et al., 2013; Fan, Wong, & Zhang 2007; also see Table 1). 
Accordingly, firms adjust their globalization strategies in response to changes in their external 
institutional environments (Peng, 2003).  
Under state ownership control, the effect of control on SOEs’ globalization is weak when 
home-country property rights are poorly defined and protected, and when home-country 
institutions are dominated by administrative orders that are less compatible with more market-
oriented institutions internationally. This is usually the case when domestic institutions are 
authoritarian without proper corporate governance reform (Shleifer, 1998; Chang & Wong, 2004). 




governance reform (Haveman & Wang, 2013; Peng, 2003), SOEs’ governance structures become 
more market-oriented and compatible with international governance practices (Megginsion & 
Netter, 2001). These governance practices include, for example, a standard selection process for 
directors and executives and the introduction of independent directors, which provide more 
ownership-based tools for state control in overseas operation. Moreover, block ownership gives 
the state an incentive to monitor and evaluate SOE managers’ performance (Lin & Milhaupt, 2013). 
As a result, the functioning of ownership control is more likely to be institutionally enacted. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H1a. State ownership control has a stronger impact on SOEs’ globalization after corporate governance 
reform than before reform. 
In contrast, political connection control functions in the opposite way in globalization. 
Before domestic governance reform, the administrative institutional environment was conducive 
to the use of political personnel control to influence SOE managers’ decision making due to weak 
property rights institutions and scarcity of market-based systems for efficient international 
resource allocation (Brockman et al., 2013). However, such a role for political connections is 
attenuated by the continuing domestic market-oriented reforms, as more resources supporting 
SOEs’ globalization are gradually transferred from the government’s hands to the private sector 
and increasingly coordinated by the developing factor markets (Hoskisson et al., 2013). In addition, 
greater compatibility between the home country and international corporate governance regimes 
provides less scope for functional administrative orders (political personnel control). Therefore, 
we hypothesize that: 
H1b. Managers’ political connections have a stronger impact on SOEs’ globalization before corporate 
governance reform than after reform. 
The Horizontal Evolvement of State Control on SOEs’ Globalization 
We now propose that the functioning of the two state-control mechanisms also evolves 
interchangeably (“horizontally”) in accordance with changes in the enabling institutions. We argue 
that the home state realizes the different levels of effectiveness of the two available control 
mechanisms contingent on different institutional environments, thus can adapt to domestic 
institutional transitions with alternate mechanisms to maintain its impact, and SOE managers 
adapt to such mechanisms in their globalization strategies. Before governance reform, a weak 
home-country institutional environment makes managers behave more like politicians because 




Ralston et al., 2006). Consequently, SOE managers’ interests are more aligned with those of the 
state (Boisot & Child, 1988). Therefore, information asymmetry is low between the state and SOE 
managers but high between the home country and host countries because of different governance 
regimes (Luo &Wang, 2012). As a result, the state uses domestic political connections rather than 
ownership control as a more efficient and less costly means of controlling SOEs’ globalization. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H2a. Before corporate governance reform, the roles of the state relative to SOEs’ globalization functioned 
more likely through managers’ political connections rather than through state ownership control.  
After governance reform, compatibility between the market-based institutions of the home 
country and international-governance regimes leads to SOE managers behaving more like 
professional executives as they are more often elected and monitored by boards of directors 
(Megginson & Netter, 2001). As a result, SOE managers’ interests are more often in conflict with 
those of the state, and the information asymmetry between the state and SOE managers is higher, 
particularly during globalization (Knutsen, Rygh, Hveem, 2011). In such cases, state ownership 
control is more efficient for the state to curb managerial opportunism and reduce agency costs in 
these state-owned MNCs under a market-oriented governance system (Li & Qian, 2013; Morck, 
Yeung, & Zhao, 2008). SOE managers also respond to a new institutional regime by conforming 
more to the ownership arrangement in their globalization strategies so as to better leverage the 
state’s resource advantages and preferential policies to overcome uncertainties abroad (Li, Cui, & 
Lu, 2014; Meyer, Ding, Li, & Zhang, 2014). Consequently, the state-control mechanism to 
influence SOEs’ globalization shifts from relying mainly on administrative orders to relying mainly 
on market-based orders. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H2b. After corporate governance reform, the roles of the state relative to SOEs’ globalization functioned 
more likely through state ownership control rather than through managers’ political connections. 
State Control in the Decision-Making Process: First Step vs. Second Step 
Finally, we propose that the managerial decision-making process under state control of SOEs’ 
globalization tends to take sequential steps. Some literature makes a similar argument that firms’ 
strategic choices are endogenous and self-selected under institutional constraints (Dastidar, 2009; 
Gao, Murray, Kotabe, & Lu, 2010) and thus also follow sequential decisions (Tallman & Shenkar, 
1994; Aharoni et al., 2011; Peng, 2012; Sun, Peng, Lee, & Tan, 2014). We therefore propose that 
the globalization decision is structured as a two-step process: in the first step, the SOE decides 




will invest abroad—i.e., the degree of globalization. Correspondingly, the impact of state control 
can vary across the two steps. Such a managerial decision-making process also matches the process 
of state control in globalization: at the initial stage, the government frequently uses administrative 
orders to select and approve certain SOEs as national champions (Li & Milhaupt, 2013) in “going 
global” via intensive capital control, which is prevalent among bureaucratic and interventionist 
governments in emerging economies (Fogel, 2006). 54  However, the government gives more 
discretionary power to the degree to which SOEs want to globalize in the later stages of investment. 
Our interviews with several SOE managers confirm the conjecture of the two-step process. 
Based on the above conjectures and observations, we argue that the roles of state ownership 
control and political connection control differ across the two-step decision process. During the 
first step when the SOE has not gone abroad yet, globalization decisions are made in the home-
country context, where information asymmetry between the state and the SOE manager is low, 
and administrative orders by the state are frequently used for capital control and industry policies 
(such as the approval of which companies can go abroad) (Hassard, Morris, Sheehan, & Xiao, 
2010; Sun et al., 2014; UNCTAD, 2011). Therefore, under this administrative environment, 
political connection is a more effective and less costly means for the state to control whether to 
globalize an SOE and control its manager in order to implement desired globalization strategies. 
Moreover, this effect should be more salient before governance reform because the administrative 
governance environment is more conducive to the functioning of political connection control. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H3a. Managers’ political connections function more likely in the first step of the globalization decision-
making process rather than the second step (especially before governance reform).  
During the second step when the SOE has gone abroad, the decision on the degree of 
globalization is largely made in the host-country context, where information asymmetry and agency 
costs between the state and the SOE manager—as well as between the home-country headquarters 
and the host-country subsidiaries—are relatively high (Denis, Denis, & Yost, 2002; Luo & Wang, 
2012). Operational risks also increase during this phase due to uncertainties in overseas sales and 
productions, which require well-defined risk-sharing mechanisms (Boubakri, Mansi, & Saffar, 
2013). Correspondingly, state ownership control is more efficient in curbing managerial-agency 
problems and thus shaping globalization decisions. In addition, the state can also better distribute 
                                                          
54 This is confirmed by our interviews with several SOE managers (the interview transcripts are available upon 
request). See also the recent special report by Economist on World Economy: The gated globe. “Capital: just in 




incomes and profits that are obtained from globalization between SOEs and the state based on 
ownership arrangement (Agmon, 2003), and such ownership arrangement is more likely to be 
accepted by more developed host countries where formal institutions are well established. 
Moreover, this effect should be more salient in the period after governance reform because the 
market-oriented institutional environment is more conducive to the functioning of state ownership 
control (Globerman & Shapiro, 2009; Luo & Wang, 2012). Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H3b. State ownership control functions more likely in the second step of the globalization decision-
making process rather than the first step (especially after governance reform). 
 
Methodology 
Data and Sample 
We empirically test our hypotheses using data on all non-financial Chinese firms listed on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, of which SOEs account for more than 80% of total 
market capitalization.55 Our data are obtained from Datastream, WIND, CSMAR, and the China 
Center for Economic Research (CCER) databases. 56  We manually collect data for our key 
dependent variable—the firm’s degree of globalization (DOG)—and for the variables regarding 
manager characteristics and backgrounds from their curricula vitae. We cross-validate the company 
names, stock IDs, and manager names across different data sources and their annual reports, and 
the inter-code reliability is above 95%. Our sample covers the 2001–2011 period, starting with the 
implementation of the “Go Global” policy. Before 2001, the outward foreign direct investment 
(OFDI) volumes from China were very low, which left little data for observation. We exclude the 
firms that were labeled as Special Treatment (ST) by the stock exchanges (under severe financial 
distress) before 2006. Finally, our sample includes 17,272 firm-year observations (2,394 firms in 
total, which is more than 92% of all listed firms) from China.57 
                                                          
55 We exclude Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong abroad as they are subject to a different institutional 
environment and regulations. 
56 A-share refers to the stocks being valued in RMB and available only to Chinese citizens. These are in 
contrast to B-share stocks that are denominated in RMB but traded in such foreign currencies such as the U.S. 
or Hong Kong dollar. 
57 We endeavor to coordinate different data sets in a consistent way since we have drawn on a variety of  
sources. More specifically, our unit of  analysis is on the firm level and the firm’s managerial backgrounds (each 
firm usually only has one general manager) are matched with the firm’s characteristics. Macro-level data such as 
the province dummies and provincial-inward FDI are matched with firm-level data and are taken with a natural 




Empirical Strategy and Descriptive Statistics 
To distinguish the effects of the two mechanisms of state control on SOEs’ globalization before 
and after governance reform, which in our case is the 2006 split-share reform in China, we use two 
approaches. The first approach is to split our sample into the pre-reform subsample and the post-
reform subsample; the second is to treat the split-share reform as a natural experiment and test the 
effect of this shock on the whole sample (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). Figure 1 conceptually 
illustrates the testable hypotheses on the mechanisms of state control in SOEs’ globalization. 
[Insert Fig. 1 about here.] 
To empirically model the aforementioned two-step decision-making process and deal with the 
potential self-selection endogeneity issue in globalization, we adopt a Tobit II model that entails a 
two-step estimation (the Heckman test; Heckman, 1979). In the first step, we create a binary 
variable (GOGLOBAL) as our dependent variable that equals 1 if a firm is involved in globalization 
(has decided to go global), and 0 otherwise (Sun et al., 2014). The first-step estimation is essentially 
a Logit model that captures the “self-selection” effect and calculates the inverse Mills ratio (IMR). 
In the second step, we use a firm’s Degree of Globalization (DOG) as the dependent variable, which 
is the average of three key dimensions of globalization, similar to Carpenter, Sanders, and 
Gregersen (2001): (1) the ratio of a firm’s foreign assets (foreign production) to its total assets 
(total production) (% foreign assets), (2) the ratio of a firm’s foreign sales to its total sales (% foreign 
sales), and (3) the ratio of a firm’s number of foreign subsidiaries to the total number of subsidiaries 
(% foreign subsidiaries). We then include the IMR calculated in the first step with other independent 
variables in the second step. In addition, we control for industry and year fixed effects. 
To avoid perfect linearity between the two steps in the Tobit II model, we exclude Firm Size in the 
first step in order to make the number of independent variables smaller than that of the second 
step. In addition, we use the continuous variable Government Ownership in the first step (Cui & Jiang, 
2012; Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2012) and replace it with the dummy variable State Ultimate Control 
in the second step (Inoue et al., 2013; Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2012) as the key independent variable 
because the state’s direct ownership is diluted following overseas sales, subsidiaries, and 
production. Also, we use both the top managers’ political backgrounds (Manager Political) and the 
proportion of directors with political ties on the board (Board Political Ties) to proxy for executives’ 
political connections (Brockman et al., 2013; Faccio, 2006). Furthermore, we use managers’ 
technology backgrounds and educational levels as proxies for their capability, which is often 




2006). Detailed definitions of our key variables are shown in Table 2. The descriptive statistics are 
shown in Table 3 and the correlations of the variables proposed above are shown in Table 4. 




In Table 5, we show the results on the determinants of SOEs’ globalization from the Tobin II 
regressions. We first report the results on the pre-reform sample and the post-reform sample, 
respectively. As mentioned earlier, in the first step we use Government Ownership as the dependent 
variable to capture direct control by the state through shareholding, while in the second step we 
use the State Ultimate Control dummy to capture the effect of indirect ownership control due to 
dilution.  
[Insert Table 5 about here.] 
Several interesting observations appear. First, in terms of the effect of state ownership control 
(Government Ownership or State Ultimate Control) on going global and on the degree of globalization, 
the coefficient is statistically significant only in the post-reform sample, with a one-standard-
deviation increase in state ultimate control associated with an approximate 5% increase in the 
degree of globalization. However, there is no such statistical significance in the pre-reform sample. 
In contrast, and in terms of the effect of political connections on globalization, the coefficients of 
Managerial Political and Board Political Ties are both positive and statistically significant at the 99% 
level in the pre-reform sample. The marginal effect of managerial political connections increases 
the degree of globalization by about 3%, while a one-standard-deviation increase in the proportion 
of politically connected directors on a board is associated with an approximate 2% (0.160 × 0.106 
[marginal effect]) increase in the degree of globalization. However, both the statistical significance 
and the economic significance of these two political connection variables are attenuated in the 
post-reform sample, and the sign occasionally even becomes negative, making the net-marginal 
effect on globalization much smaller. Furthermore, the difference in the coefficients between these 
two subsamples is also statistically significant.58 The results suggest that the role of state ownership 
                                                          
58 We generate a dummy variable indicating whether or not the observation belongs to the post-reform sample, 
and an interaction term between this dummy variable and the “manager political” variable. We then test 




control has a stronger impact on SOEs’ globalization after domestic governance reform than 
before, while that of managerial political connections has a stronger impact on SOEs’ globalization 
decisions before domestic governance reform. The Z scores from the Wald Chi-square tests for 
state ownership control, managerial political connections, and board political ties across the two 
subsamples are all higher than 2, indicating that the effects differ significantly across the two 
periods. Therefore, both H1a and H1b are supported. 
Second, and contrasting the two mechanisms of state control, while the coefficient of managerial 
political connections is statistically significant and has a positive sign during the first step in the 
pre-reform sample, neither measure of state ownership control is significant in this period. This 
finding indicates that before governance reform, the positive roles of the state with regard to 
globalization function mainly through a manager’s political connections rather than through state 
ownership control. In the post-reform sample, the coefficient of state ownership control becomes 
more significant than that of managerial political connections and board political ties. This result 
implies that the effect of the state on SOEs’ globalization mainly functions through state 
ownership control rather than managers’ political connections after governance reform. Our H2a 
and H2b are therefore supported. 
We further compare the effects of the two state-control mechanisms on globalization across 
different decision steps. In the pre-reform subsample, the coefficients of managerial political 
connections and board political ties are statistically significant in the first step but not in the second 
step. In the post-reform sample, although the coefficient of Board Political Ties is still positive and 
significant in the second step, its magnitude and significance are much smaller. The statistical 
significance in the post-reform period may be explained by the fact that board structure is also 
part of modern corporate governance mechanisms. In contrast, the coefficient of state ownership 
control is significant in the second step in the post-reform sample but not in the first step 
throughout the two subsamples. These results confirm H3a and H3b that political connections 
mainly have an impact on SOEs’ globalization in the first step in the home-country context, while 
state ownership control mainly has an impact in the second step in the host-country context. 
In addition, a manager’s global mindset (proxied by overseas experience) and education level have 
significantly positive effects on globalization during both periods, and particularly in the first step 
in which the home-country context is more significant. The manager’s technology background 
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seems to be more important in the first step before governance reform, but this shifts to the 
second step after reform. These results indicate the importance of management professionalization 
in globalization.  
Natural Experiment Analysis 
We then show the results of treating domestic governance reform as a natural experiment to 
examine the effects of state control on globalization by generating a post-reform dummy and 
interacting it with our above-mentioned, state-control variables. The results are reported in Table 
6 and, as can be seen, the previous results are upheld and become even stronger. In the first step, 
the coefficients of state ownership control are not significant, while the coefficients of manager 
political and board political ties are highly significant. However, the coefficients of the interaction 
terms Manager political × Post-reform dummy and Board political ties ×Post-reform dummy are both negative 
and statistically significant, indicating that the effects of political connections decrease after 
governance reform. In contrast, in the second-step, the coefficients of State ultimate control ×Post-
reform dummy are positive and statistically significant, indicating that the effect of state ownership 
control becomes stronger after governance reform, while none of the coefficients of political 
connections are significant. Therefore, our hypotheses on state control in globalization are upheld 
in this “laboratory” test. 
[Insert Table 6 about here.] 
Robustness Checks 
We also conduct several robustness tests that include distinguishing between firms with more than 
30% state ownership (absolute SOEs) and less than 30% state ownership (non-SOEs), comparing 
globalization into emerging economies and developed economies, and specifically examining the 
petrochemical industry, and the metal and non-metal manufacturing industries. We also distinguish 
between managers with local government backgrounds vs. managers with central government 
backgrounds, between SOEs controlled by the central government vs. those controlled by local 
governments, and among managers who are members of Congress, former government officers, 
or previously in the military services. In general, the results from these robustness tests are similar 
to, if not stronger than, the previous results, and largely support our state-control perspective on 





Discussion and Conclusion 
Contributions to the Larger Literature 
We see our results as making two important contributions to the IB and SOE literature. First, 
while numerous studies on this subject have argued that “the state matters” (Alon, Child, Li, & 
McIntyre, 2011; Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Kalotay & Sulstarova, 2010; Wang, Hong, Kafouros, & 
Wright, 2012), the underlying mechanisms of how the state influences globalization decision 
making largely remain as a black box. We fill in the theoretical gap by extending the agency theory 
and integrating it with institutional analysis in IB to explain the dynamic process of the state’s 
influence on SOEs’ globalization. As we show in the cross-sample analysis (i.e., the robustness 
tests), the presence of the state per se is not a key predictor of globalization. Rather, it is the state-
led governance and control mechanisms such as government ownership arrangements and 
executives’ political connections that are prevalent worldwide (Faccio, 2006), that carry out the 
influence of the state.  
Second, our research provides a more holistic view on the dynamics of globalization. The 
existing literature has studied such dynamics both at the macro (institutional) and the micro 
(corporate) decision-making levels. For example, at the macro level, institutional changes such as 
structural and governance reforms can affect firms’ globalization—not only their exports (Cuervo-
Cazurra & Dau, 2009a; 2009b) but also foreign direct investment and operations (Luo, Xue, & 
Han, 2010). At the micro level, firms’ decision making on globalization is not only sequential 
(Tallman & Shenkar, 1994; Peng, 2012), but also largely contingent on the specific home- and 
host-country contexts (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Ma & Delios, 2010). Our paper integrates the two levels 
of dynamics through the connecting link of state-manager relationships and the resulting 
governance mechanisms. Such a link offers a more in-depth understanding of the patterns of 
globalization.  
Implications for Practice  
Our study has important implications for policy makers and practitioners. Policymakers in 
host countries, especially those in developed economies, usually perceive the entry of SOEs from 
emerging economies as a political threat, while ignoring the SOEs’ market-based economic 
motivations. Our paper reveals that SOEs can establish market-oriented governance structures 
that are compatible with host-country environments and also potentially benefit the host country’s 
local economy. For policymakers in home countries, our study implies that as domestic institutions 




governance structures of globalizing SOEs from China (e.g., PetroChina), India (e.g., State Bank 
of India), Russia (e.g., United Energy System of Russia), Brazil (e.g., Petrobras), and other 
transition economies become more market-oriented following corporate governance reforms 
(Gupta, 2005; Inoue et al., 2013). More advanced economies such as Singapore and Norway have 
taken a step forward and utilized their state ownership in sovereign wealth funds (e.g., Temasek 
Holdings and the Government Pension Fund of Norway), which hold shares in major SOEs (e.g., 
Singapore Airlines, DBS bank, SingTel, and Statoil) to pursue long-term financial returns.59 We 
expect that the effect of corporate governance reforms on SOEs’ globalization will become more 
salient as emerging economies adopt more market-based institutions. 
For SOE managers, our study suggests that understanding when and how different state-
control mechanisms affect SOEs’ globalization decisions can help them to better leverage their 
specific institutional advantages. For example, SOE managers should be aware that political 
connections matter more in the home country when deciding whether or not to go global and may 
include domestic politicians among board members. They should also be aware that the 
government’s shares matter more in the host-country context when deciding how much to 
globalize and formulate a joint-ownership structure with foreign partners accordingly. Managers 
of rival MNCs from developed economies can learn from such state-control dynamics so as to 
better compete against or cooperate with these emerging giants. 
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
Despite these contributions and implications, our study is subject to some boundary 
conditions. First, our focus is on exploring the dynamic state-control mechanisms in SOEs’ 
globalization rather than on directly explaining the dramatic increase in SOEs’ globalization, such 
as the surge of OFDI after China’s “Go Global” policy was launched in 2000 (Luo et al., 2010). 
Second, our focus is on SOEs’ “degree of globalization,” rather than on the choices of location, 
industry, and entry mode. As we have discussed, these choices are all under the influence of state 
control at the macro level (Cui & Jiang, 2012). Third, although the control mechanisms and the 
decision-making dynamics we described above are prevalent across emerging economies 
(Hoskisson et al., 2013),60 there may still be some sample peculiarity issues and more cross-country 
                                                          
59 The Economist, Reforming China’s state-owned firms: From SOE to GLC, November 23, 2013. 
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21590562-chinas-rulers-look-singapore-tips-
portfolio-management-soe-glc  
60 Many firms in Brazil, Russia, India, and China sometimes use a third country such as Cyprus, Mauritius, 
Hong Kong, and the British Virgin Islands to overcome the regulation burdens of  capital control in 
globalization (Hoskisson et al., 2013). However, SOEs, with states’ blessings, may have relatively limited 




comparative studies could be done to further justify the state-control perspective in the future. 
Fourth, given the common organizational and governance structures of SOEs, our state-control 
perspective could be extended to contexts other than globalization, such as entrepreneurship, 
innovations, and corporate financing.  
 
  
                                                          
proportion of  SOEs that have become transnational is relatively small.” For example, only 32 out of  over 900 
SOEs are MNCs in France that have invested abroad (UNCTAD, 2011; 2013), suggesting that SOEs could be 
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H1a: 𝜷𝑶(𝒑𝒓𝒆−𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎) < 𝜷𝑶(𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒕−𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎) 
H1b: 𝜷𝒑(𝒑𝒓𝒆−𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎) > 𝜷𝒑(𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒕−𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎) 
 
H2a: 𝜷𝑶(𝒑𝒓𝒆−𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎) < 𝜷𝒑(𝒑𝒓𝒆−𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎) 
H2b: 𝜷𝑶(𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒕−𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎) > 𝜷𝒑(𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒕−𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎) 
 
H3a: 𝜷𝑷(𝟏𝒔𝒕 𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒑) > 𝜷𝑷(𝟐𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒑) 
H3b: 𝜷𝑶(𝟏𝒔𝒕 𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒑) < 𝜷𝑶(𝟐𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒑) 
 




The 1st decision step: 
To go global or not 
The 2nd decision step: 
The degree of globalization  
Political connections control 
 







Table 1. State Control on SOEs’ Globalization Before and After the Governance Reform: 
the Chinese Experience 
 Before Governance Reform After Governance Reform 
Governance system 
Administrative orders in making capital 
allocation, ownership, location, and other 
decisions. 
Market-based mechanisms in deciding 
host- country investment strategies for 




Alignment of interest; SOE managers are 
directly appointed by the state and usually 
serve as government officials, which means 
they are more politically incentivized. 
Conflicts of interest; SOE managers are 
more often elected through shareholder 
meetings and behave like professional 




Unification of ownership and control (such as 
a large number of non-tradable shares). 
Partial separation of ownership and 




State possesses all control rights (in some 
partially privatized SOEs, voting rights are 
proportional to shareholdings). 




None; most profit is re-invested in focal 
SOEs. 
The state proposes at least 10% profit 
paid to all shareholders (including state) 
as dividends. 
SOEs’ objectives 
Fulfilling political, social, and economic 
objectives with political and social goals as the 
dominant objectives in globalization. 
Fulfilling political and economic 
objectives, with economic ones 




state and manager 
 
Low asymmetry; the manager, at a low level of 
the bureaucratic system, is closely watched by 
state administrators. 
High; the state is unable to evaluate 
managers’ performance accurately, 
especially in foreign markets. 
Method of state 
control 
Hierarchy and administration; authority-
oriented (such as capital control on the 
selection and approval of certain SOEs to go 
global). 
Separation of decision control (board) 
and decision execution (top management 
team). Involvement-oriented; managers 
are more professional and given more 
autonomy and responsibility in making 
foreign investment decisions. 
Incentive structure 
Control and monitor using political career 
under the cadre promotion system. 
Facilitate and empower using the cadre 
promotion system and pecuniary 
incentives. 
Globalization 
strategy by the state 
Increasing societal employment, acquiring 
critical resources, and enhancing diplomatic 
relationships in international politics. 
Updating economic and industry 
structures in the global value chain using 
overseas expansion; protecting energy 
and raw material supplies. 
Managers’ 
behaviors 
Government office status with the “iron bowl” 
(a secured job for life); conservative; seek 
stable and predictable strategies. 
Self-actualizing; become aggressive to 
win in a competitive environment; adapt 
quickly to new strategic opportunities 
with high-order needs. 
Governance 
weaknesses 
The absence of market mechanisms; risk 
aversion, biased judgments, and political 
patronage. 
Unification of the economic and political 
interests of the state and managers can 





Table 2. Variable Definition 
Variable name Description Source  




A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is involved in globalization 






DOG is measured as an index, which takes the average of three firm-
level globalization indicators: (1) the ratio of the company’s foreign sales 
to its total sales; (2) the ratio of the company’s foreign assets to its total 
assets; (3) the ratio of the number of the company’s overseas branches 
and subsidiaries to the number of the company’s total branches and 
subsidiaries (both domestic and foreign). This measure depicts the 
extent of geographical-operations dispersion across countries (Stopford 
& Wells, 1972) and is widely applied in globalization research 
(Contractor, Kundu, & Hsu, 2003; Carpenter, Sanders, & Gregersen, 
2001; Gomes & Ramaswamy, 1999). 
WIND, CSMAR, 
Datastream 
 B. Explanatory variables  
 State control  
Government 
ownership 
Measured as the proportion of the firm’s total shares owned by the 
central or local government or authorities (Cui & Jiang, 2012; 




An alternative measure of state control, measured as a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the actual ultimate controller (based either on ownership 
or voting rights)61of the firm is the state or governmental authorities, 






Measured as a dummy variable that equals 1 if the top manager worked 
in the government, government-related agencies, or the military, or 
was/is a member of the national, provincial, or municipal Congress, and 






Measured as the percentage of the number of board members with 
political ties to the total number of the directors on the board. 
 




Measured as a dummy variable that equals 1 if the top manager has 
international work experience (including experience in a MNC) or 
international education, and 0 otherwise. This captures the critical role 
of managers’ global mindset as both a cultural and strategic concept for 
successful corporate globalization and to achieve economic returns, 
particularly outside managers’ home regions (Levy, Beechler, Taylor, & 
Bovacigiller, 2007). Such a global mindset can be acquired by 
international exposure, such as international education and international 




                                                          
61 “Ultimate controller” is defined as the largest shareholder by the number of shares being held, or whose 
voting rights exceed the largest shareholder of the company, or the shareholder that holds more than 30% of 
equity stakes and voting rights, or who can determine the nomination of more than half of the directors by 
exerting voting rights (according to CSMAR). The state could have a pyramid structure in order to control 







Measured as a dummy variable that equals 1 if the top manager 






Measured by a score ranging from 0 to 4: zero if a manager’s highest 
education level is below junior college; one in the case of junior college; 
two in the case of a bachelor degree; three if the manager has graduated 
with a master’s degree; and four for a doctoral degree. Data are 




 C. Control Variables  
Profitability Measured as the accounting-based return on asset (ROA) calculated by 
the net income over the total book value of assets, as well as the market-
based Tobin’s Q calculated as the total equity market value over the 
total equity book value. Both the ROA and the Tobin’s Q are 
winsorized at the 5% level. 
WIND 
Innovation Measured as the number of patents a firm filed at China’s State 
Intellectual Property Office during each studied year divided by the 
number of employees. This measurement, to some extent, captures the 




Inward FDI Measured as the logarithm of the total inward FDI of the local province 
and adjusted by the GDP at the province level to gauge the FDI-
spillover effect.  
China Statistical 
Yearbook 
Leverage Measured as the ratio of the total debts to the total assets to capture the 
financial constraints and insolvency capabilities of the company. 
WIND 
IPO age Measured as the number of years since the firm’s initial public offering, 
an indicator of how capitalized a firm is or the degree of privatization of 
the focal firm (being publicly traded can be seen as a symbol of being 
transformed from state owned to privatized). 
WIND 
Firm size Measured as the logarithm of the value of total assets. WIND 
Manager 
academia 
Measured as a dummy variable that equals 1 if the manager has 
previously worked in academia as a university professor or researcher 






Measured as a dummy variable that equals 1 if the manager is non-





Manager age Measured as the manager’s age in the year reported. Data are manually 




Manager gender Measured as a dummy variable that equals 1 if the manager is female, 








Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
 Observations Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Go Global (dummy) 14,864 0.135 0.341 0 1 
Degree of globalization (DOG) 15,164 0.013 0.044 0 0.618 
Government ownership (%) 15,544 24.556 25.791 0 100 
State ultimate control 14,650 0.638 0.481 0 1 
Manager political connections 16,419 0.203 0.402 0 1 
Board political ties 15,190 0.129 0.160 0 1 
Manager overseas experience 16,418 0.086 0.280 0 1 
Ln (Inward FDI) 16,124 12.814 1.526 5.680 15.26 
Leverage (%) 16,666 0.632 7.121 0 877.256 
Innovation  15,684 8.699 52.670 0 2800 
ROA 15,618 3.896 5.436 -9.607 14.241 
Tobin’s q  15,519 3.049 2.245 0.916 9.208 
Size (Ln(assets)) 15,642 21.350 1.240 10.842 28.659 
IPO age 16,557 7.430 4.774 0 21 
Manager technology 16,421 0.426 0.494 0 1 
Manager academia 16,420 0.108 0.311 0 1 
Manager nationality 16,424 0.011 0.104 0 1 
Manager education  16,292 2.356 0.902 0 4 
Manger age 16,353 46.435 6.886 21 75 





Table 4. Pearson Correlation Coefficients between Independent Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
(1) Government ownership 1.000                  
(2) State ultimate control 0.595a 1.000                 
(3) Manager political -0.004 -0.033 1.000                
(4) Board political ties -0.032a 0.027a 0.202a 1.000               
(5) Manager overseas -0.049a -0.076a -0.045a -0.031a 1.000              
(6) Manager technology 0.145a 0.179a -0.070a -0.023a -0.046a 1.000             
(7) Manager educ, degree -0.013 0.033a -0.020b -0.016c 0.101a 0.037a 1.000            
(8) Ln (Inward FDI) -0.261a -0.150a -0.037a 0.041a 0.079a -0.054a 0.082a 1.000           
(9) Leverage -0.003 -0.023a -0.006 0.006 -0.004 -0.014c -0.005 -0.001 1.000          
(10) ROA (Winsor.) -0.079a -0.102a 0.041a -0.015c 0.054a 0.054a 0.053a 0.151a -0.038a 1.000         
(11)Tobin’s q (Winsor.) -0.217a -0.186a -0.015c 0.048a 0.022a -0.046a 0.075a 0.106a -0.018b 0.159a 1.000        
(12) Innovation -0.023a 0.020b -0.015c 0.041a 0.017b 0.057a 0.068a 0.056a -0.003 0.065a -0.015c 1.000       
(13) Size  0.117a 0.246a 0.001 0.019b 0.035a 0.133a 0.125a 0.109a -0.101a 0.155a -0.142a 0.234a 1.000      
(14) IPO age -0.133a 0.094a -0.061a 0.138a -0.030a -0.056a 0.107a 0.132a 0.032a -0.191a 0.127a -0.005 0.117a 1.000     
(15) Manager academia 0.008 0.003 0.003 -0.006 0.021a 0.072a 0.135a 0.039a -0.008 0.043a 0.032a 0.033a -0.014c -0.059a 1.000    
(16) Manager nationality -0.067a -0.071a -0.030a 0.009 0.264a -0.049a -0.023a 0.044a -0.003 0.028a 0.040a 0.005 -0.005 -0.035a -0.029a 1.000   
(17) Manger age 0.026a 0.131a 0.077a 0.031a -0.046a 0.035a -0.199a 0.096a -0.014c 0.048a 0.025a 0.023a 0.175a 0.163a 0.001 0.043a 1.000  
(18) Manager gender -0.068a -0.063a 0.022a -0.006 0.010 -0.079a 0.014c 0.034a -0.000 0.033a 0.008 0.028a -0.016c 0.008 -0.007 0.011 0.021a 1.000 





Table 5. Globalization by SOEs: Subsample Analysis 
 Pre-Reform Sample  Post-Reform Sample 
 1st step 2nd step  1st step 2nd step 
 DV = GOGLOBAL DV = DOG  DV = GOGLOBAL DV = DOG 
State ownership control      
Government ownership -0.135   -0.164  
 (0.115)   (0.104)  
State ultimate control  -0.001   0.010** 
  (0.007)   (0.006) 
Political connections      
Manager political  0.191*** -0.003  -0.099* 0.002 
 (0.068) (0.006)  (0.059) (0.008) 
Board political ties 0.773*** -0.001  0.333 0.040** 
 (0.179) (0.019)  (0.130) (0.016) 
Manager capability      
Manager overseas 0.279*** 0.011  0.218*** 0.019** 
 (0.092) (0.010)  (0.074) (0.009) 
Manager technology 0.154** 0.003  -0.047 0.017*** 
 (0.061) (0.007)  (0.045) (0.005) 
Manager education  0.061* -0.012***  0.117*** -0.005* 
 (0.033) (0.004)  (0.026) (0.003) 
Control variables      
Ln (Inward FDI) 0.178*** 0.003  0.188*** 0.002 
 (0.022) (0.003)  (0.020) (0.003) 
Leverage -0.004 0.001  -0.023 0.008** 
 (0.028) (0.005)  (0.017) (0.003) 
ROA -0.006 0.002***  0.019*** -0.000 
 (0.006) (0.001)  (0.004) (0.001) 
Tobin’s Q -0.087*** 0.004  -0.040*** 0.001 
 (0.031) (0.003)  (0.010) (0.001) 
Innovation 0.001** 0.0002***  0.003*** -0.000*** 
 (0.001) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Size   -0.001   0.007*** 
  (0.004)   (0.002) 
IPO age 0.050*** -0.003**  -0.007 -0.003*** 
 (0.010) (0.001)  (0.006) (0.001) 
Manager academia -0.045 -0.004  -0.003 -0.018** 
 (0.088) (0.009)  (0.070) (0.009) 
Manager nationality 0.412 0.130***  -0.489** -0.045 
 (0.277) (0.023)  (0.250) (0.032) 
Manager age 0.015*** 0.001***  0.011*** 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.0005)  (0.003) (0.000) 
Manager gender -0.275* 0.038**  -0.412*** 0.005 
 (0.153) (0.017)  (0.110) (0.015) 
Constant  -4.215*** 0.059  -4.347*** -0.004 
 (0.396) (0.091)  (0.335) (0.068) 
Inverse Mills ratio  -0.023*   -0.045*** 
  (0.013)   (0.011) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -1323.046   -2354.048  
Number of observations 4230   6918  
Wald Chi-square 149.35***   86.73***  





Table 6. Globalization by SOEs: Natural Experiment 
 First Step  Second Step 
 DV = GOGLOBAL  DV = DOG 
State ownership control      
Government ownership -0.155 (0.107)    
Government ownership × Post-reform 
dummy 
0.025 (0.144)    
State ultimate control    -0.006 (0.008) 
State ultimate control × Post-reform dummy    0.019** (0.011) 
      
Political connections      
Manager political 0.149** (0.065)  -0.004 (0.008) 
Manager political × Post-reform dummy -0.230*** (0.086)  0.004 (0.011) 
Board political ties 0.899*** (0.170)  0.011 (0.020) 
Board political ties × Post-reform dummy -0.621*** (0.209)  0.034 (0.025) 
      
Post-reform dummy -1.359*** (0.291)  -0.005 (0.009) 
      
Manager capability      
Manager overseas 0.255*** (0.057)  0.016** (0.007) 
Manager technology 0.009 (0.035)  0.011*** (0.004) 
Manager education  0.099*** (0.020)  -0.009*** (0.003) 
      
Control variables      
Ln (Inward FDI) 0.188*** (0.014)  0.002 (0.002) 
Leverage -0.016 (0.012)  0.006** (0.003) 
ROA 0.010*** (0.003)  0.001* (0.000) 
Tobin’s Q -0.036*** (0.009)  0.001 (0.001) 
Innovation 0.002*** (0.000)  -0.000** (0.000) 
Size     0.005*** (0.002) 
IPO age 0.006 (0.005)  -0.003*** (0.001) 
Manager academia -0.016 (0.054)  -0.013** (0.006) 
Manager nationality -0.108 (0.173)  -0.067*** (0.019) 
Manger age 0.012*** (0.003)  0.001* (0.000) 
Manager gender -0.357*** (0.087)  0.015 (0.012) 
Constant  -4.480*** (0.257)  0.000 (0.055) 
Inverse Mills ratio    -0.037*** (0.009) 
Industry fixed effects Yes   Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes   Yes  
Log likelihood  -3739.401     
Number of observations 11148     
Wald Chi-square 155.32***     
* 10% significance level; ** 5% significance level; *** 1% significance level 
